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VPREFACE
This study was undertaken with a view to arriving at 
some general propositions on the origins and stability of 
federalism. Indeed, every discipline "needs theo[ries] 
that . . , [are] based on empirical generalizations which
. . . subsume particular facts". In order to make my
generalizations broadly based I have tried to test them 
with respect to all the relevant examples, for the "greater 
the array of facts subsumed, the more general the theory 
and the better the understanding of the causal nature of 
whatever phenomena are being discussed".''' it is for this 
reason that in this thesis a general study of all the 
functioning federations was preferred to an intensive study 
of a few examples. This approach to the subject has been 
possible because "(1) federalism is a precisely definable 
and easily recognizable constitutional artifact, (2) it 
has been used in enough instances to permit generalization 
but not in so many instances as to defy systematic examin­
ation, and (3) in all instances in the present world, the 
artifact of federalism is derived [since 1787] from one 
source (i. e . , the United States), but it is encased in 
diverse institutional and cultural settings so that one
should be able to distinguish between general and local
2features of the artifact".
By its very nature this study covers a fairly large 
number of countries--too large for each one of them to be 
treated in full detail. But in any research project a 
choice has to be made between saying all about a few things 
and saying a few general truths about many of them. Since 
my choice here has been for the latter type of research,
I have of necessity relied upon the works of specialists 
on history, politics and laws of the various federations 
studied for the background information on which my analyses 
and conclusions are based. My method of approach and other
I
Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Public Policy", International 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences , Vol. 13, New York: 
Macmillan Co. and The Free Press. Both the quotations 
are on p . 206.
William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation,
Significance, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964 , pp . xi-
xii .
2
vi
related points have been explained in the first chapter of 
the thesis. Suffice it here to repeat that by its very 
nature this study is essentially a work of what has been called 
a "general practitioner" rather than an "area specialist". 
Hence, since much of the work must depend on specific case 
histories, and much is of the nature of a critical examination 
of other views, the argument inevitably involves a good deal 
of direct quotation of important statements of facts and ideas.
A clarification about the style of footnotes seems 
desirable. Although I have kept my footnotes for each 
chapter in running order, chapters 6, 8, and 9 are exceptions
to this rule. This is because each of these chapters deals 
with two or more countries, and since the literature on the 
different countries involved in each of the three chapters 
is very diverse in nature, I have kept separate numbering 
of footnotes for each major country studied in a single 
chapter. Although somewhat unusual, this appeared a more 
sensible and readable arrangement. In chapter 7, where 
the literature on West Germany and Austria is largely similar, 
a single continuous order of footnotes has been maintained.
Canberra, May 1971 Ramesh Dutta Dikshit.
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Part 1
INTRODUCTION
1Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION:*
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND SCOPE OF THE THESIS
Although the relevance of geographical inquiry to the 
study of federalism is now recognized by most political 
geographers, systematic research on the subject has badly 
lagged behind. There has been singularly little discussion 
(among geographers) of the concept of modern federalism. A 
close study of the existing literature on the subject would 
reveal the prevailing confusion among geographers regarding 
the nature of this polity. Many still cling to the old 
concept of federalism as a "three layer cake" of government.
In fact, despite a general agreement that federalism is "the 
most geographically expressive of all political systems", 
little effort has so far been made to explain the essential 
geographical basis of this polity.'1'
Then, because of a generally held notion that "we [as
political geographers] are handicapped in developing scientific
principles, and are restricted to the consideration of unique
cases", little attempt has so far been made by geographers
2toward the search for generic concepts on federalism. In
Quotation from K. W. Robinson, "Sixty Years of Federation 
in Australia", Geographical Review, V o l . 51, 1961, p. 1.
2
Quotation from Richard Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach 
in Political Geography", Annals, Association of American 
Geographers, Vol. 40, 1950, p. 102. Though there are a couple
of useful journal articles on certain aspects of some 
federations, Spate's article of 1944 (0. H. K. Spate,
"Geography and Federalism", Indian Geographical Journal,
Vol. 14 , 1944 , p p . 24-36) is the only attempt by a geographer
at a general nomothetic study of federalism. This study 
was, however, presented at a time when the so-called classical 
federations were virtually the only examples of true federat­
ions. For this reason as also because of its particular method 
of approach, the writer's inferences in the article are now 
out of tune with the present-day far more expanded span of 
federalism.
*
This chapter is a slightly modified version of my paper 
"Geography and Federalism", Annals, Association of American 
Geographers, Vol. 61, 1971, p p . 97-115.
2fact, because of our over-involvement with the study of the 
specific and the unique, we have so far failed to develop 
any comprehensive approach to the study of general problems 
in political geography. This in itself might partly have 
accounted for the lack of generic studies in the field. This 
thesis, designed as a general inquiry into the origins and 
stability of federal political systems from a spatial inter­
actional perspective, should, it is believed, partly contribute 
to fill some of these gaps.
The present chapter, which is intended as a general 
introduction to the thesis, is divided into five sections.
The first section presents a synthesis of different views 
on the nature and development of modern federalism. Section 
two attempts to explain the geographical basis of this polity 
in a greater detail than, perhaps, has so far been attempted. 
This section also hints at some of the possibilities of 
geographical research on federalism. Section three attempts 
a general review of the existing geographical literature on 
federalism, and points to the need for a general geographical 
inquiry into the origins and stability of this polity. Section 
four presents a critical review of the existing methodology 
in political geography, and tries to outline the methodological 
framework of this thesis. A fifth, and the last, section 
explains the general scope and plan of the thesis.
I THE NATURE OF FEDERALISM
Although federalism is so much in currency and the
federal form of government by no means uncommon, federalism
is not easy to define. In fact, "Devised as a form of
constitutional government to express imperfect unity and
multinationalism, federalism is a particularly complicated
form of western democracy [i.e. , a government based on Western-
3style democracy]". The term "federal government" is often 
3
F. G. Carnell, "Political Implications of Federalism in 
New States", in U. K. Hicks (Ed.), Federalism and Economic 
Growth in Underdeveloped Countries, London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., 1961, p. 16.
3used very loosely in political discussions and it is seldom
4given a meaning that is at once clear and distinct.
The main features of the system are, however, well known.
A federation is born when a number of usually separate or 
autonomous political units (or units with some pretensions 
to autonomy) mutually agree to merge together to create a 
State with a single sovereign central government, while 
retaining for themselves some degree of guaranteed regional 
autonomy.^ The merger of the regional units in a federation 
is not absolute but partial , and its degree may vary depending 
upon the circumstances of the particular groups of the political 
communities involved. The legislative and executive powers in 
a federation are divided in a coordinated fashion between the 
federal (i. e., central) and the unit governments, each of
which acts directly on the people--the central government 
having jurisdiction over all matters that have bearing on 
the development and security of the nation as a whole and 
the unit governments with their right to regulate the matters 
of local and more immediate importance to their respective 
peoples.
Federalism is therefore essentially a compact. Like 
other compacts, it has a written constitution that cannot 
be unilaterally altered. The terms of the compact and the 
division of "powers" or "functions" therein are made by the 
federating units as coordinate constitutional bodies and not 
by a dictatorial third party or an overbearing unit within 
the group. To ensure that no undue and unauthorised inroads 
are made by one level of government into the sphere of the 
other, there is usually a judicial review by a supreme court
4
K. C. Wheare, Federal Government, London: Oxford University
Press, fourth edition, 1963, p. 1.
5
Throughout this thesis, unless within quotations, "State" 
stands for sovereign nation States. When written as "state" 
it means a constituent unit of a federation.
4acting as "the ark of the federal covenant". Moreover, as
"Money is . . . the vital principle of the body politic . . .
which sustains its life and motion and enables it to perform
its most essential functions", in order that the federal
government and the units are truly coordinate in authority,
it is necessary that each has a good measure of control over
7its finances and, usually, an access to taxing powers.
It should, however, be emphasized that federalism is
a set of institutions erected to serve a particular type
of social, political, and economic situation. The phenomenon
that is so created is not static but dynamic. It goes through
a process of evolution and change because a complex of
psychological, social, political, and economic factors which
necessitate federalism may require one type of instrumentality
at one time and another type at some other time. In fact,
"As the nature of the society changes, demands for new
instrumentalities are created and these demands are met
by changing or abolishing old instrumentalities and establishing0n,ew ones in their place."
Federation, Confederation, and Unitary States 
Federalism differs from certain other forms of government. 
The two words "federation" and "confederation" have often 
been used as synonyms even by serious students of constitutions 
in the past; the authors of The Federalist itself did not 
distinguish between the two terms; and even a jurist of 
Dicey's standing used the two words loosely when he wrote "The 
physical contiguity . . .  of countries which are to form a
6
M. Ruthnaswamy, "The Ark of the Federal Covenant", New 
Review, December 1946.
7
The quotation is from the Federalist essay No. 30 whose 
authorship is attributed to A. Hamilton. See A. Hamilton,
J. Madison, J. Jay, The Federalist Papers, with an introduction, 
table of contents and index of ideas by C. Rossiter, New York: 
The New American Library, 1961, p. 188.
8
W. S. Livingston, "A Note on the Nature of Federalism",
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, 1952, p p . 81-95.
Reference on p. 93.
5confederated State is certainly a favourable . . . condition
9for the success of federal government". (Italics added.)
And, etymologically there is little to distinguish between 
"federal" and "confederal", for each of the two terms implies 
a covenant, compact, or treaty among independent States.
The oldest meaning of the expression "federal government" 
appears in its use to refer to loose linking together by 
treaty of sovereign States for specific military or economic 
purposes. Hence "Examples of federation in this form can
be found as far back in history as confederacies of ancient
„ „ 1 0  Gre e c e .
Modern scholarship has, however, insisted on drawing a 
clearcut distinction between the two terms despite the fact 
that such federal States as Canada and Switzerland describe 
themselves as "confederation"(s). As K. C. Wheare writes, 
a "confederation" is now described as "That form of association 
between states in which the general government is dependent 
upon the regional governments". It is represented by countries 
whose constitutions "embody the principle of subordination by 
the general government to regional governments".^  Thus a 
federation differs from a confederation in that in the latter 
the central government is subordinate to the unit governments 
in the sense that it runs at the mercy of regional governments. 
But in a federation neither level of government is at the 
mercy of the other.
In a confederation there is no direct contact between 
the peoples of the several constituent units and the central 
authority. The central authority in a confederation is com­
pelled to reach the people only through the respective 
regional governments, which may or may not allow this contact.
In a federation, by contrast, there is a direct relationship 
between the central government and the people, who not only 
share in the task of constituting it but also submit to its
9
A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Cons titution, London: Macmillan Co., first edition 1885 ,
ninth edition 1939, p. 603.
10
R . L . Watts, New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966, p p . 9-10.
K. C. Wheare, op. cit., footnote 4, p. 32.
11
6rule (in the spheres of its competence) without interposition
12of the regional governments as intermediaries.
In a confederation the member states retain their 
sovereignties, and therefore, the central authority cannot 
compel its decisions on any of the constituents, for the 
central authority in a confederation can act only when all
1 3the constituents are unanimous. As The Federalist recorded:
In our case the concurrence of thirteen sovereign wills 
is requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete 
execution of every important measure that proceeds 
from the union.
But in a federation there is no division of sovereignty,
the constituent units are only autonomous in certain limited
spheres. Once a federation is created the states have to
abide by the decisions of the properly constituted central
government in matters where the constitutional compact empowers
14it to act. Thus as MacMahon says:
The logical difficulty of divided sovereignty can be 
avoided . . . by regarding a confederation as merely
comprehensive and cohesive form of international 
administrative union, whereas a federal system is 
regarded as a multiple government in a single state.
A federation differs from a unitary government in that
in a unitary polity "states", if any, exist at the mercy
of the central government; while in a federation each level
of government is, in theory, autonomous within its allocated
sphere of competence, and is free from any non-agreed
intervention from the other except in emergency, if the
constitution so provides.
Thus what distinguishes federalism from a unitary
government is the constitutional autonomy, not the formal
division of powers.
12
C. J. Hughes argues that a "confederacy" is a form of 
union in which the federal link is more strongly political 
than legal. See C. J. Hughes, Confederacies, Leicester 
University Press, 1963. See also Cc J. Hughes, "The 
Theory of Confederacies" paper read at the 6th Congress 
of the International Political Science Association,
Oxford Round Table Meeting, September 19-24, 1963, p p . 13.
13
The Federalist, op. cit., footnote 7, No. 15, p. 112.
14
A. W. MacMahon, "Federation", Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences , New York: Macmillan Co. , 1931, Vol. 6, p. 173.
7Federalism as a Constitutional Compromise or Bargain 
As A, V . Dicey pointed out, federalism rests on the 
peculiar psychology of the peoples of the political units 
involved, of desiring union without desiring complete u n ity.^ 
A federation is born when the political units in a region 
possess some very strong factors of individual identities 
which create in them a genuine desire to maintain their 
separate existence, while at the same time there are certain 
factors of vital import that all these units share in common 
and, for that matter, they desire a strongly coordinated and 
united existence. Faced with such a dilemma when they can 
neither set up separate houses of their own without 
losing far greater advantages from union, nor can they 
amalgamate into a complete union without forgoing their 
individual identities which they so greatly value, the 
political units enter into a compromise to create a halfway 
house between complete unity and complete separation and a 
federation results.
Federalism is thus essentially a compromise between
centripetal and centrifugal forces that are operative at the
same time. It is born only when a characteristic balance
between these forces is reached, although it is clear that
because federalism is essentially a bargain, the units would
merge into a federation only when the centripetal forces in
some senses overwhelm the separatist ones and the units in
general see greater advantages in union than in separation.^
Still the basic problem of a federation has traditionally
been for the federating units "to keep the centrifugal and
centripetal forces in equilibrium so that neither the planet
States shall fly off into space nor the sun of the central
17government draw them into its consuming fire". Erected
essentially as a halfway house between complete unity and
15
Dicey, op. cit., footnote 9, p . 602.
16
The concept of federalism as a bargain has recently been 
further refined by W. H. Riker, Federalism: Origin,
Operation, Significance, Boston: Little, Brown & C o . , 1964.
J. Bryce, American Commonwealth, New York: Macmillan Co.,
1888, Vo1. 1, p. 348.
17
8complete separation, federalism clearly has a wide spectrum.
Stages of Federalism
During its pre-twentieth century phase federalism was
more or less a dualistic polity "in which the federal and
the State governments pursued virtually independent courses
of action during a period when government activity was in
19any case minimal". Federalism then consisted of "two
separate federal and State streams flowing in distinct but
2 0closely parallel channels". Describing the American
federalism in 1858 the U. S. Supreme Court Chief Justice
2 1Roger B. Taney observed that:
The powers of the general government and the State, 
although both exist and are exercised within the same 
territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct 
sovereignties, acting separately and independently 
of each other, within their respective spheres.
This traditional dualistic approach to federalism had since
been expounded by scholars like Freeman, Dicey, and Garran
and has in more recent years been refined and justified by 
2 2K . C . Whe are.
This legal theory of divided sovereignty and the two 
distinct and separate spheres fitted the facts of the time 
well enough though not perfectly, for till long after the 
Civil War in the United States the few activities of the
18
W. S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change, 
London: Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 4, see also
Livingston, op. cit., footnote 8.
19
D. J. Elazar, "Federal-State Collaboration in the 
Nineteenth Century United States", Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 79, 1964, p p . 248-281. Reprinted in
A. Wildavsky (Ed.), American Federalism in Perspective, 
Boston: Little, Brown & C o . , 1967, p. 191.
20
J. P. Clark, The Rise of New Federalism, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1938 , quoted in D J .  Elazar, op. cit., 
footnote 19, p. 191.
21
Chief Justice R. B. Taney, in the name of the United States 
Supreme Court in Ableman vs Booth. Quoted in D. J. Elazar, 
op. cit., footnote 19.
22
A. E. Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and 
Italy, London: Macmillan Co., second edition, edited by
J. B. Bury, 1893; A. V. Dicey, op. cit., footnote 9;
J. Quick and R. R. Garran, Annotated Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Sydney: Angus and Robertson,
1901; Wheare, op. cit., footnote 4.
9national government could go along side by side with the
limited state activities without either impinging seriously
on the other. It was, William Anderson says, almost, if not
quite, a "functionless federalism" when compared with the
2 3present conditions. But the economic philosophy on which
this dualistic federalism was based has become quite outmoded 
now. No modern State, whatever its economic and political 
philosophy, can now avoid an extensive degree of State 
intervention.
This is an era of the active, public-service State, not
that of the negative laissez-faire State. The performance
of functions and services is the keynote of modern government,
and in that performance cooperation, interdependence, inter-
2 4penetration of national and state agencies are inevitable.
For this reason older constitutions have been adapted to fit 
the needs of the present time by the development of extra­
constitutional devices such as administrative cooperation 
between governments, the coordination of state policies by 
conditional grants from the federal government, and the 
purchase of federal monopoly or near-monopoly of taxation 
of incomes and profits. Many scholars, therefore, think 
that federalism has become obsolete in the twentieth century
for, as Karl Loewenstein believed, economic planning is the
2 5DDT of federalism. But federalism has only entered a new
phase. In fact, whereas the guiding principle of the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century federalism was the
independence of state and federal authorities, the guiding
principle of the mid-twentieth-century federalism is the
2 6need of cooperation between them. It is only the pest of
23
W. Anderson, Federalism and Intergovernmental relations: A
Budget of Suggestions, Chicago: Public Administration
Service, 1946, p. 13.
24
Anderson, op. cit., footnote 23, p. 14.
25
K. Loewenstein, "Reflections on the Value of Constitutions 
in Our Revolutionary Age", in A. Zürcher (Ed.), Constitutions 
and Constitutional Trends since World War II, New York:
New York University Press, 1951, p p . 191-224. Reference
on p . 212.
26
A . H . Birch, Federalism, Finance, and Social Legislation in 
Canada, Australia, and the United States, London: Oxford
University Press, 1955, p. 305.
10
dualism that economic planning (the DDT) has killed. It is
the dualistic phase of federalism that has now become a relic
2 7of the "horse and buggy days".
This new phase of federalism has rightly been called
cooperative federalism which, in essence, is a system by which
state and national governments supplement each other and
jointly perform a variety of functions. The national government,
in the new phase, with its greatly enlarged powers and functions,
has only "supplemented rather than supplanted the performance
2 8of functions by the States". The philosophy of the earlier
federalism was, Grover Cleveland (President of the United
States, 1884-1888, and 1892-1896) is reported to have said,
that it is the duty of the people to support the government
and not that of the government to support the people. Now
the philosophy has greatly changed. "There is no longer
any question about the national government's power to act,
but only about the appropriate means and amounts and the
2 9proper timing of the actions to be taken".
As some recent studies show, the traditional picture of
the nineteenth century American federalism is unreal, and
federalism in the United States, in practice if not in theory,
30has traditionally been cooperative. In fact no two
governments operating on the same people in the same area 
could possibly be so inactive as to remain unaware of each 
other. The theory of dual federalism was not viable when 
applied to concrete problems in specific situations even 
in the early days of the American Republic, says Elazar and 
adds that federalism when interpreted to mean demarcation
27
Carnell, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 18.
28
W. S. Livingston, "Canada, Australia and the United States: 
Variations on a Theme", in V. Earle (Ed.), Federalism: 
Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice, Itasca, Illinois:
F. E. Peacock Publishers Inc., 1968, p. 132.
29
W. Anderson, Intergovernmental Relations in Review, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960, p. 12.
30
M. J. C. Vile, The Structure of American Federalism, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1961; and D . J. Elazar, The 
American Partnership in the Nineteenth Century United 
States, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962.
11
of responsibilities and functions has never worked in
practice. While the amount of governmental activity on all
planes in relation to total activity of the American society
has increased, the governmental activity that existed in
the nineteenth-century was shared in much the same manner
as governmental activity in the twentieth-century. Indeed,
the roots of cooperative federalism are entwined with the
3 1roots of federalism itself.
In view of the changed emphasis on state and federal
government cooperation, Wheare's insistence that each of
the two levels of government should be limited to its own
sphere and within that sphere should be independent of the
3 2other, appears excessive. Birch, therefore, proposed to
delete these clauses in Wheare's definition of federalism.
3 3As Birch puts it:
a federal system of government is one in which there 
is a division of powers between one general and several 
regional authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, 
is coordinate with the others, and each of which acts 
directly on the people through its own administrative 
agencies.
This avoids the confusion regarding federalism and quasi­
federalism. Approached thus, federalism will not appear
34"obsolete" or a relic of the horse and buggy days. Wherever
the problem of securing political unity in face of regional 
diversity is to be reconciled in future, federalism would 
prove adaptable enough to continue to serve a fruitful purpose.
31
Elazar, 
32
op . cit., footnote 19, p. 192
Whe are , op . cit., footnote 4, p. 14.
33
Birch, op. cit., footnote 26, p. 306.
34
H. J. Laski, "The Obsolescence of Federalism", The New 
Republie, Vol. 98, 1939, p. 367.
The earlier views on the new phase of modern federalism were 
expressed by Clark, op. cit., footnote 20; G. C. S. Benson, 
The New Centralization: A Study of Intergovernmental
Relations in the United States, Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1941; and A. N. Hal combe, Our More Perfect Union, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.
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Wheare has found the above modification of his definition
by Birch as one of the "most constructive and fruitful", and
most students of modern federalism would agree that on the
whole this modified definition provides "the most serviceable
36definition of modern federalism". In fact, "Under the
heat and pressure generated by social and economic change in 
the twentieth-century, the distinct strata of the older
3 7federalism have begun to melt and flow into one another".
The following excerpts from some recent studies would
further clarify the concept of modern federalism. Morton
3 8Grodzins writes:
The American form of government is often, but erroneously, 
symbolized by a three-layer cake. A far more correct 
image is the rainbow or marble cake, characterized by 
an inseparable mingling of differently colored ingredients, 
the colors appearing in vertical and diagonal strands 
and unexpected whirls. As colors are mixed in a marble 
cake , so functions are mixed in the American federal 
system.
Thus the nineteenth-century primarily legalistic and dualistic
3 9phase of federalism is now over. Federalism is no longer:
. . . like a great factory wherein two sets of machinery 
are at work, their evolving wheels apparently intermixed, 
their bands crossing one another, yet each doing its 
own work without touching or hampering the other.
4 0As William Anderson says:
. . . the entire network or structure of American [so
also other federal] governmental units--national, state, 
and local--has become so close-meshed in recent decades 
that a strain or change at any point has repercussions 
in other parts of the fabric. One part cannot be 
understood if separated from others.
Now regional and central governments in a federation
36
Wheare, op. cit., footnote 4, p. 14. The second quotation 
is from Carnell, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 20.
37
J. A. Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism" in 
A. R. M. Lower and others, Evolving Canadian Federalism, 
Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1958, p. 122.
38
M. Grodzins, "The Federal System" in The Goals for Americans, 
The Report of the President's Commission on National Goals, 
New York: Prentice-Hall Inc. , 1960 , p p . 265-282 , Quotation
on p . 2 6 5.
39
Bryce, op. cit., footnote 17, p. 432.
40
Anderson, op. cit., footnote 23, p. 3.
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should not only be coordinate but they should also be
cooperative» Modern federalism is, therefore, basically a
federalism of functions rather than of powers--a federalism
4 1more of politics than of laws, It is worthwhile to
remember, however, that the difference between the two
versions of the federal concept is chiefly one of emphasis;
while the "dual federalism" views the two sets of government
primarily as equal rivals, the "cooperative federalism"
views them as equal partners, (Although the central government
tends to become more equal than the others.) What lies at
the root of both views is the premise that in a federation
(in principle) neither level of government is subordinate 
42to the other.
Although the states-rights sentiment continues to exist
in some form or the other in almost every federal State, it
would appear that now the nature and degree of rivalry
between the states and the central government that was
supposed to exist in the dualistic phase of federalism has
undergone a great change. Through a long process of
adjustment the main areas of state and central functions are
largely agreed (though disputes by no means are uncommon),
and now the main rivalry is between the states themselves
where the "centralized regulator [the federal government]
plays the fundamental role as in any living organism".
This is so because "different regions [or states in a
federation] tend to regard themselves as rivals just as much
4 3as small nations are within a common market". The states
are also rivals in their recourse to central government 
finance as a help to their regional development.
This role of the federal government as the centralized 
regulator brings us to a possible new phase in the development 
of federalism. This new phase has been termed organic 
federalism and may, in view of the discredit that the word 
"organic" has got in political geography, be called 
integrated federalism. This is, however, still a "recent
_
Livingston, op. cit., footnote 28, p. 141.
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and ill-defined concept". Organic federalism is the
federalism in which the centre has such extensive powers,
and gives such a strong lead to the state governments in
some of the most important areas of their individual as
well as their cooperative activities, says G. Sawer, that
the political taxonomist may hesitate to call it federal at
all. Sawer regards Austria as the most obvious candidate
for the organic category because here although the "Centre
dominates every aspect of policy", "Region autonomy within
the limits of the Region competence is no sham, and the
values inherent in such autonomy are protected both by the
44constitutional structure and by the pattern of politics".
Sawer thinks that among the older federations the United 
States is the only one where a surge towards organic federalism 
could take place in the near future similar to the surge 
towards cooperative federalism in the late 1930s.
Now the question arises: What is the line of demarcation
between an "organic" federalism and an organic decentralized 
unitary State? The answer is not very difficult. We have 
seen that the essence of federalism is that each level of 
government should have a guaranteed autonomy. Thus "so long 
as the amending procedure, the operation of the judicial 
review and the pattern of politics or a combination of any 
two of them restrict the ability of the Centre to abolish a 
Region structure . . . the position of a Region is sufficiently
secured", and so the polity in question should be called 
federal .
II THE GEOGRAPHY OF FEDERALISM
We now proceed to discuss what may be called the 
"geography of federalism". Although most political 
geographers now regard federalism as "the most geographically 
expressive of all political systems", so far little attention 
has been given by geographers (or any one else) to explain 
the geographical basis of the federal polity. In fact,
44
G. Sawer, Modern Federalism, London: C. A. Watts & Co. ,
1969, p. 125.
45
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Livingston who revived the concept of federalism as a polity
based essentially on regionally grouped diversities, and to
whose writings much of the recent interest in federalism by
geographers is due, himself described the concept as
4 6sociological rather than geographical« The result is that
students of federalism in general have wondered whether
Livingston has, indeed, provided us with "a useful tool 
4 7for analysis".
There are two reasons why federalism is considered as 
the most geographically expressive of all forms of government. 
First, it is based on the existence of regional differences 
or a sense of locality, "the belief that the area in which 
one lives is different from other areas, even though
4 8contiguity with them may provide many interests in common".
Federalism has been described as "the process by which a
widening sense of social [and political] solidarity is
reconciled with the attachment for local identity, through
4 9the provision of dual political organization." Secondly,
because of a sort of "dual" political organization and 
the grant of substantial regional autonomy the regions in 
a federal State remain highly articulate. This means that 
spatial interactions in a federal State, unlike in other 
forms of government, are most clearly and easily recognized. 
Now because federalism starts with a tacit recognition of 
the immutability of regional personalities, and because 
spatial interactions in the political life of federal States 
are most clearly recognized, federalism becomes a suitable
Although the concept of federalism as a polity based on 
essentially regionally grouped diversities has in the 
recent literature been almost invariably attributed to 
Livingston, op. cit., footnote 8, actually it is much 
older, going back at least to Hugo Preuss in 1889 (cf.
S . Mo g i , The Problem of Federalism: A Study in the
History of Political Theory, London : George Allen &
Unwin Ltd, 1931, Vol. 2, p p . 735-752) .
47
A. H. Birch, "Approaches to the Study of Federalism", 
Political Studies, Vol. 14, 1966, p. 17.
48
J. D. B. Miller, Australian Government and Politics,
London: Duckworths, third edition, 1964, p. 138.
49
D. G. Karve, Federations: A Study in Comparative Politics,
London: Oxford University Press, 1932, p. 8.
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subject for geographical inquiry, for geography is properly
50described as a science of spatial interactions.
Since the basic geographical premise of federalism is
the existence of regionally grouped diversities, no government
has ever been called federal that has been organized on
any other but regional basis. ". . . federalism becomes
nothing if it is held to embrace diversities that are
51not territorially grouped". It is true that regional
differences, or strong sense of locality may sometimes 
exist even in States that are not organized on federal 
basis. But the main fact to be remembered is that only 
when the sociological unit of the region is powerful enough 
to demand and receive social accounts does federalism become 
inevitable. The regional differences that, for example, 
exist in France have so far not been strong enough in this 
respect. The country, therefore, remains organized on a 
unitary basis. Similarly once very diverse regions with very 
strong regional identities may be found joined together under a 
single unitary State where even though regional identities 
continue to be present, through a long process of adjustment 
the cultural or sociological unit of the region has ceased to 
demand accounts. This happens when the regions concerned were 
brought together by imperial conquest and the region or the 
regions in question were not in a position to assert the 
recognition of their special position. It may here be relevant 
to remember that federalism is a democratic and voluntary union 
of essentially equal partners, and not a union dictated by some 
outside agency or an overbearing unit within the group.
A further reason why even very clearly identifiable regions 
in a unitary State are not able to demand social accounts in the 
manner that regions in a federal country are, is that while in a 
federal State regional identities are respected and protected by 
the Constitution which guarantees the claim of each component 
unit of the State to perpetuate its identity, in a unitary syst­
em, to the contrary, these differences and diversities are large-
50
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51
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ly suppressed or ignored. It needs clarification, however, that 
federalism does not mean the perpetuation of sovereignties 
if there be any. The very basis of federal union is a clear 
recognition of the limitations of the individual units as 
self-sufficient and completely functional entities.
Federalism, it is true, unlike a unitary system, does 
not force unity out of diversity. It allows the two to co­
exist. But in the process of its progress towards maturity, 
contrary to what is sometimes stated, it does create unity 
through the greatly enlarged functions of the federal 
government, national planning and the like, as also because 
of the falling down of the once rigid barriers--physical, 
psychological, and economic etc.--between the component 
units of the State. Confusion of this nature will be 
avoided if we remember that like all things human,, 
federalism is also constantly in flux. It is not a static 
phenomenon but a dynamic process. Federalism is, in some 
senses, truly a halfway house to unity and integration 
though not a unitary State, for once a federation is 
established it tends to rigidify existing regional identities 
by giving them continued opportunities for articulation; 
and even though the central and the regional governments 
become largely cooperative, the regional governments continue 
to remain rivals. Indeed, as Boehm says, "The antithesis 
of federalism is not unitarism, but particularism and 
separatism" of an extreme k i n d . ^
Although we have shown that regionally grouped 
diversities are the fundamental fact of federalism, it is 
necessary to point out that the geographical distribution 
of diversities within a federation need not always rigidly 
follow the boundary lines of the component units of the 
State. As federalism often embraces a series of diversities 
on a number of issues, it can hardly be expected that the
M. H. Boehm, "Federalism',' Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences , V o l . 5, p. 170, New York: Macmillan Co.,
1931 .
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state b o u n d a r y  lines will mark off areas which coincide 
with all the different interests and opinions which may 
be held on all questions. The essential fact to remember 
is that the units in question should possess a total complex 
of d i v e r sities strong enough to d istinguish them from 
their fellow members in the group and thereby make them 
desire and demand reco gnition of their individual identities. 
Re gi o n a l i s m  of this kind, in which diversities spill over 
state bo undaries, is c o n s idered a valid m a n i f e s t a t i o n  of the 
federal principle. Our study of the Swiss and other 
feder ati ons shows that it is a bene ficial m a n i f e s t a t i o n  
al so .
Di ve r s i t i e s  wi thin a federal society or political 
co mmu nit y may turn on all sorts of q u e s t i o n s -- e c o n o m i c , 
religious, historical, linguistic and cultural. Any of these, 
or any c ombination of these may produce a group de mand for 
sel f-e xpression. These major diversities in a nation's 
life may, however, have two diff erent patterns of geographical 
dis tri bu tion: they may either be terri t o r i a l l y  or regionally
grouped, or they may be mixed and scattered like the strands 
of di ff erent colours in a marble cake. If the major 
i de nt if ying dive r s i t i e s  within a State are arranged 
terr it or ially, then the society or the political community 
is p o t e n t i a l l y  federal. But if the distribution of 
d i v e rs it ies follows a marble cake pattern, the society is 
plural and nonfederal. Only when a society contains 
ter ri to rial groups so marke d l y  different from one another 
that they require some i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y  to protect and express 
their pe c u l i a r  qualities, does the need for f e d e ralism 
ge nu in el y arise. Doubtless, "One such circumstance . . .
does not make the s o c iety or c o nstitution federal. But 
two or six or twenty may produce a result that may properly  
be so c a l l e d " . 33
A word of e x p l a n a t i o n  is needed lest the above statement 
re ga rd in g the geog r a p h i c a l  pattern of diversities creates
5 3
Living ston, op. cit. , footnote 18, pp. 2-3.
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confusion. Here we are talking of the distribution of 
diversities and not of functions that the quotation from 
Morton Grodzin in the first part of this chapter refers to. 
While the distribution of functions in modern federations 
may sometimes resemble the marble cake pattern, the major 
diversities on which a federation is based must essentially 
be territorially arranged otherwise the society cannot be 
called federal. This, it should be noted, does not contradict 
the pattern of diversities exemplified by Switzerland where 
each of the two major diversities in the nation's life 
is territorially arranged though one cuts across the other 
and thereby creates a unifying factor in that federation.
For long federalism remained a subject matter for 
purely legal discussion. But legal answers are of value only 
in solution to purely legal problems. Federalism is 
concerned with many problems other than legal ones. Hence, 
a purely legal approach to federalism has not sufficed.
Indeed,
The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, 
not in the shadings of legal or constitutional 
terminology, but in forces--economic, social, political 
and cultural— that have made the outward form of 
federalism necessary.^
Like most other institutions of man federalism is an attempt 
to solve the problem of human organization. The particular 
problem of federalism is to find solution to governmental 
questions involved in a complex interaction of spatial 
differences and similarities. Federalism is, therefore, 
essentially a product of geography. In this sense the 
essence of federalism lies not in the constitutional 
structure but in the geography of the society itself.
This geographical view of the nature of federalism, I 
believe, does away with the confusion that over-emphasis on 
the sociological view of federalism often creates. Sawer 
objects to Livingston's statement that federalism is "a
54
Livingston, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 1.
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function not of constitutions but of societies" for such
5 5statements, he says:
can be misleading, because they suggest that there is 
a sort of general social attitude, or type of social 
structure, which corresponds uniquely with the 
constitutional form known as federalism . . .  I do not 
believe that these attitudes or structures are specific 
to federalism , . 0 the favourable social attitude is
an attitude towards government, administration and 
law in general, not towards federalism as such.
But unlike the social structures and attitudes the geography
of the society (as explained above) is to a very large
extent unique and specific to federalism, though this
geography of the society in no absolute sense determines the
federal or nonfederal form of government that ultimately
evolves in any State. Sometimes federations that are
created under or enforced over largely non-federal situations
may survive as the post-War II federalism in West Germany
does. But such federations survive largely because during
the long period that the federation remains enforced the
society within the country, in the process of adjustment to
the new political situation that it cannot undo, develops
regional identities and vested interests that in effect
change the effective political geography of the State and
make it, in turn, suitable to federalism. But federalism
created under a nonfederal situation, unless enforced by
external forces, can hardly develop into anything but the
federalized unitary State of the type that Austria represents
which, Sawer says, the political taxonomist may hesitate to
call federal at all. On the other hand, if a unitary State
structure is imposed over a region that is essentially
federal in its politico-geographic structure, the government
can be run only by military dictatorship as in Burma or
Pakistan, or by one-party rule ( i «, e., group dictatorship)
as in the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia.
As a particularly dynamic and complex phenomenon
federalism is, it would appear from the foregoing discussion:
55
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of interest not only to the constitutional lawyer 
concerned with the nature of legal frameworks, and 
the students of political institutions occupied with 
the operation of the particular types of political 
institutions; but also to the sociologist „ . . the
economist e . , the geographer . . * the historian
. . . and the political theorist.
Although of special relevance to politico-geographic study
federalism may, in fact, be found of interest to the social
geographer interested in the phenomena of social integration
and diversity, the economic geographer engaged in the study
of the role of political institutions in fostering or
hindering economic growth, and the historical geographer
interested in the evaluation of spatial interactions in
the genesis and evolution of some of the greater "new"
5 7nations of today.
Ill GEOGRAPHERS AND FEDERALISM
We now proceed to review the work done by geographers 
on federalism. Although most geographers now seem to agree 
that federalism is the most geographically expressive of 
all governmental systems, we believe that contrary to what
Prescott thinks published work by geographers does not show
, 5 8a keen awareness of this fact. Besides Prescott's own
article on Nigeria (to a certain extent), only the article
by K. W. Robinson among the works that Prescott refers,
59shows this awareness. Prescott does not refer to Spate's
A framework for the study of "Influences of Governmental 
Systems on the Location of Economic Activities" is set 
out in my paper of the same title in G. J. R. Linge and 
P. J. Rimmer (Eds.), Government Influence and the Location 
of Economic Activities, Canberra: Department of Human
Geography, Australian National University, 1971 (forthcoming)
58
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1958, p p . 1-13.
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article of 1944, nor does he mention Edmund Dale's article 
on the West Indies which, although it shows little of this 
awareness is, nevertheless, a not very successful attempt
60to study an important aspect of a federation that failed» 
Fisher's book and articles on South-East Asia present, no 
doubt, an incisive treatment of the political geography 
of the area they deal with, and because there are or have 
been some federations in that region, he does make some 
important observations on some of the federal problems of 
these States.^ But these can hardly be said to show this 
awareness,
Whittlesey drew attention to the need for studying the
62impress of effective authority on the landscape in 1935.
Soon after this Ullman presented his study of the effect of
an interstate boundary in a federal State on its surrounding 
6 3landscape. Among other important works of this nature are
64those by Rose and Logan. Two new attempts on certain
other aspects of federalism may also be noted: one, the
60
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study of federal grants-in-aid in the United States by Brunn and 
Hoffman; and the other, a case study of the geography of
65political affiliation in a federal-state system by Solomon»
Van Valkenburg was the first among textbook writers on 
political geography to recognize forms of government as relevant 
to the study of political geography.^ Since then other textbook 
writers have also included a discussion of the forms of govern­
ment in their books on political geography and in their treatment 
of individual States have discussed the political geography of 
federal States as well but seldom the geography of federalism in 
those States. Pounds in his book on political geography
considers the politico-administrative systems of States in a
6 7greater detail than others have done. For this reason he has
given a better coverage to federalism. Pounds quotes Robinson
and says that geographers should study federalism because it is
the most geographically expressive of all governmental systems.
He then proceeds to enumerate the federal States of the world
and makes some oft-repeated observations on the communist and
Latin American federations rather than giving a geographical
approach to the problem or attempting a discussion of the
68federal concept.
Credit should perhaps be given to Jackson for including
for the first time two readings on federalism (from political
69scientists of course) in his reader on political geography.
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the study of "politically organized areas" which may with 
profit be adapted to the study of individual federations; 
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It may be taken as a proof of his awareness of the special
relevance of federalism to politico-geographic study that
while he has included two readings on federalism, no reference
is made to the unitary form of government. The Systematic
Political Geography edited by de Blij that followed Jackson's
readings closely in time, besides including Robinson's paper
on the "Sixty Years of Federation in Australia", contains
70an introduction on federalism by de Blij himself. This
introduction speaks of the justification for politico- 
geographic study of federalism by quoting from Robinson.
It also presents a very arbitrary classification of federations.
In my opinion Robinson is the only geographer writing 
on federalism recently who has shown an awareness of the 
modern trends in federalism. He studied the centre-state 
relations in a federal State in a historical perspective 
and therefore drew upon the works of Livingston and Birch.
While Dale was satisfied with Wheare's definition of 
federalism, and Prescott in 1962 was still talking of "quasi­
federalism", none has shown the awareness that federalism is
7 1a dynamic process and not a static phenomenon. While
participating in a discussion on a paper by Wheare in 1952
Spate urged the need to "recognize that there are in fact
72different types of federation in existence today". He
said nothing further perhaps because the concept of 
cooperative federalism was then only taking root. To say 
this is, however, not to discredit these geographers. This 
awareness and a deeper understanding of federalism could 
come only with a concentrated study of the problem of 
federalism which none of these scholars had set out to do.
It seems to me that Hartshorne, although he never set
70
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out to study federalism as such, shows, nevertheless, an
awareness of the geographical basis of federalism as also
its cooperative nature. The very fact that he recommends
a functional approach to the study of federal States as
well, shows that unlike others he did not think that the
state and the central governments in a federation are
7 3independent of each other. Hartshorne writes that if the
74regional differences in the intensity of State-idea:
. . . are relatively minor, as in most of France . . . ,
the regions may accept a unitary government . . . If
the differences are great, the attempt to impose such 
a uniform system may provoke opposition endangering the 
national unity . . .
From this review of the work done by geographers it 
would appear that Spate's article of 1944, which the writer 
himself stated was only a "very cursory and preliminary view 
of a subject which merits closer study", is the only attempt 
at a general approach to the problem of federalism and its 
geographical relationships. But for reasons already noted 
this "cursory" view has not led to conclusions that are 
valid today.
Although Spate's observation that most federal States 
are large in area and small in population is still largely 
true, this, however, does not validate any causal relationship 
between size and the federal form of government. There is, 
similarly, no causal relationship between federalism and 
population density. Not only Switzerland, which then 
appeared to the author as an atypical federation, but new 
federations like India have also a high density of population. 
Spate's next point, that modern federalism is essentially 
a form of government appropriate to new lands with vast 
area and thin population, is valid in the sense that every 
new political and administrative experiment has a better 
chance of success in new and relatively empty lands where 
people do not have a long history to remember, and where 
strong and conflicting cultural identities in the component
73
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regions have not developed. But for all this, there is no 
cause and effect relationship between vast spaces and thin 
population on the one hand, and federalism on the other.
As the preceding discussion shows, the task that Spate 
pointed out to geographers a quarter of a century ago, i. e . ,
"to examine the geographical layout of the existing federal 
states in an endeavour to establish those conditions which 
are common to most of them and which . . . favour the
establishment and maintenance of this type of political 
organization", remains largely unaccomplished and practically 
the whole field awaits detailed investigation.
Relationship between Area, Population and the 
Federal form of Government
It appears necessary to take stock of the prevailing
ideas among geographers in particular and other students of
federalism in general, on the relationship of the size of
States and the density of their population to the federal
form of government, in order to place Spate's observations
75in the right perspective. Robinson thought that:
Countries of large areas and small population, or even 
rather large population concentrated in widely scattered 
areas, are obviously suitable for this [i. e . , federal] 
form of government.
76De Blij styles what he calls "our rule" which reads:
Theoretically, the federal framework is essentially 
suitable in a large or very large size category . 
when we view a list of federal states of the world, 
we should expect to find that they are large, comparatively 
sparsely populated, multicore, and possess several 
large cities.
Turning to political scientists, we find Parker writing in 
1949 that:77
All modern federations were, at their inception, political 
unions covering unprecedentedly huge areas with 
scattered centres of population and comparatively under­
developed communications . . . and federalism seemed
the necessary form of government primarily for this reason.
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It needs emphasis that here Parker is speaking of "all modern
federations"--as of 1949--and not of Australia alone. Carnell
wrote that many political scientists think that "Federalism
may well have been suited to a particular phase of unification
of large continental states with small populations and poor
7 8communications". And as Sawer says "Even today the size
of a country and the efficiency of its communications are
regarded as factors contributing to a choice between
79unification and federalism".
What, in fact, seems to have been missed is that the 
important fact about federalism is not the type or size of 
population and territories but the fact that federalism is 
based on regional loyalties or a sense of locality. In some, 
particularly in "new" lands with vast open spaces and having 
a few cores of population widely set apart, this sense of 
locality may well be born only or primarily because of 
physical distance playing the role of a great separator.
But in older and densely populated countries this sense 
of locality or regional identity may be (and often is) based 
on historical traditions, linguistic, religious, and other 
ethnic diversities or economic disparities and differences 
that are regionally grouped. The fallacy in establishing 
a causal relationship between the sheer area of States and 
the federal form of their government will be revealed if 
we remember that the Thirteen Colonies in 1787 or the four 
provinces of British North America in 1867 constituted only 
very small portions of the areas now covered by these 
federations.
To give the doubters their due, however, it should be
remembered that "Over centralization in [a large country]
. . . leads to anaemia at the extremities and apoplexy at
8 0the centre". Hence large size in itself does, to a certain
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degree, favour the rise of federalism even though size and 
federalism do not have a cause and effect relationship.
This whole discussion on the nature and geography of
federalism would perhaps remain incomplete without a brief
reference to the so-called (new but increasingly becoming
popular) concept of symmetry and asymmetry of federalism
8 1initiated by Tarlton. It should be clear from the
foregoing discussion that one of the fundamental premises
of federalism is that the regionally-grouped communities
that are involved in a federation should possess enough common
interests as to desire union, but they ought simultaneously
to possess some important elements in their regional makeup
that separate their interests from one another in some
important spheres, and for that reason make them desire
to retain their regional autonomy in order to preserve
their special regional interests and identities. If the
groups involved are homogeneous and similar in all important
respects, the resultant State organization should be unitary;
if the units involved are almost completely discordant, the
best that they can do is to enter some limited purpose
confederal alliance. These two extreme situations cannot
therefore be called "ideal symmetrical" and "ideal asymmetrical"
models of federalism. But this is what, in essence, Tarlton
seems to be doing. The prevailing confusion on the real nature
of federalism would be clear from the quick popularity that
this concept seems to be gaining— both among political
8 2scientists as well as political geographers.
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IV ORIGIN & STABILITY OF FEDERALISM:
83A GENERIC APPROACH
We now address ourselves to the question: how should
the study of spatial interactions in the rise and survival
of federal States be approached? The traditional method
would be the environmentalistic approach pioneered by
philosophers and students of politics like Bodin, Montesquieu
and others who tried to explain every activity of man
(including his choice of the form of government) as essentially
a response to the physical forces of the environment« Under
this approach one would be required to study the physical
geographical environment of each of the existing federal
States and through an elaborate process of elimination try
to establish the relationship between such visible geographical
features as area, shape, relief, latitudinal location,
climate etc. and the choice of the federal form of government.
A sophisticated variant of this approach is to be found in
what has been stated as "to examine the geographical layout
of existing federal states" with a view to isolating those
conditions which appear to favour the establishment and
84maintenance of this type of political organization. Though
there may be little to say against this pioneering attempt 
in the field, surprisingly enough it was being pursued even 
in the late sixties. De Blij's introduction on federalism 
is the case in point. It needs little elaboration to suggest 
that such an approach is bound to be superficial and would 
lead only to faulty conclusions. These external visible 
geographical features are only the leaves of the federal 
tree. What we really need to look for are the roots which 
alone would lead us to valid conclusions.
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A more sophisticated variant of this "layout" approach
8 5was made in 1953 by a historian MacKirdy. ~ Being based on
a sound historical knowledge this study was saved of many
o f th e envir onme nt aliStic pitfalls to which the lack of a
proper historical perspective might lead, MacKirdy presents
a comparative study of "The Geography and Federalism in
Australia and Canada", The author's method of approach is
8 6clear from the opening lines of his paper:
Take two large areas, the third and the sixth largest 
in the world's political entities . . . Sprinkle them
unevenly with relatively small populations. Provide 
them with types of federal political organisations.
Call them "Canada" and "Australia". The result should 
provide some interesting examples of the influence of 
geography on politics.
This study, however, takes a somewhat broader view of the 
"geographical layout", and considers factors such as 
urbanization and regional specialization of economic 
activities. Then, as the study limits itself to the two 
individual federations without making any attempt at broad 
generalizations, it has been saved of some obvious errors 
and is, on the whole, fruitful. The limitations of the 
approach are, nonetheless, clear. What is going to be 
achieved if we compare Switzerland and the United States, 
or India and Australia?
Our search for a solution in the existing methods of 
approach developed in political geography so far, is not 
very helpful. Hartshorne's "Functional Approach in Political 
Geography" and Jones' "Unified Field Theory of Political 
Geography" have by now attained the status of almost classic 
statements in politico-geographical methodology, and the 
general consensus among political geographers seems to be 
that these two approaches in themselves cover all the problems
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in methodology in politico-geographic studies. But a
closer look would reveal that though very competent and
comprehensive these statements are, they both stand of
value only in respect of specific problems and individual
cases, The functional approach, as its author rightly
claims, offers us a systematic method of establishing
"the basic factors and relationships involved in the
primary problem of political geography--the analysis of
the degree to which the diverse regions of the state
8 8constitute a unity". But the functional approach would
stand of value only in the study of specific politico-
geographic entities that function as units--specially a
State. It seems to offer little help in generic studies.
Similarly Jones' "Unified Field Theory" approach with
its emphasis on "Idea-Decision-Movement-Fie1d-Polltlcal Area"
chain completes, as its author claims, "the tie between
morphology and functions . . . between 'grand-ideas' and
89the earth's surface". But it is also of value only in
the study of specific politico-geographic problems--both
national and international— such as the birth of new States
like Israel or Pakistan, or of boundaries, and capitals etc.
It seems of little help in the study of generic problems.
The difficulty with these approaches may well be that
they are products of a phase in geography when our science
was over-obsessed with the study of the specific and the
unique, a phase in which it was generally believed that
as political geographers (mo re than other of our colleagues)
"we are handicapped in developing scientific principles, and
90are restricted to the consideration of the unique cases".
It was then thought that the "idea and purpose of the generic
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state--the purposes that is that are common to all states" 
were the sole concern of the political scientists, and that 
this concern ignores "The very thing that is of direct concern 
to the geographer— namely the idea that is distinct for the
9 :particular state in contrast with that of other states .
(Italics added.)
Looking for a solution we find that a historical approach
may be more useful for this study, for, as Whittlesey said,
"Any specific arrangement of earth-space becomes fully
intelligible only when it is linked with preceding combinations
9 2of nature and culture in the same area". We may examine
the historical evolution of the units involved in a federation, 
reconstruct their economic, political and social geography 
of the period immediately preceding and since the federation 
and thus try to isolate the spatial relations that were 
in each case largely responsible for the rise of that 
particular psychology among the political communities concerned 
of desiring union without desiring complete unity, as also 
the factors that finally overwhelmed their centrifugal 
tendencies and helped to bring the different units together 
into a single body politic. This genetic approach, as it 
may be called in absence of a fasionable label, would give 
us, we believe, a truer picture of the differences and 
similarities involved in the process of the rise and 
maintenance of federal States in the world. Any generalizations 
that this study may evince would, we trust, be free from 
the superficialities that the environmentalistic or the 
"geographical layout" approach often leads to.
It is necessary to point out that although the functional 
approach seems to be of little help in a generic study of 
federalism per se , nevertheless, with the changed emphasis 
of modern federalism, the approach may prove of great value
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in the study of individual federations«, And because in our 
study of federalism we are also interested in establishing 
the factors that help to maintain this type of political 
system, the use of the functional approach in a limited 
sense would be inevitable^
In fact, the marriage of our "genetic" approach to 
Hartshorne's "functional" one would give rise to what can 
essentially be called "structural-functional analysis", 
which was first formulated by Woodger in biology, and was
9 3later adapted by Merton to the study of the social sciences.
The approach has since been developed and refined by many
scholars including M . J„ Levy Jr., who has recently presented
94an excellent synthesis. The term "function" is defined
as "any condition, any state of affairs, resultant from the
operation (including in the term 'operation' mere persistence)
of a unit of the type under consideration in terms of a
structure(s)". The term "structure" is defined as "a
pattern, i. e., an observable uniformity in terms of which
9 5action (or operation) takes place".
In a federal political system the "structure" consists 
of the underlying geographical pattern of regional diversities, 
and the constitutional instrumentalities created to preserve 
them. Here the "function" will consist of the process or 
the dynamics of federalism, i. e., the federal-state relations 
and the overall progress of the system towards maturity.
As federalism is born out of the peculiar psychology 
among the political units of desiring union but not complete 
unity, in a genetic study of federalism our primary concern
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in reviewing each individual federation would be, first, 
to outline the salient historical facts about the political 
communities involved in the federation and, then, to delineate 
the politico-geographical factors that were largely responsible 
for creating among those units strong regional identities 
and a desire for separate existence on the one hand, and the 
factors that in the end overwhelmed their feelings for 
separatism and compelled them to unite into a federal State, 
on the other. One may therefrom proceed to infer the general 
geographical relationships (or spatial interactions) that 
helped the rise of federalism in each case and thus arrive 
at certain hypotheses in this respect. While reviewing each 
federal State for this study one would keep in perspective 
the working and dynamics of the federations since their 
inauguration, and try to derive therefrom the patterns of 
spatial interactions in the success or otherwise of each 
federal experiment. The sum total of these conclusions on 
the rise and survival of federal States, past and present, 
would give us, we believe, certain fruitful hypotheses on 
the role of spatial relations in the origin and stability 
of federal States.
Such a study would inevitably be concerned with State-
96ideas and the raison d'etre of States. General historical
works have, therefore, provided the raw materials for this
9 7research. It is inevitably so because:
The state-idea is a complex of traditions, experience,
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and objectives» It is made up of written history, 
folklore, stories of national heroes, religious beliefs, 
and the language and the art forms in which these things 
are communicated . . . And it is the characteristic
economic social and political institutions. The State 
is created to defend and develop the state idea.
As the State-idea is "not always easy to identify", the task
may often be difficult. But since some excellent historical
studies of the relevant periods in the history of most of
these States exist, it has seemed possible to do so for the
limited purposes of this study. Use is also made of relevant
works of political scientists, although most of what has
interested the political scientists and students of
constitutions does not seem of much interest to the
geographer.
V SCOPE OF THE THESIS
It is generally agreed that modern federalism was born
with the United States Constitution of 1787. As this study
is concerned with modern federalism alone, we shall here
be discussing only those federations that followed the
United States in time. Furthermore, as should have been
clear from the foregoing paragraphs, in this study by
federalism we mean the federal form of governmental
organization as applied to internal political organization
of sovereign nation States. We shall not, therefore, concern
ourselves with international political organizations like
the European Economic Community and others that are also
98sometimes referred to as federal.
Besides, technically even the E. E. C», the most 
sophisticated of international organizations, cannot be 
considered a federation in the sense that this term is 
understood in the modern scholarship. As Sawer says:
"The formal weakness of the system considered as a 
federation, is that its supreme legislative and policy 
organ, the Council, directly represents the member 
governments and on many critical questions has to act 
unanimously . . . The predominant attitude of the
governments and the people still places ultimate authority 
in the national legislatures, not in the community 
institutions". Sawer, op. cit., footnote 44, p. 61„ See 
G. Sawer, The Constitutional System of the European Common 
Market, Canberra: Royal Institute of Public Administration,
A. Co T. Group, 1963, p p . 41, especially pages 12-14.
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Even among the sovereign nation States that describe
themselves as "federal", many do not satisfy the minimum
condition set for federalism in the beginning of this
chapter. The basic minimum condition for federalism in
government is, as Sawer has so clearly demonstrated, that
the constituent state governments have guaranteed regional
autonomy, i. e . , they should be safe from peace-time
encroachments from the central government concerned. For
regional autonomy to be effective it would seem necessary
that freedom of speech and expression are guaranteed and
the country in question possesses a multi-party functioning
democracy. Only when free opposition and multi-party
politics are assured can the constituent regional governments
within the State maintain their individuality and
ineffaceable regional identity, and thus alone can a proper
kind of federal articulation (of regional diversity within
overall unity) emerge. On the contrary, if a State is
under one-party rule, "democracy" becomes a farce. It
becomes, in fact, a dictatorship not of an individual but
of a group, i. e . , a party. Under a dictatorship of
whatever sort, a genuine opportunity for free play of the
diverse regional interests that comprise the State can
hardly exist. One-party rule instead of fostering unity
in diversity, in practice imposes an over-all uniformity
allowing regional diversity to exist only in so far as
it does not clash with "national interests", and what these
national interests are only the top echelons of the party
decide. It would therefore seem that multi-party democracy
is the sine qua non of a functioning federalism, and as
Elazar says: "The federal structures occasionally adopted
by non-democratic systems must generally be considered as
99'window dressing' . . .".
D. J. Elazar, "Federalism", International Encyclopaedia
of the Social Sciences, 1968, Vol. 5, p. 361.
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This proposition is nothing new. Most serious scholars 
of modern federalism, from Freeman to the present, have 
regarded functioning democracy as a necessary adjunct to 
functioning federalism. Greaves regards federalism as an 
"essentially democratic phenomenon . . . [which] is
incompatible with dictatorial forms of government" .
Maddox wrote that "There can be no such thing as a federation
which includes totalitarian regions denying free political
action"."*"0 "^ In fact, as Wheare says, it may be possible in
theory to conceive of a federal government in which the
general and the regional governments are dictatorships
and yet each remains strictly within its own sphere; but
it is difficult to imagine such a government coming into
existence in the realm of practical politics or continuing
to exist for any length of time. Dictatorship with
its autocratic government and its denial of free elections,
Wheare rightly notes, is incompatible with the working of
federalism. In summary:"*"02
Federalism demands forms of government which have 
the characteristics usually associated with democracy 
or free government. There is a wide variety in forms 
which such government may take, but the main essentials 
are free election and a party [i. e . , multi-party] 
system, with its guarantee of a responsible opposition.
For this reason, Communist federations such as the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia cannot be treated as
examples of functioning federalism. They are, therefore,
not included in this study. Scholars have a genuine "suspicion
that the federal form of their written constitutions is not
merely a 'form' but a 'sham', the 'real' government being
vested in the highly centralized Communist Party hierarchy". 103
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Furthermore, in the Communist federations the role of the 
Communist Party is not only a fact; it is also explicitly 
stated in their constitutions- As Sawer says, in the Soviet 
Union there is no suggestion of judicial review or other 
check on the validity of central laws, and there would need 
be a remarkable dilution of the authority of the Communist 
Party and increase in the independent authority of the 
central and the regional legislatures before this system 
could be regarded as within the federal spectrum, Yugoslavia's 
position under the Constitution of 1963 is considered more 
arguable, partly because in that country the character of 
the Communist Party has in fact changed and may continue 
to change, and the possibility of the official legislative 
organs becoming autonomous centres of authority is greater. 
Although there are no separate effective legislatures 
for the six constituent regions of the State, the Constitution 
at its face value provides a substantial region-based 
check on political actions of the centre that may be 
prejudicial to regional autonomy. Institutionally, therefore, 
Yugoslavia may seem to possess, what Sawer calls "the makings 
of a federal arrangement". But as it exists today, it is 
no t federal.
However, both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, by
virtue of their regionally-grouped diversities, possess
potentially federal geographical bases. The main difficulty
in the way of the rise of a functioning federalism in either
of these countries is their one-party "democracy". Thus:
The formal structure in both these countries might 
become real not only through the loosening up of the 
social structure generally, and the emergence of some 
legal or at least tolerated [?] opposition to the 
Communist Party, but also through the federalization 
of the Communist Party itself within the relevant 
countrie s .104
When it so happens these countries might well form proper 
subjects for the study of federalism, but as they exist today,
Sawer, op. cit., footnote 44, p. 60.
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they do not qualify for inclusion in this study.
While a general survey of all the functioning federations 
of today is attempted, in the study of "Failed Federations" a 
selection is made with a view, first, to select only those 
examples where the generally federal nature of the polity 
(at the time of its origin) is not in question, and secondly, 
those examples have been excluded where a federal union 
was talked of but never actually inaugurated (as in French 
West Africa or British East Africa) , as also the examples 
like Chile and New Zealand where, it is believed, the 
federal experiment should be regarded as an initial wrong 
step which was soon rectified and a unitary government, more 
in keeping with the needs of the society, was firmly 
established.
The criterion applied in determining the functioning 
examples of federalism is the existence of guaranteed 
regional autonomy, as explained in first part of this 
chapter. That is, we believe that "so long as the amending 
procedure, the operation of the judicial review and the 
pattern of politics or a combination of any two of them 
restrict the ability of the Centre to abolish a Region 
structure . . . the position of a Region is sufficiently
secured", and therefore the country in question is an example 
of functioning f e d e r a l i s m . T h e s e  examples of functioning 
federations are classified into two groups: first, the
so-called Classical Federations: Switzerland, the United
States, Canada, and Australia; secondly, the Post-1945 
Federations which have been divided into two sub-groups: 
the Post-1945 Asian Federations (India and Malaysia), and 
the Post-1945 European Federations (Western Germany and 
Austria). While the four "Classical Federations" form 
the part two of the thesis and are discussed respectively
Sawer, op. cit,, footnote 44, p p . 127-128. Because of
similarity in the criterion adopted, the list of functioning 
federations discussed in this thesis is almost the same 
as in Sawer's book.
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in chapters second, third, fourth, and fifth; chapters 
six and seven (comprising the part three) are devoted 
respectively to the Post-1945 Asian and Post-1945 European 
federations. Part four of the thesis, which is devoted 
to the study of Failed Federations, consists of chapters 
eight and nine devoted respectively to "Federations Created 
Under Potentially Nonfederal Situations", and "Federations 
that Failed Despite their Potentially Federal Bases". In 
the first group are included the Latin American Federations, 
and the Central African Federation, while the latter group 
(in chapter nine) consists of Indonesia, Pakistan, the 
West Indies, and Nigeria. It needs clarification, however, 
that it is not held here that federalism in Nigeria has 
finally failed. It may well be (and most likely is) that 
Nigeria's recent troubles, like the American Civil War, 
were only a passing phase in the country's march towards 
national integration and adjustment from which will soon 
emerge a stable centralized federalism. But, in any case, 
Nigeria, like the United States of the Civil War days, 
offers some valuable lessons with regard to failure of 
federalism. It has, therefore, been thought proper to 
include it in the group of failed federations for the purposes 
of this study.
While in the study of working examples of federalism 
a fuller analysis of politico-geographic factors in the 
origin and stability of federations has been attempted, 
in the examples of failed federations attention has mainly 
been focused on the factors contributing to the failures of 
the federations studied. As the study proceeds, beginning 
with the first example, hypotheses are set forth which are 
tested and modified, in so far as relevant, in the analysis 
of each subsequent case studied. These inferences, conclusions, 
and hypotheses are summarized in a final section where some 
general propositions on the origin and stability of 
federalism are put forward. Relevant, but not integral 
to this discussion, is the role of federal capitals and 
territories in the general stability of federal States.
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A brief note on these has therefore been included in the 
appe n dix,
As the study concerns itself only with the origin and 
overall stability of federal political systems, only those 
matters have been dealt with which in the author's opinion 
have a clear bearing on either the maintenance of the State 
as a union or its continuance as a federal in contrast to a 
unitary political organization. For reasons of this 
limitation of scope, many features and movements that may 
appear very important with regard to the future internal 
structure of individual federations— such as the new state 
movements in Australia and India--have not been dealt with, 
and any reference to them is only incidental. These factors, 
the author thinks, do not affect the ultimate survival of 
the State as a federation and, therefore, are not relevant 
to this study.
Since it is hopefully designed as a study in political 
geography, several important aspects of federalism that have 
been of great interest to political scientists and students 
of constitutions, are only barely touched. For, as 
Alexander says, political geographers (as specialists of a 
science) are :
not concerned with the form or structure of government 
by itself, that is, the division of functions among 
executive, legislative and judicial branches .
These are the matters for the political scientist.
Attention to form and structure of individual federations
has therefore been limited to a brief summary in order only
to make clear the broadly federal character of the States'
constitutions. It is now generally granted that:
Geography . . . must pay attention to the spatial
arrangements of the phenomena in an area and not so 
much to the phenomena themselves. Spatial relations are 
the ones that matter in geography . . .107
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As Norton Ginsburg says» "The "spatial organization" lies 
at the very heart of . 0 « geographical investigation,
whereas it is [only] peripheral to the main thrusts of 
other fields",108
While like most studies in geography in the past, the
present study is also basically synthetic and analytical,
it is hoped, however, that it differs from its predecessors
in one respect: in the past "the formulation of general
propositions has tended to be more implicit than explicit,
more derivative than primary", while here attempt has been
made to focus attention on the formulation of general
propositlons as the explicit and primary objective of the 
109study. While our subject of investigation remains the
federal pattern of State organization, in line with
contemporary research in geography, attempt has here been
made to move "away from pre-occupation with patterns per se"
For, as Robert Platt pointed out, pattern is a function of
organization; hence any proper study of patterns should
concern itself with the formulation of general propositions
and theories of o r g a n i z a t i o n , I t  must, however, be
emphasized that the propositions and theories (if they could
properly be called so) that this study aims to offer, are
basically concerned with what Kenneth Boulding terms the
levels of fr amewo rk s and clockwork s .  ^^ ^ This is inevitably
so, for "a typical theoretical situation in geography
112is described usually by way of patterns". Thus in
political geography, in contrast to political science, 
we are more concerned with "pattern laws" than "process laws
108
N„ Ginsburg, "Tasks of Geography", Geography, Vole 45, 
1969, p„ 401.
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(The manuscript is lodged in the library of the American 
Geographical Society, New York). Cited in W. Bunge, 
Theoretical Geography, Lund Series in Geography, Series C, 
No. 1, Lund: G. W „ K. Glerrup, 1966.
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It seems necessary to explain that the "pattern laws",
as conceived here, are clearly distinguished from the so-
called "morphological laws" which "make scant mention of
the phenomena involved, and concentrate solely on spatial 
113properties". In fact, as Blaut has noted, structure (the
areal arrangement of phenomena) and process (the arrangement
of these phenomena over time) are one and the same thing.
In other words, " . . .  structures of real world are simply
114slow processes of long duration". But while writing in
political geography--the frontier between geography and
political science-~a distinction between "pattern laws"
and "process laws" becomes necessary in view of an
altogether different connotation associated with the term
"process" in political science. As Gross writes:'*'^
"Political process" refers to the activities of people 
and various groups as they struggle for--and use-- 
power to achieve personal and group purposes. Its most 
carefully studied forms have been the efforts of 
conflicting political parties, factions, cliques, and 
leaders to attain formal positions of legitimate 
authority in the central organ of public government-- 
unitary and federal, national and local.
The study is planned with the conviction that a better 
understanding of the nature of federalism can be secured by 
trying to picture its workings as a process in which the 
diverse elements that compose a federal State integrate 
and compromise their differences, rather than a set of 
institutions and procedures whose operation is wholly 
determined by the legal norms and structures. A complete
politico-geographical examination of federalism from this 
point of view would require, as Livingston says, much more
113
J. C. Hudson, "A Location Theory for Rural Settlements", 
Annals, Association of American Geographers, V o L  59, 1969,
p . 366 .
114
J. M, Blaut, "Space and Process", Professional Geographer, 
Volo 13, July 1961, p. 4. This notion, first recognized 
by philosophers of science, seems to have been clearly 
set forth for the first time in geography by W. J. Cahnman, 
"Outline of a Theory of Area Studies", Annals, Association 
of American Geographers, Vol. 38, 1948, pp. 233-243.
115
Bo M . Gross, "Political Process", in International 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences , Vol. 12, p. 273.
116
Livingston, op. cit., footnote 18, preface.
44
than a single volume» This study has, therefore, limited 
itself to a detailed examination of spatial interaction 
in the rise of federal States, and to a more general scrutiny 
of spatial relations involved in the stability of federal 
political systems»
From the nature of its subject matter, this thesis 
becomes more a work of what may be termed a general 
practitioner, chan of an area specialist» For this reason, 
in so far as historical and political facts are concerned, 
the emphasis is on synthesis rather than analysis, but in 
respect of the spatial relations involved, the analysis is 
largely the author's own. Out of all this, like the general 
practitioners in other fields, the author has hopefully 
tried to weave "other men's threads (and some of his own) 
into patterns which they had not foreseen or even suspected".'1'^  
How far this attempt has been successful I do not know.
At several places, throughout this study, some well-
established hypotheses and opinions have been questioned and
alternatives have been suggested. While no finality is claimed
regarding the inferences and hypotheses that have been put
forward, I have done this in the belief that history and
social sciences share "this characteristic with the natural
sciences, in that the greatest advances . . .  in knowledge
and understanding come from a continual intellectual
questioning, readiness to challenge even the best-established
conventional wisdom, provided that adequate facts and
118logical arguments can be mobilized against it". I hope
that the facts and arguments I have mobilized in the pages 
that follow, are adequate to make my points clear and 
(perhaps) convincing. How far they are in fact so, is for 
the reader to judge.
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THE CLASSICAL FEDERATIONS
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Chapter II
FEDERALISM IN SWITZERLAND
Although as a centralized federation Switzerland is 
second to the United States of America, it is the State with 
the longest history of continuous experiment in federalism, 
and is the oldest multi-ethnic federation. Though abounding 
in a great number of diversities--topographic, cultural, 
linguistic and re 1igious--Switzerland offers an example of 
an integrated nation, a mature federal State.^ How this 
diversity has been fostered into unity (not uniformity), makes 
a rewarding study in the geography of federalism.
RISE OF SWISS FEDERALISM
The first beginning of the Swiss Confederation in 1291
was "the product of that tendency towards cooperation which,
with varying success, inspired the mediaeval communes of all 
2lands". With the death of the king of Burgundy in 1032, 
the whole of Helvetia (Switzerland) became part of the Holy 
Roman Empire. In the beginning the Germanic kings exercised 
considerable power over the area, but with the passage of 
time their hold began to decline. This decline was almost 
complete in the thirteenth century. Now as the central power 
declined, many communities of the Empire began to experiment 
with self-government and some of these emerged as almost free 
entities. With a view to winning the loyalties of these 
communities and thereby to strengthen his military power in
The maturity of the Swiss partnership is evident from the 
fact that despite its multifarious diversities it is one 
of the leading nations in nonviolent conflict resolution 
in its internal politics. See J. Steiner, "Nonviolent 
Conflict Resolution in Democratic Systems: Switzerland",
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13, 1969, pp. 295-304.
Paul E. Martin, article on Swiss Confederation in The 
Cambridge Mediaeval History, London: Cambridge University
Press, 1932, Vol. 7, p. 183.
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the struggle against the Papacy, the Holy Roman Emperor 
Frederick II granted them the status of free (i. e. , 
autonomous) units of the Empire. Because the imperial power 
at the time was too weak to guarantee the security of all 
the areas of the Empire, many of these communities began 
to organize themselves into groups for purposes of common 
defence. Everywhere confederations were emerging. The 
Swiss Confederation, originally an association of rural 
communes, was one of these.
The three communities of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwald, 
after the decline of the Holy Roman Empire, had fallen under 
the possession of the Hapsburgs. But Uri in 1231 and Schwyz 
in 1240 had received charters from Frederick II declaring 
that they were freed from the Hapsburg control and were 
now directly under the Emperor. During the period from 
1254-1273 when Germany was without a generally recognized 
ruler, the valleys made considerable progress towards self- 
rule. But with the rise of the Hapsburg power under 
Rudolf IV, and his subsequent election as the Holy Roman 
Emperor in 1273, this progress towards regional autonomy 
was gravely threatened. Rudolf attempted to integrate the 
Swiss communities into the imperial system. This proved 
very irksome to the communities which had so long enjoyed 
virtual autonomy in their internal matters. After Rudolf's 
death (on July 15, 1291) the leaders of Uri and Schwyz along
with those of Unterwald entered (on August 1, 1291) into an
Everlasting Alliance for mutual defence. The Alliance 
affirmed that the three communities would help any member 
threatened with loss or damage, by providing without limit 
or reserve men and materials for defence and aggression.
They refused to receive any tax farmers in their valleys or 
any representatives of a higher authority against whose 
decisions they could not appeal to leaders of their own 
communities. Unlike other mediaeval leagues, the Swiss 
Confederation was, according to its text, an Everlasting 
Alliance. It was in this sense a truer beginning of a 
federation. The reason for this was that the "interests
which the first confederates sought to defend were not
narrowly political, and therefore not likely to change with
the passage of time. Facing common dangers and common
3enemies, they were conscious of complete unity."
The confederation succeeded well in preserving the 
autonomy of its members. It also helped to awaken in them 
a sense of solidarity capable of giving birth to a real 
State. A serious threat to the Confederation came in 1315 
when Duke Leopold tried to re-impose Hapsburg authority over 
Schwyz and Unterwald. But the Confederates' victory over 
the Hapsburg forces at Morgarten, greatly enhanced their 
prestige and self-confidence, and the Confederation soon began 
to attract new allies from among the neighbouring communities 
which were disenchanted with or threatened by the Hapsburgs. 
First to join was the town of Lucerne (1332). Next came 
Zurich (1351) , then Glarus and Zug ( 1352) . Berne joined 
in 1353. Thus the original strong confederation of three 
was extended into a loose alliance of eight. There was no 
single all-embracing pact binding all the members together.
Six separate pacts linked the eight cantons. Between Berne, 
on the one hand, and Zurich, Glarus and Zug, on the other, 
there was no alliance at all, until at the Sempach Convention 
in 1386, after defeating the Hapsburg forces, the Confederates 
entered a fresh agreement for mutual military help in the 
form of a common military law.
The Confederates conquered the Austrian territory of 
Argau in 1415 and Thurgau in 1460. As time passed the 
rising prestige of the Confederation brought her new allies 
in the geographically contiguous areas. These included the 
monastery and town of St. Gallen, the town of Schaffhausen, 
the community of Toggenburg, the league of Graubunden (Grisons) 
and the towns of Solothurn, Fribourg, and Bienne as well 
as the town and country of Neuchätel. These were accorded
3
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the status of "associated districts" and were under obligation 
to supply troops whenever required.
Fribourg and Solothurn were admitted to full membership 
in 1481, Basle and Schaffhausen in 1501, and Appenzel in 1513. 
This brought the membership of the Confederation to thirteen.
But throughout the sixteenth century, with the oncoming of 
the Reformation, the loose unity of the Confederation was 
turned into discord. The Confederation was divided into two 
opposite camps--the Protestants, who looked to France, and 
the Roman Catholics who looked to Spain. Of the thirteen 
cantons, Zurich, Berne, Basle, and Schaffhausen were 
Protestant, while Uri, Schwyz, Unterwald, Lucerne, Zug,
Fribourg, and Solothurn followed the Catholic faith. Glarus 
and Appenzel had the two faiths side by side. This religious 
discord continued for about two centuries, but a number of 
historical events helped to save the Confederation from 
complete disintegration. One of the chief factors helping 
to hold the Confederation together was the French alliance 
of 1521. It was in France's interest that the Protestant 
and Catholic cantons remained at peace with each other, 
otherwise France would not have been able to recruit Swiss 
troops as agreed in the 1521 alliance. For this reason France 
worked towards the maintenance of domestic peace among the 
Confederates. Later it was the conquest of Switzerland by 
Revolutionary France that laid the foundation of Switzerland 
as an organic political entity. Napoleon Bonaparte was the 
man who outlined the real beginning of a centralized federation 
in the country by initiating the Act of Mediation of 1803.
At the close of the eighteenth century the Swiss
Confederation was an elaborate edifice that, it is said, only
4Providence could maintain erect. Besides the thirteen full 
members, the Confederation had a number of allies and associated 
districts. There were, besides, a number of subject areas. 
Practically each member canton had its subject areas. Some 
territories were subject to two or more cantons, and some
4
Gilliard, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 56.
were under seven or ten. A large part of Ticino was the 
common property of all except Appenzel. Some attempts from 
within to end the confusion failed. So it remained for the 
forces of Revolutionary France to end the confusion. On 
April 12, 1798 the "One and Indivisible Helvetic Republic"
was proclaimed on the dictates of France. The country 
was divided into twenty-three cantons; the ten new cantons 
were carved out from the associated districts and common 
bailiwicks.
A representative democracy with universal male suffrage, 
rigidly centralized on the French model, was established, 
thus ignoring a long historical heritage of variety in 
political outlook and regional autonomy. There was, naturally, 
great dissatisfaction with the new arrangement among the 
constituents. This, coupled with bad administration by new, 
inexperienced, and greedy officers, and the anti-clerica1ism 
of the French, provoked a revolt in the central cantons. 
Government in the country became highly unstable. Five 
different constitutions followed in quick succession. It 
was under these conditions that Napoleon Bonaparte offered 
his mediation and presented the Act of Mediation on February 
19, 1803. The territories of Mulhouse, Geneva and Bienne,
annexed by France, were not returned. A representative 
federal democracy of nineteen equal cantons, thirteen old 
and six new--St. Gallen, the Grisons (Graubunden), Argau, 
Thurgau, Ticino and Vaud--was established. The cantons 
regained practically all of their old rights and privileges.
But recognizing the disadvantages of a loose confederation, 
Napoleon incorporated some of the lasting results of the 
Revolution in the new order and gave them constitutional 
force. The Constitution proclaimed freedom before the law, 
recognized a general Swiss citizenship and guaranteed the 
right of freedom of settlement and occupation.
The supreme authority of the Confederation was the 
federal Diet composed of deputies from each of the cantons.
The Diet was responsible for internal security and foreign 
policy. The individual cantons contributed to the federal
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treasury in accordance with their size and representation.
As there was no permanent federal capital, the meetings
of the Diet had to take place alternately for a year, in
turn, in six cantons--three Protestant and three Catholic.
Napoleon took the Act of Mediation under his guarantee, and
no amendments to the Constitution--national or cantonal--
could be made without his consent. The new Diet was
fundamentally different from the old:
Whereas the traditional Diet was a body of plenipotentiar­
ies of sovereign cantons who could as a rule act only when 
unanimous, the Napoleonic institution was more like a 
parliament. It could reach valid decisions by simple 
majority vote on all ordinary matters. Wars, however, 
could be declared and treaties concluded by the Diet 
only by a majority of three-quarters of the cantons".5
Constitutional Progress and Structure 
With the fall of Napoleon, a new constitution, this time 
sponsored by the Allies, was adopted on August 7, 1815.
Neuchätel and Geneva were given over to Switzerland and made 
autonomous cantons of the Confederation. Thus the number 
of cantons was raised to twenty-two. Because the Act of 
Mediation had suited the needs of Switzerland so well, the 
new Constitution incorporated most of the essential features 
of the Napoleonic Constitution. Equality of representation 
in the Diet was restored. In place of six only three cantons-- 
Zurich, Berne, and Lucerne--were, by turn, to be the seats 
of the Diet on a two-year term basis. Although majority 
decision in the Diet was to prevail, the Diet had no authority 
to ensure the acceptance of the majority decision by all the 
cantons. Neutrality of Switzerland in peace and war was 
recognized by all European powers.
During the eighteen-thirties the old rivalry between 
Catholic and Protestant cantons raised its ugly head, and 
by the mid-forties it threatened to break the solidarity 
of the Confederation. Seven Catholic cantons organized 
themselves into the Sonderbund League.^ In 1847 the Diet,
5
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by a majority vote, decided to dissolve the League, Federal 
troops accomplished the task in November 1847. In 1848 
a new Constitution, which represented a compromise between 
the two extreme views of a completely unitary and an 
extremely loose confederal polity, was adopted. The cantons 
no longer remained sovereign. The central government was 
given the sole charge of the army, customs, currency and 
postal services. Government in each canton was to be 
democratic and republican. The central government was 
empowered to enforce the articles of the Constitution and 
also to take necessary steps to promote national welfare.
A bicameral legislature on the American pattern was 
adopted. A Federal Assembly was to be elected by the people 
in ratio of one deputy for 20,000 (now 22,000) population.
The Council of State had forty-four members--two from each 
canton. The system of cantonal instruction to the 
representatives to the Council of State was abolished. A 
joint session of the two houses of the legislature was to 
elect the Federal Council (the central executive body of 
seven members, each presiding in turn), the Federal Tribunal 
and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. But any new law 
had to receive a majority in both the houses separately.
This saved the cantons from extreme central control. Cantons 
were to manage administration of law, justice and education, 
but freedom for religion and worship was guaranteed to all. 
Berne was made the federal capital.
Ever since the centralized constitution of 1848 the 
Swiss nation has steadily grown into maturity. As the 
interests of the people became more unified, the more redundant 
have proved the disparities in the laws of the cantons. With 
the people's consent the Constitution has been revised over 
fifty times since 1874 but the spirit of federalism, the 
diversity within unity, has remained. Power from the cantons 
has gradually been transferred to the federal government 
and the central authority has continued to play a greater 
role in the daily life of the people. The Swiss system took 
its unique shape as a federation after the constitutional
reform of 1874, which made it a federation of nineteen full 
and six half cantons. The latter rank full for practically 
all purposes, and in particular have the same degree of 
autonomy as the rest, but they have only one vote each in 
the Council of State where others have two. They count as 
half when reckoning the concurrence of the people in a 
majority of cantons for the purposes of constitutional 
revision.
Switzerland had a centuries-old tradition of government 
by public meetings. In 1874 this principle of referendum 
was adopted as a basic feature of the Swiss Constitution 
for federal purposes as well. The Federal Court in Switzerland 
can invalidate cantonal laws but not the central ones. Central 
laws can, however, be submitted to the people as referenda 
on both legislative and popular initiative. Any amendment 
needs the support of the majority of the people in the 
country, as well as a majority of the cantons. "But 
amendment is also virtually achieved if the Centre enacts 
a law not within its enumerated powers, and either no referendum 
is demanded, or if demanded results in approval by a majority 
of people as a whole--not necessarily in a majority of 
Regions as well. This method of 'breaking through' the 
Constitution is freely used where the degree of departure
7from the established constitutional power is relatively small". 
Further, the "decrees" of the Federal Assembly are not subject 
to referendum if the Assembly declares them to be urgent or 
not of general application. This, says Sawer, "has become 
in practice a kind of emergency provision, under which important 
extensions of Centre competence have been enacted, chiefly 
to deal with economic and defence crises, without any 
possibility of electoral check". All this has tended to draw
G. Sawer, Modern Federalism, London: C. A. Watts & Co.
Ltd., 1969, p. 28.
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Switzerland "towards the unificationist end of the federal 
„ 8spectrum .
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE RISE 
OF SWISS FEDERALISM
Factors for Regional Identities 
One need not be a determinist to suggest that Swiss 
federalism, in its early phases, was somewhat conditioned 
by the physical forces of its environment. With the Jura 
in the northwest covering one-tenth of its surface area, 
and the Alps in the south covering another sixty percent, 
Switzerland has a very rugged topography. In between the 
two mountain ranges is the Swiss plateau, mostly lying above 
1500 feet. The Swiss Alps run into three parallel southwest- 
northeast waves— called, from north to south, the Prealps 
(or the foot hills) , the northern Alps, and the Meridional 
Alps. The latter two are separated by the valleys of the 
Rhine flowing to the north, and the Rhone flowing to the 
southwest. The Swiss Alps form a great European watershed. 
Besides the two great rivers mentioned above, Ticino and 
Toce flow to the south to form tributaries of the River P o .
The Inn flows to the east to join the Danube. The Swiss Alps 
are, therefore, criss-crossed by a number of valleys. The 
Jura is also broken up into valleys separated by ridges.
The plateau region enclosed by the two mountain ranges is 
itself compartmentalized by a few low hills that cross it.
This compartmentalization of the surface was reflected 
in the pattern of human occupance of the area. The existence 
of small valleys separated from one another by rugged hills or
Sawer, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 29. A comprehensive study 
of the Swiss constitution is to be found in Christopher 
Hughes, The Federal Government of Switzerland, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1954. Briefer, though good, studies of 
the Swiss government are to be found in: W. E. Rappard,
The Government of Switzerland, New York: D. Van Nostrand
Company, 1936; and G. R. Codding, Jr., The Federal 
Government of Switzerland, London: Allen & Unwin Ltd.
1961 edition and 1965 impression.
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mountain ranges helped the rise of quasi-independent settlements 
of small dimensions, distinct in cultural community from one 
another. Each settlement, although small, came to possess 
a strong identity born out of its isolation and nearly 
independent subsistence economy. As Andre Siegfried says, 
the various areas in Switzerland were of such marked individual­
ity that their inhabitants were conscious of the differences.
In each circumscribed valley or distinctive pays, corresponding 
to the boundaries of a canton, each citizen knew instinctively 
why he belonged to his particular valley. This, Siegfried
thinks, was the solid basis of a federal democracy which had
9its roots both in the soil and in the hearts of men. However 
"the physical and material handicaps imposed by Nature have 
been overcome by the Swiss to a remarkable extent, it is only 
the psychological effects of living in narrow valleys that 
they could never fully overcome".
The sense of independence and individuality among the 
Swiss cantons was also fostered by their historical experience 
as parts of the Hapsburg Empire or of the Holy Roman Empire 
(at least nominally till 1648) . As these cantons, because 
of the difficulties of access, could never be effectively 
controlled from the distant seat of imperial government, the 
imperial masters had to satisfy themselves with whatever 
revenue they could extract through their intermediary vassals 
or bailiffs. The cantons were, for all practical purposes, 
left free to enjoy their internal autonomy. That the 
imperial masters recognized the autonomy of these communities 
is evident from the fact that Frederick II granted several of 
these cantons the status of free communities of the Empire.
Later, as the membership of the original Confederation 
of the three increased, other diversities and identifying
9
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elements in the makeup of the cantons were introduced.
Originally the Confederation was homogeneous in language 
and religion. First, diversity in respect of language was 
introduced as several of the new members were French-speaking. 
With the religious Reformation of the sixteenth century many 
of the cantons became Protestant while others retained the 
Catholic faith. Thus religion became a strongly identifying 
element in the makeup of the Swiss cantons. Fortunately, 
however, the religious and linguistic divisions among the 
cantons did not coincide. As we shall explain later in 
this chapter, the existence of cross-cutting (or interlinking) 
cleavages of language and religion have greatly helped 
to neutralize the divisive forces of the either and have thereby 
helped to maintain the Confederation.
Factors for Unity
Although difficulties of transport and communication 
tended to localize human activity in the Swiss valleys and 
made each canton to live in a world of its own, the inter­
vening barriers did not completely isolate the cantons from 
their neighbours. Throughout the Swiss Alps there are 
narrow corridors connecting the different valleys. Through 
these corridors there has been a continuous traffic all 
through history. This tended to make the valley communities 
in Switzerland independent but interrelated families--a 
unity in diversity.
The mountain environment of the Swiss cantons contributed 
to their sense of belonging together in another sense also.
As the communities lived under broadly similar geographical 
conditions, the” nature of their economies and their modes 
of living were also very similar. This made mutual understanding 
of one another's problems and way of life easier. While in 
modern times similarities in economy tend to pull communities 
apart by creating economic competition, in the middle ages, 
when the first foundations of Swiss federalism were laid, 
these communities were largely self-sufficient and hence the 
element of competition as a divisive force was largely absent.
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Switzerland's location on the cross-roads between France, 
Italy, Austria, and Germany was an important factor in the 
rise of a sense of unity among the valley communities. The 
Swiss realized quite early that in order to control traffic 
through their mountain cross-roads, and thereby to extract 
capital out of their strategically advantageous location, 
they had to remain united. For while individually they 
could not hold the mountain passes to themselves, united 
they made them invincible. Herold calls Switzerland an 
antechamber with its doors leading to the four main European 
apartments.
The four adjacent rooms--France to the west, Germany 
to the north, Austria to the east, and Italy to the 
south--have their own connecting doors, it is true, but 
since they are invariably locked and bolted whenever 
the tenants cease to be on speaking terms, the most 
convenient routes from Germany and northern France 
to Italy and from Austria to France lead through 
Switzerland's windowless antechamber. It is windowless 
in the sense that Switzerland is landlocked; in order 
to get air, it must keep its doors to the surrounding 
rooms open at all times, even when the neighbours 
barricade their own interconnecting doors. 1
A further factor in drawing the cantons together was 
that with the increasing population of their valleys the 
cantons realized the narrowness of their space and its 
insufficiency to meet the demands of their growing numbers.
As this recognition came, trade and commerce between the 
cantons increased, which in time bound them together into 
an economic unit. This increased interregional commerce 
loosened the barriers--physical and mental--that stood 
between the valley communities, and thereby laid the 
foundation of a closer political union. The plateau cantons 
of the north were of value to the mountain cantons for their 
surplus supplies of grains, while the city-states themselves 
provided a market for the products of the pastoral industry 
of the mountain cantons. Their interests were also bound 
together because the mountain cantons controlled the cross­
roads on whose free and uninterrupted use the prosperity 
of some of the city-states greatly depended. This inter-
11
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dependence of the Swiss cantons is rather overemphasi zed
(on rather deterministic lines) by Siegfried when he says:
juxtaposition of the two mountain systems which enclose 
it is the essential factor which permitted the establish­
ment of a political unit between France, Germany, Italy 
and the Danubian countries, and, to a certain extent, 
against them. The area thus formed is diverse in 
character, but balanced, and well organized and it 
contains within itself all the conditions necessary 
for a free and autonomous existence. On the one hand 
there has been a tendency toward diversity, towards 
formation of separate compartments, . . . but on the
other hand there is also a tendency to homogeneity, and 
the logic of this politico-geographic complex leads 
to the strongest conceivable form of national unity.12
Siegfried thinks that "The national life of Switzerland is
13essentially a combination of altitudes".
But perhaps the most important factor that gave the Swiss 
communities a consciousness of kind and fostered, rather 
enforced, unity among them, was the recognition of a common 
danger to their survival as autonomous communities. It was 
the threat of the Austrian Hapsburgs that had initiated the 
Confederation and had served to keep it together until 
the conquest of Switzerland by Revolutionary France. In the 
period after 1815, although the unity and neutrality of 
Switzerland were recognized by the leading European powers, 
the international rivalry between them continued to keep the 
Swiss alert towards their national security, for the 
preservation of which attempts were continuously being made 
towards greater centralization of governmental powers. The 
Sonderbund war further awakened the sense of urgency for 
greater centralization, and after the defeat of the Catholic 
cantons in 1848, a more centralized constitution was proclaimed- 
an objective that was more fully achieved by the constitutional 
revision of 1874. This continued sense of military insecurity 
and external interference in Swiss affairs may be seen in
12
Siegfried, op. cit., footnote 9, p p . 21-22.
13
Siegfried, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 23.
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the fact that Austria, Prussia, France and Russia at first 
forbade the constitutional revision of 1848, but later 
owing to the revolutionary movement which swept Europe that 
spring, they were unable to interfere further in Swiss affairs.
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC INFERENCES
1. This study of Swiss federalism would support "the
15military interpretation of federal constitutions" which
16has been "rather over-stressed by Professor William Riker". 
Although we do not think that the "military condition" as 
Riker calls it, is a necessary factor for the rise of 
federalism in all cases, it may nevertheless be a necessary 
condition in a particular type of federal situation. Before 
the rise of modern centralized federalism and its further 
course of integration necessitated by the rise of large 
scale industrial economy and need for centralized 
national planning, federalism was essentially an alliance 
for the limited purposes of military security in face of 
a common danger. In these earlier experiments (in which 
category the pre-Napoleonic phase of Swiss federalism is 
included), the military condition in the rise of federalism 
may well have been necessary (and sometimes even sufficient), 
for often military security was the primary raison d'etre 
of such unions or alliances. But with the changed emphasis 
of modern federalism, military security can no longer be a 
sufficient raison d 'etre of a centralized federation. Now 
federations are no longer limited-purpose-alliances. The 
primary objective of modern federalism is to create 
a body politic —  an integrated and fully functiomng political
14
W. H. Riker, Federalism; Origin, operation, Significance, 
Boston ; Little , Brown and Co . , 196 4 , p . 35.
15
Riker, op. cit., footnote 14.
16
Sawer, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 181. The thesis of the 
necessarily military origin of federalism is critically 
examined in my paper "Military Interpretation of Federal 
Constitutions: A Critique", Journal of Politics, Vol. 33,
February, 1971, pp. 180-189.
unit. For this it is necessary that the purposes that 
bind the prospective partners together are not narrowly 
political or military.
However, if we give a closer look to these earlier 
experiments in federalism, we may well find persistence of 
a politico-geographic situation essentially similar to certain 
possible type of federal situation in modern times. Put 
simply, the bases on which these earlier experiments in 
federalism were usually built consisted of a number of 
regionally-grouped communities, with small power potentials 
but strong regional identities, that were faced with a common 
threat to their survival. While their strong individual 
identities prevented the communities from coming closer 
than a loose confederation, their individual weaknesses 
and insufficiencies forced them to at least this degree of 
unity if they wanted to survive at all. In this sense the 
earlier experiments in federalism were essentially cases of 
union born under conditions of uniform geographical distribution 
of power--a case where a number of strongly self-identifying 
political units with individually weak power potential were 
faced with a common threat to survival. These units, in 
the absence of an over-arching force to guide them and 
coordinate their activities, came closer together in order 
to create jointly their own central source of light-- the 
sun of political power--in the form of a central Federal 
Government. These experiments also point to the fact that 
federalism is essentially a union of equal partners.
It is essentially this pattern of geographical 
distribution of power that seems to have brought the three 
forest cantons into the Confederation, and it was again an 
important force in keeping the diverse Swiss cantons together. 
But prior to 1798, when Berne and Zurich possessed extensive 
dependent territories and large population and economic 
resources, there was a distinct tendency towards an 
asymmetrical development since the more powerful cantons were 
often tempted towards actions and alliances independent of 
the rest of the Confederation. It should be remembered that
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the real foundation of the centralized Swiss federalism was 
laid by Napoleon when he converted the dependent territories 
of the cantons into autonomous members of the Confederation, 
thus bringing about a uniform geographical distribution of 
political status in the area, and--with its units so small-- 
making intercantonal close cooperation and union under the 
Confederation necessary to the very existence of the 
individual cantons threatened by mutual rivalries and common 
external threats. In the earliest phase, what had prevented 
an actual break of the Confederation was the presence of a 
continued external threat (as also the great military 
solidarity of the original forest cantons) coupled with 
France's interest in the maintenance of domestic peace in 
Switzerland.
In modern times somewhat similar federal situations have 
arisen, and may well arise in the future, wherever regionally 
grouped political communities possess very strong (and to 
some extent partly mutually exclusive) identifying elements 
in their makeup. In such examples the "military condition" 
may well be a necessary factor in the rise of federalism.
2. The highly complex linguistic-cultural base of 
Switzerland consists of four strongly identifying and 
regionally-grouped elements of various strength. There is 
a large majority of German- (69.3 percent), a good number of 
French- (18.9 percent), and small minorities of Italian- 
(9.5 percent) and Romaf^ch^- (0.9 percent) speaking groups. 
Cultural pulls from across the borders in north, south and 
west have often been strong, and perhaps it is truly said 
that it was a number of historico-political accidents in 
juxtaposition with certain environmental conditions that 
gave birth to the Swiss nation. The unity of the Swiss 
cantons, possessing highly divergent cultural-linguiStic 
bases, was born in the first place, out of their desire for 
self-identity and autonomy which their own cultural homelands, 
treating them as mere annexes, were not prepared to give.
At the heart of this desire for autonomy was the historical
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fact that each of the peoples, despite having cultural
attachments to their respective cultural homelands, had
throughout maintained some kind of local autonomy in view
of the looser central administration in these remoter areas.
The union that was originally initiated by this consciousness
of kind, was later reinforced by other factors--economic,
political, and strategic in nature.
But if historico-political accidents initiated the
Swiss federalism, it was the politico-geographical fact of
their location surrounded by powerful, and at times hostile,
neighbours that greatly helped to maintain the union. This
politico-geographical factor of location between strong
powers--against whom their internal division would be a sure
invitation to doom— fostered a strong sense of unity among
the apparently diverse population groups that these cantons
represented. The force of this factor has been recognized,
in different contexts, by a number of students of Swiss
history and politics. "Success in war and the pride in
common triumph counted for much in the earlier stages of the
process [of evolution of a democratic State], while in the
latest the existence of four great States to the north, east,
south, and west had, so to speak, squeezed the Swiss together,
keeping them always on their guard against dangers from
17abroad", says Bryce. The Federalist records that the Swiss
cantons have been kept together, besides other things, ". . .
by the fear of powerful neighbours, to one of which they
18were formerly subject". Indeed, the national unity of
Switzerland "was not and is not . . . based on race, tongue,
creed, or allegiance to a common ruler, but rather on a very
17
James Bryce, Modern Democracies, London: Macmillan Co.,
1929, Vol. 1, p. 372.
18
A. Hamilton, J. Madison, and J. Jay; The Federalist 
Papers (with an introduction by Glinton Rossiter),
New York: The New American Library, 1961, essay no. 19,
p. 133.
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conscious solidarity and need of reciprocal protection".
While, on the one hand, this politico-geographic
location helped to maintain the Federation by fostering a
sense of unity among the constituents, on the other it also
helped to stabilize the federal arrangement externally.
The neighbours of Switzerland, however rapacious, realized
the futility of overrunning this country, for in the event
of attack by one Switzerland was likely to get the support
of a powerful rival. As Herold remarks "Switzerland would,
in all likelihood, have disappeared from the map long
ago had it not been for the balance of power of the
2 0European States".
The hypothesis is that in multi-ethnic or highly 
heterogeneous federations with strong regional identities, a 
continued external threat is a favourable factor in the 
maintenance of the State as a federation; for if the external 
threat continues for a long enough time, the parties to 
the federal union, despite their individual identities which 
may at times be mutually exclusive, are compelled to adjust 
their differences and thus learn to live together as a 
close-knit family. A secondary hypothesis, supplementing 
the above, is that the presence of mutually hostile political 
pressures on the borders of such a federation is a further 
favourable factor for the stability of the union: while on
the one hand, it helps to keep the constituents of the 
federation together by squeezing them into unity, on the 
other, the conflicting external threats nullify themselves 
and instead of harming the State maintain the status quo on 
its borders, thus saving the nation from much wastage on 
defence etc.
3. Switzerland possesses perhaps the highest degree of 
diversity per unit area among the nations of the world.
19
Rappard, op. cit., footnote 5, p. xii.
20
Herold, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 236.
These diversities permeate practically all aspects of Swiss 
life, e. g., language, religion, culture, and economic 
structure. Simply stated these diversities enforced upon 
one another would make a federal union of the Swiss cantons 
look impossible. But, in fact, the geographical distribution 
of these diversities is such that these seemingly divisive 
forces have themselves been converted into a strong unifying 
force, and have thus helped to create in Switzerland one 
of the world's most harmonized, stable, and integrated nations. 
Among the regionally identifying diversities in Switzerland, 
language and religion are of special note. It is interesting 
that while in some other parts of the world language and/or 
religion have played havoc with national unity, in Switzerland 
the geographical pattern of their distribution is such that 
despite the regional groupings of religion and of language, 
each of these two diversities finds its house divided 
against itself. The net result is that members of neither 
group are in a position to present a united front against 
their counterparts. Large sections of German-speaking Swiss 
are Roman Catholics and large sections of French-speaking 
Swiss are Protestants. These sharply cross-cutting cleavage 
lines of language and religion (as shown in figure 2.1) 
neutralize each other's divisive forces and the cleavages 
are thus transformed into linkages helping to foster an urge 
for linguistic and religious harmony which alone could be 
the basis of Switzerland's existence as a nation.
As the tables 2.1 and 2.2 show, the total percentages 
of German-, French-, Italian-, and Romanche-speaking groups 
are 69.3, 18.9, 9.5 and 0.9 respectively, while the
percentage breakdown of the two religious faiths--Protestant 
and Roman Catholic--is 52.7 and 45.9 respectively, with 1.4 
percent people professing other faiths or having no religion 
at all. While five full cantons have a French-speaking 
majority, only one has an Italian-speaking majority, and 
none has Roman^h^. The rest of the sixteen cantons have a 
German-speaking majority. In respect of religion, however, 
the cantons are evenly divided. Of the ten and a half cantons
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with Catholic majorities, two (Fribourg and Valais) are 
French-speaking, one (Ticino) is Italian-speaking, and the 
remaining seven and a half (Obwalden, Appenzel-Inner Rhodes, 
Schwyz, Uri, Nidwalden, Lucerne, Zug, St. Gallen and 
Solothurn) are German-speaking majority cantons. Similarly, 
of the ten and a half cantons with Protestant majorities, 
two (Vaud and Neuchätel) are French-speaking, and the 
remaining eight and a half (Berne, Appenze1-Outer Rhodes, 
Schaffhausen, Basle Country, Basle Town, Zurich, Glarus,
Thurgau, Argau and Grisons) are German-speaking majority 
cantons.2'*' These highly overlapping boundaries of language 
and religion in Switzerland have weakened both language and 
religion as divisive forces, because each of them, on 
account of this peculiar pattern of spatial distribution, 
is divided against itself. Hence, neither is able to fortify 
its camp without risking sizable segments of its group in 
the other camp. Thus neither of them can overplay its hand 
and the fissiparous tendencies cancel out.
The hypothesis is: when the boundary lines of regionally-
identifying diversities in a federal State highly overlap, 
the cleavages are transformed into linkages and the result 
is a stable federalism. From this it is also deduced that 
in multi-ethnic or highly heterogeneous States with strong 
regional identities, other things being favourable, the 
greater the factors of "felt" diversities in the national 
life, the greater are the chances of a stable federation, 
for under such conditions the chances are greater that 
the geographical patterns of the major diversities, such as 
religion and language, will not coincide, and their overlap 
will tend to neutralize their divisive force. Under the 
neutralized forces of the main identifying diversities 
national unity will be longer lasting and easier to achieve.
The examples of Canada, India, and Malaysia would support 
this hypothesis in different ways.
Although in 1950 Geneva had an overall majority of Protestants 
who comprised 50.6 percent of the total population of the 
canton, in 1960 neither religious faith had an overall 
majority. Percentage share of the two faiths in 1960 was: 
Protestants 45.7, Catholics 48.3.
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Table 2.1
LANGUAGES SPOKEN IN SWISS CANTONS (IN 1960)
(Percentages)
Canton Ge rman French Italian Romarfch^ Other
Zurich 88.1 1.9 8.0 0.4 1.6
Berne 80.5 14.4 4.3 0.1 0.7
Lucerne 94.3 0.9 4.0 0,2 0.6
Ur i 94.5 0.3 4.7 0.4 0.1
Schwyz 94.3 0.4 4 . 7 0.3 0.3
Obwalden 96.2 0.4 2.9 0.1 0.4
Nidwalden 93.5 0.5 5.6 0.2 0.2
Glarus 86.9 0.4 11.7 0.4 0.6
Zug 90.4 1.1 7.0 0.4 1.1
Fribourg 34.0 63.4 1.7 0.0 0.9
Solothurn 90.3 2.0 6.9 0.2 0.6
Basle Town 89.4 4.2 4.7 0.3 1.4
Basle Country 88.1 2.4 8.3 0.2 1.0
Schaf fhausen 91.1 0.9 7 . 1 0.2 0.7
Appenzell- 
Outer Rhodes 93.0 0.4 5.5 0.2 0.9
Appenzel1- 
Inner Rhodes 95.8 0.1 3.8 0.1 0.2
St. Gallen 93.3 0.5 5.1 0.4 0.7
Grisons 56.6 0.5 16.1 26.1 0.7
Aargau 90.5 1.0 7.6 0.2 0.7
Thurgau 91.7 0.5 7.1 0.2 0.5
Ticino 9.4 1.5 88.2 0.2 0.7
Vaud 11.0 79.2 6.7 0.1 3.0
Valais 33.6 61.7 4.4 0.0 0.3
Neuchätel 11.9 78.3 8.6 0.1 1. 1
Geneva 13.3 70.0 9.6 0.1 7.0
Switze rland 69.3 18.9 9.5 0.9 1.4
Source: Annuaire Statistique de la Suisse, 1967, p. 27 .
Note: All cantons have a German-speaking majority except
for those whose percentages are underlined.
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Table 2.2
DOMINANT RELIGIONS IN SWISS CANTONS (IN 1960)
Canton Protestant Catholic
(Population by (Population by
percentage) pe rcentage)
Zurich 65.8 32.4
Berne 79.9 19.5
Lucerne 13.7 85.7
Ur i 7 . 3 92.6
Schwyz 6.2 93.7
Obwalden 3.8 96.1
Nidwalden 7.6 92 . 3
G 1aru s 58.8 4 1.0
Zug 16.2 83.3
Fribourg 13.3 86.3
Solothurn 39 . 3 59.9
Basle Town 59.8 37.1
Basle Country 65.3 33.7
Schaffhausen 71.4 27.9
Appenze11- 
Outer Rhodes 76.6 22.7
Appenze11- 
Inner Rhodes 3.7 96.2
St. Gallen 37.2 62.3
Gris on s 48.0 51.4
Aa rgau 52.4 46.9
Thurgau 60.9 38.7
Ticino 6.8 91.3
Vaud 70 o 7 27.2
Valais 3.9 95.9
Neuchäte1 68.5 29.2
Geneva 45.7 48.3
Switzerland 52.7 45.9
Source: Annuaire Statistique de la Suisse, 1967, p. 29.
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Ch ap te r III 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM
The United States is the country that invented modern
centralized federalism through its Constitution of 1787--that
"most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the
1brain and purpose of man". It has been described as a
federal country in spirit, in its way of life, and in its 
2Constitution« Its paramount significance in the development 
of the modern idea of federalism is clear from statements 
such as: "Any definition of federal government which fails
to include the United States would be thereby condemned as
3unreal". C * J. Friedrich has traced in detail the impact
4of the American Constitution abroad.
THE RISE OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
The foundations of the Anglo-Saxon nation in what is 
now the United States, were laid in 1607 when the first 
English colony was planted in Jamestown, Virginia, which 
after some initial hardships of the wilderness soon proved 
a success. Attracted by the success of Virginia, new 
colonies began to take root. Plymouth and Boston were planted 
in 1620 and 1630 respectively; Rhode Island and Connecticut
in 1636, and Maryland in 1634. New Netherlands, established
I Lb-23by the Dutch in , was conquered by England and renamed
New York in 1664. Charleston was founded by the Carolina 
Proprietors in 1670. This was followed by the royal province
1
Statement by Gladstone, the British statesman. Cited in B«
Schwartz, The Reins of Power: A Constitutional History of the
United States, London: Chatto & Windus, 1964, p. 2.
2
M. J. C. Vile, The Structure of American Federalism, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 1.
3
K „ C. Wheare, Federal Government, London: Oxford University
Press, fourth edition, 1963, p. 1.
C . J. Friedrich, Impact of American Constitutionalism Abroad, 
Boston: Boston University Press, 1967,
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of New Hampshire in 1679. In 1729 Carolina was split into 
North and South, centred respectively on Wilmington and 
Charleston. New Jersey had already been founded in 1664. 
Pennsylvania in 1681, and Delaware in 1702 were founded by 
the Quaker, William Penn, Only one more colony, Georgia, 
was established (in 1733) before Independence was achieved.
From the beginning, conditioned in part by their 
geographical and political circumstances, these scattered 
little pockets of plantation or trading post planted in the 
wilderness of the eastern coast of North America, often 
removed from one another by long distances, developed strong 
individual identities. While the intervening distances 
restricted inter-co1onial intercourse, the geographical 
circumstances of the colonies, greatly differing from north 
to south, gave rise to marked differences in their economies 
and way of life. Especially marked were the contrasts between 
the colonies in the extreme north and the deep south. South 
of the Chesapeake Bay, mountains lie 200 to 250 miles inland 
leaving a wide and fertile coastal plain with a warm and 
humid climate, while the New England region in the northeast 
is almost entirely hilly. Hills rise abruptly not far back 
from the shore, the terrain is rugged, the soil stony and 
acid, and the growing season short. Besides these factors, 
differences in religious faiths and the diverse origins 
of the colonies also tended to keep them apart.
But while on the one hand these factors tended to keep 
the colonies apart, there were other factors, both physical 
and political, that were fostering in them a consciousness 
of kind. The colonies were hedged by Spanish territory to 
the South and French territory to the north, while the 
seemingly unsurmountable barrier of the Appalachians to 
the west narrowed the British horizon and "shut off the 
great beyond; it took away the temptation to wide expansion
which was defeating the aims of the Spanish and the 
5French . . .". It was natural that as these discrete
foundations expanded, they discovered further mutual interests 
along their borders and became, in that process, "the 
building blocks" that after nearly two centuries were built 
into the federation of the United States of America.^
Civil War and other internal troubles in England during 
1641-1653 left all the English colonies to grow in their own 
ways. This "salutary neglect" was continued by Cromwell 
when he became the Lord Protector of the English Commonwealth 
in 1653. Being thrown on their resources, the colonies sought 
their own markets, undertook their own defence, and by 1660 
had begun to develop local institutions with a distinctive 
cast, when with the restoration of the monarchy in England 
there came a perceptible shift in the policy towards the 
colonies. But this period of neglect was long enough to give 
the colonies a sense of manhood. Each--the New England group, 
Virginia, and Maryland--were by now "full-fledged commonwealths
E. C. Semple, American History and its Geographical Condit- 
ions, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1933 edition, p. 46. As
another geographer writes "At first the Appalachians were 
thought to be so formidable as to prohibit easy communication 
across them, but this belief . . . was abandoned in the
light of exploratory accounts [and] the spirit of optimism 
reached . . .  by the 1790s". R, H. Brown, Historical 
Geography of the United States, New York: Harcourt, Brace
& C o . , 1948 , p . 96.
D. Whittlesey, "The United States: The origin of a Federal
State", in W. G. East and A. E. Moodie (Eds.), The Changing 
World, London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1956, p. 242.
The standard work on the colonial period of American history 
is C. M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History, 
four volumes, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943-1947.
Andrews has beautifully summarized his ideas in The Colonial 
Background of the American Revolution, New Haven: Yale
University Press, revised edition, fifth printing 1948. 
Especially relevant is the first essay titled "The British 
Colonies in America", p p . 3-36, in the latter book. Also
relevant is D. J. Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial
Experience, New York: Random House, 1958.
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possessing most of the apparatus of civilized life as
developed up to that time . . . [and] conscious of their
peculiar interests and capable of defending themselves against
7foreign enemy". Perhaps the most significant development 
of the period was the formation of the New England Confederacy 
in 1643, largely for defence against the Dutch, the French 
and the Amerinds. The union, which lasted till 1684, has 
been regarded as having "In several respects . . . anticipated
the Confederation of 1781".^
Under the influence of their Confederacy the relationship 
of the New England colonies with the mother country became 
"one of sentiment and tradition rather than of compulsion; 
they were every bit as self-reliant and independent as the
9British Commonwealth of today". In 1651 Massachusetts 
declared "Our allegiance binds not to the laws of England 
any longer than while we live in England, for the laws of 
the Parliament of England reach us no longer".10 The 
declaration was re-echoed in other colonies, and was a 
favourite statement of many spokesmen at the time of the 
Revolution. All in all the colonies, by the mid-seventeenth 
century, were developing into virtual little countries.
After 1660, however, things began to change. Under 
Charles II New Netherland was conquered and the gap between 
New England and Maryland was filled by the Middle Colonies 
(Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware); the 
southern frontier was extended by the foundation of Carolina. 
The English Parliament laid down a definite economic policy
7
S. E. Morison and H. S. Commager, The Growth of the American 
Republic, Vol. 1, New York: Oxford University Press, fifth
edition, 1962, p. 72.
8
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Cited in W. Miller, A New History of the United States, 
London: Faber & Faber, 1958, p. 56.
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for the colonies in the Acts of Trade and Navigation. The
Acts were motivated by mercantilist doctrine, which held that
the individual and corporate enterprise should be controlled
by the State to enhance the wealth of the nation. The Empire
was regarded not as a federation but as a unit, a consolidated
State, in which it was supposed that the colonies should
contribute to national wealth and power by giving employment
to imperial shipping and by producing articles which the home
country would otherwise have to buy from foreign lands;
such as sugar, tobacco, rice, naval stores, and other raw
materials. The mother country should, in return, supply
manufactured goods to the colonies.
Though the first elaborate Navigation Acts were passed
in 1651, little effort was made to enforce them. With the
restoration of the monarchy, however, the Parliament "set
about to closing the breaches in the mercantilist walls which
remained after the Act of 1 6 5 1 " . ^  To the basic Acts passed
between 1660-1663, some important ones were added in 1696
which with a few minor alterations and extensions were
12operative for nearly a hundred years.
Till late in the eighteenth century the Acts of Navigation 
were honoured more in the breach than in the observance, but 
the mercantilist system had served the mother country well.
As an Englishman observed in 1766 an "American [is] apparelled 
from head to foot in our manufactures . . .  he scarcely drinks, 
sits, moves, labours, or recreates himself without contributing
n
J. C. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution, London: 
Faber & Faber, 1945, p. 56.
12
The Acts of Navigation and Trade restricted all trade 
between the colonies and England to English ships; 
enumerated commodities that could be sent nowhere but to 
England; and made it necessary for all imports to the 
colonies to be routed through English ports where taxes 
were collected. Later industrial manufactures in the 
colonies were generally restricted. In 1673 limits were 
put on intercolonial trade itself.
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to the emoluments of the mother country". To the colonists,
however, the system was most unpalatable, especially as it 
came after that period of "salutary neglect" during which 
the colonies had attained manhood. The resentment is apparent 
from the declaration of the Massachusetts General Court in 
1651, cited above.
It was an important factor in this early rise of self- 
consciousness and independence in the English colonies that 
wherever the English went they carried with them in theory 
the rights of free-born Britons. In the charter of the very 
first English American colony (i. e., Virginia) it was clearly
stated that the colonists were to en]oy all the liberties, 
franchises, and immunities "as if they had been abiding and 
born within this . . . realm of England". Because of this,
almost from the beginning the colonies began to rear their 
own fabric of constitutional government, contending for a 
stronger representative system, control of the purse and 
fuller guarantees of personal liberty. Soon after their 
inception each of the colonies could boast of a popular 
assembly elected by citizens possessing the prescribed 
property qualifications. Virginia had its first elected 
assembly twelve years after its foundation, and Massachusetts 
after only four years. Founders of the proprietary colonies, 
in order to attract settlers, invited their people to partici­
pate in the government of their respective colonies.
The colonial society, like English society itself, was 
stratified virtually from the beginning. The colonial 
assemblies were elected by property owners alone. Being 
controlled by men of property interested in resisting taxation 
by the mother country, the colonial assemblies developed a 
sense of unity vis-a-vis the mother country.
From their small beginnings the assemblies soon grew in 
diginity and took some of the pomp and circumstance long 
associated with the House of Commons in England. Exercising 
the right of laying taxes, raising troops, incurring debts, 
issuing currency, fixing the salaries of royal officers
__
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and ap p o i n t i n g  judges to the colonial courts, the asse mblies
became, in course of time, virtual "little p arliaments" which
by the e i g h teenth century, like the Parliament in E n g l a n d
"used their control of purse to usurp the control of the
14entire government". The assemblies were the
. . . laboratories in wh ich were formulated all the
gr ievances of the colonists against the g o v e r n m e n t  of 
England. They were training schools where lawyers could 
employ their talents in political declamation, in 
o u t w i t t i n g  royal officers by clever legal d e v i c e s .^
As C. A. and M. R. Beard remark, p o s s essing a ruling
class e x p e r i e n c e d  in the art of government and c o m m anding
econom ic resources of great magnitude, the colonies ne eded
only two things to tr a n s f e r  them into an independent nation--
a m a s te ry of the art of warfare and the capacity to cooperate
on a co ntinental scale. Extreme nece ssity of self - d e f e n c e
against the natives, and later the consciousness of their
e n c i r c l e m e n t  by the hostile imperial power of France taught
them both. Thir ty-one years out of seve nty-four from 1689
to 1763, the colonists were ba t t l i n g  by the side of the British
army agai nst France and the natives. This helped to give
them valuable "exp erience in the use of that u nanswerable
arg ume nt of sovereignty, m i l itary f o r c e " . 16 M i l itary conflicts
and the threat of a common enemy in France taught the colonies
their first lessons in cooperation. Though the British-
spo ns or ed Albany Congress for interc olonial union in 1754
failed, the Seven Years War that followed drove the colonies
into co op e r a t i o n  on a "continental" scale, and the conquest
of New France removed the French threat almost for ever.
The common threat from the French having disappeared,
the colonists, with their enhanced self-confidence, were now
ready to remove any source of common irritation. F o r t unately
for them, and u n f o r t u n a t e l y  for the Empire, soon after the
French war fresh taxes levied on the colonies by the British
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government were of a nature that alienated all sections of 
the colonies in America, while efforts were made to strengthen 
the power of the Crown by reducing the dependence of the 
Governors on the Assemblies. This made the British imperial 
government the next target for colonial action.
The Seven Years War had almost doubled the national 
debt of England and increased the expenditure on the colonial 
administration in America by almost four times. The imperial 
government decided to derive this additional revenue for 
defence and administration of the American possessions from 
the colonies themselves. With this view the Acts of Trade 
and Navigation were tightened up, and new and supplementary 
Acts were passed. The Sugar Act of 1764 prohibited colonial 
imports of molasses from the French and Spanish West Indies.
This greatly hurt the New England colonies which had based 
a flourishing distilling industry on these imports. The 
same year, the Stamp Act made it compulsory for every document 
in daily use to bear requisite stamps. Then came the Currency 
Act (1764) which excused English merchants from accepting 
paper money in the American colonies in payment for their 
debts. It also put a ban on the issue of paper money in the 
colonies. To cap these all the Mutiny Act was passed in 1765, 
providing for despatch of troops to America for maintaining 
order. By the Quartering Act the colonies were made to bear 
the burden of supporting the troops. Already in 1763 the 
Royal Proclamation Line had shocked the land-hungry colonists 
by closing to them "any purchases or settlements" in the 
vast region between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi from 
Florida to Quebec.
While different taxes had affected the different colonies 
differently, the Stamp Act stung all of them together. Further, 
by imposing a duty that affected all sections of the society, 
the Act made the colonial grievances universal. A violent 
united protest was made by the Stamp Act Congress (June 1765), 
which succeeded in getting the Act repealed in 1766. Tempers 
cooled for some time, to rise soon against the Townshend 
Duties which resulted in the Boston Massacre of March 1770.
The mother country yielded again, Then followed the Boston 
Tea Party of December 16, 1773 in protest against the grant
o f monopo1y to the East India Company for trade in tea to
America. This taxed the patience of the imperial government.
Early in 1774 the "Coercive" or "Intolerable" Acts were passed
according to which the port of Boston was closed, the Charter
of the colony revoked, and meetings in the town banned;
capital offenders were to be sent to England for trial, and
quartering of troops in Massachusetts was legalized. By the
Quebec Act the boundaries of Quebec were extended to the Ohio
river, and toleration was granted to Roman Catholics in Canada.
It was this last Act that prompted Virginia to call for the
First Continental Congress in September 1774. And as George III
wrote, "the die [is now] cast, the colonies must either submit 
17or triumph". In the protracted struggle that ensued the
colonies ultimately triumphed, and the thirteen colonies
were transformed into the United States of America.
Though the independence of the United States was
recognized by nations of the world, the new nation was still
very weak. Indeed, says Adams, there scarcely was a nation,
for the Confederation which bound the old colonies together
had neither the reality nor the semblance of power. Lacking
an effective central government, it was "merely an empty shell
18of loose union". As usual, when the war was over, there
were a couple of years of hectic but spotty prosperity, and
17
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Jensen in his The New Nation: A History of the United
States During the Confederation, 1781-1787(New York: Knopf,
1950)contends that the picture given by The Federalist 
is overdrawn, and that far from being a period of 
disintegration and disillusionment it was a period of 
"exuberant optimism". But that the government of the 
Confederation was weak and inefficient, remains a fact.
then the crash earner Discontent was rife, and an exodus
began from the older colonies to the new western frontier.
The success of the new experiment began to look doubtful.
Britain was treating the colonies with contempt and was not
carrying out the terms of the peace treaty. Neither were
the United States; and the Confederacy was too weak to
force either England or its own people to do so. The future
of the country appeared bleak, for "if the States were to
leave their debts unpaid, become a mere pack of small republics
quarrelling among themselves . . , [they were likely to be]
19gobbled up singly by some European power". Alarmed by
these grim prospects, national leaders rose to the occasion
and at last in February 1787 the Congress sent invitations
to the states to elect delegates to a convention to meet at
Philadelphia in the month of May for the sole purpose of
revising the Articles of the Confederation. After about
three months of deliberations the document was complete.
It was a novel compromise between unitary and confederal
principles of government, for, as Tocqueville noted, here for
the first time a federal government was created, in which
the central and the unit governments both acted directly on
2 0the people of the respective units. This helped to make
the central go ve rnment an effective authority over the whole 
of the nation. It could make and enforce law on matters of 
common interest allotted to it by the Constitution, while 
the unit governments surrendering their sovereignties (at 
least in part) to the centre retained autonomy in respect 
of all matters not specifically given over to the central 
control. The Constitution created two Houses of the central 
1egis1ature--a lower House consisting of representatives 
elected on the basis of population, and an upper House having 
equal representation of each unit, big or small. This was 
a device to reconcile the interests of the smaller states.
A Supreme Court was created as the ark of the federal covenant.
19
Adams, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 92.
20
A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, New York: Knopf,
two volumes, 1945 reprint.
75
Judges to the Court were to be appointed by the President,
with the advice of the Senate, for life terms on good behaviour.
It may, however, be noted that the U. S. Constitution
was not, as is sometimes erroneously believed, a product of
manufacture rather than of evolution, though, no doubt, it
was one of the most constructive achievements of its age.21
The system, as it finally evolved, was built upon an experience
of a century under the British Empire. It was an empire in
which powers were distributed between central and local
governments. Parliament had controlled all matters of general
concern, while the colonial assemblies had exercised practical
control over all matters of local interest. It is said that
"The British Empire of the mid-eighteenth century, in
operation and in fact, . . . [though] not in theory or law,
2 2was a federal empire".
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE RISE 
OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
Factors Giving Rise to Regional Identities 
There was something in the very nature of the American 
colonies that favoured their rise as a federation rather than 
an amalgamated unitary State. In this politics, social forces, 
and environmental circumstances, all played their hand.
Looking at the physical factors of the environment we find 
that certain features of the Atlantic seaboard of America 
were destined to have a marked effect on the future development 
of political life in the area. The many bays and inlets on 
the Atlantic coast provided opportunities for nume rous small 
foundations rather than a few large ones. Thus thirteen 
separate colonies came to be established on the eastern seaboard 
south of Quebec, each growing independently of the others, 
and each clinging tenaciously to its own character. So when 
independence came there were almost thirteen different nations 
each possessing its own little "homeland". Any union of these
21
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was, by their very nature, bound to be a federation.
Rivers on the eastern seaboard of America, facing Europe,
did not form an interconnected system like that of the
Mississippi. Each one flowed more or less directly to the
sea. In New England they were hardly navigable. South
of it the rivers flowed in drowned river valleys. The Hudson
and Delaware rivers, as also the Chesapeake, were navigable
right across the coastal plain, and were enormously important,
though only the first provided the real corridor through the
highlands. Most of the others were navigable only short
distances from their mouth. The Southern rivers in general,
though navigable for only relatively short distances to
the "Fall Line", did provide basic transport, though connected
into a system only by the coastal waters. Each accommodated
along its easily accessible banks a narrow isolated border
of settlements "hugging closely to the rivers which kept them
2 3in touch with the sea and thus with Europe". Behind the
colonies stretched a tangled growth of virgin forests that 
were highly difficult and dangerous to penetrate.
Distance and isolation played a very important role in 
the rise of strong regional identities among the colonies.
In the beginning these settlements were only dots on the wide 
open spaces on the seaboard, each separated from the others 
by long distances without any developed and with few natural 
means of transport and communication. The natural cover of 
forests in which dangerous beasts and hostile Amerinds took 
cover helped further to heighten this effect. Besides, the 
nature of the colonial economy and politics offered little 
incentive for intercolonial intercourse. Each colony was 
separately governed from London; and whatever trade the 
colonies possessed was, for a long time, confined to maritime 
trade with the mother country. Great distances and hazards 
in the river and sea navigation along a dangerous and unlighted 
coast discouraged trade and commerce between the colonies.
Thus "The very forces of physical geography would seem to
C. H. Van Tyne, The Causes of the War of Independence, Boston:
1922, p. 74.
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have conspired . . .  to make the colonies self-centred,
24individualistic and disunited". In 1673 the English Acts
of Navigation and Trade further encouraged this regionalism
by restricting intercolonial commerce. The compound effect
of this was that, in the words of a contemporary, the
colonies remained "as much divided in their interest and
2 5affection as Christian and Turk".
As the colonies were spread in a north-south direction,
eC--W
covering ,tw»nty-fi-v€ degrees of latitude, their environmental 
circumstances were greatly varied. Besides the differences 
in climatic conditions that this latitudinal extent implied, 
geological and topographical circumstances of the colonies 
were also highly different. North of New York cultivable 
lowlands were extremely limited. Much of the arable area 
lay in the valleys of the Connecticut and Mohawk rivers away 
from the coast. This was in sharp contrast to the ever- 
widening coastal lowlands to the south. This, allied with 
climatic and social factors, gave rise to completely different 
economies in the northern colonies (New England) and those 
of the south, while the Middle Colonies shared some of the 
characteristics of both. Being an area of rugged topography 
with very limited lowlands and poor soils, New England 
developed an economy essentially based on small, well-tilled 
farms, and with a large number of people engaged in lumbering. 
But in the south the wide coastal lowlands allied with the 
humid tropical climate and large land grants favoured large- 
scale plantation economy carried with the help of slave labour 
from Africa. In course of time the contrast between the 
northern and southern colonies further increased as the New 
England colonies developed a maritime interest in fishing 
and trade to supplement the meagre produce from the land.
The contrast was only to be further heightened after independ­
ence as industrialization came to America and machines became 
as essential to the North as the slave was to the South.
2Ä
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The diverse origins of the colonies, the dissimilar 
provisions of their charters, and their different social and 
religious foundations coupled with their democratic heritage 
from England, helped further to enforce separate colonial 
identities. Because of popular participation in the government 
of the individual colonies the people in the respective areas 
of British America, unlike those in Spanish America, were 
sentimentally attached to the po1it 1 cal-administrative 
peculiarities of their colonies. This helped to give them 
a set of popularly recognized regionally-grouped diversities 
which, even in the absence of any marked ethnic differences 
between the colonies, provided them with a durable federal 
base. Each colony had remained differently responsible 
to the Crown. Before the establishment of the Board of 
Plantations and Trade in 1696, there was no common coordinating 
agency for the colonies. And even after the Board was founded, 
its functions remained largely supervisory, for the ultimate 
decisions rested with the Crown. Thus till the close of the 
Seven Years War, the relationship with the mother country 
remained an independent and distinctive one in the case of 
each of the thirteen colonies.
Though no doubt exaggerated, the following observation
of a contemporary traveller (during the Seven Years War) gives
some idea of the prevailing differences between the British
American colonies: "fire and water are not more heterogeneous
2 6than the different colonies in North America". From these
inherent differences among the colonies, it was apparent that 
if the colonies ever united, they at least could not completely 
forgo their rights to manage their own regional affairs. Each 
colony having enjoyed the taste of self-government for so 
long a period, was loath to subordinate its interests completely 
to a unified central government. Thus, if union was ever 
to be achieved, the salvation of the colonies lay only in 
a federation--that halfway house between complete unity and 
complete separation.
26
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Fo1itico-geographic Factors Fostering Union
Despite a number of conflicting diversities that made 
many like James Otis feel, as late as 1765, that "were these 
colonies left to themselves tomorrow, America would be a mere 
shamble of blood and confusion", there had all through been 
certain under-currents of unity which could and did make 
the colonies forget their family quarrels to cooperate for 
a common cause; only the cause would have to be clearly 
de fined.
A very important factor in the rise of the sentiment 
for intercolonial union was what some historians have called 
the "sense of special destiny", though we do not think that 
this sense developed because the colonists thought that "they 
had before them a career such as no other nation was likely 
to achieve". Nor, perhaps, did "this faith [arise] 
naturally from the general wealth of the country, the energy
of the people, and the atmosphere of freedom which enveloped
2 7 .both". The real factors that seem to have given rise to
this sense of common or special destiny in the colonies were
that all the thirteen colonies by virtue of their geography,
politics, and culture formed a distinct group surrounded by
the French in the north, Spanish in the south, and blocked
by the seemingly unsurmountable barrier of the Appalachians
to the we s t .
The wide and wild barrier of the Appalachians seemed 
so hard to cross that the coastal se111ements grew fairly 
thick and sturdy, with well-rooted ways, before the colonies 
embarked upon trans-Appalachian expansion. The net result 
was that the colonies, which were only widely scattered little 
pockets of plantation or trading posts till 1660, became 
by 1760 virtual little countries, though still scattered but 
much solider and more connected as the area between the 
Appalachians and the sea was gradually filled in, and 
settlements began to spill over into the Ohio valley. [Fig. 3.1]
Nevins and Commager, op. cit., footnote 22, 1942 edition,
p . 5 0.
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ENGLISH SETTLEMENTS 
1660-1775
MILES
Fig. 3.1 SPREAD OF ENGLISH SETTLEMENTS,
1.660-1775 . The colonies were only widely 
scattered little pockets of settlement 
till 1660; a century later, though still 
scattered, they were much solider and more 
connected as the area between the Appalach­
ians and the sea was gradually filled in, 
and settlements began to spill over into 
the Ohio valley. (Adapted from maps A, B, 
C, and D on Plate 60 of C. 0. Paullin,
Atlas of the Historical Geography of the 
United States, 1932.)
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That all the colonies hemmed between the mountain and 
the sea had a common general origin (though diverse specific 
origins), a common language, and a common metropolis to deal 
with, helped greatly to foster in them a strong consciousness 
of kind, While on the one hand, it fostered consolidation, 
on the other, it imparted to the colonies a sense of a well- 
carved out common territory of inhabit^nce, a factor which 
invariably gives rise to the sense of a common fatherland-- 
the feeling that imparts to a people that strong sense of 
belonging together which is the sine qua non for the growth 
of a Nation. The facts of political geography further helped 
to enforce this feeling as the colonists found themselves 
surrounded on three sides by the territories or at least the 
claims of imperial France and Spain.
When in 1677 the French explorer La Salle sailed all
the way down the Mississippi to its mouth on the Gulf, the
entire basis of the French power in America was changed. In
place of a thinly populated ribbon of settlements along the
banks of the St. Lawrence, cut off from Europe during all
those months of winter when the St. Lawrence is frozen, the
way was now open for a great western empire extending in
a hugh arc from the estuary of the St. Lawrence to the delta
of the Mississippi. This establishment of a French frontier
down to their borders along the west appeared to the English
colonies to pose a great danger to their survival. It seemed
to "restrict their [westward] growth as a dam holds back 
2 8a stream". By a line of forts and trading posts the French
had steadily marked out a huge crescent-shaped domain stretching
from Quebec through Detroit and St. Louis down to New Orleans
on the Gulf. This would pin the colonies to the narrow belt
east of the Appalachians. Further, France was a stronger
nation militarily than Britain, and the "highly centralized
government of New France was better fitted for conducting
war than the loose association of the il1-coordinated colonial 
2 9governments". Thus as a contemporary army officer put it
28
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before the House of Commons "They [the French] hold our
Colonies between the two Ends of a Net which if they tighten
by Degrees, they may get all of them into the Body of it,
30and drown them into the Sea"»
The overall effect of the encircling presence of France
and Spain was to squeeze the colonies into unity. Thus
. » » though they carefully nursed their dislike of
one another, [the English colonies] had grown by 1750 
into a veritable nation of nearly a million and a half 
persons who were feeling increasingly hemmed in and 
harassed by the maritime activity, the territorial 
claims, and border violence of New France.
As the presence of the French threat had united the
colonies and goaded them into action, so the disappearance
of New France in 1763 helped to bring them into a compact
to struggle for complete sovereignty.
With no powerful neighbours now thundering on their 
gates, the governing classes of the thirteen American 
colonies were free to try their strength with the 
governing classes of England . . . [and indeed] the very
war that set the bells of London ringing with acclaim 
to the news of victory borne on every breeze opened the 
way to another explosion.32
Observant people like that anonymous French writer in the
early years of the eighteenth century were long thinking this
possibility, If Canada fell, wrote this writer, then the
colonies would "unite, shake off the yoke of English monarchy,
3 3and create themselves into a democracy".
After the removal of the French threat, the raison d'etre 
of colonial cooperation appeared, temporarily, to vanish.
But fortunately for the colonies the British government 
through its new measures to enforce the Acts of Navigation 
and Trade, and through its new duties and taxes, and legislation 
affecting all sections of the American society, provided the 
colonists, now risen high in self-esteem, the much-needed 
spur to cooperation and united action. While the various
30
Cited in R „ W. Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence: The
International History of the United States, New York : John
Wiley & Sons, 1965, p. 14.
31
Miller, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 89,
32
Beard and Beard, op. cit., footnote 15, p. 120.
33
Cited in Van Alstyne, op, cit., footnote 30, p. 3,
82
other Acts affected only certain groups of colonies at a time, 
the Quebec Act and the Stamp Act were the ones that alienated 
all the regions together. The colonies now came increasingly 
to the realization that British overlordship was the greatest 
stumbling block in the way to their fuller expansion and 
progress, It was this feeling, and the continued irritations 
offered by Britain, that finally led the colonies to revolt 
and achieve independence.
A further geographical factor of great importance was 
that as the eighteenth century wore on, as the population 
and wealth grew, and as the society became more complex, so 
economic and social ties in the colonies began to cut across 
intercolonial boundaries. (It needs to be remembered that 
salvery was till then not an issue of so great a significance 
as it later became.) In the rise of cross-cutting inter­
colonial cleavages the frontier of settlement in the West 
played a very important role, Stretching like a cord of 
union (to use Turner's telling phrase) on the western margins 
of the colonies, the frontier was the zone of most rapid 
and effective Americanization. The wilderness of the frontier 
mastered the colonists and "the outcome [was] not the old
Europe, not simply the development of Germanic germs", but
34"a new product that is American", The net result was the
rise of a composite American nationality, "English neither
3 5in nationality nor characteristics". The pioneers on the
border were everywhere stamped with the same traits.
It should here be noted that despite separate colonial 
identities, people all through the American colonies were 
much of a piece. As de Crevecoeur wrote in 1782, the colonies 
from the beginning served as an asylum where "the poor of 
Europe met together. [Where] Everything . . . tended to
34
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3 6regenerate them . . . The old differences--re1igious
and linguistic--that divided them in Europe, were largely
forgotten for "Hither they had fled not from the tender
embraces of the mother but from the cruelty of the monster
Save for a small number of Germans in Pennsylvania and the
Dutch in New York, the non-English-speakers were so scattered
throughout the colonies that they of necessity had to merge
and mingle with the English-speaking majority and adopt their
culture. " . . .  at the time of the Revolution probably over
three-fourths of the white colonists were still of British 
3 8blood". The importance of this melting-pot character of
the whole of America south of Quebec, will be borne out
by later discussions which will seek to show how because
of this the United States was saved from the divisive cleavages
that have often plagued the federal relationship in Canada.
A further force in this direction was the apparently
mutually complementary nature of the colonial economies of
the various sections of British America in the later eighteenth
century; only later developments introduced the sectional
economic interests that proved divisive. The force of this
argument will be appreciated if we remember that sane thinkers
like John Adams were dreaming as early as 1775 of a united
America which even "the united force of Europe will not be
3 9able to subdue".
Scholars may differ from Charles Beard when he says that
the U. S. Constitution was "an economic document drawn with
superb skill by men whose property interests were immediately 
4 0at stake", but most will agree that the Constitution was an
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eccnomic document in the sense that the nationalism of the
Constitution "was created by a welding of economic interests
4 1that cut through state boundaries". As Beard puts it, the
Southern planter was as much concerned in maintaining order
against slave revolts as the creditor in Massachusetts was
concerned in putting down Shay's desperate debtors. The
consolidation of interests in support of the Constitution was
nationwide. The following excerpt from a contemporary writer
would explain how the Constitution promised benefits to all
4 2sections of the Union.
The eastern states will receive advantages . . . [from]
the regulation of trade; . . . Connecticut and New Jersey
will receive their share of general imposts; the middle 
states will receive the advantages surrounding the seat of 
government; the southern states vail receive protection, 
and have their Negroes represented in the legislature; 
and large back countries will soon have a majority in it. 
This system promises a large field of employment to 
military gentlemen, and to the clergy, salary men and 
others depending on money payments.
Further, even though the imperial relationship in the 
case of each of the colonies remained independent and distinct­
ive, and efforts at intercolonial cooperation through the in­
stitution of the Board of Trade and Plantations were only partly 
successful, all the colonial governments, whether directly under 
the Crown or not, had the same basic problem of reconciling the 
interests of the colonists with those of the mother country. 
There was a strong tendency for this situation to find
4 3expression through similar institutions of government.
This helped to make America what has been termed as the "most
common-schooled" nation in the world.
44Thus, as Boorstin says,
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There is . no paradox in the fact that the colonies
were willing to "revolt" and yet unwilling to unite; 
on the contrary the two facts explain each other .
And the se were the reasons which would make American 
federalism difficult, necessary, and in the long run 
spectacularly successful.
As Merritt writes, the colonies "demonstrated their willingness
to think of themselves as a single community without permitting
the collective concept to overshadow the importance of the
individual colonies. It was this image of unity in diversity,
essential to Arnerican federalism that carried over into the
Constitutional Convention of 1787" and was responsible for
the rise of the peculiar political structure of the United 
45States.
TRIALS OF FEDERALISM : UNEASY BALANCE, THE STORM,
AND CALM
The Constitution came into operation in March 1789, but 
the new government was weak and untried. The Constitution 
had been ratified in many states by the narrowest margins, 
and even if a majority of population approved of it, the 
dissenting minority was nearly as large. Fortunately no 
sectional parties had yet come into being. The only division 
was between the Federalists and the anti-Federalists--a 
division that cut across colonial boundaries. The young 
government was, therefore, saved from divisive sectional 
contest and a partisan President.
There had all through been a certain amount of friction 
between the growing mercantilism of the North and the planter 
class in the South. But at the time of constitution-making 
the division between the slave and free states was not so 
sharp, even though their different circumstances had fostered 
the development of different patterns of life in North and 
South. At the time the Federation was inaugurated, many
R. L. Merritt, "Perception of Unity and Diversity in Colonial 
America, 1735-1775", paper read at the 6th Congress of the 
International Political Science Association, Oxford 
Round Table Meeting, September 19-24, p p . 1-20 text 21-30
tables. Reference on p. 15.
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Southerners themselves were in favour of a gradual abolition 
of slavery. But in 1792, with the invention of Whitney's 
cotton g m ,  cotton became king in the South. This doomed 
the slave to his slavery, and the pattern of Southern culture 
was now fixed for a long time to come.
In the meantime industrialization received a great 
impetus in the North as cotton textile machinery began to 
be manufactured in America. Though differences between the 
North and South had always existed, these came to be 
increasingly emphasized during the next half century as the 
two sections became devoted more and more to contrasting 
economic interests. Fortunately, however, a new section, 
the West, soon to become of great importance, was emerging 
to the west over the mountains. Promising rich rewards both 
to the North and South the New West helped to maintain federal 
balance between the two. It also helped to win their loyalties 
for the Union government which alone controlled the entire 
Western lands.
It soon became apparent that the North and South were 
drawing so far apart that union could be maintained only so 
long as the West was able to maintain the balance between 
the two sections. In the beginning, because of the Mississippi 
river, which was the only outlet to the sea for the whole 
of the western area, the relations between the West and South 
were closer. Further, as both the regions were agricultural, 
their interests were also to some extent similar. This appeared 
to tilt the balance against the North. In fact this liaison 
between the South and West was so disturbing to the North 
that Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts declared in the Congress 
in January 1811 that, if Louisiana were to be admitted as a 
state--as she was the next year--the bonds of union would 
be dissolved, and that "as it will be the right of all, so 
it will be the duty of some, to prepare, definitely, for a
46separation; amicably, if they can; violently, if they must". 
During the 1812-1815 war with Britain the malcontents of
46
Cited in Adams, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 130.
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New England had gone to the very verge of secession. They 
had sent delegates to a convention at Hartford, Connecticut, 
in 1814, to consider the question of setting up a separate 
union !
Soon after the war large scale manufacturing became very 
important in New England and the Middle States. This further 
intensified the economic conflict between the agricultural 
South and a North which was becoming increasingly Industralized. 
Slaves were as vital to the southern plantations as machines 
became to the Northern factories. The West was still set off 
against both the North and South, though its southern section 
was becoming slave. Slave and free states had been admitted 
alternately, and there were eleven of each, giving the two 
economic systems equal representation in the Senate. However, 
the inevitable conflict came in 1819 with the controversy 
over the admission of Missouri as a slave state. Missouri 
lay north of the line which had hitherto tacitly been accepted 
as marking the northern limit for slavery. The North was, 
therefore, thrown into ferment by what seemed to it as a 
new aggressiveness on the part of the South. The matter was 
settled by the Missouri Compromise; by which Maine and 
Missouri both were admitted, one as slave and the other as 
free, but extension of slavery in the Louisiana Purchase area 
to the north of latitude 36 J30' was prohibited.
Till now the West was in closer alliance with the South 
because of the Mississippi. The North had all through been 
viewing this alliance with concern. But with increase in 
industrialism and decrease in agriculture, the North needed 
markets as well as food. Part of the problem could be solved 
if the West and North could be linked. In 1825 through the 
efforts of De Witt Clinton, the Governor of New York, the 
Erie Canal, following the lowest watershed between the 
Atlantic and the Great Lakes, was opened and helped to make 
New York city the principal gateway of commerce for the 
northern West, and the financial centre of the country. The 
whole of the Mississippi valley was no longer an enclosed 
area which could trade only down the river. The human 
geography of the whole area was rapidly changing. And this 
greatly influenced the political geography of the nation.
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The South was bound to view the new relationship between 
the North and West with alarm, especially because while 
slavery restricted free immigration to the South, the non­
slave states of the North were increasing their population 
very rapidly, and thereby constantly threatening to put the 
South into a minority position„ The South now realized that 
safety lay in limiting the powers of the central government 
over the states so that they could maintain their institution 
at least within their own area. But the North which, for the 
first fifteen years of the century, was talking of secession 
and nullification, now became strongly federalist as the 
new link with the West began to offer it new rewards. It 
became clear that the former postures of the North and South 
in the federal relationship would soon be reversed. When 
the North-sponsored tariff bill of 1828 was passed with the 
support of the West, the South was indignant. South Carolina 
threatened secession. The legislature of the state passed 
an Ordinance of Nullification, and armed resistance to the 
national government was threatened. But North and South 
were still fairly evenly balanced in the Senate, and a 
compromise was soon reached. However, the contest was on, 
and each of the two eastern sections in order to get better 
of the other continued to vie for the support of the ever 
expanding West.
Secessionist voices were soon to be heard again as the 
question of the admission of Texas to the Union came up.
While the Vermont legislature "solemnly protested" (November 
1837) against the admission "of any state whose constitution 
tolerates domestic slavery", Calhoun, of South Carolina, as 
solemnly announced that any attempt to exclude a state 
for reasons of its "peculiar institution" would be virtual 
dissolution of the Union. Though recognition was given to 
the independence of Texas from Mexico, its admission had to 
wait till 1845. In the meantime two by two, slave and free, 
new states had been admitted to the Union: Michigan-Arkansas,
Iowa-Florida. The admission of Texas was balanced by that 
of Wisconsin. (Territorial growth of the United States 
is shown in Fig. 3.2.)
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But the collapse of this uneasy balance was well in
sight. The West continued to expand, but now in areas that
were hardly suitable for plantation, and, hence, for slavery.
The South appeared doomed to a minority position at the
federal level. As new territories were conquered or acquired
from Mexico, and the question of admitting new states came
up, the thin cord of union that had bound the North and South
reached almost the breaking point. When in 1850 the question
of the admission of California as a free state to the Union
came up, it was with very great difficulty that Henry Clay
was able to bring about a temporary compromise (truce?) by
which California was admitted as a free state but New Mexico
and Utah were left to be organized as territories without any
mention of slavery or freedom. In order to satisfy the South
a more stringent fugitive-slave law was passed. Now while
the Southern spokesman, Calhoun, was warning the Senate to
the imminent danger of United States' "end in disunion"
(March 4, 1850), it was now a Massachusetts Senator who was
speaking . . not as a Massachusetts man, nor as a Northern
man, but as an American . . . for the preservation of the
4 7Union." What a contrast to the speech of Massachusetts
representative Josiah Quincy delivered in January 1811 (cited 
above)!
Speeches cited in F. W. Wellborn, The Growth of American 
Nationality 1492-1865, New York: Macmillan Co. , 1948, p p .
748-749. The broader transitions in Southern life which 
led to Nullification are analyzed in C. S. Sydnor, The 
Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848, Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1948. The psychological 
anxieties which beset slaveholders are finely portrayed 
in C. G. Sellers, Jr., "The Travail of Slavery" in Sellers Jr. 
(Ed.), The Southerner as American, Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1960, p p . 40-71. The latest full-
scale study of nullification is W. W. Freehling, Prelude 
to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South
Carolina, 1816-1836, New York: Harper, 1966. Also relevant
is A. 0. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848- 
1861, Baton Rouge: Louisiiiana State University Press, 1953."”"*/
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However, the compromise proved only a calm before the 
storm. The West by its very nature was becoming non-slave«
Gold discoveries in the West gave further impetus to the 
development of transport and communications« Railroad building 
progressed rapidly and it was soon to join the West firmly 
with the North, almost completely changing the former South-and- 
West alliance dictated by the southward course of the 
Mississippi. As the railway map shows, in 1850 railroads 
hardly penetrated the middle West. By 1860 their network 
covered it [Fig. 3.3]. Railroad construction was far more 
advanced in the North than in the South. Of the almost twenty 
thousand miles of railroad built during 1850-1860, most were 
in the North. Thus now nature and man together were tilting 
the balance against the South. The year 1856 saw the 
foundation of a North-and-West political alliance which 
shattered the dream of a perpetual South-and-West alliance 
based on the arms of the "01* Man River". It was this 
development that four years later caused the South to seek 
safety for slavery in secession.
Sectionalism against Nationalism: The Great Split
A dangerous division between the North and South came
on the issue of organization of the Kansas-Nebraska territory
with a view to creating new states, an issue which itself
was brought up with a view to obtain a more northerly route
for a transcontinental railway. As the territory lay north
of the 36°30' line, the South was against its organization. A
bait was offered to get the support of the South, by providing
in the Kansas-Nebraska Bill of 1854 that it would be left to
the people of the territory to decide whether or not they
would have slavery as soon as they obtained a territorial
legislature. This enraged the North because to it the Bill
appeared to extend the bounds of slavery beyond the prohibited
line. However, the Bill was passed in May 1854. With this
began the tug of war between the pro- and anti-slavery elements
that turned Kansas into "the theater of cold war . . . that
48led to the Civil War".
Morison and Commager, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 649.
48
Fi
g.
 
3.
3 
RA
IL
RO
AD
S 
IN
 O
PE
RA
TI
ON
, 
18
50
 A
ND
 I
86
0. 
In
 
18
50
 
ra
il
ro
ad
s 
ha
rd
ly
 p
en
et
ra
te
d 
th
e 
mi
dd
le
 
We
st
. 
By
 1
86
0 
th
ei
r 
ne
tw
or
k 
co
ve
re
d 
it
 
an
d 
jo
in
ed
 t
he
 W
es
t 
fi
rm
ly
 w
it
h 
th
e 
No
rt
h.
 
(A
da
pt
ed
 
fr
om
 
Pl
at
e 
13
9 
in
 P
au
ll
in
, 
At
la
s 
of
 t
he
 H
is
to
ri
ca
l 
Ge
og
ra
ph
y 
of
 t
he
 U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
.)
9 1
Though a S o u t h - s u p p o r t e d  candidate (Buchanan) became
the Pr e s i d e n t  in 1856, party divisions were now appr o a c h i n g
da ng e r o u s l y  close to the M a s o n - D i x o n  Line. The Division was
further intensified during the next four years, so much so
that in the 1860 Presidential election the extension of slavery
became the dominant issue of the election politics, and party
di vis ion s which had so long cut across sectional boundaries,
now almost coincided with the Maso n - D i x o n  Line [Fig. 3.4] „
And as the new Republican candidate, Abraham Lincoln, won the
el ec ti on  carrying every free state, though scarcely po l l i n g
a vote in the South, "the curtain . . . rung up for the central
49act of the great tragedy". On December 20, 1860 the South
Ca r o l i n a  legislature unan imously declared "that the Union
now su bs isting between South Carolina and other states under
the name of the 'United States of America' is hereby 
50dissolved". By the first of February 1861, Georgia, Alabama,
Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas were out of the 
Union; on the eighth of February the "Confederate States of 
America" was formed [Fig. 3.5]. This started the tragic Civil 
War from which it was with very great difficulty that the 
Union was able to emerge intact. As the C onfederate States 
were def eated in 1865, slavery was abolished, the South was 
com pl et el y hu mbled and the inde s t r u c t i b i l i t y  of the Union 
was finally established»
Like S witzerland after 1848, the United States after
1864 eme rged as an indest r u c t i b l e  union that has with the
pa ss age  of time become more and more centralized and strong.
As more unified have the interests of the people become,
the less dualistic and more cooperative and i ntegrated has
become  the federal polity. The net result has been that from
"a group of small, weak, poor, agricultural, selfish,
di sc or da nt states", the United States has emerged as a powerful,
5 1wealthy, and mainly urban and industrial nation. As
49
Adams, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 229.
50
Cited in Morison and Commager, op. c i t . , footnote 7, pp. 666- 
667 .
51
W. Anderson, F e d e r a l i s m  and Intergovernmental Relations: A
Budget of S u g g e s t i o n s , Chicago: Public A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  Service,
1946, p. 1.
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Whittlesey points out, it is significant to note that before
the Civil War the country was referred to in the plural
("The United States are . . . "). Since then the singular verb
has become the universal usage in spite of its derogation of
5 2grammatical English ("The United States is . . . "). Now
"State citizenship has given way to national citizenship,
and the national government has risen to supremacy over the
States in all matters of commercial, industrial, agricultural,
5 3and fiscal policy." It is truly said,
As the nation changed from farming to industry, from 
rural to urban and more recently to metropolitan, and 
from a minor role in world affairs to the leader of the 
free world, and as the nature of the problems to be 
attacked by government changed accordingly, the concept 
and functioning of federalism underwent continuous 
evaluation as well, until adaptability became its 
basic principle, flexibility its very core.54
Two things, however, need pointing out. First, it is
true that dualism in the federal polity did not completely
vanish with the Civil War,
Till long after the Civil War the few activities of the 
national government could go along side by side with 
the limited state activities without either impinging 
seriously on the other. It was almost . . .  a 
"functionless federalism" when compared with present 
conditions. The legal theory of divided sovereignty 
. . . fitted the facts of the time well enough though
not perfectly.55
52
Whittlesey, op. cito, footnote 6, p. 270. Though some 
philosophers of dualistic federalism may still write: "The
United States are at a lower level of national integration 
. . . ",D. W. Brogan, The American Political System,
London: Hamish Hamilton, first published 1933, the 1947
reprint used here, p. 100.
53
Anderson, op. cit., footnote 51, p. 1.
54
R. H. Leach, "Intergovernmental Cooperation and American 
Federalism" in G. Dietze (Ed.), Essays on the American 
Constitution, Englewood Cliffs (N. J . ) : Prentice-Hall Inc.,
1964, p. 128.
55
Anderson, op. cit., footnote 51, p. 13.
But all this soon changed as governments cast off the
inactivity of laissez-faire policies and entered upon an era
of active intervention in economic and social life of the
nation. Thus the picture of the nineteenth century American
federalism as entirely dualistic, Elazar has analyzed,
5 6is unrealistic. William Anderson goes so far as to say
that "Independent of each other, separate from each other,
they [the states and the federal government] never were after
5 7the Constitution was adopted." Secondly, it should be
remembered that in this process of centralization
. . . the States have not been excluded; they remain
as important partners in these aspects of government 
activity, sometimes junior partners it is true, but 
still exercising a degree of independent [i. e. , 
autonomous] power and influence which is certainly not 
characteristic of local authorities in a unitary State.
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC INFERENCES
1. The preceding study of the rise of federalism in the 
United States would show that the base on which the American 
federalism was built consisted, as in the Swiss example, 
of a number of regionally-grouped communities, having small 
power potentials but strong regional identities, that were 
faced with common threats to their survival. While their 
regional identities prevented them from amalgamating into a 
unitary State, their individual weaknesses and insufficiencies 
forced them to unite if they wanted to maintain any semblance 
of independence. The thirteen colonies, in the absence of 
an over-arching force to guide them in the struggle with the 
mother country, came closer together in order jointly to 
create a central source of light in the form of their Federal 
Government. Each of the early colonies was individually weak;
56
D. J. Elazar, The American Partnership: Intergovernmental
Cooperation in Nineteenth Century United States, Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1962.
57
Anderson, op. cit., footnote 51, p. 15. See also Anderson, 
The Nation and the States: Rivals or Partners?, Minneapolis
University of Minnesota Press, 1955, and W. Anderson, 
Intergovernmental Relations in Review, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1960.
58
Vile, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 15.
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in the beginning all of them were like lone stars in the
firmament. They had no organized threat to their existence.
Each colony with a few guns found itself strong enough to
frighten the natives. But soon, when powers strong enough
to engulf each one of them individually began to appear on
the American scene, the colonies began to seek strength in
union. The New England Confederacy of 1643, erected as a
"firm and perpetual league of friendship and unity, for
5 9offense and defense, mutual advice and succor", was the 
first significant beginning whose success encouraged and 
inspired later Americans. Some later attempts such as Penn's 
"brief and plain scheme" of 1696, or Benjamin Franklin's 
scheme of 1754, failed primarily because "there was no urgent 
need, no special and immediate fear, to cement the bond of 
union",60 for it was in the interest of Britain to interpose 
between the colonies and any external menace, i. e. , to 
fight the French.
But when conflict broke out with the mother country
itself, the only hope for these scattered little colonies
was to combine in order to create a strong central power
that would guide them through the confusion, and lead them
to victory. The Congress of the United Colonies when passing
the Articles of Confederation on 15 November 1777 impressed
upon the constituents "the absolute necessity of uniting all
our councils, and all our strengths, to maintain and defend
our common liberties . . . surrounded by the same imminent
dangers".61 Ten years later when it again appeared to them
6 2that the existence of thirteen sovereign wills was proving 
a great stumbling block in the achievement of their economic 
and political goals, and that their ineffective union was 
virtually opening the doors for some European power to gobble 
each one of them individually; the wise Fathers at Phi1adelphia
_
Cited in Morison and Commager, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 71.
60
H. R. G. Greaves, Federalism in Practice, London: Allen
& Unwin, 1940, p. 21.
61
Cited in E. C. Burnett, The Continental Congress, New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1941, p. 246.
The phrase "thirteen sovereign wills" appears in A. Hamilton, 
J. Madison, and J. Jay, The Federalist Papers, No. 20.
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decided to create a more perfect union.
2. The study supports my hypothesis that in highly hetero­
geneous federations where the constituent units possess strong 
regional identities, a continued external threat to survival 
of the State helps to maintain federal cooperation. If 
political frontiers remain active for a long enough time, the 
constituent parties, through a process of mutual adjustment, 
learn to live like a close-knit family. This leads to 
the evolution of an integrated polity within the State, for a 
continued external threat to national survival has the 
effect of squeezing the constituents into unity. This factor 
has much to explain why Americans are today one nation rather 
than a collection of isolated States.
The effect of active frontiers with the war-like natives
and hostile foreign powers as a consolidating agent in
American history is visible all through. Throughout the
struggle with France in America the British suffered from
the reluctance of colonies that did not border on the troubled
French frontier to fight for the common defence. Pennsylvania,
in particular, contended that the war which was fought mainly
along the borders of New York and New England, was none of her
concern; while the colonies of the deep south regarded
themselves as safely "walled off from the formidable barrier of
6 3the Alleghenies". After independence the British frontier to
the north, and Spanish (later French) to the south and west, 
acted strongly against internal divisions and thus helped 
to maintain the Union.
Later when relations with Britain normalized and pressures 
along the northern settled frontier ceased to exist, the cord 
of unity became looser in states not bordering on the active 
frontier of expansion. Events of the 1812-1815 war with 
Britain are sad reminders of it. When on 4 June 1812 the 
Congress declared war, the voting in the House was 79 to 49, 
and in the Senate 19 to 13. New England, New Jersey, and New 
York opposed the war and discouraged volunteering. But the 
states to the west and the south bordering on the active
63
Nicholas, op. cit. , footnote 28, p p . 31-32.
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frontiers inland, were conscious of the threat and of the
opportunity. Part of the explanation may be that while these
southern and western areas found the British and Spanish
areas damming their westward expansion, the states to the
northeast thought that the War, though its ostensible cause
was seamen's rights, only wrecked their trade and endangered
their territory by making an otherwise calm international
boundary alive to their north. So great was the resentment
that some delegates from the New England states met in
convention to discuss revision of the Constitution and even
plan for secession. As Julius Pratt says, if plotted on a
map, the constituencies of the Congressmen who voted for
the War resolution would show that their districts stretched
from New Hampshire to Georgia in the form of a great crescent
bending westward. "From end to end" says Pratt, "the crescent
traversed frontier territory, bordering foreign soil, British
or Spanish, or confronting dangerous Indian tribes among whom
6 4foreign influence was respected and feared . . . ". [Fig. 3.6]
3. The history of federalism in the United States also 
satisfies my hypothesis that cross-cutting social, economic, 
and political cleavages in a federal State with marked 
regional identities help to change the cleavages into linkages, 
and thereby foster unity and cooperation among the constituents 
of the federation. As already noted, immigration to America 
had taken place in a way that made the English language and 
English institutions dominant in all parts of the country. 
Neither Germans nor French Huguenots set up separate colonies. 
They mingled with the first British comers adopting their 
language and outlook. In New York English migration had soon 
swamped the Dutch. People of different religions and 
nationalities from Europe were so mixed up in the melting pot 
of the American frontier that a unity of tongue and basic 
institutions co-existed with diversity in national origins. 
Though some Germans concentrated in the interior, and the 
different original colonies had developed strong regional
J. W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1812, Gloucester, Mass. :
Peter Smith, first edition 1925, 1957 reprint used,
pp. 126-127.
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DECLARATION OF WAR JUNE 4 1812
VOTE ON PASSAGE
----------Not Voting
Unsettled etc
Votes Not Shown — (General Ticket ) 
NH ,2 Nays, N J,2;Yeas (Districts). 
iPa , 2 Nays
Fig. 3.6 DECLARATION OF W A R , JUNE 4, 1812.
The constituencies of the Congressmen who 
voted for the War resolution stretched from 
New Hampshire to Georgia in the form of a 
crescent which "traversed frontier territory, 
bordering on foreign soil, British or Spanish, 
or confronting dangerous Indian tribes among 
whom foreign influence was respected and 
feared". (Adapted from Plate 113 A in Paullin, 
Atlas of the Historical Geography of the
Uni ted States . )
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identities, intercolonial migr ations were soon b r e a k i n g  down 
the b a r ri ers of purely local circumstance. In the veins of 
many colonists of the second generation ran the b l o o d  of two 
or more nations, and an E n g lish name might well cover a 
Dutchman, a Swede, or a S c o t . 65 It is true that the c r o s s ­
currents of popu lation m o v e ments were not heavy, still 
m i g r a t i o n s  were mi xing many strains and weakening rigid c l e a v ­
ages by extending cultural ties across political boundaries.
This d evelopment was greatly facilitated by America's  
vast empty spaces. It is rightly said that against Eu rope's 
"time people" rooted in the past, Americans developed as a 
"space people" with no strong local roots. From the b e g i n n i n g  
A m e ri ca  remained a "nation on the march". This
ph ysical mobility has been accompanied by social mob i l i t y  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a ceaseless movement up and down the 
ladder . . . .  The migrants moving from the East into 
Nor th Central Area, or from Old South into the new South 
West, have carried their political loyalties and trad itions  
with them. The result has been to establish in the new 
areas enclaves of Republicans or Democrats whose 
p a r t i s a n s h i p  has its roots in the older areas from 
wh ic h the migrants c a m e . 66
This al l-round mobility in the A m e r i c a n  population p r e v e n t e d  
icing of the cake in America n society, and thereby he lped 
to es ta bl ish a pattern of cleavages cutting across state 
boundar ies . The net result was that in social as well as 
pol it ic al  life, every where o v e r l a p p i n g  diversities e n g e n d e r e d  
a spirit of compromise w h ich b l u nted the teeth of religious 
and social particularism. This promo t e d  national harmony.
The institution of slavery remained the only s i g n ificant 
social and economic i nstitution that sharply divided the 
states of the union on the federal level; and this, even 
after three quarters of a century of coordinated exis tence  
of the constituents, thre a t e n e d  to cause a collapse of the
65
Beard and Beard, op. c i t . , footnote 15, p. 85.
66
P a r a p h r a s e d  in P. H. O d ega rd and H. H. Baerwald, The Am e r i c a n  
Republic: Its G overnment and P o l i t i c s , New York: H a rper &
Row, 1964, p. 35 from Viva Booth, The Political Party as a 
Social P r o c e s s , u n p u b l i s h e d  Ph.D. Thesis, Philadelphia: 
U n i v er sity of P e nnsylvania , 1923.
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federal edifice of the United States. It is interesting to 
note that the institution of slavery, divisive as it always 
was, did not break the federal tie so long as the social and 
economic cleavages in the Mississippi valley cut across each 
other. While on the issue of slavery and freedom mo s t of 
the West was sentimentally attached to the North, economically 
the whole of the Mississippi valley area was till about 1850 
very closely tied with the South through the arms of the 
Mississippi which provided the main outlet for the commerce 
of the area. When in the next decade railroads tied the upper 
West more closely to the North than to the South, the 
cleavage lines became sharply defined almost along the 
Mason-Dixon Line; this eventually led to secession and the 
Civil War.
It should again be remembered that this cross-cutting
pattern of social and economic cleavages was present as a
binding influence in the union right from the beginning. As
Beard has shown, the opposition to the adoption of the
Constitution came principally from "the agricultural regions,
and from areas in which debtors had been formulating paper
money and other depreciatory schemes"; while the support for
the new system came principally from the "regions in which
mercantile, manufacturing, security, and personality interests
6 7generally had their greatest strength." A. N . Holcombe
has shown that these cleavages in the battle over the adoption
of the Constitution were projected into politics under the
new government. "Jefferson succeeded in organizing the greater
portion of the back country grain growers from Maine to Georgia
into a coherent 'bloc' , which formed the strongest element in
6 8his victorious combination." Thus "Jefferson and Jackson
built their fences on the solid soil of unity of the sectional
69interest of the then West".
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Beard, op. cit., footnote 40, p p . 290-291.
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1969, p. 231. See also J.A. Woodburn, "Western Radicalism 
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4. The vicissitudes of federalism in the United States 
strongly support my hypothesis that in highly heterogeneous 
or multi-ethnic federations the existence of a larger number 
of diversities within the State helps to sustain federal 
cooperation by creating cross-cutting cleavages and, thus, 
putting a check on divisive sectionalism. Although the 
United States, being made up, overwhelmingly, of the people 
of White European stock speaking the same language, and 
following the same broad religious faith, is not a multi­
ethnic federation; still, because of its large size it covers 
a variety of areas with distinct economic interests. It is, 
in this sense, a heterogeneous federation composed of various 
sections.
Conditioned by their circumstances, New England and the
South had early developed nearly contrasting patterns of social
and economic life, while the Middle Colonies shared the
characteristics of either. But soon, as the frontier expansion
increased, a new cleavage between the coast and the back
country was imposed upon the existing one, which became the
main basis of the political division between Federalists and
anti-Federalists. While with further evolution in the
economic life of the nation, the existence of the Middle
States as a separate section was blurred; the continued
expansion of the nation, and the addition of new states added
to the number of new sections in the United States until by
the close of the nineteenth century the American sections
were becoming what has been termed "more and more the American
70version of the European nation."
With the opening of the new West in the Mississippi 
valley, each Atlantic section--North and South--became engaged 
in increasing struggle for power, and power was to be gained 
by drawing upon the growing West. This growing interest of 
the two Atlantic sections in the West created overlapping 
cleavages in which the emergence of the West as a section
70
F. J. Turner, The Significance of Sections in American 
History, with an introduction by M . Farrand, New York: 
Peter Smith, 1932, reprinted 1950, p. 23.
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in its own right helped to balance the two warring sections 
and keep them together in the Union. Whenever the West seemed 
to tilt the federal balance between the two sections over­
whelmingly to one side, the Union was threatened with collapse.
As this balance tilted unfavourably against the North in 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, the New England states 
were planning secession at Hartford. But soon after the war 
with Britain the interests of the West and North became more 
closely linked as canals and railroads tied them together.
This new alliance between the North and West was as disturbing 
to the South as the Southern alliance with the West had 
been to New England in the past. By the mid-century the 
sectional strife between North and South developed into 
a virtual Cold War until the resentments precipitated into 
the tragic Civil War. As a Southern writer wrote in 1847
. . . the contest between north and South [was] not 
limited to slavery or no slavery, . . . [it was
rather] a contest . . . whether the growing commerce
of the great West shall be thrown upon New Orleans or 
given over to the Atlantic cities.71
Had there remained only three well-defined sections in
the United States, a permanent alliance between two would
very likely have emerged which would have repeatedly subjected
the out-cast minority section to injustices, actual or imagined.
The result would have been a repetition of the same gloom.
Fortunately, however, the cleavages were not fixed because
of the continuing expansion of the country. As Turner wrote,
unlike the small States of Europe the "United States has . . .
the clash of economic interests closely associated with
regional geography on a huge scale"; all through American
history national politics seems to have closely approximated
72to the "geographical" regions of the country.
Because state boundaries do not coincide with physical 
boundaries (even if these could be exactly defined) , and 
because one state is often divided in more than one economic 
section, the existence of a number of sections in the country has
71
A Southern writer in DeBow' s Review, in 1847. Cited in
Turner, op . cit. , footnote 70, p. 32 .
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assured an overlapping pattern of cleavages and, consequently,
a shifting political balance. As Turner has noted, the results
of the Presidential elections from 1836 to 1852 clearly showed
7 3the influence of these cross-cutting cleavages. In these
elections the rough and the poorer lands, and the illiterate
counties, were for the most part the Democratic counties;
while the fertile basins were, for the most part, Whig.
These cross-cutting cleavages, or intersectional linkages,
served to unite the several states in a national citizenship
74by mobilizing their common interests in the national arena.
A distinction is sometimes drawn between regionalism
and sectionalism. Sectionalism is said to involve arrangements
of much greater permanence which persist despite the emergence
of immediate conflicts or divergences among its components
from time to time. Regionalism, on the other hand, is
regarded essentially as a transient phenomenon that brings
adjacent states together because of immediate and specific
75common interests. It often runs across sectional boundaries
in order to obtain specific federal assistance with a view 
to overcome some specific problems that face the respective 
states in two or more adjoining sections. A good exampleais offered by the states from Albama to Pennsylvania that 
are crossed by the Appalachian Mountains and that have united 
to improve the lot of the depressed mountain communities on 
a regional basis.^
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To H. U. Faulkner the United States appeared "fundamentally
a group of economic sections rather than an agglomeration of 
7 7states". And because economic interests are often shifting;
the sectional boundaries in America, unlike the boundaries
of fixed ethnic sections, are ever changing and creating, in
that process, ever-shifting alliances among the constituent
states. In this sense, American sections represent the
7 8"consciousness of differences between kindred". Walter
Kollmorgen has analyzed the endless overlapping, criss-crossing,
and interpenetration of activities and interests in all the
major physiographic sections of the United States. Spread
of iron and steel industry from the Great Lakes through the
Atlantic coast to Alabama, or that of oil from Pennsylvania
to the Pacific, says Kollmorgen, "must confound the advocates
of regionalism" who regard sections as something fixed in 
79American life.
It is, therefore, a mistake to regard sections as "the
8 0American analogue of European nations". Further, the United
States is fortunate that unlike ethnic elements which are 
often fixed in their territorial surroundings (such as 
language in India, or language and religion in Canada), the 
economic interests which form the bases of American sections, 
are often shifting. The ever shifting nature of economic 
cleavages in the United States constantly help to strike new 
balances which help to prevent the development of divisive 
rigidities.
5. Scholars and laymen alike often wonder why new federations 
all the world over are passing through so much of internal 
stress and strain that threaten to break their unity. It
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is often thought that the reasons are to be sought in
illiteracy, backwardness, and political immaturity of the
new countries. But as this study would reveal, despite all
the maturity, wisdom, affluence, and the consciousness of
the so-called "manifest destiny", in its early phases the
American Union also had to pass through very serious stresses
and strains, even though its Western European heritage
"established certain common traditions in advance, facilitating
the task of harmonizing differences of language, culture,
81religion, and politics." In reality, in spite of all this
"Throughout the colonial period, the Americans tended to 
assume that these differences of language, culture, and
8 2religion would prevent the growth of a common loyalty."
So the question is: Why the United States, her teething
troubles apart, faced her severest threat to existence as a 
federal union some three quarters of a century after its 
inauguration, whereas in many of the newer nations of today 
the federal edifice has collapsed or is threatened with 
collapse in the very first few years of its erection? A 
close look at the "new federations" would show that a common 
factor in their federal instability or failure has been the 
disappearance of their raison d'etre for union once 
independence from foreign rule was achieved. In States 
where a charismatic leadership and/or a strong central 
authority existed from the beginning, as in India or Malaya 
(later Malaysia), the federation had a smoother run because 
the central government was able to present the nation with a 
new raison d'etre for union by taking up in hand plans and 
projects of national importance which helped to carry the 
loyalty of the major components of the nation with the central 
government. But elsewhere the cause of union languished.
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As Elkins and McKitridfcnote, in America, too, following
the War of Independence the spirit of unity generated by
the struggle for independence lapsed, and the older generation
began to revert to their own ways— the particularism and
8 3inertia of local authority. The United States was, however,
fortunate in the possession of its vast and open frontier
of pioneer settlement, under the control of the Federal
Government, where almost every section of the nation, every
partner in the federal bargain, could receive a pay off. The
frontier, therefore, presented a very strong raison d'etre
for the American Union. It was only in the middle of the
nineteenth century when a section of the nation found that
frontier seemingly closed to itself, that, in the view of
this section, the raison d'etre for union appeared to exist
no longer. The result was the tragic Civil War.
The Western frontier contributed to the maturity of the
new nation in two ways. First, the progressively shifting
frontier provided a motive force for strong mobility in the
nation's population; and "Nothing works for nationalism
84like intercourse within the nation". What the Mediterranean
Sea was to the Greeks, that and more the ever retreating frontier
8 5has been to the United States. Secondly, because the entire
frontier of settlement in the West remained under the control 
of the central government, so long as the frontier existed 
there was opportunity for the competence of the centre 
vis-a-vis the states. And, fortunately for the United States, 
this opportunity for the competence of the central government 
existed for long enough time (nearly a century and a quarter) 
for the states to consolidate into a^ nation and a_ State, 
rather than remain what Brogan regarded "a continent [?] 
with a disjointed government which . . . has few and imperfect
organs of national will."88
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Appendix to Chapter III
FURTHER NOTE ON TURNER AND BEARD 
(cf. footnotes 34 and 41)
Although both the Turner and the Beard theses have been 
put to close, and sometimes quite adverse, scrutiny, the basic 
facts as cited in this chapter are largely granted.
TURNER: Most critics of the Turner thesis would concede
that the Western Frontier stood as a great melting pot in 
which diverse cultural strains were mixed together, and 
where the linguistic, cultural, and other differences that 
had divided the people in their parent countries were 
largely forgotten. As Ray Billington says "of the many 
forces helping to create a distinct American culture, none 
was more important than the existence of a frontier during 
the three hundred years needed to settle the continent" -- 
R. A. Billington, "Frontiers" in C. Vann Woodward (Ed,),
A Comparative Approach to American History (Voice of America 
Forum Lectures, 1967, p. 82). The frontier was a cord of 
union in the sense that it helped to strengthen the peoples' 
loyalties to the Union because each state (and its people) 
looked to the virgin frontier of settlement as a great 
treasure-house in the hands of the Union government, on 
which each of them could draw in times of need,
The role of the frontier as a nationalizing force 
receives a good treatment in D, J. Elazar's books: The
American Partnership: Intergovernmental Cooperation in
The Nineteenth Century United States (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1955), and American Federalism: A View
from the States (New York: T. Y. Crowell, 1966). A strong
defence of the frontier as a moulding force is in H. C.
Allen, "F. J. Turner and the Frontier in American History" 
in H. C. Allen and C. P. Hill (Eds.), British Essays in 
American History (London: Edward Arnold, 1957, p p . 145-166).
A summary and appraisal of the extensive writings on the 
subject are to be found in R. A. Billington, The American 
Frontier (Washington, D. C . : Service Center for Teachers
of History, 2nd edition, 1965). Also useful is R. A, 
Billington (Ed.), Frontier Thesis: Valid Interpretation of
American History? (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966).
Almost a complete condemnation of the Turner thesis is to 
be found in J. F. McDermott (Ed.), The Frontier Re-examined 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969) especially in
the first essay by McDermott titled same as the book.
Two notable references in geography are M. Mikesell, 
"Comparative Studies in Frontier History", Annals, Association 
of American Geographers, Vol. 50, 1960, pp. 62-74; and
J. L. M. Gulley, "The Turnerian Frontier: A Study in the
Migration of Ideas", Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale 
Geografie, Vol. 50 , 1959 , p p . 65-72 and 81-91.
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BEARD: The dispute over the Beard thesis on economic
interpretation of the Constitution has largely centred around 
the questions: whether or not the Constitution was a "counter
revolution" by the rich whose property interests were 
immediately at stake; and whether the process of the 
Constitutional Convention was democratic or not. As R. E. 
Brown, one of the chief critics of the Beard thesis, himself 
agrees; "most of the evidence, while supporting a thesis 
that economic factors are important in constitution making, 
disproves the particular kind of economic interpretation 
that we have accepted in the past". (From a selection from 
R. E. Brown, in L. W. Levy (cited below) , p. 97) .
Two important critiques of the Beard thesis are: R. E.
Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution: A Critical
Analysis of "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution" 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), and F.
MacDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the
Constitution (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958).
An important support for the Beard thesis is Jackson Turner 
Main, "Charles A. Beard and the Constitution: A Critical
Review of Forrest MacDonald's 'We the People1", Willi am 
and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 17, 1960, p p . 86-102.
A further support for the thesis is in E. J. Fergusson,
The Power of the Purse: A History of the American Public
Finance, 1776-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1961, especially p p . 337-34 3) which concludes
that "The broadest cleavage in American society . . . [was]
that which ranged mercantile capitalists and their allies 
against agrarians both great and small". Other notable 
contributions are: J. P. Roche, "The Founding Fathers:
A Reform Caucus in Action", The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 55, 1961, p p . 799-816; and S. M. Elkins and
E. McKitrick, "The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the
Revolution", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 76, 1961,
p p . 181-216. A selection from the above authors (along 
with some others) is to be found in L. W. Levy (Ed.),
Essays on the Making of the Constitution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1969) . The selection contains useful 
editorial notes and a helpful bibliography.
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Chapter IV
CANADIAN FEDERALISM
"Some people are born nations, some achieve nationhood
and others have nationhood thrust upon them" parodies a
Canadian historian and adds that "Canadians seem to be among
these latter".1 In fact, "Canada was more a name than a
nation on that first Dominion Day and for some time thereafter".
In contrast to most post-co1onial nations the Fathers of
Canadian Confederation were faced with the task of reluctantly
replacing the rather nominal union under the Crown which was
proving inadequate to defence and development. Hardly any
federation born under these circumstances has ever been
successful. The history of Canada in this sense is indeed
3"A Story of Challenge", and the po1itico-geographic factors 
that played their part in keeping this multi-ethnic union 
together offer a challenging inquiry into the dynamics of 
federalism.
THE RISE OF CANADIAN FEDERALISM
Although the history of modern Canada starts in 1534 
with the arrival of the French Captain Jaques Cartier on the 
banks of the St. Lawrence, the history relevant to this study 
begins much later, in 1763, with the British conquest of Quebec 
and the eclipse of French power from North America after the 
conclusion of the Seven Years' War. This brought the entire 
area north of Florida and east of the Mississippi under the 
British flag, and New France passed under the British Crown
1
A. R. M. Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada,
Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1946, p. 325.
2
D. F. Warner, The Idea of Continental Union: Agitation
for the Annexation of Canada to the United States 1849- 
1893, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960,
p . 6 0.
J. M. S. Careless, Canada: A Story of Challenge, London:
Cambridge University Press, 1952.
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after a distinct existence of a century and a half. With
the returning French army went some of the French seigneures,
businessmen, priests and officials, but
the real New France remained: the men and women .
who inherited a way of life that was more solid than the
frowning wall of Quebec . . . These were les Canadiens.
Half-consciously they had developed a new culture that 
drew part from the old civilization from which they 
came and part from the soil, the forests, and the 
rivers of the land they had come to know and love.4
There were now four British possessions in the present-
day area of Canada: Quebec, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and
Rupert's Land. However, they in no way formed a separate
group: along with the Thirteen Colonies they comprised the
British North American Empire. Ever since its conquest in
1713 Nova Scotia was fashioned almost on the pattern of the
New England colonies and was often looked upon as one of them.
The initial plans were to end the anomalous position of Quebec
by bringing it in line with the other British colonies on
the continent. Despite its unique French background and its
solidly French-speaking Roman Catholic population, Quebec was
to receive no special treatment. Policies were to be set
forth for the British American Empire as a whole. The Royal
Proclamation of 1763, which redefined Quebec's boundaries, laid
down a common land policy for the entire American West, and
promised regular British institutions, including representative
government, to Quebec, Nova Scotia had already been cleared
of its original French Acadian population in 1755, and had
received a representative government on the New England model
in 1758. Similar developments were to be expected for Quebec
as we 11,
By closing the land beyond the Appalachians, to the west 
of the Thirteen Colonies, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
invited migrants to Quebec. The intention was to deflect 
the tide of American settlement northward, as in Nova Scotia, 
until the French in Quebec were submerged in an English-speaking
G. P. de T. Glazebrook, A Short History of Canada, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1950, p. 82.
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population. But as Quebec seemed too far, too cold, too 
alien, and not at all like the tempting lands in the Ohio 
valley just across the mountains, settlers did not come.
The only English-speaking settlers to Quebec were a small 
number of merchants who originally came as contractors and 
suppliers to the British army and later filled the gap left 
by the French merchants and fur traders who returned to France 
after the Paris Peace Treaty. These British merchants were 
soon able to establish a new flourishing fur trade on the 
St. Lawrence, and by virtue of their wealth and their membership 
of the ruling "race" they soon came to control the economic 
life of the province.
The Proclamation failed completely in its aim of sub­
merging the French elements in an English-speaking population. 
Outside the fur trade the two peoples--French and English-- 
were treading separate paths. The French majority were 
engaged mainly in agriculture, and the English minority in 
trade. The two sides were acquiring different traits. Each 
looked down the other's way of life. Thus seeds of strife 
were being sown and trouble was being stored for the future.
Though the Act of Proclamation had promised representative 
government to Quebec, there were great difficulties in calling 
a general assembly in the province because under the existing 
British law Roman Catholics were barred from political rights.
In view of this any assembly in this overwhelmingly Catholic 
population would have been highly unrepresentative. Further, 
responsible British administrators thought that it was 
diplomatic to keep the aristocratic and military-looking 
seigneurial system of Quebec intact in order to keep His 
Majesty's French subjects pacified. In view of the increasingly 
radical and disorderly politics in the Thirteen Colonies, 
it was realized, scarcely ten years after the 1763 Proclamation, 
that the strategy of the time demanded not British institutions 
but full recognition of the existing French traditions of the 
province which alone, it was thought, could win over the 
French population and bind Canadian loyalty tightly to the 
Empire. It was with this view that the Quebec Act, which 
"still stands, honoured by French Canadians as the Magna Charta
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of their national rights and privileges" (though it was a
great stimulus to disaffection in the strongly anti-Papist
New England), was passed in 1774. The Act ensured the survival
of the French language and culture in Quebec. Though there
was to be an appointed Council of both French and English, no
provision was made for an assembly. Though the English criminal
law was instituted, the French civil law was maintained, and
the Catholic Church in Quebec became a body backed by the State.
With the outbreak of the Revolution in the Thirteen
Colonies a large body of Loyalist Americans fled to the northern
provinces of Quebec and Nova Scotia. The distinctive traditions
of the Loyalist migrants coupled with equally distinctive
traditions of the French in Quebec were destined to modify
profoundly the normal course of colonial development in the
north, for like the French elements the Loyalists too harboured
a distaste for the radical New Englanders. Hence "demography
like geography was to prove a variable and baffling factor
in the development of Canadian nationhood".  ^ Thus, the
"American Revolution bore not one but two nations in its womb--
the American, its obvious offspring, and a more obscure progeny,
the Canadian." ". . . Canada was the offshoot of the losing,7conservative side of a gread racial [sic] upheaval." Indeed,
"The rock [of 'the Old Colonial System'] which wrecked the 
first American dominion was to become the cornerstone ofQthe second".
In all nearly forty thousand Loyalists came to the 
northern provinces--thirty thousand in Nova Scotia and the
5
G. F. G. Stanley, "Act or Pact? Another Look at Confederation", 
Canadian Historical Report, 1956, reprinted in Confederation, 
a selection of articles from the Canadian Historical Review 
and other volumes, edited with an introduction by Ramsay 
Cook, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1967, p p . 94-118,
reference on p. 96.
6
Chester Martin, Foundations of Canadian Nationhood, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1955, p. 47.
7
Lower, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 85.
8
D. G. Creighton, Dominion of the North: A History of Canada,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1944, p. 174.
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rest in Quebec. The first tangible result of the Loyalist 
migrations was the establishment of two new colonies in the 
north. At the mouth of St. John River grew up a new Loyalist 
town of St. John. So considerable was the influx of migrants 
in the area that a new province, New Brunswick, was carved 
out of the old Nova Scotia in 1784. Similarly the Loyalist 
settlement in the St. Lawrence-Lakes region of Quebec became 
the English-Canadian province of Upper Canada in 1791.
Intangible results of the migrations were no less important.
The anti-republican animus of all Loyalists, great and small, 
made it certain that there would be a second group of English 
communities in North America. The anti-republican sentiment 
supplied the migrants with a common bond the primary expression 
of which was anti-Americanism, and the secondary a strong 
sentiment of loyalty to the conception "British". This 
indirectly gave birth to a Canadian nation separate from the 
American.
The independence of the United States, and the large 
influx of migrants to Quebec, changed the legal position of 
the province. Canada could no longer be retained as a purely 
French province with French laws and traditions. Authorities 
in London were also drawn to the opinion that an Assembly in 
Quebec with powers of taxation would relieve the mother country 
of some of the financial burden involved in the administration 
of the colony. It was with this view that the Constitutional 
Act of 1791 was passed. Quebec was divided into Upper and 
Lower Canada, the common boundary between the two provinces 
running along the Ottawa River. Each of the two new provinces 
received a Governor and a legislature consisting of an appointive 
Council and an elected Assembly. The problem of civil law was 
left to each legislature. The French civil law was continued 
in Lower Canada, and the English civil law was opted for in the 
Upper province. Thus within a generally British administrative 
structure diversities of "race", language, and culture were 
retained, and it was almost finally destined that two different 
streams would flow in Canadian life for a very long time to 
come, for now the Act "provided the French fact with a 
geographical as well as political buttress". It was a
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9"renewed consecration of the French fact in Canada".
After the independence of the Thirteen Colonies the 
Maritimes were cast to play the role in the Second Empire that 
New England had played in the first. The Maritimes were, 
however, a very poor replacement for New England, for apart 
from fish they could not supply sufficient foodstuffs to the 
British West Indies. Still, because the Acts of Navigation 
had decreed that the Empire commerce should be kept to the 
Empire ships, the Maritimes remained protected from a good 
deal of American competition, and Nova Scotia, in particular, 
was able to build a flourishing trade by sea. New Brunswick 
was more concerned with lumbering and ship-building than 
fishing and sea-faring. However, because of the preferential 
treatment given to its timber by Britain during the Napoleonic 
wars, the province gained prosperity by its lumber trade. The 
imperial framework was benefiting the Canadas also. By 1800 
lumbering had become, along with the fur trade, one of the 
main industries of the two provinces. ‘L° Then, as new land 
was being cleared in the Upper province, a new staple was 
developed in wheat. By cutting Britain off from the European 
grain market, the Napoleonic wars created a large market for 
the Canadian wheat in Britain. This laid the foundations 
of the future granary of Canada. With their exports of fur, 
lumber, and grain receiving preferential treatment in the 
British market, the Canadas, like the Maritimes, found a very 
happy lot under the imperial system. And since in all this 
commerce the British North American provinces were in direct 
competition with the United States, the imperial economic 
system helped greatly to reinforce in the people of these 
northern provinces a very strong sense of special destiny 
separate from the United States. Thus were laid the foundations 
of a new nation in North America.
9
Canon Groulx, Histoire du Canada Frangais. Ill, 133. Cited 
in Stanley, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 98.
10
A brief summary of these economic factors may be found on 
p p . 105-107 of D. G. Creighton, The Story of Canada, London:
Faber and Faber, 1959.
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The continued insecurity of the Canadian boundary with 
the United States, and later the War of 1812, only further 
helped to harden this sense of separate identity and destiny 
among the British North Americans. With the conclusion of 
the War, Upper Canada, where the Loyalist and anti-American 
sentiments had become less pronounced because of the later 
immigration of frontiersmen from the United States (who had 
no pro-British feelings), also became definitely anti-American. 
By 1820 British North America was on a far more solid 
footing than it had ever been before the War of 1812. Pride 
in successful defence against invasion had planted the roots 
of specifically Canadian national feeling, and the War by 
"turning the people of the republic into foes, completed the 
separation which the War of Revolution had begun, and confirmed 
Canadians in that determination of which their separate nation­
hood more than anything has been built, the determination not 
to be 'Americans'".^  It is possible that there would have 
been a Canadian nation without the War of 1812 but it would 
have been much less self-conscious, less securely based 
emotionally, and one whose continued existence would have 
been much less certain. Though the War of 1812 is only a 
footnote in British and only a minor chapter in American history, 
it was Canada's great struggle for survival. The War not 
only confirmed the political independence of British North 
America, it also "completed its economic revolution" for the 
"economic design of British North America since 1783, which 
was to co-operate with the Empire, and to compete with the
United States in new staples, seemed [in 1812] almost to have
12passed into reality of achievement". From its demonstration
that the British seapower balanced the American landpower
there came the peaceful completion of the continental partition.
Thus were spun the threads of a new Canadian destiny, both
13French and English, both colonial and national.
11
A. R. M. Lower, Canadians in the Making; A Social History of 
Canada, Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co. , 19 5 8 , p~! 17 4.
12
Creighton, op. cit., footnote 8, p. 194.
W. L „ Morton, The Kingdom of Canada: A General History from
Earliest Times, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merri11 Co. Inc.,
1963, p. 144.
13
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After the Treaty of Ghent (1815) , the British North
American colonies, now free from the menace of war, turned
their attention to their own internal problems* The
Constitutional Act of 1791 had provided for appointive
Councils in the two Canadian provinces* These councils, in
course of time, had become "oligarchies entrenched around the
governor" that administered the government of their colonies
14without regard to popular wishes* By the 1830s the colonies
had outgrown the form of government laid down for them in 
1791. As the grievances of the colonists grew, reform 
movements developed, and in 1837 the reform actually moved 
into armed rebellion in the two interior provinces. This 
shocked the imperial government in London. Early in 1838 
the Earl of Durham was appointed the Governor-General for all 
British North America with instructions to calm the provinces 
and to report on their grievances. In his report, submitted 
in 1839, Lord Durham recommended the institution of responsible 
governments in all the colonies, and to create a political 
union of the two Canadas. In response to the latter 
recommendation the Act of Union was passed in 1840, and in 1841 
the United Provinces of Canada came into being. But contrary 
to Durham's recommendation, the structure of the two units 
was retained almost intact, and the units were given equal 
representation in the Assembly. "The new constitution was thus, 
in effect, a vague, unintended, and undefined form of 
federalism, with the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada 
continuing in existence under the names of Canada West and 
Canada East, despite their union in one political entity 
called the Province of Canada . . . the name [of course] does
15not affect the substance so long as the identity is manifest."
As the industrial leadership of Britain was established 
in the world, the British interest in her colonies began to 
wane, for now that every country was willing to buy British 
goods the small protected colonial markets seemed of little 
value. The Corn Laws were repealed in 1846, and by 1849 the
14
Morton, o p . c i t . , footnote 13, p . 209 .
15
Stanley, o p . c i t ., footnote 5, P- 100 .
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old colonial system came to an end. Now that the economic 
life of the colonies was no longer to be controlled the British 
government could have little objection in granting responsible 
government to the colonies. Canada and Nova Scotia received 
it in 1848. Prince Edward Island had its responsible government 
in office in 1851, New Brunswick in 1854, and Newfoundland 
in 1855. Soon after, various factors including economic 
problems with the loss of British mercantilist protection, 
the relative disinterest of Britain in her colonial affairs, 
and the mother country's desire to be relieved of the burden 
of administering the colonies coupled with tensions on 
the boundary with the United States awakened British North 
American colonies to the need for greater cooperation and 
a closer union. Various plans for union began to be talked 
of until their efforts finally succeeded in creating the 
Canadian Confederation in 1867. Originally the Confederation 
was a centralized federation consisting of the United Province 
of Lower and Upper Canada (that now became the separate 
provinces of Quebec and Ontario) and the two provinces of 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The new State was called 
Canada. Manitoba became a province of Canada in 1870, British 
Columbia joined the Confederation in 1871, and Prince Edward 
Island in 1873. Later new provinces were created from the 
Northwest Territory. The newest member of the Confederation 
is Newfoundland which joined the union only in 1949. [Fig. 4.1] 
Whether the Canadian Confederation was in spite of, or 
because of "geography" has been a much disputed point among 
Canadian historians. The chief proponent of the first view 
was Goldwin Smith who regarded the Confederation as an entirely 
unnatural creation because "God and Nature never designed a 
trade between Ontario and the Maritime Provinces".^  Since 
the major lineaments of North American geography run north-south 
everything seemed to him to point to a union of all the English-
A statement by the Attorney General of Nova Scotia. Quoted by 
Goldwin Smith in Canada and the Canadian Question, Toronto: 
Macmillan Co., 1891, pp. 205-206. This line of thinking has 
been followed by many including Andre Siegfried in his 
Canada: An International Power, translated from French by
D 0 Hemming, London: Jonathan Cape, 1949.
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speaking people in North America. Diametrically opposed to
this view is the line of thinking that began with the economic
historian Harold Adams Innis who insisted that the history
of staple trades in Canada based on the St. Lawrence system
showed that the natural geographic axis of the country was in
fact east-west. The Confederation to him was, then, a
constitutional structure built on a natural geographic base.
As he put it: "The present Dominion emerged not in spite of
17geography, but because of it". Innis has found a great
18follower in Donald Creighton.
The truth however lies between the two extremes. "Geography"
is hardly a fixed thing. In fact, "Geography . . .  is man's
19concept of his environment at any given time", for in human
2 0affairs the idea is what ultimately counts. Ideas are as
much a part of our environment as physical features are.
And the basic idea of Canada was, the Crown Connexion and
anti-Americanism. As Watson says,
Indeed, hardly any factor has been of greater importance 
in the geography of Canada than the Crown Connexion.
Where the Appalachians, the Shield, and the Rockies 
tended to keep the original colonies apart, the Crown 
Connexion drew them together and eventually enabled them 
to form such a union between themselves as to give unity 
to their several geographies, and to create the geography 
of a united country a mari usque ad mare.2-*-
But there was no question of man against Nature as such. The
east-west pull of history and politics that was imposed upon the
north-south grain of the land, produced a new arrangement, a
17
H . A . Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to
Canadian Economic History, Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, first published in 1930, new edition, 1956, p. 393.
18
D. G. Creighton, The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 
1760-1850, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937.
19
W. L. Morton, "The Geographical Circumstances of the Confeder­
ation" in W. J, Megill (Ed.), Patterns of Canada, Toronto: 
Ryerson Press, 1967, p. 62.
20
L. Febvre in collaboration with Lionel Bataillon, A 
Geographical Introduction to History, translated by E. G. 
Mountford and J. H. Paxton, London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1932, chapter 4.
J. W . Watson, North America: Its Countries and Regions, New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, p. 197.
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new balance of natural physical features by harnessing them
to good purpose wherever they had of political, strategic, and
economic value. Indeed, a country's "geography" may sometimes
have little meaning outside its history. In Canada's case
History . . . put its own interpretation on coasts and
riverways, on upland and lowland « . . until . . . these
things began to express . . .  a specific character, 
differentiating them from others, and making them without 
question Canadian.22
The primarily north-south grain of Canada which cuts off
habitable parts of the country from one another by physical
barriers of more difficult country is clearly visible in the
growth of separated communities "like separated melons on one
long vine, strung out across the continent close to Canada's
2 3southern boundary". [Fig. 4,2] But a natural connexion 
between the eastern colonies had already existed in the St. 
Lawrence route which the railways extended westwards across 
the Prairies and the Rockies to the Pacific coast until at 
last they knotted together all parts of Canada into a single 
"steel-bound" entity. This geographic compartmentalization 
was indeed one of the chief factors in the rise of strong 
regional identities among these colonies which in effect made 
federal type of union a necessity.
The Federal Structure
Although the Constitution of 1867 made Canada an 
independent federation the country continued to be a British 
Dominion with the British Crown as its symbolic head. The 
Constitution provided for a general legislature of two 
houses: an appointed Senate with life tenure (amended in 1965
to provide for retirement on reaching seventy-five years of 
age), and an elected House of Commons. Executive and 
legislative powers are in close identification through the 
control of administration by leaders of the parliamentary 
majority. An appointed judiciary is virtually independent
22
Watson, op. cit,, footnote 21, p. 219. Very relevant are 
Watson's "Canadian Regionalism in Life and Letters" The 
Geographical Journal, Vol. 131, Part 1, 1965, p p . 21-33/ and
"Role of Illusion in North American Geography: A Note on
the Geography of North American Settlement", Canadian 
Geographer, Vol. 13, 1969, pp. 10-27.
Careless, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 5.
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of control by either the executive or the legislative 
branches of government and holds office during good behaviour.
Endeavouring to profit by the experience of the United
States where exaggerated states' rights appeared to have
produced dissension and civil war, Canada adopted a modified
form of federalism that initially leaned strongly towards
centralization. The Parliament was endowed (by section 91 of
the BN A Act) "to make laws for the peace, order and good
government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming
within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively
to the provinces". The central government was empowered
to control most important fields of national interest as: the
Armed Forces, regulation of trade and commerce, banking, credit,
currency, criminal law, postal services, navigation and shipping,
railways, canals and telegraphs, and the raising of money by any
mode of taxation. The provincial governments were given
enumerated powers embracing matters chiefly concerning regional
affairs. Provinces were given exclusive authority with
respect to education subject only to certain safeguards for
minority communities. Both English and French were recognized
24as official languages of the union.
But despite its greater emphasis on central powers, the 
Canadian Confederation also remained essentially a dual polity 
where both unity and genuine diversity would flourish. This 
classical federalism worked with considerable success until 
World War I, but soon after the depression of the thirties 
transformed it tremendously. "Although the change has been 
effected without any striking amendments in the formal 
constitution . . . the alteration in the working governmental
structure . . 0 has been profound". "There has been a persistent
and rapid acceleration in the centralizing of the prime 
initiative in government, if not so much the formal exercise of
24
A thorough study of the constitutional development in Canada 
is W. P. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada, 1534-1937, An 
Introduction to its Development, Law and Custom, London:
Oxford University Press, 1938, An authoritative, but very 
brief, summary of the constitutional structure may be found 
in Canada One Hundred 1867-1967 , (pp. 26-48) , prepared by the 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa: Queen's Printers,
1967 .
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governmental power". However, there is little to lament,
for, indeed, "Those who want to get back the substance of 
the classical federalism will have to reduce greatly big 
business, big government, and economic interdependence".26
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE RISE OF 
CANADIAN FEDERALISM
Factors for Separate Identities
Except for the fact that Upper and Lower Canada were
linked in uneasy partnership by the St. Lawrence, till the
Confederation was actually born "the only connection between
the various British North American colonies lay in the word
'British'. In nearly all particulars of their life they lived
2 7in separate worlds with no inter-communication". So little
was this inter-communication that as late as the 1830s the 
steamship Royal William, which attempted to pioneer a passenger 
run between Quebec and Halifax, failed dismally because of 
the lack of traffic. The roots of this separative particularism 
lay in diverse factors--physical, and cultural.
Ever since Canada became a British province, the "Two 
Ways of Life" have constituted the principal theme of its 
history. As a Canadian historian puts it, among White and 
Christian peoples no two more complete opposites could have 
been found in juxtaposition than the French and English as
25
J. A. Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism", in 
A. R. M. Lower and others, Evolving Canadian Federalism, 
Durham, (N„ C.): Duke University Press, 1958, both
quotations on p. 96.
26
Corry, op. cit„, footnote 25, p. 125. The changing phases 
of Canadian federalism are beautifully summarized by J. R. 
Mallory, "The Five Faces of Federalism" in P.-A. Crepeau 
and C. B. Macpherson (Eds.), The Future of Canadian 
Federalism, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965 , p p .
3-15. Very relevant are D. V. Smiley, "The Two Themes of 
Canadian Federalism", The Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science, Vol. 31, 1965, pp. 80-97; and J. M.
Beck, "Canadian Federalism in Ferment" in R. H. Leach (Ed.), 
Contemporary Canada, Durham (N. C . ) : Duke University Press,
1967, pp. 148-176.
Lower, op. cit., footnote 11, p. 189.
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they grew up in North America, Though the two people were
traditional foes, the two civilizations had many common bridges
in the old world« But while the post-Enlightenment French
culture had not emigrated to the New World, the extreme French
Catholicism hado Similarly, the English Protestantism in
America was on the whole of a harsh and bigoted kind, more
extreme than that of England« The differences between the
two communities covered diverse aspects of life--religion,
language, and institutions; and because the two communities
possessed distinctly marked areas of habitance, they developed
from the beginning highly separate identities. As the Earl
of Durham wrote, the French and the English were virtually
2 9"two warring nations in the bosom of a single state".
Even the English-speaking colonists in British North 
America were hardly of a piece. Settlers to the northern 
colonies were made up of diverse groups--the pre-Loyalists, 
Loyalists, and 1ater-Loyalists from the United States; the 
Irish, English, and Scots from Britain. As these different 
groups in the northern colonies came to possess somewhat 
localized areas of settlement, their ethnic heterogeneity gave 
rise to a strongly federal situation. Whereas Nova Scotia was 
largely settled by the pre-Loyalists, New Brunswick regarded 
itself as the Loyalist province par excellence. Besides these 
differences that divided the Maritimers, there was a world of 
difference between the Maritimers, on the one hand, and the 
English-speaking Canadians on the other. Upper Canada was 
largely settled by immigrants from the frontier regions of the 
United States, and later, by Irish and other poorer immigrants 
from Britain. Compared to these rough and little-educated 
frontiersmen of Upper Canada, the Maritimers were on the whole 
a sophisticated group. As Whitelaw says "not only was the 
rebellious character of the Canadians contrasted with the
28
A. R. M. Lower, "The Two Ways of Life: The Primary Anti­
thesis of Canadian History", The Canadian Historical 
Association Report of the Annual Meeting, 1943, pp. 5-18.
Ro Coupland, The Durham Report, An abridged version with 
an Introduction and Notes, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945,
p < 15 .
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loyalty of the maritime sentiments, this Canadian characteristic
was commonly held [by the Maritimers] to be the result of
poorer stock". To the Maritimers the French Canadians were a
"fossilized branch of the seventeenth century France", while
they regarded the English Canadians as a "strange conglomerate
of economic misfits recently migrated from Ireland and Great
Britain, and worse still, downright republicans who had of late
been pouring over from the United States". No doubt, there had
in Upper Canada been a substratum of the United Empire Loyalists,
but these had been submerged by the recent immigration; whereas
in spite of its recent migrants New Brunswick was still inhabited
by the native-born. Although one in every three English-
speaking Canadians was not native-born, eight out of every
30nine persons in the Maritimes were so.
Though, it is said, Nature might have seemed to intend
the Maritime provinces to face inward and northward on the
Gulf of St. Lawrence, and history and politics emphasized
this frontage by linking them with the rest of British North
America to the west in a common country, first under the French
and later under the British, in spite of its spacious harbours,
good supplies of coal, and its strategic position, the north
shore had not flourished and the Maritimes
tended to look to the Atlantic for whatever contact it 
might have with the outside world. Almost three times 
the amount of shipping entered the ports of New Brunswick 
along the Bay of Fundy as entered its north shore ports.
In Nova Scotia, Halifax was connected with the Bay of Fundy 
by a railway to tidewater at Windsor ten years before a 
similar connection was completed with the north shore at 
Pictou. None of the three Maritime capitals faced north. 
There was no north shore port in New Brunswick that could 
vie with St. John; and in Nova Scotia although over a 
thousand ships a year left Pictou, the town was no rival 
to Halifax, and its importance was owed to its rich 
deposits of coal rather than the Gulf frontage.31
Thus the Maritimes had found their real frontage not towards the
north and west where the rest of British North American provinces
lay, but to the south and east facing the New England states.
30
Wo M. Whitelaw, The Maritimes and Canada Before Confederation, 
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1934, p. 25.
31
Whitelaw, op. cit„, footnote 30, p p . 10-11.
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Not only were the south shore ports of Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick nearer and more accessible to New York and Boston
than to the Canadian ports on the St, Lawrence, they were, in
fact, nearer and more accessible to these American ports than
their own ports on the north shore. A trip from Halifax
to the West Indies was, in fact, less hazardous than the one
from Halifax to Montreal, While risky in summer owing to its
shifting currents, dense fogs and treacherous rocks and shoals,
the St. Lawrence route remained closed for about seven months
during winter because of ice. The result was that the Atlantic
frontage of the Maritimes had become as much psychological as
geographic. The provinces were Maritime in a deeper sense
than that of merely bordering on the sea. They lived on and
by the sea. This gave them a feeling of intimacy with the
North Atlantic world, and they, therefore, faced not towards
32Canada but away from it. During winter Quebec could have
its contact with the outside world not through the British
American ports in Nova Scotia or New Brunswick, but overland
through the United States territory to the American ports of
Portland, Boston, or New York.
As the imperial soldiers found in 1861, the overland
route between Canada and the Maritimes via the Temiscouta road
3 3was extremely difficult. Only a small fraction of mails
destined for Canada were carried over the route between Truro
and Riviere du Loup, and even telegraphic communication between
Canada and the Maritimes was carried largely over American 
34lines. The northward extension of the Appalachian system
in Canada had only further reinforced the physical division 
between the Maritimes and the interior.
This particularism was further reinforced by the greatly 
varied economic bases of the colonies. The gold of British 
Columbia, the furs of the Prairies, and the cereals and 
lumber of Canada stood in sharp contrast to the fisheries, 
coal, and timber of the Maritimes. The result of all this
Whitelaw, op. cit., footnote 30, p. 13.
33
R. G. Trotter, Canadian Federation; Its Origins and 
Achievement, London: J. M. Dent, 1924 , pp. 190-192 .
34
William Smith, History of the Post Office in British North 
Arne rica, London: Cambridge University Press, 1920, pp. 32 7-32
1 2 3
was that
the interrelations of British North America on the eve 
of Confederation were not provincial but regionale Canada 
was an economic unit; the ties which bound the maritime 
provinces were strong and close; but the relation between 
Canada and the West on the one hand, and Canada and the 
Atlantic provinces on the other, were undeniably tenuous 
wherever they existed at all«35
Conditioned by the mercantilist policy of the Empire,
the colonial pattern of trade further emphasized this colonial
isolation» As the bulk of the trade of the provinces was
with the mother country or the Empire, that great binder of
separate communities--intercolonial trade--could have little
chance to develop till late in the mid-nineteenth century»
Though the mercantilist restrictions had slowly been removed,
not till the Confederation was actually born was there freedom
of trade in manufactured goods between the colonies, though
raw materials could be freely exchanged» In absence of a
customs union, the provinces confronted each other, as well
3 6as the outside world, with distinct tariff systems» Trade
between Canada and the Maritimes formed only a small part 
of the total commerce of these territories. In 1863 Canada's 
export to the colonies of British North America were valued 
at only $935,196 out of a total outward trade of $39,347,890. 
Similarly the total value of commodities shipped annually 
from the Maritime provinces to Canada did not always reach 
$100,000. The Maritime exports to Canada were largely made 
up of fish, fish oil, coal, and re-exports of West Indian 
sugar and molasses; similarly most of the Canadian exports 
to the Maritimes consisted of flour and other agricultural 
products with a little quantity of manufactured goods.
35
D. G. Creighton, British North America at Confederation, 
Ottawa; Government Printers, first published 1939, reprinted 
1963, p. 36.
36
J. C. Hammeon ("Trade and Tariffs in British North American 
Provinces Before Confederation", Proceedings of the Canadian 
Political Science Association, 1934, Vol. 6, pp. 51-59) 
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A further force making for provincial particularism was 
the highly disparate size and population of the provinces in 
general, and the Maritimes and "Canada" in particular. Together 
the Maritime provinces were less than one-sixth of the area of 
the United Province of Canada, and much smaller than either of 
the two units of the Province. By 1861 Upper and Lower Canada 
each had over a million population but the total population of 
the Maritimes had as yet not reached seven hundred thousand. 
Montreal alone had twenty thousand more people than Prince 
Edward Island. Thus, except for Upper Canada (which then had 
more population than Lower Canada) in every province of British 
North America there were genuine apprehensions against any 
move for political union of the provinces. While the tiny 
provinces on the Atlantic were afraid of their giant neighbour 
which they thought would be bound to rule the union to its own 
benefit, the French Canadians were afraid that in a general 
union of the provinces they would be overwhelmed by the English- 
speaking elements, and this, in their view, appeared as the 
death-knell of their language, culture, and religion that they 
had so painfully guarded for over a century now.
Thus, although a little exaggerated, the following 
analysis of the component parts of the "New Nation" (that 
was being born in 1866-67) by a contemporary journal contains 
a fair amount of truth:
We don't know each other. We have no trade with each 
other. We have no facilities, or resources, or incentives, 
to mingle with each other. We are shut off from each 
other by a wilderness, geographically, commercially, 
politically and socially. We always cross the United 
States to shake hands. Our interests are not identical 
but very opposite--they are antagonistic and clashing.
Our political habits and history run in different channels. 
. . . Our wants are different. The laws of the two
countries are different, and framed for different states 
o f things.37
Whereas in Canada "the centralizing tendency of the St. Lawrence
was at war with the divisive force of the two distinct
cultures"; in the Maritimes "economic decentralization and
3 8political particularism were in harmony". This is how P. B.
37
Acadian Recorder, July 27, 1866. Quoted in Creighton, op.
cit., footnote 35, p. 36.
38
Creighton, op. cit., footnote 35, p. 37.
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Waite describes the eastern provinces in 1867:
Newfoundland, its population clinging precariously to a 
living wrested from the Labrador current and a hard 
land; Prince Edward Island, complacent, defiant, and 
parochial; Nova Scotia, afloat on seven oceans, proud 
of herself and jealous of Canada; New Brunswick, half- 
American in politics and attitude; Quebec, determined 
to get every jot and title of privilege with or without 
Ottawa; Ontario, sleek, bigoted, and stentorian.39
Factors Creating the Urge for Union 
"Canada is a colony, not a country, it is not yet 
identified with the dearest affections and associations,
remembrances and hopes of its inhabitants: it is to them an
4 0adopted, not a real mother" essayed a writer in 1838. By
1850, however, "a new British North America had come into
existence . . . working itself towards the point where it
could clothe these things with 'dearest affections . . .
remembrances . . . hopes'". British North America had now
begun to take an observable collective meaning. It now became
"a phrase which had begun to possess some discernible content
and reality". Now the various colonial streams had begun to
converge, and there were prophetic overtones about it which
4 1cast the shadows of the coming events. So prophetic were
these overtones that some historians believe that "even if
there had been no Confederation, even if there had been no
federal government, the forces acting upon British North
America would have involved the different provinces in common
difficulties and spurred them to comparable efforts and 
42enterprise".
The overriding allegiance to British memories and 
attachments had thrown the British North American colonies 
together in a hostile world. Yet just as most loving family 
memories do not prevent sisters from losing touch with each
39
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other if they remain apart too long, so the common allegiance
of the colonies probably would have become less significant
as they found their individual roles in the world, had not
4 3devices appeared which could bring them together.
Although the destinies of the St. Lawrence colonies lay 
in the interior, and for the Maritime provinces the ocean 
remained the great highway, while the Appalachian ridges 
emphasized the isolation between the two, by the middle of 
the nineteenth century on a basis of "flour down, and coal up" 
the St. Lawrence had begun to attract the northern and eastern 
parts of the Maritime provinces into its orbit again as it 
had done in the days of New France. While the oceanic 
forces towed the Maritime colonies out to sea, the continental 
ones held them back. Each successive improvement in 
transportation only increased the attraction of the St. Lawrence 
link. Railways had proved a great unifying factor in the 
States to the south and they were destined to be more potent 
than ocean navigation in the British North American colonies 
in tying them together in one tight geographical entity. An 
intercontinental railway, and the extended Grand Trunk had 
great attractions. It would give the St. Lawrence region 
a British American winter outlet; it would provide the 
Maritime ports a great continental hinterland, and above all, 
it would offer, in the emergency of American attack, a 
completely British American route for the movement of troops.
The assurance of the intercolonial railway went a long way 
in bringing Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to the Confederation 
table. [Fig. 4.3]
The fear and jealousy of the United States provided 
another important factor for intercolonial unity. Speaking 
of the haste with which the British North American union was 
brought about in 1867, a historian remarks that it was 
necessary in order to forestall the Americans who threatened 
to gobble the colonies up if they did not act quickly.
"Somewhere on the Parliament Hill in Ottawa . . . there should 
be erected a monument to this American ogre who so often
Lower, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 310.
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performed the function of saving us from drift and indecision."
There were strong memories of boundary disputes (along Maine
and Oregon in the 1840s), quarrels over fisheries, and
the War of 1812 which were currently being further reinforced
by the strained Arnerican-British relationship born out of
incidents in the Civil War. After the Northern victory in
the Civil War, the balancing role of the Southern states
disappeared. This greatly alarmed the colonies, and
hastened to bring them together for their collective security
against the post-Civil War United States that now seemed "a
vast and encroaching organization, politically truculent, [and]
4 5economically aggressive".
As Chester Martin has analyzed, the Canadian Confederation
was preceded by the failure of the British North American
colonies to float new loans in the London markets; and the
Union was in a large measure put through by the British 
46authorities. Heavy British investments were involved in
Canadian municipal bonds, and in the Grand Trunk railway.
While the Grand Trunk had reached a chronic financial chaos,
in the depression following 1857 many municipalities had
defaulted in payment. Thus, the "British assistance [to the
move for Confederation] might be interpreted as an effort
to assist in the creation of a great holding company in which
could be amalgamated all those divided and vulnerable North
American interests whose protection was a burden of the British 
47capital". A union of all the provinces would give a larger
base for financing provincial liabilities, while the railroad 
would profit by the increased traffic.
Thus the nationalism of Canadian Confederation was
44
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in a great measure an economic nationalism. Time and again
the leaders of the Confederation emphasized the complementary
nature of the resources and industries of North America,
which they thought would, under a union, provide the requisite
base for a balanced and stable national economy. " . . .
in the proposed Union" said Galt, . . w e  shall obtain some
security against those providential reverses to which as long
as we are dependent on one branch of industry , . . , we must
4 8always remain exposed". The Confederation seemed to offer
an economic pay-off to large sections of the population both
in the Maritimes as well as in the Canadas. While it was
expected that Lower Canada would become "the great commercial
centre for the whole of the Provinces", the Upper Canadians had
the "last best West" at their doors. The Maritimes had
their own high expectations for the prosperity of St. John and
Halifax. "We form" said the Maritime leader Lynch, "the
nearest point to Europe, while British America extending
across the whole continent, is laved by waters of the Atlantic
and Pacific". He thought that a mighty railroad running
across this great country would bring the region in
juxtaposition to the best part of Asia— China and Japan. If
the Maritimes could only be made "a place of transit for the
mighty trade . . .  it would be of incalculable benefit .
What made Venice or Genoa but their . . . being situated
4 9somewhat as we are, but without half the advantages". Nova
Scotians believed that the "geographical advantages" and 
the "geological attributes" of their province had destined 
her to a role in the Confederation similar to the role of 
Great Britain in the world, or of the New England states in 
the United States. New Brunswick was no less optimistic.
And almost every colony had some expectations of benefit 
from the "last best West" to whose share the membership of 
the Confederation would entitle them. Indeed the intention 
of the Fathers was to create a structure "stronger financially, 
commercially, and politically--a structure which would command
48
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the confidence of investors, as well as the interest: of
50merchants and the respect of statesmen". Even though their
separation and remoteness from one another had created among
these British American colonies a sense of regional independence
and individual identity, the limitations of their individual
5 1economies made for their political dependence.
The two communities--English and French--in Canada had
no doubt followed two separate ways of life; still, as recent
studies reveal, the geography of religion in the provinces
tended to unite rather than divide them in ehe 1860s.
Religion rather than nationality was the main concern of the
French Canadian leaders of the time. And because of the
existence of members of the Roman Catholic Church other than
French, religion made for unity rather than separation.
"The great concern of both the French as such, and the Roman
Catholics as such, was education rather than their relative
standing in respect of English or Protestants in either
5 2political or economic matters".
* * * * * *
Thus the overall picture of the 1860s was that the British
North American provinces were torn between diverse factors
of unity and separation; and it is truly said that the real
Father of the Confederation was the "deadlock".
Upper and Lower Canada, like the man and the woman 
in the fable, had come sadly to realize that they could 
get along neither together nor apart. They had tried 
both and succeeded in neither. Separation had proved 
to be economically impossible, union to be politically 
intolerable.53
The predicament of the union was so severe by the 1850s as to 
suggest that a more flexible alliance alone could maintain 
unity while safeguarding, at the same time, the interests of 
the sections. The United Province of Canada had to divide 
politically as it had to expand economically; and it could do
50
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both only in a union of all British America. While to the
English Canadians the larger union with the Maritimes offered 
an inalienable majority for their language and "race", to 
the French, on the other hand, it seemed that with their highly 
different, economy and outlook that strongly contrasted with 
the frontiersmen of Upper Canada, the Maritimes might provide 
in the union a balancing factor between them and the English 
Canadians »
The Maritimers, it is true, were highly "particularist
in spirit, regional in outlook, often parochial in sentiment . .
and fiercely independent and still elevated by the heady
5 5political wine of responsible government". Their
constitutional machinery functioned with reasonable efficiency, 
and they thought more in terms of a Maritime than a general 
union. But obstacles in the Maritime union were many. 
Geographically they were dispersed by the sea, the mountains, and 
the forests. They possessed no interconnecting roads and 
railways. Institutionally their existing provincial assemblies 
were stiff-necked vested interests with little desire to 
merge in a larger union. And but for a Maritime fellowfeeling 
there were few economic benefits in the smaller union. In 
order to tide over their geographic obstacles of separation 
and isolation they needed money. And money could come only 
in the larger union of all British America, Thus even though 
the Maritime provinces felt themselves "secure within the 
imperial art of Britain and the friendly neighbourhood of 
the 'Boston states'";
. . . each [of the provinces] had a problem, or problems,
of weight that neither the imperial connection nor the 
friendship of the United States were to solve. In each 
instance the failure of the imperial administration or 
American influence to solve these matters was the cause 
of the Atlantic provinces, except Newfoundland, entering 
the union of British America by 1873.56
But like the French Canadians, these provinces
("particularist in spirit", "fiercely independent", and
"elevated by the heady political wine of responsible government")
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also could not be expected to enter a completely centralized 
union. For them all the salvation lay in a federation.
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC INFERENCES
1. This study supports my hypothesis that federalism is a 
form of union that originates when a number of regionally- 
grouped political communities with small power potentials but 
strong regional identities are faced with a common threat to 
their survival; and that federalism is essentially a union of 
equal partners. In the pre-Confederation British North 
America the geographical distribution of power potential did, 
apparently, not appear uniform; and thus it does not seem to 
have been a union of equal partners. Even each of the sections 
of Canada was larger in area and population than all the 
Maritime provinces put together, and this was one of the 
reasons why the Maritimes were till the last not very enthusiastic 
about the union. A closer look would show, however, that the 
actual distribution of political status and prestige in the 
provinces in relation to their vulnerability to attack from the 
unfriendly republic to the south, and to the retreating British 
imperial protection, was not so anomalous as it appears at the 
first look. Though Upper Canadians regarded themselves as 
heirs to the great North-west, and Lower Canadians thought of 
themselves as custodians of the St. Lawrence commerce, both, 
cut off from the sea in the absence of any all-weather approach 
road, found themselves highly indefensible against the 
potentially encroaching Union from the south. The military 
weakness of the Canadas had been evident once, and in future 
they could possibly not be defended if free and effective 
movement through the Maritime ports was not guaranteed. Thus, 
without a general union of British North America the two 
sections of "Canada" were far more helpless than the Maritime 
provinces singly or collectively.
Because of her strategic position and her accessibility 
to British armed support, Nova Scotia had a standing in 
British North America which none of the other provinces 
possessed. Since the others needed the assistance of the British 
army for their defence, they felt their position of dependence, 
however free they might be in legislating for local interests.
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In fact, while "The other provinces felt their need of defence:
5 7Nova Scotia felt it was helping in the defence of the whole."
This need for defence increased in ascending order as one moved
from east to west. In fact, it was generally thought that
Britain might afford to abandon the province of Canada, it
could not afford to abandon the Maritimes as long as it had
a western empire to defend. As The Times wrote in 1849
in surrendering Canada they the British Statesmen will 
take care not to surrender one jot of sea or land the 
possession of which effectively concerns the maritime 
and commercial importance of Great Britain. They will 
not cede Nova Scotia, they will not cede Cape Breton ; 
they will not cede the seaboard and those harbours which 
must ever command the mouth of the St. Lawrence 
and protect the trade of the Atlantic.58
However, as British disinterest in the colonies increased, 
and as the advantages of British mercantilist protection began 
to disappear, each of the colonies, howsoever particularist, 
was faced with a grim future--some economically and some 
militarily. And in view of the impending crises that faced 
all of them together, they sought strength in union, and the 
Confederation was the obvious result.
2. This study further supports my hypothesis that in
multi-ethnic or highly heterogeneous federations with strong
regional identities, a militarily alive political frontier
serves as a consolidating agent by tending to squeeze
the dissenting partners together into unity. This consolidating
role of the militarily alive political frontier may be traced
all through the history of Canada. It was this factor that
had helped to change even the non-Loyalist elements in Upper
Canada into staunch Canadian nationalists after the 1812 War.
It is significant to note that throughout the period before
the Confederation, all the more serious plans for union
originated in the Canadas whereas the Maritimes (having almost
no live political frontiers, and being effectively shielded
by the British Navy) were till the last wavering between join
5 9or not to join.
Whitelaw, op. cit., footnote 30, p. 17.
The Times, November 2, 1849. Quoted in Whitelaw, op. cit.,
footnote 30, p. 17.
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Although looking back to Canadian history one can see
that general peace between Canada and the United States dates
from 1815, in the mid-nineteenth century there was no sense at
all that permanent peace had yet been secured. There had been
boundary fighting in 1838, and a war-scare over Oregon in
1846. Strained relations between Britain and the United
States during the Civil War— exemplified by the Confederate
raid from Canada on St. Albans, Vermont--had kept the
possibilities of a desperate struggle with the Republic ever
alive. And the Fenian raids from American soil in 1866 reminded
that the risk of a struggle with the Republic had not ended
when the Civil War was actually over in 1865. As the Colonial
Secretary Edward Cardwell wrote in June 1865 "the Provinces
of British North America are incapable, when separated and
divided from each other, of making those just and sufficient
preparations for national defence, which would be easily
undertaken by a Province uniting in itself all the population and
all the resources of the w h o l e " . Thus,
in part [at least] the Confederation was an attempt to 
band together the strength of British North America to 
resist any American threat. The United States, therefore, 
not only supplied an example for a new northern federation: 
it supplied an urgent reason for it.61-
Just as the military pressure on the frontier varied 
from the east to west so also did the awareness of the need 
for defence and the consequent urge for union. Although 
primarily a Maritime colony, New Brunswick was more inclined 
to the Confederation than the other colonies on the coast. Part 
of the reason may be that it also, like the Canadas, had a 
longer frontier to defend. Support for the hypothesis may 
also be seen in the greater enthusiasm of Upper Canada relative 
to Lower which was closer to the British bastion in the Maritimes
60
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The announcement of the U. S. intention, during the Civil War,
of a plan to rearm the Great Lakes (which were left free of
warships since 1817) , the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty,
and later reports of responsible Americans talking of the plans
to annex Canada to the United States, kept the military threat
62alive and, thereby, helped to keep the provinces together.
Fortunately for the Confederation, the British North 
American settlements were aligned along a narrow ribbon 
following the United States border, which was a militarily 
alive political frontier. Had the settlements been north- 
south instead of east-west, under the circumstances then 
prevailing, this union of strange bed-fellows, as the 
Confederation then was, would most probably not have been 
sustained, since security from all sides would have made the 
northern colonies complacent like the Maritimes and, in that 
event, a single province of Canada might not have had enough 
resources to bargain union with so many reluctant partners.
3. This study also suggests the favourable effects of 
geographical contiguity in the rise of federal unions.
British Columbia, it may appear, was not geographically 
contiguous to the rest of the federal units in the east.
But because all through its existence British Columbia was 
oriented towards the Hudson Bay Company and the Northwest 
territory, it had in effect possessed close ties with what 
later became the Dominion of Canada. When the construction 
of a link-railway within ten years was promised, the 
geographical contiguity was in fact created. This along with 
the anti-American sentiment born from the Oregon war-scare, 
as well as the lure of "the last best West", that lay in the 
backyard of the province, as it were, brought British Columbia 
into the Confederation. Further, British Columbia, unlike 
the other provinces, had come to possess borders with the 
United States both to her west as well as to south consequent
J. Patterson Smith, ("A United States of America, Shadow or 
Substance?", Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 26, 1945,
p. 118), says that it was because Americans assumed that 
the absorption of British North America was an inevitability 
which time would consummate, that they begot a sense of 
nationality in Canada which ultimately destroyed any notion of 
union. The whole question of annexation and continental union 
is ably dealt with in Warner, op. cit., footnote 2.
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upon the United States' purchase of A l a s k a n .panh-xnaldbae
in 1867»
4, The Canadian example also satisfies my h y p o thesis that
when bo un dary lines of regionally i d e n t i f y i n g  diversities
wi th in  a federal State highly overlap, the cleavages are
t r a n s f o r m e d  into linkages, and the result is a stable federalism.
The poi nt is made negatively, however, since the greatest
wea kne ss in the Canadian Confe d e r a t i o n  is the virtual
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of the major cultural deviance or dissidence
in one unit only, i c e . , Quebec» The absence of c r o s s -cutting
clea vag es in Canada has pr oved a great divisive force which
for some time now has been posing a th reat to the stability
of the Federation. Unlike S w i t z erland where the cleavages
of language and religion are hi ghly o v e r l apping, in Quebec
the Roman Catholic Church is so closely iden tified with the
French language and culture that the pr o v i n c e  has become
al to g e t h e r  a diff erent world within Canada.
Here one is tempted to point out that had A. T. Galt's
plan of di viding Canada at the time of C o n f e d e r a t i o n  into
three au tonomous units been accepted, the Central Canada (or
call it: the province of Otta w a  or Montreal) with its
he t e r o g e n e o u s  p opulation of both En g l i s h -  and F r e n c h - s p e a k e r s
wo ul d have acted as a link in keeping the c o m m unities together.
This ar gument also applies to the s h o r t - s i g h t e d  measure of
taking away the privilege of separate C a t holic schools for
6 3the m i n o rities in Manitoba in the year 1890.
A closer look at the history of the Confederation, in fact, 
shows that c r o s s - c u t t i n g  cleavages in the form of religion did 
play a s ignificant role in the rise of the C o n f e d e r a t i o n  in 
1867. B o n e n f a n t  thinks that it is wr ong to criticize Cartier, 
the F r e n c h - C a n a d i a n  Father of the Co n f e d e r a t i o n ,  for not 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  ensuring the protection of his comp atriots outside 
Q u e b e c .
At the most one can reproach him . . . for having had a 
[wrong] conc eption of fede ralism . . . [which] He e x p ressed  
. . . in 1865 in these words: "Under the federal system,
whi ch leaves to the central g o v e r n m e n t  questions of 
general interest in which racial d i f f e r e n c e s  ar-e not
6 3
On this point see Creighton, op. cit, , footnote 8, 
pp. 377-378.
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concerned, it will not be possible that rights of race
and religion fail to be appreciated"«
Because at that time "the problems of education were
much more centred on religion than on language . « . the
protection claimed for the minorities depended more on the
64former than the latter"« And as there were a good number
of Roman Catholics, other than French, in other parts of the 
colonies, the religious cleavage made for unity rather than 
separation« Had minority privileges been maintained in the 
new areas that were being opened in the West, a cross-cutting 
pattern of cultural cleavages would have emerged« This would 
have done a great deal to promote unity between the two 
communities, and would thereby have made the federal arrangement 
more stable 0
5. In order to build a strong national loyalty the central
government in a federation must succeed in attaching major
groups in the constituent units of the State to the national
government as the centre of their primary interest. The
United States was able to do this through the federal control
of the Great West. Like the United States in Canada, too,
the "last best West" with its rich wheat lands in the prairies
helped a great deal in binding the component units of the
Federation together by providing in it a forum of common
interest and a common source of reward to all participants
in the Union. Favourable effects of the frontier region on
the federal relationship in Canada may still, to some extent,
be discerned. It is said that "The line which marks off
the frontier from the farmland, the wilderness from the
baseland, the hinterland from the metropolis, runs through
65every Canadian psyche". Developed or not, the North remains
all-important to the Canadian's self-image. It makes their 
country the second largest in the world. "Its promise of 
riches is a lottery in which every Canadian holds a ticket 
. . . [and] its brooding physical presence over the land is
64
J „ C. Bonenfant, The French Canadians and the Birth of 
Confederation, The Canadian Historical Association, Historical 
Booklets No. 21, 1966, p. 16«
65
Morton, op. cit., footnote 51, p. 93.
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a warning [and a consolation (?)] that Canadians have not 
yet conquered their universe"^ and, therefore, there is, in 
effect, still much to be optimistic about.
But the Western frontier in Canada did not prove a 
melting pot in the manner that the Great West in the United 
States had been. The existence of Quebec as almost a 
distinct cultural island in Canada proves the point. Looking 
for its reasons we find that for a century and a half of its 
existence uniformity in language, culture, and "race" was 
the rule in New France. By the time heterogeneity was 
introduced in 1763, a distinct French culture was deeply 
implanted in Quebec. Further, it was a heterogeneity introduced 
by a victorious "race" over the vanquished nation that had 
always considered its language and culture superior to the 
conqueror's. The need for change was, therefore, seldom 
felt or accepted. A continuing factor in this hardening 
of the separate communal shells was the British imperial 
policy which was aimed at keeping the French Canadians very 
much les Canadiens and Catholics so that the Quebecers 
continued to feel themselves separate from, and antagonistic 
to, the "rowdy" Protestants to the south. Then as long as there 
was land for settlement in the fertile valley of the St.
Lawrence there was little to induce the French Canadians to 
move out into the frontier wilderness. At the time when 
the "last best West" could have provided a real force for 
mobility —  that great antidote to 1ocalism--among the 
Quebecers, the short-sighted legislation to end the privilege 
for special schools for the Catholic minority in Manitoba, 
only further helped to impress upon the French Canadian 
people the notion that although no longer a physical 
wilderness, the West to them had now become a hostile cultural 
wilderness. The unhappy memories of the largely French or 
meti and Catholic Riel Rebellion had greatly contributed to 
English Canadian suspicion of the French community in the
Brian Moore and the Editors of the Life, Canada, Life World
Library, Time-Life International, 1965, p. 109.
66
138
6 7area«. Behind all this was the underlying psychology of a
conquered "race" which was satisfied with its lot among its 
own people rather than going as inferiors among the members 
of the victorious "race"«,
6« As in the United States here also sectionalism has been 
an important force in the federal relationship. In Canada 
topographic barriers tend to consolidate groups of provinces, 
though in extreme east and west single units are isolated.
The Rocky Mountains are so scenically spectacular that their 
barrier effect on British Columbia might often be over-rated. 
Though economic activity in British Columbia differs from 
that to the east of the Rockies, fish and timber of the Pacific 
coast and fruit products of the interior are complementary 
to the grain crops and dairy products of the West across the 
Rockies. For this reason the province of British Columbia, 
despite the Rockies, finds itself so strongly tied to the 
province of Alberta that the talk of closer Alberta-British 
Columbia relations appears recurrently, and the British 
Columbians claim an associate membership in the "West" which 
is usually defined as the region between the Rockies and the 
Great Lakes specializing in wheat production.
The Great Shield intervenes between the "West" and 
the densely populated regions in the lower Great Lakes-St, 
Lawrence region— i. e . , the most of Ontario and Quebec,
The Shield is, however, not a completely uninhabited waste.
It is true that its Precambrian rocks provide little 
inducement to agriculture, but the railway construction 
revealed its great wealth in minerals which, coupled 
with softwood forests, have given it considerable sprinkle 
of mining settlements as well as pulp and paper mills. As 
the financial interests of Toronto are deeply involved in the 
area, the barren-looking Shield has helped to keep the West 
and the St. Lawrence region together, and there is a continuous
67
For brief but excellent accounts of the Riel Rebellion see 
D, F. Warner "Drag ^ach Norden: The United States and the
Riel Rebellion", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 
34, 1953, p p . 693-712; and A, C. Gluek, Jr., "The Riel
Rebellion and Canadian-Arnerican Relations", Canadian 
Historical Review, Vol. 36, 1955, p p . 199-221.
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federal interaction between the two sections.
Ontario and Quebec, though divided politically, culturally 
and linguistically, are nevertheless economically and 
geographically bound together by the common pull of the St, 
Lawrence commerce- The Maritimes in the east are, however, 
cut off from the rest of their co-linguists by the interposition 
of the French-speaking Quebec, The isolation of this region 
is further emphasized by the fact that the St, Lawrence, 
which is frozen for almost seven months during winter, ceases 
to be the main carrier of the area's commerce, [Fig, 4.4]
This sectionalism--physical , and cultural--has helped 
to create a kind of shifting balance in Canadian federalism 
because the physical geographic sectionalism has given rise 
to a sort of economic sectionalism which often works against 
the cultural divisiveness and thereby helps to maintain unity. 
Though culturally rivals, Ontario and Quebec, which together 
produce three-fourths of the manufactures of Canada, find 
their interests (on the federal level) to a great extent united. 
The Canadian production of export wheat is centred in the 
three Prairie provinces, while the production of pulp and 
paper, another important export item, comes largely from Ontario 
and Quebec. Since forest and minerals are subject to regional 
competence, the manufacturing and other industries associated 
with them have a vital impact on federal politics for like 
the wheat farmers, the groups engaged in the industries also 
have a special interest to guard, though, no doubt, these 
interests are much less forceful and distinctive compared 
to those associated with wheat, for wheat, being the king 
of the relatively densely settled Prairies, supports more 
votes than pulp and paper do.
A strong farmers' bloc, sometimes taking the form of 
a separate group, sometimes within a traditional party, can 
always be found in the federal Parliament advocating the 
current farmers' panacea, be it lower tariff or federal 
price support, and fighting a constant battle for low freight 
rates. As in the United States, in Canada too "The existence 
of regional specialization . . . [has led] to a type of
federal government dominated by 'log-rolling' deals and 
concessions negotiated by different interest groups promising 
to support other sectional projects in return for support
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of their own". But owing to its simpler economy and a
less powerful Senate, and, most important of all, a solid
concentration of cultura1-1inguistic dissidence in a single
unit (Quebec), Canada has not been able to benefit from
sectional interaction to the same degree as the United States.
The position of the Maritimes is specially anomalous because
economic interdependence, which is a marked feature of the
rest of Canada, is extremely weak in the Maritimes. The St.
Lawrence commerce bypasses them for seven months during winter
when the river is closed to navigation.
As the preceding analysis would show, the greatest
difficulty in Canada's rise as a centralized mature federalism
is that here, unlike in the Swiss example, the two cultural
streams in the country flow quite apart and, thus, avenues
of intercultural intercourse are virtually blocked. Because
of this Canada has not been able to create a distinctive all-
Canada nationality. Strangely enough it continues to be so
in spite of the fact that raw materials for interlocking or
cross-cutting cleavages have been present in the country
all through its history. Out of a total population of
18,248,247 in 1961, 8,342,826 were of the Roman Catholic faith.
There are sizable numbers of French-speaking people in Manitoba
and New Brunswick besides Quebec. At present the Catholic and
French-speaking people living outside Quebec do not provide
an element for cross-cutting ethnic ties because their minority
privileges are not recognized. If a way out could be found
to do so, the French Canadians in Quebec could cease to consider
their province as a French-Catholic cultural island in an English
cultural ocean, constantly threatened by the encroaching waves
of the English and, hence, needing constant vigilence and
fortification. A geographer, therefore, finds his convictions
echoed when the historian says:
We must find institutions that will give full expression 
to the cultural duality of the Canadian nation-state.
. . . French-language education must be provided where
there are enough French-speaking Canadians to make it 
practical. These institutions . . . would . . . increase
K. A. MacKirdy, "Geography and Federalism in Australia and 
Canada", Australian Geographer, Vol. 6, No. 2, March 1953, 
P. 46 .
68
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the mobility of the Quebecers, who are at present reluctant 
to leave their province because of the lack of educational 
facilities in French for their children. 69
And as Turner said, "nothing works for nationalism like inter-
70course within the nation". Similarly some method may be
found to harness the federalizing effects of the over forty-
five percent Roman Catholic population spread all over Canada
(see Table 4.1). Thus, it is within the reach of Canadian
statesmen to change the internal political geography of Canada,
and create therein conditions which will be conducive to a
7 1centralized and stable federal polity.
Table 4.1
DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
IN THE PROVINCES OF CANADA
Province —
Newfoundland
Prince Edward Is.
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
% Catholic 
35 . 7
46.1
35.2 
51.9 
88.1 
30.0 
22.8
26.2
22.4
17.5
% French-speaking
3 . 7 
16.6 
11.9 
38.8 
80.6 
10 . 3
9 . 1 
6 .4 
6 .2
4 . 1
Source: Annuaire du Quebec, 1961, p, 115.
69
Ramsay Cook, Canada and the French Canadian Question, Toronto: 
Macmillan Co., 1966, p. 3.
70
F. J. Turner, The Frontier in American History, New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1920, (1948 reprint), p. 30.
71
On the question of Quebec see P. E. Trudeau, Federalism and 
the French Canadians , Toronto: Mcmillan of Canada, 1968.
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Chapter V
AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM
Historically the last of the so-called classical federations,
Australia offers the best example of what is called "structural"
federalism/ for here in the opinion of many scholars the
states "no longer correspond with distinct interests or
attitudes: there are no longer any solid economic or social
foundations for the political divisions within the federal
structure". They are merely administrative political units,
and "it is the existence of six separate governments which
chiefly produces the sentiments, attitudes and interests
2which support those governments". Thus to many who believe
3that federalism is usually "a road to unification" "the 
evidence [seems to point] decisively to the conclusion that 4the [Australian] federal system has outlived its usefulness".
William Riker "wonders, indeed, why they bother with federalism
in Australia" for in his opinion "the divisions in Australian
culture seem to be economic and religious with hardly any
geographic base". Australia appears to him the singular case
of a federation where national "patriotism is unobstructed by
5loyalties to states." That prophet of doom for Australian 
federalism, A. P„ Canaway, wondered why the Australian Fathers 
made such a complete departure from the best British tradition
1
A. Wildavsky, "Party Discipline Under Federalism: Implications
of Australian Experience", Social Research, Vol. 28. 1961,
pp. 437-458.
2
P. H. Partridge, "The Politics of Federalism" in G. Sawer 
(Ed.) , Federalism: An Australian Jubilee Study, Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1952, both quotations on p. 195.
3
A . V . Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, London: Macmillan Co. , first edition 1885 ,
tenth edition 1959, p. Lxxxvi.
4
G. Greenwood, The Future of Australian Federalism, Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1946, p. viii.
W. H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance,
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964, p. 113.
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when in fact at the time of the federation "The respective 
[Australian] colonies were less differentiated from one another 
than are certain counties of England," and "as compared to 
the divergences between England, Wales and Scotland . . . the
distinctions between the respective colonies were in verity 
microscopic." ^
Such views, however, only show the utter disregard that 
scholars sometimes show to the role of geography in a nation's 
polity. To establish an analogy between English counties 
(separated from one another by negligible distances) and the 
colonies in Australia, whose cores were separated from one 
another by several hundred miles, is thoroughly unrealistic.
In fact, a closer look at the Australian history would show 
that although the "crimson thread of kinship" runs through 
all the Australian people--the federal slogan of Sir Henry 
Parkes in 1890--their geography compels them to remain only 
somewhat imperfectly joined units of a federation, because 
oppressed by the "tyranny of distance" they are not prepared 
for the economies of a complete unification of their polity 
under a unitary form of government.
AUSTRALIA'S RISE TO FEDERATION
For nearly a decade and a half after Captain Cook landed 
at Botany Bay, little attention was paid to the new continent 
in the south, until the American Revolution and the independence 
of the Thirteen Colonies finally stimulated action. With the 
independence of the Thirteen Colonies, the British government 
needed a new area to take convicts transported from Britain.
To remove the apprehension to the English gentleman's "person 
and property" and to promise him "security in his bed", the 
antipodes were ultimately thought of value for the establishment 
of a "colony of thieves." In the words of the then Home 
Secretary, Lord Sydney, New South Wales was "a very proper 
region for the establishment of criminals condemned to 
transportation." Thus Governor Phillip with his party of 1030,
A. P. Canaway, Failure of Federalism in Australia, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1930, pp. 1-2.
6
144
including 736 convicts, landed at Sydney Cove on January 26,
1788 , and the first, foundations of Australia were laid,^
Beginning as a remote gaol, New South Wales had a bad 
start as a colony, It could not emerge as a land of hope and 
second opportunity until 1823, when its formal recognition 
as a Crown Colony triggered a flow of private money and free 
immigrants. Swollen by immigration the white population 
of Australia grew to 190,000 in the year 1840, Thousands 
of square miles had now been brought under sheep grazing.
The assumption of sovereignty over New Holland made Britain 
the mistress of the whole continent, and a new British colony 
was begun in the west. Van Diemen's Land was made independent 
of New South Wales, and a free colony of South Australia was 
founded.
While a strong despotic government was essential in the 
penal days, even in the "free" settlements "ample government" 
by a paternal administration was needed in order to overcome 
the initial difficulties of foundation. However, as the numbers
Although this is the generally agreed view, the mystery why 
England decided to send many of its convicts to the opposite 
side of the world was given a new interpretation by Dallas 
in 1952. He suggested that England needed a new base and a 
refitting port in order to strengthen her commercial empire 
in the East, and Botany Bay was to be that maritime base, 
Geoffrey Blainey, who has further refined this argument, has 
gathered evidence to the effect that the probability of 
growing flax (a sure supply of which, wrote Lord Sydney,
"would be of great consequence to us [Britain] as a naval 
power") was a reason for the selection of New South Wales.
Tall trees which grew in the islands near Australia would, 
it was thought, yield masts of unparalleled size and quality 
for the British fleets in India. Australia was thus thought 
to be reciprocally beneficial both to English gaols and the 
English seapower, See K. M, Dallas, "The First Settlement in 
Australia: Considered in relation to Seapower in World
Politics", Papers and Proceedings, of the Tasmanian Historical 
Research Association, Hobart, 1952, No. 3; and G. Blainey, 
Tyranny of Distance, Sydney: Sun Books, 1967. For further
discussion of the problem see the B1ainey-Boulton controversy 
in the following articles in the Australian Economic History 
Review , Vols. 8 and 9 (1968 and 1969): G. C, Boulton, "The
Hollow Conqueror: Flax and the Foundation of Australia." 1968,
p p . 3-16; Geoffrey Blainey, "Botany Bay or Gotham City?", 196S
p p . 154-163; and G. C. Boulton, "Broken Reeds and Smoking
Flax," 1969, p p . 64-70.
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of free settlers and the colonial free-borns gradually increased, 
the danger to society in the grant of free institutions became 
less. In fact, by 1840 the political divisions in New South 
Wales had begun to follow the more usual groupings of rich and 
poor, rather than the temporary and particular distinctionQbetween the bond and free. Transportation to New South Wales 
had been abolished in 1840 (though the colony finally stopped 
receiving convicts only in 1850), and Van Diemen's Land stopped 
receiving convicts in 1853 and changed its name to Tasmania 
the same year. Both the colonies attained self-government in 
1855 .
With its 77,000 settlers and about five million sheep the 
Port Phillip District (founded in 1836) was renamed Victoria 
in 1850 when it gained independence from New South Wales. South 
Australia had already been founded in 1836 as a Crown Colony 
of entirely free settlers. Western Australia was also rising 
slowly. Transportation, stopped elsewhere, continued in 
Western Australia till 1868, for here the prime question was 
not of responsible government but of survival. And survival 
was possible only if labour could be sent because it refused to 
come voluntarily, for immigrants having come so very far 
thought it worth going another relatively short leg to have 
advantages of an already settled community in eastern Australia. 
Queensland was born in 1859 when the 24,000 people north of 
the twenty-eighth parallel were granted independence from New 
South Wales with a constitution modelled on that of the parent 
colony.
So by the close of the first half of the nineteenth century 
these different prosperous communities, largely self-governing, 
were winning wealth from the wilderness, and the social and 
cultural foundations for a new nation had been laid. By 1860, 
Australia in fact had five parliaments and political reforms 
in advance of its mother country; Western Australia was finally 
granted self-government only in 1890. Government from a 
distance was coming to an end. But what had emerged was a 
democracy of the middle classes, not of the wage-earners, for 
howsoever radical the new assemblies, the privileges of the
8
A. G. L. Shaw, The Story of Australia, London: Faber & Faber,
1961, p. 91.
146
conservative land-owners in the Legislative Councils remained
9as an effective check on popular government. However, the 
separate colonies, freed from the immediate British control, 
and unhampered by any common national feelings, were going 
their own ways, tackling in their own fashion the urgent problems 
that beset them. This tended to make each one a kind of "little 
world" in itself.
With the discovery of gold in 1851 immigration to Australia 
increased tremendously. The population of the continent trebled 
in the ten years after the discovery, and the "diggers" reduced 
the convict elements in the population to more modest proportions. 
Liberal elements in the colonies were now able to introduce 
many re forms such as manhood suffrage and vote by ballot. By 
1858 property qualifications for membership of the New South 
Wales and Victorian legislative assemblies were abolished. In 
a decade (December 1851 to December 1861) the total White 
population of Australia increased from 437,665 to 1,168,149.
It is during this period that large numbers of Chinese came to 
Australia--by 1857 there were 23,623 Chinese on Victorian 
goldfields, and by 1861 their number had increased to 24,062.
For various reasons, the Chinese immigration became the cause 
of that common abhorrence for coloured immigration on which, 
as much as anything else, Australian nationalism was initially 
based.
The discovery of gold became the occasion for, if not 
the cause of, the rapid material progress and the strong 
movement for democracy. Gold and new constitutions had set 
colonists free to shape their own destiny, but the long 
opposition to the Colonial Office rule was not the best training 
for political independence. Only after 1880 did the colonists' 
ideas become quite distinctive because of the lessons learnt 
in the twenty important years of experiment. Before that period 
a good deal of the militant and theoretical radicalism was 
imported from the Old World. "As imported radicalism was 
modified by colonial conditions, a distinctly Australian democracy 
was born". This colonial democracy, no doubt, had an earlier
D. Pike, Australia: The Quiet Continent, London: Cambridge
University Press, 1962, p. 104.
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beginning; but it was only after the gold rushes that "its 
main outlines were clearly drawn".'*'0 In fact, though the 
Australian colonies were still clinging to fringes of the 
continent, in pockets set apart from each other, by the 1860s 
they had begun to grope their way toward closer acquaintanceship.
Between 1861-1883 the bourgeoisie upset squatterdom's 
domination, and land-laws in the colonies were changed. Every­
where the cry was to unlock the land, while in the cities 
there was an intense clamour for the principle of equality 
of opportunity. New South Wales in 1861, Victoria in 1862, 
Queensland in 1868 and South Australia in 1869 had their 
different 1 and-se1ection Acts to enable the small farmers 
to own land, though by one trick or another the small farmer 
was still largely excluded, and the best land usually went 
to the rich. Further, as we will explain below, the Australian 
frontier was basically a "big man's frontier". Still, because 
of mechanical inventions and other reasons, in the twenty 
years of land reform the area under crops doubled in New 
South Wales, and multiplied six times in Victoria and South 
Australia. Facilities for transport were greatly improved. 
Railway mileage increased from 200 miles in 1860 to 4,000 
miles in 1880. All this had helped the spread of agriculture.
"As reforms weakened the political power of the rich, electors 
slowly began to see the gove rnment as a friend and provider 
that could turn each colony into a paradise for working men.
For good or ill, these new attitudes were to do more than wool 
or gold in shaping modern Australia".'*''*’
Rapid progress of transport and communications was bringing 
the isolated colonies closer together. A trunkline (though 
with a break of guage) joined Sydney and Melbourne in 1883, 
Melbourne and Adelaide in 1887, and Sydney and Brisbane 
(again with a break) in 1888. Western Australia, because of 
the vast gap of the almost desert Nullarbor which made it 
virtually an island, was not connected with the eastern colonies 
by rail until 1917. The total railway mileage had reached
10
R. M. Crawford, Australia, London: Hutchinson University
Library, 1952, p. 107.
Pike, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 126.
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13,500 in 1900. Electric telegraph linked Melbourne and 
Adelaide in 1858; Sydney and Melbourne the same year;
Sydney and Brisbane in 1861; Sydney and Adelaide in 1867; 
Launceston and Melbourne in 1859; and Adelaide and Perth in 
1877. By the 1890s the colonial parliaments had placed 
ownership and control of telephone services under their colonial 
post offices.'*’2
Native-born Australians had long begun to outnumber 
immigrants. In 1861 just over 50 percent of the people were 
born in Britain. In 1871 nearly 60 percent were native-born.
The figure increased to 75 percent by 1891, and to 82 percent 
in 1901. The total population also increased rapidly. The 
number rose to 3,773,801 from a mere 2,306,736 in 1881.
As their population and material prosperity increased, 
Sydney and Melbourne began to look for markets for their 
industrial and other goods outside the boundaries of their 
own respective colonies, but the existing institutional barriers 
stood in the way. The idea that the colonial economies were 
being thwarted by the dead hand of the past increasingly 
crystallized. While the past divided Australia into six 
separate colonies, economic development, even though impeded 
by tariff and other barriers, rushed ahead and was helping 
to bring the colonies closer together. Intercolonial trade 
unions were also moving in the same direction.
All through the 1880s government and private enterprise
helped to expand economic activities recklessly. Rapid
immigration, a spell of good seasons, further protection,
and mining discoveries, all combined to stimulate the
boom which in its turn encouraged the growth of a vigorous
labour movement, and a strong nationalistic feeling that
cut across the colonial borders. Almost until the year
1890 there seemed to be no limit to progress, though, in fact,
1 3it was a case of sowing the wind to reap the whirlwind.
During the boom, less than three million people of the colonies 
borrowed over £200,000,000. The colonial governments had
12
See M. Clark, A Short History of Australia, London:
Heinemann/ 1963, p p . 157-58.
Shaw, op. cit., footnote 8, p. 151.
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raised loans in London in excess of their ultimate capacity 
to pay. So when in July-August 1890 a financial crash occurred 
in Argentina (which was then the centre of world speculation), 
and in November the great firm of Barings failed in London, 
the British investors were greatly alarmed and rapid withdrawals 
of deposits from Australian financial institutions began. One 
bank failed in March 1892, and by May fifteen banks had closed 
their doors in Victoria, New South Wales,and Queensland.
A great many public and private works were stopped, leading 
to mass unemployment. Farmers and squatters were hard-hit 
by drops of up to 50 percent in the prices of their produce.
Land values were heavily depreciated.
This devastating depression converted the colonial bankers 
and financiers into nationalist Australians who, with a view 
to escape the repetition of such disasters, began to urge 
the creation of a federal parliament with powers to legislate 
on banking and currency. But this increased interest of 
bankers, financiers and other capitalist groups in an inter­
colonial federation as a servant to their material interests 
helped to plant in the mind of labour thinkers a dark suspicion 
that federation might become a means of preventing in perpetuity 
their own cherished reconstruction of society, though their own 
intercolonial trade unions had been steps in the same 
direction.^
A series of strikes between 1890-94 led to similar thinking 
on the part of both labour and capital. The labour conception 
of trade unions changed. They were no longer confined to 
the struggle for higher wages and improved standard of living. 
They now busied themselves with the idea of the overthrow 
of the society that imposed these hardships. With this objective 
in view, labour electoral leagues were formed in New South Wales, 
Victoria, South Australia, and Queensland which won several seats 
in the respective parliaments. Thus both labour and capital 
were marching in the same direction (i . e., intercolonial union)
though on the question of federation, each continued to be 
apprehensive of the other.
Although in retrospect the depression can only be regarded 
as the bursting of a bubble that had blown to an inordinate
14
Clark, op . cit. , footnote 12, p p . 163-165.
150
size, its psychological effects were profound. It brought
people up against the stubborn fact that the country's material 
prosperity could be undermined by what happened overseas.
This gave them a sense of urgency for standing on their own.
And this seemed possible only in an intercolonial union. As 
will be discussed in a following section, the mother country's 
indifference to Australian defence in New Guinea and the South 
Pacific had led some to the same conclusion even earlier.
But now the great combination of circumstances led to final 
effort, and despite various lions in the path the great 
Commonwealth was consummated by the turn of the century.
The Federal Structure
The Australian Federal Fathers adhered more closely to 
the model of the United States than has any other federalism 
before and since. However, the system borrowed considerably 
from Canada and Switzerland, and though in its original form 
the system had no markedly distinctive features, the modification 
on the originals in detail were significant. As in the United 
States, the states retained their existing constitutions 
and their power to amend them, as also the residual competence; 
while the federal centre received an express list of powers. 
Powers of the central government under the terms of the 
Constitution are limited, as in the U. S. A . , to obvious 
national subjects with but few additions suggested largely 
by the difficulties experienced by American federalism. The 
centre has express powers over banking and insurance. It 
was also granted the power to arrange conciliation and 
arbitration of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits 
of one state. Some express welfare powers were extended by 
amendment in 1947, but as Sawer says, they still go no further 
than (if so far as) the U. S. "general welfare" power. The 
residual powers of the states are therefore quite extensive.
They include the general civil and criminal law, most aspects
V. Palmer, The Legend of the Nineties, Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press, 1954, p. 73.
This discussion of the federal structure of Australia closely 
follows G. Sawer, Modern Federalism, London: C. A. Watts &
Co., 1969, p p . 42-44 . For further details see G. Sawer, 
Australian Government Today, Melbourne: Melbourne University
Press, 1967,
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of production--agricultural and industrial--and of distribution 
which does not actually cross a state border, the principal 
utilities (water, power, land transport) , the major aspects 
of internal order and police, most of the problems of urban 
concentrations in which seventy percent of the people live, 
as also a large part of education. There is more explicit 
provision for joint centre-state action in Australia than 
in any federation that preceded it. The centre and the states 
jointly have concurrent power over all tax fields, except 
that the centre has a monopoly of customs and excise so as to 
produce a common market and provide an absolute freedom of 
interstate trade; but as regards income tax, in practice, 
though not in strict constitutional theory, this has been 
reserved to the centre since World War II. The High Court 
of Australia is a Commonwealth-appointed judicial body that 
acts as a general Court of Appeal both from the centre and 
the states.
The new Commonwealth though healthy was "perhaps hardly
a lusty child" for it lacked that "quasi-revolutionary energy"
17which is so often associated with new states. But because
the federal government was, under the terms of the Constitution, 
given fairly wide powers, important leaders from the colonies 
were attracted to the Commonwealth--a factor the lack of which 
proved so fatal in the case of the West Indian experiment 
in federalism. Then the badge of nationalism in the "White 
Australia" policy appealed to every section of the Australian 
society, and thereby gave the Commonwealth a sense of purpose 
in the eyes of its citizens. This greatly helped to strengthen 
the hands of the central government in building a strong 
national loyalty.
It is possible that the first fervour and support for 
the Commonwealth might soon have declined once the immediate 
objectives were achieved had not a national crisis in the 
form of the first War soon intervened. Only an hour after 
London's ultimatum on August 4, 1914 the first British shot
of the War was fired at a German merchantman leaving Melbourne, 
and Australia pledged "the last man and the last shilling"
17
0. H. Ko Spate, Australia, London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1968,
p . 67 .
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to the support of Britain. Participation in the War gave
a sense of manhood to the young nation, and finally assured
Australia that she was a nation in her own right. Involvement
in the War strengthened the Commonwealth vis-a-vis the states
in economic activities generally. And as Spate remarks "If,
as some say, true [?coordinate] federalism is dead in Australia,
i 8it died under the pressure of the first war".
Though in the twenties Australia seemed to have settled
back into a comfortable unawareness of world affairs, the
changed strategic position in the Pacific soon dented this
complacency. The Japanese had supplanted the Germans in
Micronesia, and Rabaul, the main port of New Guinea, was only
900 miles from their advance base at Truk. And as the later
events showed "The Near North was terrifyingly close; the
19Yellow Peril was incarnate in arms".
The second War led to further centralization of power
in the Commonwealth. A system of uniform income tax was
introduced, the states vacated this field against Commonwealth
grants. The effects of the increased emphasis on social
services and reconstruction and planning with a stress on
full employment were similar. The overall impact of these
developments has been "to override state identity in order
to produce uniformity in the economic, political, and
administrative fields. It has not destroyed state identity,
but . . . it has strengthened the centralist tendencies within
each state". The greatly extended powers and functions of
the central government have tended to make the Commonwealth
as a disbursing authority and the states as the developmental 
20agencies.
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE RISE 
OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM
Factors for Strong Regional Identities 
The Australian colonies had developed as six unconnected
18
Spate, op. cit., footnote 17, p. 74,
19
Spate, op. cit., footnote 17, p. 90.
20
K. W. Robinson, "Sixty Years of Federation in Australia," 
Geographical Review, Vol. 51, 1961, p. 12.
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social islands on the coast of a continent, facing three 
different seas. Having d e v e loped as "six seaports with
2 1independent legislatures devoted to their special interests"
the six colonies were to all intents six independent States
in so far as their internal ma tters were concerned. Each had
devel ope d virtually a world of its own, Distance, indeed,
is as characteristic of A u s t r a l i a  as mountains are of
Switzerland. It has been one of the very strong moulds
which shaped A u s t ralian history. As Blainey says, "In
un d e r s t a n d i n g  Australia's history [politics t o o ] , the idea
of distance may be as revealing as say Frederick Jackson
Turner's 'frontier theory' is in probing the h i s tory of the 
2 2United States."
Before the 1880s major commercial links be tween the colonies 
were by sea. Railway links between the colonies had not 
developed, and each colony was very closely i d e n tified with 
its capital city which alone served and supervised its people 
and all the routes in the colony converged to it. Intercolonia l
•fcontacts in A u s t r a l i a  were greatly h a n d i c a p p e d  b e c ause of the 
lack of long and reliable inland waterways. E v e r ywhere in the 
world before the oncoming of the railway-age inland waterways  
had been the most efficient agents in binding d i s p e r s e d  
contine ntal communities. Further, while over a th o u s a n d  miles 
of sea stood between Western Aus t r a l i a  and the eastern colonies, 
the rough sea on the south and eastern coast of the cont inent  
p r e s en te d no easy problems for the small vessels of the day.
Later when the railways were laid, each colony laid its railways 
almost i n d e p endently of the others. Thus there came to be 
est ab lis hed different railway gauges in the d i f ferent colonies. 
While Victoria and the main lines in South A u s t r a l i a  adopted 
the broad guage (5'3"), the remoter parts of South A u s t r a l i a  
and the whole of Que e n s l a n d  had a 3'6" gauge. New South Wales 
with its 4 ' 8 V  gauge was different from all the others. This 
greatly hampered intercolonial transport and commerce even 
where a rail link existed.
21
A. Jose, Australia: Human and E c o n o m i c , London: George
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Though the Australian colonists were predominantly British 
and English-speaking, there were nonetheless some social 
limitations to a general cultural homogeneity» While New 
South Wales and Tasmania had started as convict settlements, 
Western Australia regarded itself as less tainted, and South 
Australia having remained all through a "free" settlement 
was extremely proud of its high caste. Thus the "crimson 
thread of kinship" was not very crimson, indeed, It became 
crimson enough to be able to bring the Australian communities 
together only when other circumstances forced them to join 
together for their own larger interests.
All of the colonies had developed as largely self-
sufficient primary-producing communities with near-similar
economies--exporting their surplus produce to Britain and
receiving from there manufactured goods in return. For
this reason that great binder of dispersed communities--
interregional trade--was very slow to develop. There were
some institutional barriers as well. A provision in the
Australian Colonies Government Act of 1850 prohibited free
trade between the colonies, A request for repeal of this
2 3provision was turned down by the mother country in 1868.
This further helped to fortify particularist tendencies in the 
colonies, and made the foundations of their six little worlds 
stronger still.
The absence of a customs union gave rise to highly
contrasting policies with regard to protection and free trade.
The postures of Victoria and New South Wales, in particular,
were opposite on this issue. In view of the rising demand
for employment and the declining fortunes of gold diggings,
Victoria was all for high tariffs. New South Wales, on the
other hand, stood for complete free trade. So strong was the
division on this issue that even when the colonies forced by
other circumstances had become reconciled to the idea of a
united nation, the tariff question still stood as a great
2 4"lion in the path." The New South Wales politician George
2*3
Jo Quick and R, R„ Garran, Annotated Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1901,
pp. 104-105.
From a speech by James Service in 1890. Quoted in Quick and 
Garran, op. cit,, footnote 23, p. 119„
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Reid was voicing the opinion of the majority of his people
when attacking the resolution for federation by Sir Henry Parkes
in the New South Wales parliament he said that New South Wales,
a complete teetotaller, could not contemplate keeping house with 
2 5five drunkards.
Then because of the highly disparate size of their 
2 6populations, the smaller partners were afraid that in a 
union the larger colonies, by virtue of their majority, might 
manipulate the central administration in a manner prejudicial 
to their (i. e., smaller colonies') interests. Queensland,
Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia were so far 
removed from Sydney and Melbourne that to these colonists a 
complete union under a unitary polity appeared as the sub­
stitution of one distant control by another--a lesser evil, 
but evil nonetheless. These colonies were not inclined to 
exchange King Log in London for King Stork in Sydney or 
Melbourne. The result was that so long as the devastating 
depression and the strikes of the 1890s did not completely 
shake them from their particularist little mansions, all efforts 
at union went to waste. South Australia's resolution in her 
legislative Council on Earl Grey's federation scheme in 1849
2 7was characteristic of the prevailing attitude of the colonies. 
Factors for Intercolonial Unity 
Despite all their differences the Australian colonies had 
all through possessed a measure of fellow feeling born out of
25
In a speech in the New South Wales Parliament in 1891. Quoted 
in Quick and Garran, op. cit., footnote 23, p. 145.
26
The following are the figures showing the populations of the 
six colonies in 1901: New South Wales 1,354,846; Victoria
1,201,070; Queensland 498,129; South Australia 363,157; 
Western Australia 184,124; Tasmania 172,475.
27
The South Australian Council rejected the federation proposal 
of Earl Grey in 1849 on the following grounds: "1. There
is a great dissimilarity in the pursuits and interests of the 
several colonies. 2. The overwhelming predominance that the 
larger colonies would have in the Assembly would be greatly 
injurious to the lesser. 3, The Council cannot see any point 
upon which benefit would accrue to any of the provinces by the 
establishment of such an assembly." Cited in Quick and 
Garran, op. cit., footnote 23, p, 86.
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their unity of "race" and language » Unlike in Canada the union 
of the colonies was not a case of binding the opposites. Though 
the colonists followed different Churches, unlike in British 
North America there were no regional divisions in religion and 
culture» Nor were the colonies, unlike the Thirteen Colonies, 
divided between slave- and nonslave-hoiding groups, Queensland's 
Kanaka labour did raise some difficulties but they were soon 
resolved o
Three million people for a continent of three million 
square miles were, no doubt, a small number. Still, the 
precedents of the United States and Canada had made these 
six daughters of British imperialism highly conscious of 
their manifest continental destiny. If the Thirteen Colonies 
could do it a century and a quarter before, why could not 
a united Australia do the same if not better? The colonists 
believed that Nature had neatly shaped Australia to be the 
home of one homogeneous people and to stand as the mistress 
of the South Seas, Only in union could they make Australia 
the home of a homogeneous people, and only their united country 
could become the mistress of the South Seas,
Railways, telegraph, and telephone connections had already 
begun to weaken the walls of particularism that had separated 
them for so long. Now with increased production and the 
development of manufacturing the arbitrarily drawn intercolonial 
barriers began to irritate both the farmers and the manufacturers 
Regions on the intercolonial borders felt that their economic 
destinies lay across rather than within the borders of their 
own particular colonies, The drawbacks of governing a continent 
divided into six independent colonies with their separate 
tariff barriers were now becoming too clear as the shoe of 
intercolonial customs barriers began to pinch them hard.
These intercolonial barriers were especially irksome
to the people in the valley of the Murray and its tributaries.
A small steam boat could enter the river system near the
2 8southern coast not far from Adelaide and steam more than 2,000 
miles to the western New South Wales. Though very narrow 
and shallow, compared to the Mississippi system, it was
Steam boats could not, however, enter ehe Murray mouth.
Nothing came of the attempts at a port there»
28
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nevertheless very valuable in a continent where navigable 
rivers are so scarce. Burning wood cut from the river banks 
the steamers were many times cheaper than bullock teams.
Often they would carry goods 1700 miles upstream to points 
near the goldfields of north eastern Victoria at a cheaper 
cost than bullock teams could carry from Melbourne, a journey 
only one-tenth as long. Then, the river was navigable in
2 9winter when the roads to the goldfields became quagmires.
Though merchants and intercolonial travellers cursed the
intercolonial barriers, merchants and intercolonial travellers
were but a small proportion of the population. The financial
collapse of the 1890s, however, shook the colonists from
their particularistic slumber. Now
The general stagnation of trade set everyone enquiring 
for himself into the causes which clogged the wheel; and 
the folly of in terprovincial barriers became increasingly 
apparent. Federation [now] began to appeal to the pocket 
as well as to the heart; and the people began to wake 
up to the fact that the "fad of federalism" with which 
politicians and parliaments had been dallying so long, 
meant the salvation of Australia.
"Five and twenty years ago, nine-tenths of the European
inhabitants of Australia regarded the country as a camping-
ground for money making purposes, but now nine-tenths of them
think of it as their home", wrote a visiting Englishman in 
3 11878. Australia by now had come to possess a history of
its own, a history of British people accommodating themselves 
to a new environment and being changed by their experience.
The colonists' love for the country of their adoption had 
become so intense by the 1880s that many a "son of the soil" 
like one Robert Thompson had begun to regard 1788 as "a date 
that will be classed in the world's history with the founding 
of Rome, the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers, or the storming 
of the Bastille." And this Robert Thompson and his like had 
begun to believe that "There will be but one greater day in 
our own Australia's annals, and that will be the anniversary 
of the declaration of Independence." The "hopes, desires, and
29
See Blainey (1967), op. cit., footnote 7, pp. 240-241.
30
Quick and Garran, op. cit., footnote 23, p. 150.
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Quoted in W. K. Hancock, Australia, Brisbane: Jacaranda Press,
first published 1930, reprinted 1961, p. 46.
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aspirations" of these people became now "bound up with the
32interests of the Australian continent."' This rising sense
of Australianness also heightened in the colonists' mind
the sense of Australian unity and independence.
Almost three-fourths of the Australian community in the
1880s and 1890s was comprised of urban and rural wage-earners.
This gave rise to trade unions cutting across the colonial
boundaries. The late fifties had seen the building tradesmen
in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane attain an eight-hour
working day. The principle was later extended to other trades.
The First Intercolonial Trade Union Congress met in 1879,
followed by five more in the next decade. At the eight-hour
celebration accompanying the Intercolonial Trade Union Congress
of 1888 the loyal toasts were replaced by "the day we celebrate,"
and the three cheers were given for the "Federated Republic of 
3 3Australia." The first platform of the Labour Electoral League
in New South Wales included the plank "the federation of
Australian colonies upon a national as opposed to an imperial 
34basis." In fact, many streams helped to swell the flood, and
the conservative classes, too, were sending down roots in the
Australian soil, and were now quick to resent the suggestion
35of patronage in the word "colonial".
With the increased activities of foreign powers in the 
Pacific, Australians now began to think that they could no 
longer regard their continental defence as a matter to be 
decided from the other side of the globe, i. e . , London.
There were in 1883 strong rumours of annexationist designs
32
Quoted in Hancock, op. cit., footnote 31, p. 46.
33
Reported in Boome ran g , dated 3 March, 1888. Cited in R. Gollan 
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G. Greenwood (Ed.)., Australia: A Social and Political
His to r y , Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1955 , reprinted 1965,
p. 152.
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as noted elsewhere in the chapter, the federation movement 
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was basically suspicious. It was, however, a different matter 
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of France and Germany, in New Hebrides and New Guinea. To 
forestall the Germans in New Guinea, the Queensland Premier 
Sir Thomas Mclllwraith sent an officer to take possession 
of the eastern part of the island in the name of the Queen.
While other colonies supported the action of the Queensland 
government, the Home Government undid it. The French also 
were displaying clear designs on New Hebrides, and were 
continuing to transport habitual as well as political criminals 
to New Caledonia.
The mother country's indifference to colonial defence,
as evidenced by the New Guinea episode, led to the realization
that although the umbrella of the British Navy protected them,
there were issues of vital importance to the colonists that
might at times clash with the imperial interests of Britain.
The colonies had been growing up, but they thought that they
must now grow up together. The New Guinea episode taught
them how much they could lose through disunity. This was a
convincing argument for federation; and it was made the most
of. A Convention of Australian colonies, New Zealand, and
Fiji meeting in Sydney on November 28, 1883, ended with the
conclusion that on many issues of importance
the colonies, though of one mind, are unable to obtain 
united action owing to the absence of some common authority, 
the time has now arrived for drawing closer ties which 
bind the colonies to each other by the establishment of 
a Federal U n i o n , ^
And then there was the White colonists' distaste for
coloured labour. As Keith Hancock wrote, the Australian
democracy pictured itself as a vine brought out from Europe,
and dreamt of a time when its boughs would be like the goodly
cedar tree. But the vine was still young and tender and had
to be encompassed with a hedge lest the wild boar out of
3 7the woods should root it up. Besides the "capitalist boar
of Europe's industrial woods", the vast reservoir of "yellow
humanity" appeared a formidable one. The fear of black labour
had greatly helped to transform Queensland provincialism
3 8into Australian patriotism, and coloured immigration was an
36
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important issue in fusing the separatist and jealous colonies
into a united whole. Wrath against England for her half-hearted
support was nearly as great as against the coloured immigrants
who threatened to steal the "Australian heritage". It was
obvious to the colonists that in order to safeguard this
"heritage" the six colonies acting together were stronger
39than the six guarding their independence of action.
The stage was nearly set when the final spur to action 
came from the depression of the nineties which made it clear 
to the colonies that without a strong intercolonial union 
they could not stand as a great holding company that would 
attract the confidence of overseas investors, which was vitally 
important to their developing economy.
Though for long the essential unity of Australia as a
country with common interests was taken for granted, till late
in the nineteenth century the six Australian colonies were
still consolidating as widely separate islands with all the
paraphernalia of "little kingdoms." Though federation had
for quite some time been talked of in the colonial capitals, till
late in the nineteenth century "it was regarded almost as
an alliance between countries foreign to one another and
40having rival economies." This, indeed, adumbrated the future,
and when Australians finally recaptured the continental ideal 
what they essentially proposed was to coordinate their 
particularist colonies, not abolish them, and to enforce 
coordination through a government with powers to deal nationally 
with certain specific matters but leaving to the existing 
regional governments the sole authority to manage their own 
local and regional affairs.
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC INFERENCES
1. The origin of the Australian federation fits into my 
hypothesis that when a number of small and separate political 
units with marked regional identities are faced with a common 
threat against which none of them is able to stand firmly,
39
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40
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the tendency for these units is to come close together and 
seek strength in union. If the political units are geographically 
close together (i, e . , not separated by formidable physical 
barriers) without any marked regional concentrations of cultural 
and/or economic deviations, the result may often be a unitary 
State. But if the units are separated by long distances, and 
possess competitive and/or contrasting and incompatible economic 
interests, or have marked regional deviations in religion, 
language, and culture etc. then the more likely result is a 
federation wherein the regional units would retain their 
regional autonomy.
It is sometimes thought that the Australian colonies
federated without any serious military threat to their
existence. But incredible as it might appear "It is necessary
to have been born in Oceania" says Andre Siegfried, to
appreciate "to what extent neighbours seven to nine hundred
4 1miles away can be thought annoying." Facing the northern
approaches of Australia were vast reservoirs of "yellow
humanity" whose outpourings, if unchecked, would ruin what
the Australians held most precious —  the economic and racial
4 2foundations of their egalitarian society. At the Federal
Conference of 1890 Sir Henry Parkes, pointing to the Chinese
threat, quoted Napoleon's words that if the Chinese only
4 3acquired European arts, they would conquer the world.
Then, the Pacific was being increasingly drawn into
international conflict, and Japan was emerging as a formidable
military power in the north and was overtaking China. In the
meantime Major-General Edwards had informed the colonies in
1889 that if they were to rely separately on their own defence
resources, their position would be dangerous. As John Cockburn
put it in 1890, Major-General Edwards did, indeed, come "at an
4 4opportune time and grasped the skirts of happy chance."
41
A . Siegfried quoted in Hancock, op. cit., footnote 31, p. 49.
42
Hancock, op. cit., footnote 31, p. 50.
43
Cited in Palmer, op. cit., footnote 15, p. 133.
44
South Australian Legislative Assembly Debates, June 26, 1890.
Quoted in L. F. Crisp, Parliamentary Government of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, London: Longmans, Green & Co.,
1962, p . 3.
162
The general policy that had emerged after the Royal
Commission of 1879 was that while the British Royal Navy
would maintain the freedom of the seas, and would be at call
in the unlikely event of invasion, the colonies had to maintain
and pay for internal order and the defence of their ports. The
British regiments had already been withdrawn and replaced
by militia. Major-General Edward's report heightened the
impact. What the colonies feared, and what Britain did not
realize, was not immediate danger of invasion but the setting
of foreign bases within striking distances of the vulnerable
Australian coast. Having learnt from their experiences in New
Guinea and elsewhere as to how little could they expect in
the way of aid from Britain, it was plain to the colonies
that they had to stick together for their individual and
collective security. Still the dangers were small compared
to those that drove the Swiss, the Americans or the Canadians
to union. And this was the reason why some colonists could
4 5still say "Time enough to federate when danger threatens."
As in 1867, in 1891 still the colonists were in no great hurry
"to see a new constellation of six stars in the heavens" when
4 6they left the Conference room. But the urgency was greater
now, and the military threat coupled with the economic crisis 
succeeded in bringing about the federation.
2. The Australian example also supports my hypothesis that 
cross-cutting cleavages are favourable factors in bringing 
about and keeping the constituents together in a federation.
At the time of federation in Australia the major cross-cutting 
cleavages between the colonies were two. First, there were 
large numbers of people from one colony living in another. 
Secondly, the economic interests of the people on the inter­
colonial borders often ran across their colonial boundaries.
The favourable effects of the first were clearly visible 
in Western Australia's voting pattern in the referendum on
J. H. Want's speech in the New South Wales Assembly on May 
14, 1890. Cited in Crisp, op. cit., footnote 44, p. 3.
An excerpt from the speech of Henry Parkes in 1867. Quoted 
in Quick and Garran , op. cit. , footnote 23, p. 104.
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July 31 , 1900 0 As the results of the referendum showed, the
people on the recently discovered goldfields were the most 
ardent supporters for federation in this otherwise indifferent 
colony. The diggers, who had in large proportion come from 
the Eastern colonies,
apparently saw in the continental nationalism of 
federalism a way of escaping from the isolation they 
felt in Western Australia and from the political domination 
of the politicians in Perth whose views were, by inheritance 
essentially isolationist, and reintegrating themselves 
into the larger Australian community then, as today, 
centred in the e a s t . ^
The people on the goldfields felt so strongly about the
federation that at one stage they even threatened to secede
from Western Australia and form a colony of their own w h ich
would promptly join the federation.
As regards economic cleavages we find that the "people
in general . . . judged . . . [the federation] not on a
class basis, and not on a State Right basis, but in terms of
4 8regional economic interest." As Parker says, the intercolonial
jealousies on which the colonies laid so much stress amounted
to little more than the rivalry of trade competitors. "What
the voting at different referendums suggest is that the apparent
division of opinion along State lines is really a division
along rather different lines, which can be well seen if the
results of each colony are dissected instead of being looked 
49en bloc." Parker pictures the map of the continent in the
1890s as a series of economic regions exporting their produce 
to or through a small number of large urban entrepots, the 
latter serving and exacting tribute from segments of territory 
of roughly equal radius.^ [Fig. 5.2]
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The areas of contact between any two regions were, naturally 
scenes of competition between the entrepots of two regions» As 
a result, the producers and traders in the economic border 
areas came to regret the existence of political borders and 
wished them to perdition. The federation which would establish 
a customs union, and would set some limits to railway competition 
and ensure unhampered transport on the Murray system, was 
inevitably attractive to border residents but repulsive to 
those urban interests which relied on discriminatory legislation 
in order to participate in an otherwise uneconomic commerce. 
Commenting on the Queensland situation in 1899 the Bulletin 
recorded:
The North . . . is decidedly in favour of saying good-bye
to provincialism while the sugar districts (despite the 
black labour question) want to unite with the province 
that will supply them with a market. Southern Queensland, 
with the exception of [Brisbane, the Octopus, and 
Toowoomba which was afraid of New South Wales cabbages 
and potatoes] . . .  is federally inclined.
3. The Australian frontier of settlement did not work as
a very large scale melting pot in the way the American frontier
in the West did. The reason was that
Unlike the Middle West, the Australian frontier was and 
largely still is, a "big man's frontier". The costs 
implied by distance to markets, the high overheads of 
bringing in bulk supplies, the constant risk of drought, 
bush fires, and floods, all conspire to make Australia 
by and large inhospitable to the small farmer.^
Secondly, the Australian government, unlike the American
or Canadian, did not inherit large habitable areas where it
could settle people and create new states and, thereby win
the loyalties of the poorer sections of society in its
constituent regions. The Northern Territory that the federal
government did actually take over was of hardly any value
in this respect. In fact, the Australian continent was
fully divided into the six colonies before the federation
was born. Each colony controlled large unsettled areas and
thus possessed its own frontier of settlement whose development
remained the full responsibility of the respective regional
government. Still, as in America, the people on the "out back"
51
Quoted in Parker, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 172.
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Spate, op. cit., footnote 17, p. 46.
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were much of a piece. The "out back" did act as a cord of 
unity, and the federation movement was, in fact, "supported 
by big majorities throughout the 'out back' and up the north 
coast."5 ^
In a sense, however, the geography of frontierism has, 
indeed, played a favourable role in the stability of Australian 
federalism. The continent still remains a frontier of 
settlement for the European people. Because of this there 
are large numbers of people in almost every state for whom 
regional loyalties (as opposed to the central) have little 
meaning. This weakens the sense of state-parochialism and 
thereby encourages the centralizing tendency in the regions.^
4. As already noted, in order to build a strong national 
loyalty the central government in a federation must succeed 
in attaching to itself the majorities in its constituent regions 
as the centre of their primary interest. The Great West in 
the United States, and the protective tariff and the trans­
continental railway in Canada had provided this highly desirable 
motivation for national loyalty in the two North American 
federations. In Australia, too, the federal government was able
53
Shaw, op. cit., footnote 8, p. 196. The point is amply clear 
in the South Australian example studied by R. Norris in his 
"Economic Influences on the 1898 South Australian Federation 
Referendum" (included in A. W. Martin (Ed.) , Essays in 
Australian Federation, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press,
1969 , pp. 137-166) . An appendix on page 166 of the essay
shows that whereas two of the city electorates recorded 
unfavourable majorities, all the country electorates registered 
favourable votes for the Federation Bill. Further, while only 
three of the seven city electorates recorded above sixty 
percent majority "yes" votes (the highest being 67.40 percent), 
all the country electorates had above 60 percent "yes" votes-- 
the highest being 95.21 percent.
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As Russel Ward's Australian Legend (Melbourne: Oxford
University Press, 1962), and Tom Collins' Such Is Life (first 
published 1903; re-issued in 1948 by Angus & Robertson,
Sydney) bring out, even in the colonial days roving bush 
workers (often enough not sufficiently settled for long 
enough in any one place to have a colony vote) had a definite 
al1-Australian feeling, perhaps before anyone else. Explaining 
the reasons for a greater all-Australian consciousness in 
Victoria (relative to New South Wales) Geoffrey Serie hints 
at somewhat similar factors when he writes: "[The colony's]
mere half century of history did not allow any deep rooted 
provincial loyalty based on long tradition to exist". Geoffrey 
Serie, "The Victorian Government's Campaign for Federation 
1883-1889" in A. W. Martin (Ed.), op. cit., footnote 53, 
pp. 1-56, reference on p. 53.
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to retain the faith of its people for long because of the much
needed "ring fence" of protection both against coloured
immigration and foreign manufactures which the federal government
with her continental resources was alone able to provide»
5. As the constituent units of the Australian federation
were culturally of a piece, keeping the federal family together
was relatively easier. For this reason the importance of
live political frontiers in the maintenance of federal stability
in the country was less vital» Still fear of external threat
did play an important role in consolidating national loyalties.
Australians' consciousness of their land as a bowl of food
placed next door to the hungry millions of Asia was a strong
5 5factor in the stability of the union. It was clear to
Australians that in order to reserve the bowl to themselves 
they needed to forge a united front. The German military 
presence in the South Pacific was a further force in the same 
direction.
Western Australia's move for secession in the 1930s (when 
138,653 of its population voted for, and 70,706 voted against 
secession in 1933) may now be dismissed as the act of an angry 
baby striking against his mother's breast, for it is said 
that "a great number of those who voted for secession did not 
believe that it was likely to be brought about" and that 
"What the people did want to do was to show their sense of 
grievance . . . and record a protest against Commonwealth policy
sufficiently emphatic to ensure that the federal government 
would take some action to pacify opinion within the state.
It is true that with the return of a measure of prosperity 
secession lost much of its force and the movement receded into
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As Mary Gilmore [1865-1962] wrote in her poem "Nationality":
All men at God's round table sit,
All men must be fed;
But this loaf in my hand,
This loaf is my son's bread.
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the background, but it could well have emerged to the forefront 
again had not the devastating 1939-45 War intervened and 
reminded the constituents of the federation that if they did 
not jointly trim the sails of the ship of Australia the on­
coming storm might sink all of them together. Soon after the 
War Western Australia found that she no longer bordered on 
a British lake. It could therefore no longer afford to be 
complacent and fissiparous,
6. Although it was a kind of sectionalism that had helped
to pull the different colonies together into the federation,
still because of certain factors of economic geography
sectionalism has not been an active force in Australian
federalism. Australia lacks regional specialization of the
type found in the United States or Canada. All the Australian
states produce wool and wheat, and at least four of them
produce exportable quantities. This brings about a kind of
homogeneity in the economic interests of the states and
discourages sectional divisions at the federal level. Then as
every state has its capital city with metropolitan ambitions, 
and since the important service of transportation is a 
state matter, farmers' grievances are likely to be directed 
toward the state capital. Friction within the state 
rather than an alliance of urban and rural interests 
of the region to exact concession from another region is 
the more common Australian development.^8
State identities have continued to be fostered by metropolitan
rivalries. The agrarian discontent in each state tends to
assume the form of an anti-capital city feeling. There
are no groups of contiguous states sharing common grievances,
aspirations and vested interests. Further, some questions
which bring these regional groupings to the fore, such as
freight rates in Canada, do not exist as federal problems
"In the new expansionist age that dawned after the war, the 
government at Canberra was seen by Western Australians 
to have some of the marks, not of a distant ogre, but of 
Santa Clause bringing gifts to distant dependants."
F. Alexander, Australia Since Federation: A Narrative and
Critical Analysis, Melbourne: Thomas Nelson (Australia) Ltd.,
1967 (1969 reprint), p. 123.
K. A. MacKirdy, "Geography and Federalism in Australia 
and Canada," Australian Geographer, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1953,
p . 4 6.
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in Australia. Then, in contrast with the United States,
Australia has a relatively inconsiderable amount of interstate
trade» As the railway map of Australia shows, channels of
trade still largely run within the various state boundaries,
up and down from the interior to the sea. [Fig. 5.3]
It has been suggested that the great wool-wheat belt
in the south-east, or the pastoral and mining belt in the
north could supply the economic and cultural base for a
sectionalism in the American manner, but they are split
up between three or four states and yet not dominant in any
one. This is probably the main factor in the failure of
Australian Senate to act as a state's House. With only six
units the possibilities of bloc-making are extremely limited.
Spate regards a unitary State with provinces as the most
rational organization of Australian space which, he thinks
could mean a smoother machinery for constitutional problems, 
more local participation in local problems, the emergence of 
sections in the American sense, corresponding to real and 
homogeneous regional interests and to some extent offsetting 
the prevailing and increasing cultural uniformity.
He, however, concedes that on a practical plane there is no
visible basis of support for such a recasting, for any one
who can see the state machines of any of the major political
parties "yielding an iota of their power and patronage is
a visionary indeed."^0
We may now examine the question of whether the Australian
6 1"federal system has outlived its usefulness." Such opinions
are based on the conviction that Australia has evolved to
a stage of political development when the sense of regional
identities born out of physical isolation etc. have largely
been overcome. If it were so federalism, indeed, would have
outlived its usefulness. Recent studies show, however, that
this is by no means so. As Colin Clark has written
in the present state of Australian transport, the 
Australian manufacturer finds that the population and 
industries of a neighbouring Australian state might almost
59
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as well be in Europe for all the good they can do him 
as markets or suppliers . . - The freights on sending
goods between one Australian State and another are as 
high, in some cases higher, than the cost of sending 
goods to or from Europe or North America . . .62
Though this is somewhat overdrawn, it seems likely to some
scholars that, until well into the future, lines of commercial
intercourse will probably continue to flow outward rather
than inward, knitting Australia in that process closer
to Europe and the United States but leaving the six Australian
6 3states still rather independent economic units» The diversity
of railway gauges (and their concentration on state capitals, 
except in Queensland) makes Australia's railway system a 
loose combination of independent units. This has greatly 
encouraged state-parochialism. Indeed, the railways have 
tended to divide Australia into five separate "islands" instead 
of welding the continent into a great political and economic
■ 4- 6 4uni t.
However, since Sir Harold Clapp made the above observation, 
many improvements in interstate rail links have taken place.
Since 1956, under various Commonwealth-State Standardization 
Agreements several hundred miles of standard (4ft. S^in.) 
gauge track have been completed. Melbourne was linked to 
Sydney (and hence, also to Brisbane) by a standard gauge railway 
in 1962, and now direct (2,442 miles long) standard link is 
available between Sydney and Perth. Bogie exchange facilities 
have been installed at Melbourne and Port Pirie (South 
Australia) to eliminate the physical transfer of goods between 
the rolling-stock of the standard gauge and that of the broad 
gauge (5ft. 3in.) systems serving Victoria and the large parts of
South Australia. Development of air transport, and the 
improvement of road communications between the states have 
also facilitated interstate movement.^ But it may by large
62 ~
C. Clark, Australian Hopes and Fears, London: Hollis & Carter,
1958, p. 72.
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R . L . Leach, Interstate Relations in Australia, Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1965, p. 18.
64
H. Clapp, "Australia a Nation," (1946) p. 148. Cited in 
Leach, op. cit., footnote 63, p. 159.
65
For details see the Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth
of Australia, No. 55, 1969, p. 391.
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be true to say that
Australians, perhaps to a greater extent than other people, 
will never see eye to eye with each other on everything. 
Certainly complete cooperation between the Australian 
states is impossible. The states are at least semi­
sovereign, and even if they had the maximum desire to 
cooperate, their interests are not identical. Geography 
alone limits the number and kind of cooperative arrangements 
that can be worked out.66
As Miller notes, part of the reason for the elaborate
framework of government in Australia lies in the inhospitable
nature of the country, in the remoteness of one centre of
population from another, and the sparseness of population
between the main centres. The political expression for this
has been the demand of the far away areas for special
representation in their local parliaments, equal representation
in the Senate, and a place at the Premiers' Conference.
Geography has been assisted by the stubborn fact of a 
continuing federalism in Australian life, the retention 
of "State sentiment" not so much in the sense of 
patriotism toward a particular State and its form of 
government, as attachment to special interests which 
characterise the State and are assumed to be protected
by its separate existence.67
Hence, despite all that has been said of "the failure of
federalism," "the States remain cardinal factors in the society
and politics of Australia, in its human and economic geography,
6 8and not only in the sense of filing boxes." "Despite the
arbitrary nature of their boundaries," the states are "the
69primary geographical regions in the country."
Given the present state of affairs federalism is bound 
to remain a continuing factor in Australia's political life.
Leach, op. cit., footnote 63, p. 162.
67
J. D. B. Miller, Australian Government and Politics: An
Introductory Survey, London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., third
edition, 1964, p. 217.
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K. W. Robinson, "Diversity, Conflict and Change--The
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Geographical Studies, Vol. 8, 1970, p. 5. Also see
K. W. Robinson, "Political Influence in Australian Geography", 
Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 3, 1962, pp. 73-86.
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Those who wonder "why they [Australians] bother with 
70federalism" overlook not only the fact that Australia continues 
to be oppressed by the tyranny of distance, but also ignore 
the truth that the Australian states through their long 
existence have now become historical entities incarnating 
strong and multiplex traditions and interests that differ 
in their details from one state to another.
Appendix to Chapter V
A NOTE ON THE "NEW STATES" MOVEMENT IN AUSTRALIA
It may not be irrelevant to add as a postscript a few 
remarks on the current force of regionalism in the Australian 
politics as expressed in the "New States" movement« The 
movement starts with two basic premises: first, that very
large political units create "apoplexy at the centre and 
anaemia at the extremes" leading to neglect of the areas 
away from the capital; secondly, the supposition that federal 
articulation in Australia would increase (and undue 
centralization would cease) if the present six large states 
are split up into three or four times that number. The fallacy 
in the second argument is clear. It is true that a more 
balanced federation could have resulted if the Commonwealth had 
originally started with a larger number of constituents, for 
that might have facilitated sectional groupings that could 
promote greater federal articulation. But after such a long 
period of evolution
the unscrambling of the existing structure into three or 
four times as many units would [not] produce any positive 
effects. More likely the Commonwealth, faced with so 
much weaker components (which would have lost the 
intangible but real strength of historic tradition 
possessed by the present States), would become even more 
centralized; unless indeed something like the sectional 
blocs of the American States had developed.71
Faced with initial problems of establishment and coordination, 
the "new states" might, in fact, because of the absence of 
any inhibiting historical loyalties, agree for greater powers 
to the centre. The result might be a more centralized polity 
rather than less.
The first argument, no doubt, has its strength but there 
are obvious difficulties in the creation of new states. The 
proposed new states may be of two types. First those that 
would comprise regions that are at present divided into two 
contiguous states. The other type is of the states that
70
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may be carved out of the outlying areas of a single state.
The first type is an almost impracticable proposition because 
the Constitution provides that new states can be created 
only with the consent of the old state(s) affected. And the 
prospect of joint assent at a relevant time is indeed a 
pure fantasy. The most obvious case of this type would be 
the Riverina-Murray valley. Of the second type two are most 
important--northern Queensland with Townsville as the regional 
capital, and second, New England in New South Wales, the 
movement for which has by far been the more active. With 
its 64,000 square miles and about 750,000 people, and its 
coal and industry of the Hunter Valley, New England could 
be a workable state on the Australian scale. Though the 
movement for New England state gained a great momentum 
when the long-awaited referendum was held in 1967, although 
reasonably good majorities were secured in the tablelands, 
and the north coast, Newcastle and the Lower Hunter valley 
balanced it by even more striking "No" votes.
Part 3
THE POST-1945 FEDERATIONS
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Chapter VI
POST-1945 ASIAN FEDERATIONS 
1. INDIA
Although the roots of political life in India go back
further than in any other modern federation, in a brief study
of this nature we would primarily be concerned with the more
immediate historical factors. There has, no doubt, been a
general consciousness, among the elites, of India as a single
geographical and cultural entity from the very early times,
and the great Rishis of India had tried to enforce this
consciousness of a common motherland of all Hindus through
their numerous hymns and through the institution of
pilgrimage to the Holy Places (Tirthas) spread through the
four corners of the country.^ But nationalism in its modern
sense (as developed in nineteenth century Europe) is only of
recent growth in India, and arose largely in opposition to
the all-pervading British rule. It must, however, be
remembered that though the British rule became the immediate
cause for the rise of this all-India nationalism, by providing
a single target against which the aspirations of the leaders
of every region in the country struck, the genuine foundations
of this sentiment lay much deeper. The people realized that
just as they had a common "enemy" to fight against, they also
2had a common heritage to safeguard.
The realization of a common heritage came from a number 
of factors. The first and foremost was the existence of a 
common culture and a common (though complex) religion that 
had through centuries knitted the diverse regions of the 
nation together. The Indian elites were highly conscious of 
the fact that though different kingdoms with their distinct 
regional bases had fought with each other for a large part
1
See R. K. Mookerjee, The Fundamental Unity of India, Bombay: 
Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, 1954.
2
R. D. Dikshit, "India's Evolution as a Nation-State", Indo- 
Asian Culture, October 1967, p p . 211-226. Salient differences
between the nature of Indian and European nationalism are 
discussed and some of their underlying causes explained in 
R. D. Dikshit, "The Idea of Nationalism: Indian and European",
Indo-Asian Culture, January 1966, p p . 15-30.
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of Indian history, in fact each one of them, with any claim 
to greatness, strove for a chakravarti samrajya, an all-Indian 
empire of Himachala-setu Paryantam (extending from the 
Himalayas to the sea). The modern elites felt that if many 
of the great men of the past failed to achieve a lasting all- 
India union, it did not mean that such a thing was unachievable. 
What kings and emperors had failed to achieve, they hopefully 
thought that a modern people could attain, for they knew 
that they were armed with far better tools than had ever 
existed in the past.
THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INDIAN FEDERALISM
As many historians have pointed out, it was India’s 
traditional concept of paramountcy dating back to pre-Christian 
times and reflected in the traditional Ashwamedha Yajna 
(Horse Sacrifice) that had helped the Mughals, and after them 
the British, to attain paramountcy all over the country. Save 
for this underlying sense of an all-inclusive unity side by 
side with the numerous regional diversities (a kind of incipient 
federalism), the roots of the present-day all-India republican 
federalism date almost from the rise of British power in the 
country, although, as Panikkar writes, "In fact, the doctrine 
of the unity of India was taken over by the British from the 
disembodied idea of a national State which the Moghals
3represented at the beginning of the nineteenth century."
The foundations of British power in India may be traced 
to the establishment of the East India Company in December 1600, 
but Britain did not become a ruling power in India till the 
second half of the eighteenth century. The British began, 
like their European competitors, with little extra-territorial 
enclaves conceded by the Mughals or the local rulers. But 
the rapid decline of the Mughals and the virtual elimination 
of the French in the eighteenth century left them opposed 
only by the weak and often disunited "country powers".
Supremacy over the region of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa had 
been achieved as the result of victories at Plassey (1757) 
and Buxar (1764). After the defeat of Tipu Sultan (1800) and
K. M. Panikkar, A Survey of Indian History, Bombay: Asia
Publishing House, 3rd revised edition, 1957 reprint, p. 201.
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the destruction of the Marathas (1818) most of the country 
came under British paramountcy, and when the Sikhs were 
defeated in 1849 the British dominion in India was established 
from the Indus to the Brahmaputra, from the Himalayas to the 
Cape Comorin--over the whole of the traditional territory 
of Bharatvarsha.
The unity of India which the sacred writings of the 
Hindus had postulated centuries before Christ . . .
had [now] in fact come into being. The doctrine of 
the national State which the mind of India accepted 
in the eighteenth century was realized through the 
force of British arms.4
But underneath the placid surface other forces were taking
shape which culminated into that tremendous thunderstorm for
the British power--the so-called Mutiny or the War of
Independence of 1857. Uniting the diverse factions in the
country, this great national uprising was "at bottom .
the last rally of the old indigenous India" against the 
5foreign rule. It indeed was "a heroic effort of a dispossessed0
people to assert their national dignity". This proved a 
great divide in modern Indian history. In 1858 the British 
Crown took over the government of India, and the Crown, having 
learnt a lesson from the Indian discontent that had given rise 
to this uprising, formulated some fundamental changes in the 
policy of government.
The ninety years of British rule following the uprising 
of 1857 formed, indeed, a period of great recovery. The 
all-India services initiated by Cornwallis were strengthened 
to make them the great steel frame of all-India administration. 
Gradual Indianization of these services was begun till only a 
very small top fraction remained European. Railways and 
telegraph lines knit the country together. A uniform law under 
a modernized jurisprudence (yet with allowance for customary 
laws in religious and family matters) was administered 
throughout the country. A uniform system of education through 
a common medium of instruction (i. e., English) provided the
4
Panikkar, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 202.
5
0. H. K. Spate and A. T. A. Learmonth, India and Pakistan;
A General and Regional Geography, London: Methuen & Co.
Ltd., third edition, 1967, p. 195.
6
Panikkar, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 202.
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government with a large corps of clerks to work in her offices.
It also gave the Indian elite, after a long interval, a 
common language of intellectual communication such as the 
country had possessed in the very distant past. This uniform 
education through a common medium helped to create a broad- 
based middle-class elite who throughout the country talked 
the same language, had the same intellectual training and 
thought broadly in terms of the whole nation»
In the mid-nineteenth century the cotton boom of the Amer­
ican Civil War had greatly encouraged commercial speculation, 
and the Suez Canal by bringing India nearer to Europe helped to 
tie Indian agriculture to the world market. This induced road 
and rail construction which helped to knit the country into a 
close economic unit. In time indigenous capital started factory 
industries which soon found themselves in competition with 
manufactured goods imported from Britain, and began to clamour 
for protection. Thus the middle-class nationalist elite soon 
found a following in the urban classes, and sympathy and 
silent support from capital. With Mahatma Gandhi's appeal 
to the masses the high and low in British India were brought 
together, and the stage for national regeneration was set.
The Indian National Congress as an all-India political party 
had already been established in 1885. To this growing 
nationalist feeling Curzon's unpopular partition of Bengal 
in 1905 provided a further impetus.
Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 ended the myth of 
European invincibility and added profoundly to the nationalist 
self-confidence towards which Tilak was already striving 
through his revival of the cult of Sivaji. By the first 
decade of the present century the spirit of all-India nation­
alism became increasingly militant and pitted its expectations 
higher. The fortuitous arrival of Mahatma Gandhi and the 
great national shock at the Jalianwala Bagh massacre watered 
the seeds of nationalism sown broadcast by Tilak, Gokhale,
Lajpat Rai, Moti Lai Ghosh, Aurobindo Ghosh and others. 
Abrogation of the Bengal partition in December 1911 showed 
that the British government could not altogether resist all- 
India national sentiments. "It was the first retreat of the 
Government before the onslaughts of Indian nationalism and 
became the prelude to the many more open conflicts between
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7the two, the final outcome of which could never be in doubt"; 
although by a strange irony of history the year 1947, which 
saw the final victory of Indian nationalism in the achievement 
of complete independence, also saw its final defeat on the 
issue of Bengal partition.
It is necessary to review India's constitutional evolution 
during the British period in order to appreciate fully the 
rise of republican federalism in the country for, in fact, 
the present federal Constitution embodies the changed sense 
of Indian unity that was brought about by a century of evolution 
under British rule. In a sense, however, the roots lie deeper 
still, for the British themselves had inherited from the 
Mughals a strong political system, albeit in the process 
of disintegration, The British took advantage of Mughal 
legacies in revenue and judicial administration, in the division 
of the country into Subas and Sarkars, as well as the concepts 
of paramountcy and paternalism. The first step in the 
constitutional advance of British India began with the 
Regulating Act of 1773 by which the British Parliament set up 
a Governor-General and a Council for the Presidency of Fort 
William in Bengal, and a Governor and Council for each of 
the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay: the latter two were
subordinated to the Governor-General-in-Counci1 on questions 
of war and peace as well as in their relations with the 
native powers.
The next significant step was taken with the Charter Act 
of 1833 which named the Governor-General and Council of Fort 
William as the Governor-Genera1-in-Counci1 of India; in his 
hands became concentrated the supreme executive and legislative 
authority for the entire subcontinent. Legislative powers 
hitherto enjoyed by the provincial Councils were withdrawn 
and the Governor-General-in-Council assisted by a Law Member 
became the sole legislative authority for the whole of British 
India. By the Government of India Act of 1858 the Governor- 
General, who had so long been responsible to the Court of 
Directors and the Board of Control of the Company, was made 
responsible to the Secretary of State for India acting on
V. B. Kulkarni, British Dominion in India and After,
Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, 1964, p. 110.
7
178
behalf of the British Crown»
But the defects of this extreme centralization in 
government soon became clear to the authorities concerned, 
and indeed "If one word could sum up the post-1858 administrationQof British India it was 'decentralization'". Conceding the
advantages of legislation being enacted by those who reside
"in or nearer the spot", Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of
State for India, proposed to restore to the Presidencies of
Madras and Bombay the power of passing laws and enactments
on local subjects. This was achieved by the Indian Councils
Act of 1861. As new provinces were created, they also received
their own Councils with similar powers. Decentralization
of a limited character in financial matters can clearly be
9noticed from 1870 onwards.
The Councils Act of 1909 (the Morley-Minto Reforms) 
considerably enlarged the size of the Central and the Provincial 
Councils, and made further additions to their powers. But all 
this still failed to satisfy local hopes and aspirations.
Faced with this dilemma the Government of India sent a Despatch 
(August 25, 1911) to the Secretary of State for India clearly
stating that "the only possible solution for the difficulty 
would appear to be gradually to give the provinces a larger 
measure of self-government until at last India would consist 
of a number of administrations autonomous in all provincial 
affairs, with the Government of India above them all . . ." . ^
This idea of provincial autonomy was given a fuller 
expression in the Report on the Indian Constitutional Reforms 
(the Montagu-Chemsford Report) of 1918 which envisaged the 
future of India as "a sisterhood of States, self-governing 
in all matters of purely local or provincial interest".^
This Report was the basis of the Government of India Act of
8
M. Vo Pyle, India's Constitution at Work, Bombay: Asia
Publishing House, 1962, p. 111.
9
B . Prasad, Origins of Provincial Autonomy 1861-1920 ,
Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1941, p. 369.
10
C. Ilbert, Government of India, London: Oxford University
Press, third edition, 1915, p. 115.
Report on the Indian Constitutional Reforms (or The 
Montagu-Chelmsford Report) , 1918, para 349,
11
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1919 which Sir Charles Whyte has aptly described as "the
finger-post to federalism" and which, in fact, introduced in
12the country a "federalism in embryo". Despite statutory
restrictions hedged around the taxing and borrowing powers
of the provinces, the provincial governments acquired almost
complete freedom to frame their budgets and a considerable
13latitude in the expenditure of their funds. Thus the Act
in effect "gave rise to something like the beginning of a
federal system for India . „ . the provinces were now, for
14all practical purposes, masters in their own houses".
The long-term effects of the Reforms were tremendous,
As a recent study summarizes it:^^
. . . the small dose of provincial autonomy injected
into the Indian political system by the Montford Reforms 
created a strong appetite in the country for a substantial 
expansion of the area of provincial self-government.
. . o The noteworthy advance in the democratization
of provincial administrations, providing for a 
substantial popular participation and placing effective 
though not unrestricted power in the hands of the 
people's representatives, generated and galvanized 
those social and political factors the impact and 
interaction whereof, coupled with the unavoidable effect 
of the natural and geographical factors . . . made
federalism the only practicable solution of the political 
and constitutional problem of India. The Montford 
Reforms contributed towards this development . . . by
setting in motion pressures for linguistic redistribution 
of provincial boundaries, by accentuating the fears of 
the Indian Muslims of being swamped by the numerically 
stronger Hindus in a majoritarian democracy and, 
consequently, giving keener edge to their demand for 
further safeguards to ensure their own future as a 
distinct political entity. At the same time the march 
of democracy in the provinces of British India could 
not but arouse apprehensions in the minds of the rulers 
of Indian States who, inevitably, became increasingly 
aware of the impossibility of indefinitely preserving 
their feudal fiefs by purchasing for themselves a position 
of protected isolation from the main currents of 
political development in British India . . .  As was to
12
Sir Frederick Whyte, India: A Federation?, Simla: Government
of India Press, 1926, the first quotation on p. 34 and the 
second quotation on p. 297.
13
K. R. Bombwall, The Foundations of Indian Federalism, Bombay: 
Asia Publishing House, 1967, p. 117.
14
J. Coatman, India, the Road to Self-government, 1908-1941, 
London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1941, p. 52.
15
Bombwall, op. cit., footnote 13, pp, 122-123.
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be expected, they began to bestir themselves and their 
manoeuvres to enter into some form of federal association 
with the British Indian provinces without surrendering 
their despotic authority in their own dominions became 
another factor in the federalization of Indian policy 
and in shaping the federal pattern of 1935,
There were two other factors working in the same direction.
First, Muslims, though an overall minority, were, in fact,
substantial majorities in certain geographically compact
areaso This created a federal situation in respect of Hindus
vis-a-vis Muslims, and gave rise to the Muslim demand for a
federal political organization for India wherein they could
achieve regional autonomy in their majority areas. Secondly,
as A. B. Keith says, "It is difficult to deny the justification
of the contention in India that federation was largely evolved
by the desire to evade the issue of extending responsible
16government to the Central Government of India". Federalism
with its promise of regional autonomy seemed to offer the
solution for the problems of the Muslims, the Princes, the
linguistic patriots, as well as the imperial interests of
Britain. Only the Congress, which alone could contemplate
the capture of power at the Centre, was not satisfied- Viewed
thus, the federal scheme under the Government of India Act
of 1935 was an inevitable next step.
The Act of 1935 envisaged an all-India federation
including the states as well as the provinces. The union could,
however, not be fully implemented because the Princes, though
enthusiastic in the beginning, became indifferent to the
proposalc Although taken as a whole the federal scheme was
full of many incongruities and anomalies, and perhaps "a priori,
a more unworkable federation could not have been devised by
17the ingenuity of man", still the Act provided a kind of 
"plaster cast" for the pattern of Union-state relations which 
was set in the Constitution of 1950. As the Provincial part 
of the Act came into force in 1937, the British Indian provinces 
attained a measure of autonomy in their regional administrations.
16
A. B. Keith, Constitutional History of India 1600-1935,
London: Methuen & Co, first published 1936, 2nd. edition,
1937, p. 296.
K. B. Punniah, India As a Federation, Madras, 1936, p. 63; 
cited in Bombwall, op. cit., footnote 13, p. 197.
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With the independence of India and the creation of
Pakistan, one of the chief forces for a federal political
organization of the country disappeared, since now all the
geographically compact Muslim majority areas in the provinces
1 8went to Pakistan» 'This made the problem of union much
more simplified. But given the several hundred autonomous 
princely states, the near-autonomous provinces, and the 
self-conscious and geographically compact linguistic groups, 
it was inevitable that some kind of federalism alone could 
resolve the problem of political organization of the country.
At the height of British rule, over two-fifths of the 
entire area of the subcontinent had continued to be ruled by 
the subordinate Princes. The political fragmentation of the
19country was "indescribable verbally and well-nigh unmappable". 
Direct British rule was largely confined to the Punjab, the 
Ganga valley, and to the provinces bordering largely on the 
coasts. Vast tracts of the interior remained under princely 
rule. The states of Hyderabad and Mysore between them ruled 
over 100,000 square miles of the southern tableland. The 
whole of Kashmir in the north, Travancore in the south, and 
vast territories in Rajasthan were ruled by the Princes. It 
was an index of the divided character of the country that 
the BB & Cl (Bombay, Baroda and the Central Indian) railway 
line from Delhi to Bombay in its direct route of 1,000 miles 
covered only 150 miles of British territory. All this made a 
federal solution to India's problems inevitable. [Fig. 6.1]
It is great tribute to Sardar Patel and his associates 
that within the course of a year and a half the Princes had 
voluntarily withdrawn from the government of the states, 
accepting a financial settlement for themselves and retiring 
into private life, [Fig. 6.2A] With the reorganization of
18
The situation is clear from a study of the maps in J.E, Brush, 
"The Distribution of Religious Communities in India", Annals, 
Association of American Geographers, Vol. 39, 1949, p p . 81-98.
See also G. S. Gosal and A. B. Mukerji, "The Religious 
Composition of India's Population: A Spatial Analysis",
Tijdschrift Voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, Vol. 61, 
1970, pp. 91-100,
0. H. K. Spate, "India and Pakistan" in W. G. East and
0. H. K. Spate (Eds.), The Changing Map of Asia: A Political
Geography, London: Methuen & C o . , third edition, 1958, p.131.
19
Fig. 6.1 INDIA BEFORE THE TRANSFER OF POWER. At the height 
of British rule, well over two-fifths of the entire area of the 
subcontinent continued to be ruled by the subordinate Princes. 
Direct British rule was largely confined to the Punjab, the 
Ganga valley, and to the Provinces bordering largely on the 
coast. The B. B. & C. I. railway from Bombay to Delhi in its 
direct route of one thousand miles covered only 150 miles of 
British territory: an index of the divided character of the
country. (Map adapted from C. C. Davies, An Historical Atlas 
of the Indian Peninsula, London: Oxford University Press, 1954,
96 . )
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the state boundaries on linguistic basis in 1956, nearly all 
the vestiges of old, feudal, and imperial India had formally 
disappeared. [Fig. 6.2B]
The Federal Structure
India's Constitution has often been described as federal 
but with strong unitary features. Sawer thinks that it is 
"But for one circumstance, . . .  a federal reaction to a 
federal situation, . . . This one circumstance is the
"emergency power" of the President which "while it operates, 
makes the Constitution a unitary one . . . from the viewpoint
of the constitutional lawyer". In practice, however, Sawer 
agrees, "the government of the country has continued to be 
carried on during the emergency in a substantially federal 
fashion".  ^^
The federal legislature consists of two Houses: a
popularly elected House of People (the Lok Sabha) and a 
Council of States (the Rajya Sabha). Unlike the U. S. A. and 
Australia, the upper House does not have equal representation 
for all the states. The federal executive is substantially 
on the British pattern of cabinet government. The Ministers 
are required to be members of the Lok Sabha or should become 
so within six months of appointment. But the President, who 
is chosen for a five-year term by the elected members of 
central legislature and the members of the lower Houses of 
the states, though far less powerful than his American 
counterpart, has far more independent discretion than either 
the British monarch or the West German President.
There are three lists of the division of powers: exclusive
centre, exclusive state, and concurrent; though the centre 
is expressly given the residue powers. The main powers of 
the states are the fields of police, land, agriculture, local 
manufactures and trade, and education. The centre competence 
is, therefore, quite substantial.
The state Governors are appointed by the President, the 
Governors are empowered to reserve bills of their respective 
states for the President's assent. The states are required 
to give effect to the laws of the centre, and not to impede
G. Sawer, Modern Federalism, London: C. A. Watts & Co.,
1969, p p . 46-47.
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central administration» If the President is satisfied that 
the government of a particular state cannot be carried on 
in accordance with the Constitution, he may with the assent 
of the two Houses of the central legislature assume all 
functions of the state government for six months» This 
period may be further extended with the approval of the 
two Houses.
Despite this overall paramountcy of the central 
government, in matters of finance, however, "the Constitution 
goes a surprising distance towards dividing tax fields so as 
to give the Regions some degree of financial autonomy".2"1'
The freedom of trade and commerce between the states is 
guaranteed. The judicial system is highly integrated because 
not only the Supreme Court but the High Courts also remain a 
centre responsibility. The Supreme Court is a general Court 
of appeal on all questions of importance,
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE RISE OF INDIAN
FEDERALISM
Factors_for Regional Identities
India is, no doubt, a better "geographically intelligible 
isolate" than most other countries, but because of its great 
size and population, the country, though it lacks any internal 
barriers of impassable magnitude, is parcelled by nature 
into a number of somewhat self-contained units which, before 
the coming of modern communications, had for centuries 
developed in relative isolation and so had come to possess 
their own distinctive cultural and linguistic complexes»
Though this isolation was seldom complete, and all the diverse 
regional units were daughters of the same mother culture, 
still these were daughters that had set their houses at places 
far removed from one another long before the era of mechanized 
transport. With the opportunities for inter-regional inter­
course being greatly limited, despite an overall sense of 
belonging together each of the units developed its own identity 
to some extent conditioned by its own geographical 
circumstances. [Fig. 6.3A]
The Vindhyas stand as a formidable barrier between the
21
Sawer, o p . cite footnote 20, p„ 48,
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northern plain and the southern plateau. Before the railways 
were laid, the Vindhyas with their tangled growth of forests 
presented a barrier of magnitude. The dividing effect of 
the system may be seen in the presence of a so-called Aryan 
north and a Dravidian south, ^ The predominantly Aryan north 
with its Indo-Aryan languages and its predominantly Vaishnavite 
religion differs to a degree from the Dravidian south with its 
different "racial" characteristics, its different linguistic 
complex, and its predominantly Shaivite religion.
But the change from the north to south is not sudden. 
Between the cores of the two regions stands a middle zone 
which shares the characteristics of either, while the forest- 
covered tracts of central India along the Vindhyan zone have 
been the traditional homeland of the dispossessed tribal groups 
whose cultures differ from the either two. The north and 
south are themselves divided into several smaller linguistic- 
cultural subdivisions by certain topographical lineaments 
of the landscape. The Indus valley region is separated from 
the Ganga-Yamuna plain by the wide expanse of the Rajputana 
desert, and is connected with the latter only by a narrow 
corridor to the north of Delhi. Though all the time in close 
touch with the main cultural hearth in the Ganga valley, 
this western region developed, in course of time, an identity 
of its own--developing its own language and its own script.
But from here to the far east there is no geographical divide 
in the plain. It has resulted in the development of a 
homogeneous cultural complex from the west to east till the 
northward projecting horn of the plateau in the Chhota 
Nagpur region is reached. This projection with its forest- 
clad surface forms a break in the otherwise unimpeded transport 
and communication of the plains (and this must have been a 
real break before the coming of modern transport and in the 
formative period of the regional cultures). Thus Bengal, 
beyond the bottleneck between Chhota Nagpur and the Himalayas, 
though culturally one with the rest of the plains developed 
its own language (though clearly derived from the Sanskrit 
root as the other north Indian languages are) and its own 
script. Separated from the Bengali-speaking areas by the 
Shillong plateau is the Brahmaputra valley of Assam with its 
own linguistic-cultural complex in the Assamese.
<
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South of the Indus-Ganga plain are, from west to east, 
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa--each of them 
(except Madhya Pradesh), though still Indo-Aryan in its 
linguistic-cultural complex, has developed its own language 
and script» Gujarat, separated from the Indus-Ganga plain 
by the Rajputana desert and the central Vindhyan districts, 
and from Maharashtra by the forested Satpura-Maikad zone, 
has developed its own language and literature in Gujarati. 
Separated by the Vindhyan districts and the Satpura-Maikal 
zone from the north, and occupying the Deccan lava country, 
is the region of Maharashtra with its indomitable identity 
that has stood firmly against foreign onslaughts throughout 
the mediaeval and modern times. Its language, though from 
the same root and having the same script as the languages in 
the northern plains, has its own identity in the Indo-Aryan 
family. Further east, Madhya Pradesh, again Hindi and Hindu, 
is in close touch with the Ganga plain outside its tribal 
areas. East of it is the Orissa region bordering on the 
Bay of Bengal. Separated by the Chhota Nagpur plateau region 
from Bihar and Bengal, and by the forest-covered tribal country 
from Madhya Pradesh, Orissa has, through the ages, developed 
its own regional identity and a separate language.
South of the Deccan lava country in Maharashtra is the
Kannada-speaking Mysore. Kannada, unlike Marathi, belongs
to the Dravidian group. Further south of it is the Malayalam-
speaking Kerala separated from the Kannada-speaking Mysore
and the T ami 1-spe ak i n g Madras by tire- iradgo »f/ the Western
Ghats. The Tami1-speaking area is roughly separated by the
Mysore Ghats from Mysore and the Western Ghats from Kerala,
and io dominated— fcry^the Kaveri plains. Being farthest removed
from the zone of tension in the north, this area was rarely
penetrated by a northern power. North of Tamil Nadu (Madras)
and east of the Kannada- and Marathi-speaking areas is the
Telugu-speaking Andhra Pradesh which is dominated by the
2 2riverine tracts of Krishna and Godavari. [Fig. 6.3C]
The dynamics of Indian history in relation to its geographical 
personality are best treated in B. Subbarao, Personality of 
India, Baroda: M. S. University, 1956; and Y. A. Raiker,
I. S. Uni-Indian History; 
versity, 1960.
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Throughout history each of these different geographical- 
cultural entities (or nuclear areas) maintained some kind 
of separate historical identity, though some of them were 
divided into a number of rival principalities. [Fig. 6.3b ]
There were, no doubt, continued attempts to weld these 
diverse regions together into a single body politic, and 
some measure of success was achieved in the different periods 
of history; but through the ages, under India's traditional 
concept of Samrajya (or paramountcy) , the regional units, 
while recognizing the paramountcy of the central power, retained 
their regional autonomy. Thus a kind of incipient federalism 
was present all the time in India's historical past. As already 
noted, the British, recognizing the advantages of a decentra­
lized administration in India, soon accepted this legacy^ ^
The regionalizing effects of the gradual devolution of 
authority to the provinces in British India have already 
been referred to and need no repetition. Then the princely 
states were, we have seen, an altogether different world in 
themselves. While a uniform legal and educational system 
prevailed in the British provinces, in the states "in most 
cases autocracies continued unmasked and in a few States
2 3it was covered with a thin veneer of democratic government".
Factors for Unity
Despite the long distances and the differences in 
climate and physical features involved in an area of this 
magnitude, nature does not compartmentalize the country into 
discrete units. Most of the geographical features separating 
one area from the others were more like boundary fences than 
total barriers. The fences were high enough to safeguard 
privacy of the separate households, but low enough to enable 
some consciousness of what was going on to the other side.
Thus while maintaining their separate identities the regions 
were all the time conscious of their essential cultural unity.
Unlike most other areas of similar extent in the Old 
World, India has all through been a vast cultural realm made 
up of a number of regional units always conscious of their
White Paper on States, quoted in P. Griffiths, Modern 
India, London: Ernest Benn Ltd., third edition, 1962,
p. 113.
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unity in separation. The Ramayana and the Mahabharata embody
"common links in the realm of thought, literature and social
24customs of the various regions" of India. Because of the
concept of Rama "the whole of the country has [fundamentally]
one idea, one inspiration--one personification of many 
2 5virtues". Indeed, "Under favourable . . . geographical
circumstances, Hinduism was able to build up throughout India
a common culture and a uniform way of life. . . . The
foundations thus existed on which, under favourable political
26conditions, a structure of true unity might be created".
Thus the statement that "Multilingual India's separate
territories have failed as consistently as Europe's to hold
together as a political unity" takes a narrowly political view
2 7of India's history. As Percival Spear says, the division
in the political life of India was not so much a chronic malady
as suggested by many British historians, as a periodic malaise
caused by the nature of Indian polity and the tensions produced
by overlapping "races" and rival "cultures" in a subcontinent
which provides few convenient physical compartments for the
growth of integrated nationalities. Many historians have
drawn attention to what Percival Spear has so beautifully
summarized in the following lines:
Groups which developed into nations tended to grow into 
empires, ossify into aristocracies, and decay into 
dispersion. There never was an Indian concept of a 
balance of power of stable states within the orbit of 
Indian culture. Instead there was a continuing tradition 
of empire and overlordship from the Chakravarti raja 
with his horse sacrifice as token of supremacy in ancient 
times to the great Mughals of the seventeenth century.28
Before the arrival of the British there was a complete
absence in India of the linguistic and cultural nationalism
24
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25
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28
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then and since so dominant in Europe. As Percival Spear notes,
in India the horizontal division of caste and the vertical
division of religion were more important than those of "race"
or language. Tribalism was important as with Afghans, but it
seldom deepened into any thing like nationalism because
geographic dispersion did not favour it, and the community
separation in the institution of caste hindered it. The
Rajputs largely remained an aristocracy divided by clan spirit.
Only the Marathas, enjoying the advantages of a geographically
distinct homeland, a common language, and love of independence,
and fanned by the genius of Sivaji in calling for the defence
of the desh (homeland) and the cow (religion) , federated the
different communities on a functional basis and developed an
incipient nationalism based on the hatred of the Islamic rule 
29of Aurangzeb.
However, the more immediate factors giving rise to all- 
India nationalism were largely products of the British rule.
As the British Indian provinces were governed by officers 
of a centralized bureaucracy amenable to transfers, rather 
than smaller vassals often deeply rooted in their own regions, 
almost for the first time in India did the common man come 
into direct contact with an al1-pervading central authority, 
though, no doubt, some beginnings in this direction had been 
made by the Mughals. The question of centre-state relations 
no longer remained a matter between a local Nawab and the 
paramount power. Now, because they were aimed directly at 
the common central authority, the grievances of the common 
man in all parts of the country became united. This realization 
of a united grievance gave rise to the feeling that their 
salvation also lay in united action. Thus when nationalism 
finally came to India, it came as an all-India nationalism.
The vertical division of religion and the horizontal division 
of caste no longer stood in its way, for the Brahmin and the 
Sudra, the Hindu and the Muslim, whatever language he spoke 
and whatever part of British India he lived in, felt almost
29
Spe ar , o p . cit. , footnote 28, p. 111.
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equally aggrieved by the same authority.
One hundred years of British rule, though to some extent 
decentralized but with a uniform mould of administrative 
style, united the different regions of India into a single 
political and economic structure. Even the princely states, 
which lay interspersed with the British Indian territory, 
followed closely behind. A customs union transformed the 
whole of India, with the exception of Kutch, into a single 
unit for purposes of external trade. After the first World 
War, India was internationally recognized as a single political 
entity, and international treaties entered by the British 
Indian government became binding on the Indian states.
u j » ! -*• «While j ~  f I r-4 i ‘ 1 ■> v a -i i t.T a y Systemsand improved roads
made inter-regional communication easy and isolation of the 
provincial units difficult, the centrally governed postal, 
telegraph, and telephone services, and the broadcasting system 
bound the entire country together. The unifying effects of 
a uniform system of education through a common medium of 
instruction, and the uniform legal and judicial administrative 
system have already been noted.
The whole of the subcontinent developed as a single
economic unit. The provinces had no raison d 1etre as
independent economic organizations. Industrial development
took place at the centres most conveniently located from
the economic viewpoint disregarding the political boundaries.
The republican federation of independent India was, therefore,
not an artificial creation but the genuine emergence of a
single nation welded together by social, economic and political 
3 1forces. Having for so long developed as the organic parts
of the same economic whole, it would have been suicidal for 
either the provinces or the states to have parted company 
as independent units. Thus, after the two areas on the
30
One of course does not discount certain regional and 
class- and caste-based political movements in British 
India, or some strong appeal to religious traditions and 
loyalties. But the Indian National Congress with its 
all-India appeal did provide a more or less united national 
front that for the most part overrode the distinctions 
of class and caste.
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peripheries of the country were cut apart to form Pakistan, 
it was natural for the remaining states and the provinces 
to join together into single organic political unit.
But while the large size of the country, the geographically 
compact linguistic groups, and the highly diverse princely 
states made a centralized unitary polity unsuitable, the 
legacy of a unified administration and a unified economy 
that had existed over a long period of time, made a loose 
coordinate federalism appear as a retrograde step. India's 
solution lay, therefore, either in a highly federalized unitary 
polity or in a highly unified federal one--that is somewhere 
between a normal unitary and a classical federal organization, 
and something like the twentieth century mature federalism 
in practice. Thus when India decided upon a federal political 
organization she achieved by her Constitution what the earlier 
federations had achieved by a long evolution.
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC INFERENCES
1. The origin of Indian federalism differed in its essentials 
from that in the United States, Canada or Australia. Unlike 
in the classical examples Indian federalism did not involve 
joining together of formerly disjointed units that had over 
long periods of time grown in relative disregard of one 
another. India had all through remained a single British 
colony whose different provinces had together formed an 
organic political unit. Thus, in relation to the classical 
federations the rise of Indian federalism presents a somewhat 
atypical case for here, unlike in the classical examples, 
the problem was not of creating unity from disunity. India's 
real political problem was to convert a dependent and somewhat 
imposed unity into a unity of free choice. For this reason 
some of the hypotheses developed with respect to the origin 
of the classical federations may not apply to India.
Thus the hypothesis that federalism is a form of union 
that often originates when a number of regionally-grouped 
political communities with small power potentials but strong 
regional identities are faced with a common threat to their 
survival, would not exactly fit this case. Yet, in a sense, 
it applies to this case also for both the provinces as well 
as the princely states knew that disjointed they were helpless 
economically as well as politically, while in union they
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could be a considerable force in the society of nations,.
They were impressed that in a world of aggressive and 
expansionist politics only large and powerful States have 
a fair chance of survival.
2 0 The consolidating effects of live political frontiers, 
though not to the same degree as in the classical examples, 
may still be discerned in the Indian example. The princely 
states of Rajasthan, which for long bargained for more 
favourable terms of union, hastened to join soon after the 
partition of the country, for the military implications to 
their weak Hindu states next door to the new and militant 
Islamic republic of Pakistan were only too clear to them.
The proposed declaration of independence by the state of 
Travancore, situated deep into the south away from any 
foreign frontiers, may provide a negative proof of this.
The Hindu Raja of Kashmir finally decided to join the Indian 
Union only when the military invasion from across the borders 
in Pakistan forced him to beg for Indian protection. The 
consolidating effects of the Chinese aggression and the 
Pakistani war of 1965 were clear to every observer of the 
Indian political scene.
Though Switzerland is the best example of how dynamic 
political frontiers help to maintain unity within a highly 
heterogeneous federation, India also presents an interesting 
case. India's live political frontiers are limited to its 
north, northeast, and northwest. Throughout its wide expanse 
in the south it is washed by the placid waters of an open 
sea. Because of this smaller events in the north, like the 
protracted controversy over Kashmir or the minor skirmishes 
on the borders with Pakistan, do not agitate and frighten 
the southern states to the same degree that they do the 
people in the north. Only when the issues are vital enough 
to question the unity and survival of the nation per se- - 
as the Chinese aggression or the Pakistani war--do the people 
in the south get emotionally charged.
3. As in most other federations, in India too, geographical 
contiguity of the units involved in the federation played 
an important (perhaps decisive) role in the origin of the 
Union. Had the princely states not been hemmed in by the 
British Indian provinces in the way they were, several of
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them might not have so smoothly and willingly joined the 
federation. The point is very clearly exemplified by the 
case of Kashmir, which not being geographically surrounded 
by the Indian territory was out for independence, and entered 
the Union for protection only when faced by a massive military 
invasion. The lines of transport and communications in the 
pre-independence India did not so effectively link Kashmir 
with what became the Indian Union as they do now.
Even the largest of the princely states were very small 
in area and resources when compared to the united provinces 
of British India. Had all the princely states formed a 
geographically compact area, even though divided among so 
many Princes, the federation, if born, would have been a loose 
union somewhat on the eighteenth century model. Thus, 
geographical contiguity and the peculiar distribution of 
the units concerned played an important part in the rise of 
the Union.
4. Hinduism has aptly been likened to a sponge that absorbs
everything that enters it without ceasing to be itself. Like
the sponge Hinduism has no very clear outlines at its borders
nor an apparent core at the centre. Still, as Selig Harrison
puts it, "the common identity of all Hindus in a non-Hindu
world gives validity to Indian nationalism in the world 
3 2setting". Due to the absence of that fanatic zeal associated
with certain other religions with distinct outlines, the 
Indian identity as the homeland of Hindus surrounded by the 
peoples of other faiths was seldom very strong, but the birth 
of Pakistan and all the bitter memories associated with the 
Partition did perhaps give rise to some such feeling at the 
popular 1eve1--though religion has never been the raison 
d'etre of the Indian Republic, unlike the case in Pakistan.
5. The Indian example satisfies my hypothesis that in a 
multi-ethnic federation social and political cleavages cutting 
across state boundaries foster a sense of national unity by 
interlocking the diverse groups within the union. It also 
demonstrates the fact that in multi-ethnic federations with 
regionally-grouped cultural diversities, other things being 
favourable, the greater the factors of "felt" diversities the
Harrison, op. cit., footnote 27, p. 96.
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greater are the chances of a stable federalism for then,
most likely, the patterns of the major diversities such as
language and religion would not coincide, and their overlap
would tend to neutralize their divisive force. As the
cleavages overlap, the different groups within a union find
their loyalties divided and their interests interlinked.
Despite the large number of apparent diversities in India,
after the birth of Pakistan and the subsequent reorganization
of the states on a linguistic basis, language has become the
3 3main factor of cleavage between the states of the Union. As
the political boundaries have coincided with those of language,
the cleavage lines between the states have hardened, and
language has begun to play mischief, as in Canada, to the
detriment of national unity. The advantages are, no doubt,
great if the regional administrations are carried out and
early education imparted through a people's own mother tongue.
But if a strong link language does not develop, and if English
continues to be neglected as it is at present, the dangers are
great that the like-mindedness among the elite, born out of a
uniform education imparted through a common language, may
soon disappear and the people's intercourse of ideas would
become confined to their own fellow-linguists. This would
weaken all-India nationality and might create a situation
somewhat similar to Canada vis-a-vis Quebec. This will hinder
inter-state mobility of population which is a most desirable
34antidote to localism. This would create in the Indian body
3 3
For the details of the factors behind the linguistic 
redistribution of states see Report of the States Reorgan­
ization Commission, New Delhi: Manager of Publications,
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politic a number of parochial linguistic cells with hardened 
outsides . ^
6. Despite its large size and varied resources, regional 
specialization in surplus production of agricultural or 
industrial goods meant for large-scale internal or external 
export, so characteristic of the United States and Canada, 
is largely absent in India. For this reason sectionalism 
or "bloc" formation of the American or Canadian type has not 
been possible here. Most of the agricultural production is 
for the local or regional (state) use, and large-scale 
sectional (compact bloc of several states) specialization 
of primary production for export is very limited. Jute and 
tea are the two significant cash crops for export, but 
because both are experiencing severe strains in the inter­
national market, and because the Indian government being 
short of foreign exchange holds the interests of these 
exchange-earning commodities as a national concern, there 
has not developed any sectionalism on this issue. There is 
no doubt a considerable regional specialization in the cotton 
and sugar industries, but both these commodities are primarily 
for home consumption, and are so limited in their inter-state 
spread that they stand of little value in the rise of that 
log-rolling deal in the federal politics which is so 
characteristic of the United States or even of Canada. Thus, by 
virtue of the geographical pattern of the distribution of
It is interesting to note that despite linguistic 
ossification in different parts of the country, seldom did 
the political and other cultural boundaries in India coincide 
with the linguistic ones. This is evidenced by 
authropogeographic study of the geographical distribution 
of certain cultural elements in India. As Nirmal Kumar 
Bose writes: "When maps showing the distribution of
culture, languages or physical types are superimposed 
upon one another, they are not likely to correspond . . . .  
This implies that another kind of cultural affinity was 
slowly built up through migration and diffusion of culture 
than the kind we are accustomed to through the history of 
rise and fall of empires". (See Nirmal Kumar Bose,
Culture and Society in India [a collection of previously 
published papers etc.], Bombay: Asia Publishing House,
1967, p. 22.) Unfortunately, however, these elements 
of culture are no longer recognized as identifying factors 
among the people of the nation. Hence they are of little 
value in giving rise to the much needed overlapping 
cleavages that might antidote the divisive force of language.
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diversities in India, linguistic regionalism has been left
alone to play havoc with the national unity.
It is here that one begins to feel that the multilingual
states with boundaries drawn arbitrarily with a view to
administrative expediency of the British imperial government,
howsoever unsatisfactory for local aspirations, were, perhaps,
better from the viewpoint of overall unity and cohesion. Even
an ardent supporter of the linguistic states agrees that
the fear was legitimate that a state and its people would 
become more conscious of their distinctiveness if the 
state boundaries coincided with deepseated distinctions 
of language and culture. It would strengthen the state's 
resistance to a distant Central Government which would 
necessarily be compounded out of areas with different 
languages and cultures. Differences with neighbouring 
states whose personalities would be similarly accentuated, 
would acquire a sharper edge. A state like Assam, for 
example, can more evocatively say "Assam is being bled 
for Bengal" when Assam and Bengal are both linguistic 
States, each with undertones of being "a people", than 
it could if both were multilingual . . .36
However, having recognized the principle of linguistic
states for so long the central leadership could not go back
on its own promises, and the linguistic reorganization of
states could not be shelved unless its implications were made
clear and were accepted by the leaders supporting the
linguistic redistribution of states. All this did not seem
practicable at the time. It is also true that it has turned
out to be a wrong-headed myth that "anyone who demands
linguistic State for his language is somehow by that much
3 7lacking in loyalty to India". The regional loyalties
(linguistic and historical) "are [in fact] aspects of self-
image . . . which do not interfere with a nation's
3 8development", though they are, no doubt, a hindrance in
the progress of national integration.
In this connection it may be relevant to take a point 
about India's much confusing and much confused caste system.
It should be remembered that "the caste system is exceedingly
36
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complex and varies from one part of India to another".
By and large the linguistic boundary is the caste boundary,
and because the caste ties do not generally cross the
linguistic boundaries, Hinduism for all its unifying power
is vulnerable to the centrifugal forces within. "Loyalty
to caste" has not "inhibited the development of national
patriotism" as Spate thinks, for as the states are not
homogeneous from a caste point of view, caste does not
4 0accentuate state feeling of patriotism. Nor do "the
loyalties of caste cutting to some extent across provincial
boundaries . . . encourage . . . these groups to support
4 1wider federal union", as R. L. Watts believes. It is in
this sense that the geography of caste in India is unfortunate, 
for while imparting many evils in the nation's life, it is 
deprived of conferring one possible good that might have 
accrued from a cross-cutting nationwide cleavage that could 
be an antidote to the divisive force of language 
7. Alarmed by the need for resisting and containing the 
separatist forces let loose by the movement for linguistic 
states, and impressed by the need for fostering a temper 
of inter-state cooperation in the field of social and economic 
planning, the late Prime Minister Nehru felt that "the 
division of India into four, five or six major groups regardless 
of language" would be helpful in implementing the national 
schemes and plans and in developing "the habit of cooperative 
working" among the states. Thus five Zonal Councils were 
established by legislation of the Parliament in 1956.
Established with the objective of "emotional integration", 
the Zonal Councils were expected as a "corrective to over­
emphasis upon sectional and linguistic loyalties, an effort 
to establish values transcending language and religion, a
39
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197
forum for fruitful cooperation . . By creating a middle
tier of authority halfway between the centre and the states
the Councils could prove "a most useful device in the develop-
4 3ment of cooperative federalism", for under their aegis multi­
state utilities would have grown and helped the states' 
development to become zonal in scope. Close cooperation in 
matters of river-basin development, power, and inter-state 
transport and police might have given rise to some kind of 
a salubrious sectionalism over-riding linguistic loyalties.
But, though a mechanism of great promise, "the Councils
4 4[virtually] died of neglect in their childhood." As some
recent studies show, though there have been some positive
gains in matters of power development, formation of common
reserve police force, and man-power planning, in other
directions, more particularly on financial issues, the Councils
have failed to achieve unity. They have not succeeded
in evolving coordinated and integrated lines of action over
a large field. But, as Ashok Chanda says, the failure of
the Zonal Councils system "is a failure of leadership and
not of the concept". Indeed,
If the Councils develop, in the fullness of time, 
into effective organs of zonal administration . 
they should arrest the growth of linguism and 
"provincialism", accelerate economic growth and 
social progress and better fulfill the purpose 
for which federations exist.45
8. India has so far been the most stable federal democracy 
among the post-colonial "new" States. This is no mean 
achievement in view of the country's multifarious diversities 
--linguistic, historical, religious and others. Hardly ever 
in the past was the federal polity required to cope with such a
42
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tremendous range of heterogeneity except possibly in the Soviet 
Union which, as already noted, because of its one-party 
government does not qualify for the title of federalism as 
it is understood by modern scholarship in the non-communist 
world. Unlike the classical federations, India was not 
growing in a "new" land with wide open spaces waiting for 
exploitation, where every disgruntled element in society, 
individuals and groups, could find a place leaving the bulk 
of society at peace. Unlike the United States, it had no 
frontiers of settlement under the federal control whe re every 
state, every region of the Union, could expect a pay-off 
and thus be attracted to attach its strongest loyalties to 
the federal Government.
What was it, then, that helped India to steer through
these seemingly impossible conditions? On a closer examination
three factors stand out prominently. The first is what has
been termed the "Fundamental Unity of India", preserved in
the cultural realm of Hinduism, its sacred religious texts,
and its Holy Rivers and the Holy Tirthas spread through the
four corners of the country and thereby joining it into 
4 6a living whole. Every linguistic group, however extremist,
while it thinks that its language is superior to all others
and that its state belongs to its own fellow linguists and
no others, still thinks that India as such belongs to it
and it to India. In this regionalism there is little of
separatism. As a recent political commentator writes, the
great distances involved between the component units of the
4 7State do create some differences in attitude
But all that distance does is to reduce rigidities . . . .
[it] no longer breeds indifference to the territorial 
integrity of the country as a whole. No party could 
hope to win votes in Bombay if it works for separation 
of parts of Assam from India; even more is this true 
about Kashmir.
The second important factor was the charismatic 
leadership especially of Gandhi and Nehru, though it was not 
charisma alone. The people's faith in the leadership was 
based on the extreme devotion and self-sacrifice that the
46
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leadership had shown in the protracted struggle for freedom.
So when the hour of freedom arrived there was no scramble 
for power as in some other "new" nations. It only involved 
a change of portfolios from the struggle for national 
freedom to the struggle for national reconstruction.^8
Lastly, though the federal government in India lacked 
the resources of a Great West or the "last best West" that 
could automatically attract the loyalties of the constituents 
to it, yet soon after independence the national government 
under the leadership of Nehru took steps to fight the nation's 
poverty and backwardness by embarking upon certain broad- 
based programmes of national planning and took in hand 
some great river valley projects and public sector industries 
which in effect helped to create a sort of new frontier, 
or what Nehru called the new Shrines (Tirthas) where workers 
coming from different parts of the country joined hands 
together and shared in the common experience of building 
the new nation. This helped to bring about a measure of 
mobility in the nation's population--something that the 
American frontier had done on a far larger scale. The pro­
grammes helped to bind the people's loyalties to the centre.
It is, perhaps, in this respect that India's federal stability 
would offer some object lessons for some present and future 
experiments in post-colonial federalism.
2. MALAYSIA
As contrasted to the normal "territorial federations" 
Malaysia has been styled a "racial federation".  ^ The chief 
identifying diversities in the national life of Malaysia
48
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are not territorially grouped: The Chinese and the Malay
elements in the population are present in almost equal
proportions in a number of states while the "Indian"
community stands only as a balancing force between the two.
Thus, unlike the French community in Quebec, the Chinese or
the "Indian" communities in Malaysia cannot claim autonomous
"homelands". Therefore, a kind of federal compromise, in a
social sense, is required not only at the national level
but also in a number of the states. In fact, so far as Malaya
proper is concerned, a federal form of government was adopted
not because of but in spite of "racial" diversity, though
it must be pointed out that the pattern of areal predominance
of the communities in the country has created a politico-
geographic situation that favours a federal rather than
2a unitary organization of State.
The distribution of ethnic elements in the population of 
Malaya proper is such that while in the western states of 
the peninsula the Chinese community stands in sizable 
majority, in the eastern states the immigrant communities 
account for very small share of the state populations.
Since the indigenous Malay community has throughout been 
very apprehensive of economic competition from the better 
skilled and harder working Chinese, the areal predominance 
of the Chinese in the west and their relatively smaller 
numbers in the east created in the eastern Malay states 
an urge for regional autonomy to safeguard their states 
from the stiff competition that the Chinese had already 
posed in the West. While in a unitary set-up the whole 
of the country would have become equally open to economic 
competition from the Chinese, in a federal set-up, with 
the regional affairs remaining under the control of the 
region governments, the rights and privileges of the Malay 
community could well be preserved.
Many political scientists have completely missed this 
vital background to the support for federalism against 
unitarism in Malaya. Carnell thought that Malayan 
federalism "was the outcome of the British system of 
ruling through the Sultans of protected Malay states and 
a response to the problems posed by the survival of Malay 
monarchies" (Carnell, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 58),
While alluding to similar causes for the sentiment for 
regional autonomy in Malaya, B. Simandjuntak thinks that 
"By this time [i. e., the inauguration of the Federation]
the strength of Malay regionalism received a serious 
setback . . . [and] Sino-Malay communalism . . . displaced
regionalism"--possibly implying irrelevance of the federal 
solution to Malaya's communal situation (B. Simandjuntak, 
Malayan Federalism 1945-1963: A Study of Federal Problems
in a Plural Society, London: Oxford University Press, 1969,
pp. 297-98).
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MALAYSIA'S MARCH TOWARDS FEDERALISM
All through her history Malaysia has been a cultural
marchland: first between the great Chinese and Indian
cultures, and later with the rise of powerful kingdoms in
Sumatra and Java, between them and Siam (Thailand). The
marchland character of the area continued well after the
penetration of European powers, and it came to an end only
when the Dutch and British interests on the one hand, and
the British and Siamese interests, on the other, were slowly
defined. Only in 1909 did Siam renounce her suzerainty over
the territories forming the present-day states of Kedah,
Kelantan, Perlis, and Trengganu in favour of Britain. Thus,
in fact, the evolution of the present-day political geography
of Malaya begins only with the establishment of British rule
in the peninsula; in so far as Malaysia is concerned, the
"region [as a unit] . . . derives its significance from a
contemporary creation", and political historians are faced
3with the task of "giving [the area] a historical unity", 
for throughout British rule the Borneo territories had formed 
quite separate entities with very little intercommunication 
with the peninsula proper.
Portugal had captured Malacca in 1511. It passed to the 
Dutch in 1541. The entry of Britain in the area dates back 
to 1786 when she established a base in Penang to which the 
adjoining tract of Province Wellesly was later added. Britain 
had occupied the Dutch territories during the Napoleonic wars 
as custodian against the French, but with a view to naval 
and commercial strategy she retained control over Malacca 
after 1815, and also obtained Singapore from the Sultan of 
Johore in 1819. As a result of an agreement in 1824 the 
Dutch withdrew from the peninsula completely.
In 1826 the three separate possessions of Penang, Malacca, 
and Singapore were joined to form the Straits Settlements 
with Singapore as its capital. Outside the Straits Settlements 
the Malay sultans ruled their own territories without any 
interference from the British. However, by the end of the
D. K. Basset, "The Historical Background, 1500-1815" in
Wang Gungwu (Ed.) , Malaysia: A Survey, Melbourne: F. W.
Cheshire, 1964, p. 113.
3
202
third quarter of the nineteenth century, prompted by the 
economic considerations of tin and rubber and the military 
considerations of forestalling other external powers with 
interest in the area, Britain reversed its policy of non­
intervention in Malayan affairs. Internal tensions in 
Selangor and intense rivalry for succession in Perak offered 
the Straits authorities in 1873 the sought-for occasion to 
intervene» By April 1874 agreements were reached for the 
appointment of British Residents in each of the states of 
Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong. The British influence soon 
began to spread in the surrounding areas, and in 1895 the 
nine small states in the neighbourhood of Sungei Ujong were 
joined together to form the state of Negri Sembilan under 
the supervision of a British Resident. Johore, though it 
did not receive an official Resident, had through the prudence 
of its ruler, maintained a close contact with the British 
rulers in Singapore; by a treaty in 1885 it definitely agreed 
to British protection. Pahang, so long neglected because 
of its lack of minerals and plantations and its distance 
from the important trade routes, was brought under the British 
influence, and in 1888 it also accepted a British Resident.
Though the Residential system succeeded in establishing 
law and order in the peninsula, and a centralized system of 
revenue collection; for all other matters each state remained 
a distinct unit, for hardly any attempts were made at 
interstate cooperation. The attention of the officials was 
soon drawn to this defect, however, and the four states with 
Residents were made to agree to a federation which was named 
The Federated Malay States, and was inaugurated in 1896.
This proved the first step in the direction of a peninsular 
federation.
Under the new scheme the states were required to submit 
to some uniformity in matters of common interest. With this 
view a Resident-General was appointed and the main departments 
of administration were placed under federal heads of departments. 
A unified civil service and police force, a federal education 
policy, a standard postal system, and a common code of land 
regulations were established. These greatly helped in the 
integration of the states. Indeed, though "the intention 
was to establish a federation, the result was in fact a union"
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and as time passed the political power of the Sultans became
4almost nonexistent.
In 1909 the states of Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and 
Trengganu also accepted British Residents, but as they lay 
at the fringes of economic activity in Malaya little attempt 
was made at coordination either among these states themselves 
or between them and the Federated Malay States. Thus being 
cut off from the main currents of life in Malaya, and 
remaining largely confined to themselves, these states devel­
oped their own regional identities separate from the rest of 
the peninsula.
James Brook, a private citizen, had acquired the first 
British interest in North Borneo in 1842 when he was installed 
as Rajah of Sarawak. Soon after in 1847 the kingdom of Brunei 
entered into a commercial treaty with Britain, while the off­
shore island of Labuan had become a British dependency in 1846. 
The territory of Sabah was ceded to Britain by an American 
company in 1881. It remained under the rule of a newly chart­
ered British North Borneo Company until the Japanese occupation 
in 1941. A British Protectorate had been imposed over the 
two British territories and the kingdom of Brunei in 1888.
This completed the pattern of British power over North 
Borneo. [See Fig. 6.4]
As the above summary would show, ever since the 
inauguration of the Federated Malay States the administrative 
pattern of the present-day Malaysia (including Brunei) con­
sisted of three separate administrations in North Borneo, five 
in the unfederated Malay states and Johore, a coordinated 
administration in the four Federated States, and three fairly 
separated Straits Settlements governed uniformly from 
Singapore as a single colony. This diversity of administrat­
ions had fostered a sense of separation, and so a proposal in 
1931 to unite all these regions into a loose Pan-Malayan Union 
provoked great resentment and the idea had to be dropped.
It was under this administrative-political situation that the 
Second World War broke out and the area fell under the 
Japanese occupation. The Japanese returned the four northern
N. J. Ryan, The Making of Modern Malaya: A History from the
earliest times to the Present, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1963, p p . 135-36.
4
E
O
1 cn JH
TP C UH •
<D •• 0 PP
Pm 0) - H > 1 <d
G 4P rH PP
TP 0 fd £ fd
G * H U P cn
fd 4P 4P 0
fd cn 4 h TP
G - H - H G
0 4 J G G fd
•H CD • H G
g - H 6
D G TP TP fd
■H rd CD 5
CD E G id
PP TP a) ^H u
-P td 4P CD td
fd > cn
r-H cd V4 O
rH 4P fd Cn G
•H td a •r4
+ J u d) cn
fd 0 ) 4P cn
TP a G G
c CD d) CD 0
fd cn > £ • H
- H d> a
<d 4 4 rH fd
cn G 4P u
m • H *■ 4P a
cn G W d) cn
i—i CD cn •H
0 4P G
C 4P fd cn •H
H G 4P 4P £
■H cn • H TP
<d fd
• 2) > i u
cn d) fd 4P CD
m TP i-H cn a
cn •H fd fd
r—I > a CD u
• H pp <d
2 rÜ TP 4P a
H d) CD
Cfl 4P cn
2 fd fd CD
2 2 p u o
M d) 0
Eh TP 4P a
Eh 0) d) 0
< u a l"3 <D •
CM 0 pp CO
a <u TP a UP
GJ fd 4P G cn
< Cn 4P fd TP a
U G c
H •H G cn fd »•
Eh cn • H CD u
H 4P >■ CD
Cn G fd > i pp
O G O 4P G cn
CU • H • H cn 0 • H
TP 4P rH Ph
w G fd 0
2 i—1 u fd o •
Eh ü 4P i—i <
G cn fd CD
•H • H a rH •
• • G Cn u
<c - H TP G
H fd E CD - H £
cn •H TP 4P cn 0
>H W fd fd Sh
< > i u fd a
a fd TP CD
< i—i CD TP cn TP
a fd 4P d) fd CD
S (d a a
G G CD a
—. •rH G >H td
• G TP 0 TP
UP 0 Sh CD a fd
- H 0 pp fd
• 4P 0 4P Cn a
cn fd u G fd
•H Vh G -H a
2 <d < • H cn
204
states back to Siam and also fanned the feeling of communal 
hatred between the Chinese and the Malay communities. The 
cultural links between the two communities had always been 
slight, and as the result of the War their identities were 
only further hardened and their differences sharpened. In 
fact, they formed two distinct nations in the bosom of one 
State.
After the Japanese surrender the four northern states 
were returned to Malaya, and with a view to speedy recovery 
a union of all the Malayan territories, except Singapore, 
was created in 1946. The difficulties in creating a 
unitary polity in an area which had so long enjoyed seven 
separate administrations were obvious, and in view of the 
great opposition from the local population the Union was 
abrogated and the Federation of Malaya declared in 1948, 
comprising the eleven peninsular units. The country obtained 
a new Constitution and complete independence in 1957.
The reason why Singapore had so far been left out of 
any scheme of all-Malayan union was the Malay fear that 
inclusion of Singapore with its large Chinese population 
would make the Chinese elements dominant in the population. 
But as time passed and communist forces around Malaya 
increased in strength, it dawned upon the Malayan leaders 
that the country's interests would be better served by 
absorbing Singapore (despite the difficulty of "racial" 
balance) than letting her slide into the communist camp. 
Dictates of political arithmetic now showed that a greater 
Malaysia including the Borneo territories with their small 
Chinese and larger "Malaysian" population would provide a 
counterweight against the increased Chinese strength 
consequent upon the inclusion of Singapore. Because of the 
economic advantages that the union with the mainland would 
offer, Singapore was obviously quite willing. The indigenous 
population of the Borneo territories has few affinities with 
those of the mainland, and some opposition to union was 
encountered in Sarawak, but the fear of incorporation into 
the entirely alien Indonesia, and hope of economic benefits 
in association with the more prosperous peninsular states, 
finally brought overwhelming support for federation. The 
Sultan of the oil-rich Brunei, however, found little economic
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incentive and, therefore, decided not to join.
The Federation of Malaysia was inaugurated on September 
16, 1963. But soon the political arithmetic failed and
"racial" tensions between the Chinese and Malay communities 
began to mount, leading to the expulsion of Singapore from 
the Federation in August 1965.
The Federal Structure of Malaysia 
5As Sawer puts it, Malaysia
is farther along the federal spectrum in the centralizing 
direction than India, but the special position accorded 
the Borneo States may be regarded as at least creating 
a "weak" federal relationship between them on the one 
hand--"East Malaysia"--and the peninsula States--"West 
Malaysia"--on the other.
Like most other federations Malaysia also has a two-House 
central legislature. The upper House has equal representation 
from each state, but here members nominated by the central 
government outnumber the elected ones. This greatly weakens 
the effectiveness of the House as a states' House. The 
Constitution also provides for a Conference of Rulers which 
consists of princely hereditary heads of the nine states 
which have such an institution, and the governors (who are 
appointed by the central government) of the other four states. 
The Council elects from its members an executive Head of the 
Federation (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) for a four-year term, and 
can remove him if found unfit. The Council also has a veto 
on some constitutional amendments and laws affecting the 
position and authority of the princely rulers, as well as 
legislations affecting the boundary of the states. Though 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is very much a constitutional 
monarch, he is authorized to have "some independent 
discretions which work in the same direction--to protect 
the cultural autonomy and traditional values of the Malays 
which have become particularly identified with the Regions". 
Thus the Council has rightly been called "for some purposes
For a detailed commentary on the Constitution of Malaysia 
reference should be made to H. E. Groves and L. A. Sheridan, 
The Constitution of Malaysia, New York: Oceana Publications, 
1967. A brief, but competent, analysis is presented in 
G. Sawer, Modern Federalism, London: C. A. Watts & Co. ,
1969, p p . 50-53 . This summary leans heavily on Sawer, and
the quotations in this paragraph are from his above mentioned 
book .
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a third legislative House".
The division of powers in Malaysia is on a three-list 
system: exclusive central powers, exclusive state powers,
and concurrent powers. Though the residuary powers are 
given to the states, the powers given to the centre are so 
far-reaching that all that is left to the regions are largely 
the powers over Muslim religious matters, matters of land 
tenure, agriculture and forestry, and local government. Even 
in matters of land and local government, the centre has an 
extensive power to procure uniformity of law and policy. Then 
there are the Emergency Powers, beyond the reach of judicial 
review, which enable the central government to act without 
regard to the federal distribution of competence. The 
states have very slight independent sources of revenue, and 
can borrow only with the consent of the central government or 
its Central Bank. The superior Courts are wholly centre- 
controlled, culminating within Malaya in a tribunal called 
the Federal Court which has some original jurisdiction 
(mainly constitutional) and is the appellate Court on all 
matters.
But because of the different history of their entry 
into the Federation, the Borneo states have been given a 
slightly greater degree of protected autonomy. The central 
government's power to intervene in matters of land tenure, 
agriculture and forestry, and local government, does not 
apply there, and the constitutional amendments affecting the 
special privileges of the Borneo states require the consent 
of their Governors.
Although there is no constitutional guarantee of the 
common market between the states, the states, however, lack 
powers which might obstruct freedom of trade.
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE RISE OF 
MALAYSIAN FEDERALISM
Factors for Regional Identities
While the cultural counter pulls inherent in its marchland 
character prevented the rise of an integrated Malayan identity 
in the past, the peninsula had sufficient geographic 
compartmentalization to give rise to diverse social groups 
with strong regional identities. The alignment of the Main
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Range provided a major obstacle to east-west movement, and
the lower but complex ranges in upper Kelantan, inland
Trengganu and Pahang with their thick forest cover repelled
human occupance for a long time. . . the peripheral
distribution of the better agricultural soils was a further
factor tending to foster localism, for settlement has most
consistently concentrated in a few relatively favoured
lowland areas, widely scattered around the edges of the
peninsula as a whole".  ^ Then, because the highly eroded
pre-P1eistoeene landscape "protrudes through its surrounding
aprons of alluvials in the same way as islands stand above 
7a shallow sea", these forest-clad protrusions helped to keep 
the settlements on the littorals fairly isolated from one 
another. The widespread occurrence of jungles impeded movement 
any distance inland. The physical geography of the peninsula, 
therefore, created almost two distinct Malayas--one in the 
west and the other in the east. The differing identities of 
the east and west coast were further reinforced by the ease 
of maritime access in the west and the great difficulty in 
navigation along the eastern coast. While the western coast 
traditionally remained the "front door", the east has been 
in Sir Hugh Clifford's telling phrase, "the further side of 
silence".^
Upon this east-west cleavage was established a north- 
south one because the four northern states that had remained- 
under Siamese suzerainty till 1909 were, even after their 
incorporation in the British territory, not integrated with 
the rest of Malaya until the formation of the Malayan Union 
in 1946. The geographic cleavage between the east and west 
was further reinforced by the pattern of Britain's economic 
and strategic interests. Because of her paramount concern 
with the control of the Indian Ocean and the navigation 
between India and the Far East, Singapore and the western 
seaboard of Malaya remained the area of Britain's primary
6
C. A. Fisher, South-east Asia, London: Methuen & Co. , 1964,
p. 589.
7
R. Ho, "The Environment", in Wang Gungwu, op. cit., footnote 
3 , p . 3 5.
8
Cited in Fisher, op. cit., footnote 6, p. 589.
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interest. Thus the eastern areas and the northern states 
remained comparatively neglected.
Malayan economy has been rightly considered as the product 
of two autonomous economic systems interacting over time. The 
first is the indigenous system which is Malay, agrarian, 
subsistence, non-commercial, wet-rice oriented and village 
organized. The other is the predominantly foreign and commer­
cial economic system dominated by the non-Malay population, 
especially the Chinese, and closely linked with the world 
market and outside capital. Tin and rubber have been the two
pillars of the latter system. Tin mining has spread rapidly
Tthrough the three western states of Perak, Selango^, and Negri
Sembilan. The growing importance of tin in world commerce
by the middle of the nineteenth century gave great impetus
to the development of roads and railways on the western coast
of the peninsula. And the geographical patterns established
by tin conditioned those of rubber. Because rubber could
thrive on most of Malay's lateritic soils advantage was
taken of the road and railway facilities already established
by tin. Thus rubber plantations became heavily concentrated 
9in the west. Though, later on, other areas also came to 
possess rubber plantations, the west coast remained by far 
the main area of concentration.
As both rubber and tin industries were, in the main, 
run by immigrant labour— Chinese and Indian— this economic 
plurality between the two sides of Malaya gave rise to an 
ethnic plurality as well--one superimposed over the other.
Thus the eastern and the western states of Malaya became, 
in some ways, two different worlds. And distinct from 
either were the separately administered unfederated Malay 
states which were highly different from the other two 
components in their ethnic composition and outlook.
Outside the western coastal areas there were few roads 
and railways connecting the different regions in general and 
the eastern and western regions in particular, while the 
Borneo territories seemed to lie a world apart. In fact,
From the dawn of history until the campaigns of 1941-2
E. G. H. Dobby, "Some Aspects of Human Ecology of South 
East Asia", Geographical Journal, Vol. 108 , 1948 , p p . 40-54 ,
reference on p. 48.
9
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Malaya has repeatedly suffered from the weakness of 
nodality unsupported by commensurate internal strength,
. . . the problems to which the country is .
subjected by virtue of its geographical position are 
very real. -*-0
Because of its divided administration, the different regions 
of Malaya developed in course of time their separate identities, 
which in effect made a federal political organization of the 
State almost inevitable.
Factors for Peninsular Unity
Despite a certain amount of geographical compartmentaliz- 
ation of the peninsula, "Malaya would appear" says Fisher,
"to be an almost perfect example of the hypothetical 'geogra­
phical region1",^  though unlike India this consciousness 
of the geographical unity of the land was seldom present in 
the popular mind.
However, since the close of the nineteenth century 
certain factors--political, economic, and strategic--were 
tending to pull the British territories together. The British 
impact on these territories had imparted them a broadly 
similar political culture. Their patterns of education, social 
services, and judicial administration etc., though not unified, 
were broadly similar. While in the north the linguistic- 
religious complex sharply differed from that of Siam, in the 
south also the sharp contrast between the British administrat­
ive system and that of the Dutch in Indonesia, helped to shear 
off any historical and cultural affinities that the Malayan 
territories had possessed with those of Indonesia. This, along 
with the fact that each of the British territories in the 
area was too small to form a viable political unit by itself, 
helped to develop in them a sense of common destiny. Further, 
because the racial-cultural cleavage between the Malay and 
the immigrant communities cut across state boundaries, the 
"racial" conflict did not bring in a divisive element in the 
political organization of the State.
10
Fisher, op. cit., footnote 6, p. 590.
C. A. Fisher, "The Problems of Malayan Unity in its 
Geographical Setting", in R. W. Steel and C. A. Fisher (Eds.), 
Geographical Essays on British Tropical Lands, London :
George Philip & Sons, 1956, p. 271.
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The post-1945 emergency, consequent upon the Chinese 
communist terrorist activities that threatened to make 
Malaya a Chinese-dominated country, helped greatly in the 
rise of a strong sense of belonging together in the Malay 
people by giving them a sense of common destiny in face of 
a common danger. The federation of the peninsular states 
was, in this sense, a natural growth. The rapid expansion 
of rubber plantations in the decade preceding the Second 
War tended to tie the eastern and the western coastal areas 
of the country into a single economic system. Expansion of 
the railway line from Johore Bahru, opposite the island of 
Singapore, to Gemas in Pahang and later to Kelantan, brought 
the two sides of the peninsula closer.
While the geography of "race" had excluded Singapore from
the federation in 1948, the Borneo territories were
geographically and economically greatly removed from the rest
of the British territory, so much so that Arnold and Reid,
who in 1912 pleaded for a closer coordination between all
the British Malayan states and settlements on the ground
that "The water-tight compartment system may be good for a
12ship, but it is bad for a colony", made no reference to 
them. But when the British departure from the area became 
imminent, these territories, except the oil-rich Brunei, 
found themselves too weak to stand on their own. Only two 
courses seemed open to them--a union with Malaya or absorption 
with Indonesia. Of the two alternatives the former appeared 
preferable —  first because they seemed to possess a politico- 
cultural affinity with the peninsular State born out of their 
similar colonial experiences, and secondly, the Malaysian 
Federation rather than the Indonesian Republic offered them 
the better prospects for political and economic stability, 
and for the preservation of their regional identities 
developed over a long period of time.
Indeed, no matter how anomalous the established political 
boundaries are "provided only that they have time in which 
to stabilize, they tend to become accepted frameworks within 
which political attitudes and economic interests crystallize
A. Wright and T. H. Reid, The Malayan Peninsula, London:
1912, p. 349; cited in Fisher, op. cit., footnote 13, p. 102.
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to produce a condition of politico-geographical ossification" 
Thus, when circumstances, both internal and external, made a 
close union of some kind necessary, a federal union in Malaya 
(and more so in Malaysia) became imperative, for the legacies 
of the politico-geographical forces could not be completely 
written off.
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC INFERENCES
1. As in many other federations, military threat has been 
a potent factor in the rise and maintenance of Malaysia as 
a federal State. Although sponsored by the colonial masters, 
the Federation of all the Malayan territories in 1948 may be 
seen as a clear response to a military threat. With the 
independence of Malaya and the imminent British departure 
from the area, a situation typically suited to the rise of 
federalism had come into existence. After the British 
withdrawal the different political units of British Malaya 
would now have formed isolated political units of weak 
power potential that seemed to be surrounded by hostile 
political forces on almost all sides. It was therefore 
natural that the federal arrangement should be continued after 
1957. Similar forces, along with the fear of Indonesia 
under Sukarno, helped to bring the remote Sabah and Sarawak 
into the union with Malaya. This factor had also helped 
to overcome, though only temporarily, the Malayan distaste 
for the Chinese-dominated Singapore which was then accepted 
as a partner in the Federation.
External military threat would seem also to have proved 
a favourable force in the maintenance of the Federation. 
Despite the explosive situation in respect of "race" and 
culture, it was, to some extent, because of the continued 
military pressure from without that the Federation was able 
to achieve progressive centralization and stability.
Similarly, the Indonesian "confrontation" of Malaysia, with 
an eye on Sabah and Sarawak, rather than splitting these 
territories off from the Federation only helped to strengthen
C. A. Fisher, "Malaysia: A Study in Political Geography of
Decolonization", in C. A. Fisher (Ed.), Essays in Political
Geography, London: Methuen & Co., 1968, p. 104.
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their allegiance further to the central government.
It must, however, be pointed out that while security
concerns were the prime force in the Malayan move towards
Malaysia, in the case of the Borneo territories economic
motives were equally, if not more, significant: the new land
policy of the Malayan government is reported to have had
great attractions for the predominantly rural population of
these territories. The economic considerations were, indeed,
the primary factor behind the overwhelming support for the
Federation proposal in the September 1961 referendum in Sabah
and Sarawak. On the part of Singapore, any military threats
to her existence were secondary to the economic considerations
15which reigned supreme in the mind of its leaders.
2. My hypothesis that the existence of cleavages cutting 
across state boundaries is a favourable factor in the 
maintenance of federal ties finds a somewhat atypical support 
in the case of Malaysia, particularly Malaya. From the view­
point of plurality of Malaya's population federalism was 
not the only possible method of government,^ though, as already 
noted, the regional predominance of the Chinese community in
the western states did, indeed, provide some basis for
1 7federalism as against unitarism. As the map [Fig. 6.5] of
the communal composition of Malaya's population shows, the 
immigrant communities, especially the Chinese, though in a siz­
able majority (but except for Penang not in absolute majority)
14
The role of external military threat in Malaysian federalism 
has been somewhat overstressed by Simandjuntak, op. cit., 
footnote 2, p p . 299-300.
15
The predominantly economic motives for Singapore's entry in 
the Federation were exposed by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in 
a series of twelve broadcasts to the nation during the 
campaign for federation. A good summary of the contents of 
the twelve lectures is to be found in V. Purcell, Malaysia, 
London: Thomas and Hudson, 1965, p p . 189-90.
16
See T. E. Smith, A Background to Malaysia, London: Royal
Society of International Affairs, 1963, p. 4.
17
As Watts puts it: "The regional differences in stages of
economic development, in cultural tradition, in history, and 
in communal proportions, gave a real basis for federal 
government and for the continuance of the various state 
governments which were manifestations of these variations".
R. L. Watts, New Federations: Experiments in The Common-
wea1th, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966, p. 68.
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in certain states (i. e . , Penang, Perak, and Selangor where 
they account for over 44% of the total population) are 
non et hel ess present as s ign ificant minorities in other s t a t e s ; 
while in Negri Sembilan, Malacca, and Johore both the leading 
commu nities are present in near-equal p r o p o r t i o n s - - e a c h  
accou nti ng for over 40 percent of the state populations.
(In Perak the percentage share in the popu lation is Chinese 
44.2, Mal aysians 39.7.) Under these conditions ne i t h e r  
of the leading communities is in a position to think of b r e a k ­
ing up the union. The two may harbour diamet r i c a l l y  opposite 
polici es and ideologies, but in the interests of their own 
collective communities they cannot follow a policy of disruption  
of the Union which would leave a large number of their 
br et hr en  to the other side of the fence as it were. It would, 
in fact appear that it is the geographical d i s t ribution of 
the communal elements in the population that has saved the 
Fe de ra ti on of M a l a y s i a  (especially M a l a y a ) , because in view 
of the fact that communal cleavages in the country are almost 
wate r-t ight, it is easily u n d e r standable that had the c o m m u n i ­
ties oc cu p i e d  clearly defined areas of o c c u p a n c e — one separate 
from the ot her--a union of any strength could hardly have 
been born, for the two communities in Malaysia are far more 
anta go ni stic than are the French- and E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g  
co mmu nit ies in Canada.
As for communal tensions, it may be expected that in
course of time trade unions and the like organ i z a t i o n s  and
po lit ica l parties as well as other forces based on economic
and secu lar c o n s i d e r a t i o n s - - a n d  not on communal co n s i d e r a t i o n s
alone as is largely the case at pr e s e n t - - w o u l d  be born.
When  this happens, it would create communally c r o s s - c u t t i n g
and int er locking cleavages that would form an antidote to the
divisiv e force of cultural and "racial" differences. At
present, however, "in Ma laya ideological lines of cleavage
18are not entirely separate from communal ones".
3. The greatest p r o b l e m  of Malaysian federalism is that 
the absence of any common national symbols of h i s t o r i c a l
R. S. Milne, "Politics and Government", in Wang Gungwu, 
op. cit., footnote 3, p. 330. See also R. S. Milne, 
Gove rn ment and Po litics in M a l a y s i a , Boston: Ho ughton
Mif flin C o ., 1967.
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significance, the lack of any memories of having done great
things together in the past, has impeded the growth of a
significant State-idea to which all the communities in the
country could be inescapably attached. In fact, a well-defined
State-idea for Malaysia is scarcely existent even though all the
communities recognize a common State-areac This results largely
from the fact that the historical memories of the sufferings
and rejoicings of the Malay and the non-Malay populations are
dissimilar, and in some ways, even contrasting. This has led
to a situation in which Malaysia's essential problem remains
"to discover potent Malayan symbols conducive to national
19unity which are not exclusively Malay". In this respect
the formation of greater Malaysia has only complicated the 
picture for only about a sixth of the population of Sabah, and 
a minute portion of Sarawak is Malay, though if the term "Malay" 
is used to mean all those who are either indigenous to the 
peninsula or the islands, and profess Islam, then 38 percent 
in Sabah and 23 percent in Sarawak would be Malay. In both 
these territories the Chinese have about a quarter of the total 
population. The remainder belong to various tribal groups.
4. Despite all the separatist forces within the nation, 
however, Malaya and Malaysia carried on as a reasonably stable 
and efficient democratic federation until the recent racial 
riots rocked the nation. As already noted, for any federation 
to be stable it is necessary that the national government 
is able to command the loyalties of the majority of people 
in all sections of the nation. Devoid of any rich frontiers 
of settlement (as in the United States), Malaysia, like India, 
dealt with this task through wise formulation and execution 
of national development programmes that benefited majorities 
in all sections of the society. The government of Malaya's 
decision to extend the rural development programme to the 
"new villages" largely settled by Chinese, had helped to win 
the loyalties of large sections of that community. Similarly, 
as the Cobbald Commission pointed out, the population of 
Sabah and Sarawak had great interest in Malaya's rural
R. S. Milne, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 331. Also see 
R. S. Milne, "'National Ideology' and Nation-building in 
Malaysia", Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 7, July 1970 , p p . 63-67 .
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development programme and the prosperity that Malaya was 
enjoying by virtue of its efficient government and wise 
planning, was a decisive factor in their option for union 
with Malaya. In this respect the lessons of India as well 
as Malaysia for new experiments in federalism are almost 
simi1ar.
Table 6.1
COMMUNAL COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF MALAYSIAN STATES
(Figures for West Malaysia and Singapore for 1957, 
for East Malaysia and Brunei for 1960)
State
Joho re 
Kedah 
Ke 1 an tan 
Maiac ca
Negri Sembilan
Pahang
Penang
Perak
P e r 1 i s
Selangor
Trengganu
S ab ah
Sarawak
Brunei 
Sin gapo re
—  Percentage —  
share of 
Malaysians*
48.0
67.7
91.6
49.1 
41.5
57.2
28.8
39.7 
78.4
28.8
92.1 --
67.0
68.0
71.0
14.0
Percentage -- 
share of 
Chinese
42.4
20.5 
5.7
41.5
41.2
34.6
57.2
44.2 
17.4
48.2 
6.6
23.0
31.0
26.0 
76.0
Percentage 
share of 
" Indians"**
7 .7
9 .7 
1 .2 
8.1
15.1
7 .0
12.2 
14.9
1 .8 
20.1
1 .1 
1 .0
2.0 
8.0
Source: Figures for West Malaysia from the 19 5 7_Population
Census of the Federation of Malaya, Report No. 14 by H. A. 
Fell, Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics, Federation
of Malaya, 1960, Table 1.5, on p.4; and for East Malaysia, 
Brunei, and Singapore from C „ A. Fisher, "Malaysia: A Study
in the Political Geography of Decolonization" in Fisher (Ed.), 
Essays in Political Geography, London: Methuen & C o . , 1968,
Table 7.2, on p. 122.
* Refers to ethnic Malaysians, i. e., Malays and Borneo 
indigenes.
** Refers to immigrants from the Indian subcontinent.
J. /S'7° I Vt «M.
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Chapter VII
FEDERALISM IN POST-1945 EUROPF
1* WEST GERMANY
Although right from the eighteenth century there has 
been a great deal of theoretical discussion on federalism in 
ermany,^in practice federalism as it is understood in the 
non-Communist world today hardly ever existed in the country
t,iJJ the— vi rta-ri nns ftllift-s— vii fujl-ry "rtrirucrsed11— 4-fc— im—
The real political history of Germany begins with the 
establishment of the Holy Roman Empire on Christmas Day,
800 A. D. when Pope Leo III placed the imperial crown on 
the head of the Frankish chief Charlemange (who had by then 
expanded his domain from France and the Lower Countries in 
the west to the Elbe in the east) and saluted him as Augustus, 
the old title of the Roman Emperors. This was an effort to 
revive the old Empire, and on this day began the long and 
fateful connection between the German political ruler and 
the head of the Roman Church.
When the German branch of the imperial family died out 
in 911, an electoral as against the former hereditary system 
of the German kingship was established. Now the Crown began 
to change hands between the leading German houses and, except 
when it was (rarely) held by strong personalities, the 
Emperor was little more than a figurehead. The Empire was, 
for all practical purposes, only a clumsy confederal alliance 
which did little more than elect the Emperor (or confirm 
dynastic arrangements) and occasionally settle disputes. In 
fact any really strong organization over this area was 
inhibited by backwardness of transport and the lack of any 
historical tradition of unity. A further factor hindering 
the growth of a united Germany was the division brought 
about by the religious wars that broke out in 1618, and 
lasted for thirty years, in which the Catholic and Protestant 
princes fought to prevent the Empire from becoming a governing
THE RISE OF GERMAN FEDERALISM
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reality."*- Ever since, the identities of the southern states, 
especially Bavaria, were greatly heightened, for now their 
Catholic bastions had to be guarded against Protestantism,
Even as early as the thirteenth century regional dynastic 
particularism had advanced so far that the Emperor could 
look for support only to his own feudal territories. When 
Napoleon amalgamated a number of German states and announced 
the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine (subsequently 
including all Germany except Austria and Prussia), the 
Emperor Francis II declared that the Empire no longer existed. 
This ended the thousand years old institution. In the absence 
of a really unified administration under the Empire, throughout 
this period Germany remained what has been called a mere 
"geographical expression".
After the defeat of Napoleon the Congress of Vienna 
regrouped the German territory and established a loose German 
Confederation of 38 (later 39) states under the permanent 
presidency of Austria. A central diet was provided for, but 
because the decisions of the parliament were required to be 
unanimous, it could achieve little in practice, especially 
in view of the rivalry between Austria and Prussia.
The French Revolution of 1848 spread rapidly to Germany 
and was initially a success. A German National Assembly 
elected on the basis of limited popular suffrage was convened 
at Frankfurt in May 1848 to produce a constitution which 
called for a federal empire with bicameral parliament, a 
responsible ministry, and popular suffrage. But by the time 
the Constitution was ready in 1849, forces of reaction had 
mobilized in the more important states, especially in Austria 
and Prussia. In these states, therefore, the regional 
governments refused to approve the proposals of the National 
Assembly. The Assembly was itself forcibly dissolved by 
Prussian troops, and the revolutionary aspirations died a 
tragic death. Now reestablished in their authority the German
Cf. Herman Finer, The Major Governments of Modern Europe, 
London: Methuen & Co., 1960, p p . 408-409. For a brief
account of the impact of religious divisions on the 
development of German politics see Finer, op. cit., pp. 394- 
395. As for the Holy Roman Empire "In Voltaire's oft-quoted 
cynicism, it was neither holy nor Roman nor empire". Finer, 
op. cit., p. 407.
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monarchs revived their old despotic regimes.
Between 1864 and 1871 Prussia under the leadership of
Bismarck extended its territory in north Germany and gradually
pushed Austria out of the Confederation. A North German
Confederation was formed in 1867; in 1871, after the Franco-
Prussion War, negotiations started between Bismarck and the
south German states (not members of the North German
Confederation) for a united German Empire without Austria.
Thus a new German Empire under the hegemony of Prussia was
established on January 18, 1871. In view of Prussia's
dominant position, the new imperial Confederation was, in fact,
2what has been called Prussia writ large.
The king of Prussia, by hereditary right, was 
the head of the Empire (or the Confederation). The 
king was authorized to appoint a Chancellor (or Prime 
Minister) to carry out the executive policies of the union.
Two legislative Houses were created: an upper House called
the Bundesrat, and a lower House called the Reichstag. The 
upper House was a House of Princes, and the lower one that 
of the peoples. The lower House was elected on popular 
suf frage.
The Empire, therefore, appeared to possess the outward 
form of a federation though in fact it was only a facade.
The Emperor was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, 
and had the power to declare war or peace with consent of 
only the upper House, over whose legislation and decision he 
exercised considerable influence, for being the king of Prussia 
he controlled 17 out of the 58 (later 61) votes of the 
Bundesrat. The delegates to the Bundesrat being the 
representatives of the Princes had to vote according to their 
instructions. As Prussia had 17 votes in the upper House its 
king, the Emperor, exercised an absolute veto on constitutional 
amendments, for any legislation was invalid if 14 votes were 
cast in the negative.
The Reichstag was a properly elected House of Peoples 
with 400 members. It participated in the enactment of 
legislation and was, in theory, in control of the Empire's
Marshall Dill, Jr., Germany: A Modern History, Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1961, p. 140.
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budget, but since the Chancellor (the executive head of the 
Empire) was an appointee of the Emperor and responsible to 
him alone, the governmental system of the Empire was in fact 
not a parliamentary system. For this reason the Empire left 
the German people without much political education in 
democratic self-government either at the national or the 
regional level. In the absence of fully democratic and 
responsible governments in most of the states and especially 
in Prussia (which controlled three-fifths of the area and 
population of the Empire) the scope for the development of 
an enduring and broad-based states-rights sentiment remained 
greatly limited.
After the German defeat in the first World War, 
dissatisfaction in the armed forces (especially the Navy) 
and the rise of liberal and socialist forces led to the 
Revolution in 1918. This resulted in the abdication of the 
Emperor as well as the Princes, and the establishment of 
republican regimes in all the states. A National Assembly 
of popularly elected members met at Weimar on February 6,
1919, and a new Constitution, drafted by the great jurist Hugo 
Preuss, was adopted by a majority vote on August 11, 1919.
This established a democratic federal republic in the country.
Provision was made for a popularly elected President as 
head of the State. The President formally appointed the 
Chancellor who was selected by the Reichstag. The President 
was not the executive head of the federation and his actions 
were subject to the approval of the Chancellor or the 
appropriate cabinet minister, although in emergencies he was 
empowered to suspend the Reichstag and order a reelection in 
sixty days. In event of emergency he was empowered to rule 
by decree. But in peace-time the country had a normal 
parliamentary government. The bicameral pattern of the central 
legislature was retained. The lower House was called the 
Reichstag and the upper House Reichsrat. The Reichstag was 
an elected House under universal franchise, and was the chief 
legislative body with authority for peace and war, treaties 
and alliances, and financial and general legislation. The 
Reichsrat was a states House and was comprised of one 
representative from each constituent state plus an additional 
vote for every 700,000 people. Its representatives were
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appointed not elected, and its function was largely advisory, 
for the Reichstag could override its legislative proposals 
with a two-thirds majority»
The new federal Constitution because of its provision 
of proportional representation (P. R.) lacked "a state­
forming organ" for it did not provide "a satisfactory solution
3of the problem of forming a majority" in the lower House.
Indeed "Nowhere have the consequences of P. R. manifested
4themselves as disastrously as in Weimar Germany". "Beginning 
in 1920 the German election system followed the so-called 
automatic type . . . There was from that time onwards an
almost unlimited utilization of surpluses, and a number of 
parties were successful which, under the majority system,
5would have fallen into the category of the 'also-rans'".
The electoral system gave a sort of guarantee to small 
splinter parties, and even pressure groups, that they could 
not be completely finished, and this in effect encouraged a 
plurality of parties. This plurality made it difficult for 
any party to emerge with sufficient majority to form a 
government of its own. There were quick changes in political 
alliances resulting into changes of governments. There were 
twenty-one cabinets in less than fourteen years and none 
of them lasted for more than twenty months, Thus the Weimar 
Constitution gave birth to what Hermens termed "the 'Republic 
without Republicans'".3 456
In the election of July 1932 National Socialists and 
other political extremists together obtained a majority in 
the Reichstag, and through their obstructionist activities 
began to hinder smooth running of the parliamentary procedure. 
The parliament had to be dissolved several times until the 
President invited Adolf Hitler, the leader of the largest 
party in the parliament, to form a government. Soon democracy
3
Statement by Friedrich Naumann in 1919; cited in F. A. 
Hermens, Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy, Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1951, p. 64.
4
Hermens, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 63.
5
Hermens, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 66.
6
Hermens, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 66.
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was dead in the country, since on March 23 the Enabling Act was 
passed through which the Constitution was suspended and the 
Hitler cabinet assumed dictatorial powers. A one-party 
government was established and all opposition was banned. The 
states were made subservient to the centre and federalism 
was finished.
After Germany's defeat in 1945 the country was put under
quadrupartite military control. For purposes of occupation
the country was divided into four occupation zones: one each
under U. S. S. R., U. S. A., U. K., and France. In 1948,
when the rift between the three Western Allies and the
U. S. S. R. led to the withdrawal of the latter from the Allied
Control Council, the three Western powers decided upon the
reunification of their zones in order to create a united
German State. By steps power began to be handed over to the
German people after local elections produced more durable
native authorities. The process was begun gradually from the
lower to the upper levels. The western zones (exclusive of
Saarland) had been divided into eleven states. Although in
principle the former Länder were to be reconstituted
wherever possible, in practice all of them had to undergo
some surgery, partly in order to accommodate the carved-up
pieces of Prussia, and partly to settle within the zonal
boundary lines and to eliminate exclaves and enclaves. As a
German representative Carlo Schmid said at the 1948 convention,
the German people did not "recognize the Laender as they are
today. Most of them are purely products of coincidence and
it seems odd to make them the original constituent elements
7of the future German political reality".
When the plan for creating a united West Germany was 
taken up, the division of the area into eleven states was an 
established fact, and it was within this existing territorial 
and political arrangement that the constitution-makers had 
to devise their plans for the new State. The Parliamentary 
Council that assembled to draft the Constitution consisted of 
leaders and delegates from the existing eleven states that 
were by now enjoying virtual self-government. This in itself
Cited in P. H. Merkl. The Origin of the West German 
Republie, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 42.
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made a federal political organization of the State almost 
imperative, for the very existence of the Lander as organic 
political units before the rise of the united nation helped 
to create vested interests among the regional leaders most of 
whom could not hope to have much say at the national level.
QThen, as Elmer Plischke writes, the decision to 
establish a federal system in West Germany was not entirely 
an indigenous determination: Seeking to provide a genuine
democratic foundation the Allies had decided quite early 
that there should be no great centralization of power in the 
country. And this, they thought, could be best achieved under 
a federal system founded upon a clear-cut division of powers 
between central and the regional governments. During 
deliberations of the Parliamentary Council for the new 
Constitution the Western Military Governors made determined
9efforts to prevent a high degree of centralization of power.
It was only after considerable Allied-German negotiation that 
an acceptable text of the Basic Law was devised which 
reconciled the German demand for adequate central authority 
with what the Allies thought was the federal principle.
A Review of the Structure and Operation of the West
German Federalism
The Basic Law retained the Weimar pattern of the division 
of powers. The national government was given extensive
Elmer Plischke, Contemporary Government in Germany, London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961, p. 51. In their primary 
post-surrender directive (issued in April 1945, and known as 
the JCS 1067) the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the aim of 
"decentralization of the political and administrative struc­
ture and the development of local responsibility". In his 
Stuttgart address on September 5, 1946, the U. S. Secretary
of State called for an early drafting of a "federal" Consti­
tution for Germany. The point was reiterated in the official 
policy statement known as JCS 1779 dated July 15, 1947.
In the Aide Memoire drafted on November 22, 1948, and
addressed to the Parliamentary Council, the Western Military 
Governors specified certain principles which the occupying 
powers required the Parliamentary Council to embody in the 
new Constitution. These principles included, among other 
things, the establishment of a bicameral legislature, specific 
enumeration of powers of the central government, limitation 
of the financial authority of the centre, and restriction on 
the establishment of central field agencies only to fields in 
which implementation by state governments would be 
impracticable.
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legislative powers and its concurrent powers covered wide 
fields of social and economic life so much so that the 
occupation authorities objected to undue centralization. But 
except for the issue of taxing and spending, among the 
German representatives themselves there was no great dispute 
regarding the central competence. The states were granted 
the major responsibility for the execution of the national 
1egis1ation--which to the German representatives appeared a 
genuine guarantee for decentralization. Powers not specific>- 
ally granted to the centre were reserved to the states. These 
reserved powers included in the main local government, educ­
ation, and cultural affairs. The terms "local government" and 
"cultural affairs" were, however, taken in their broader sense 
and included radio, television, theatres, museums, libraries, 
press, police, public health, and regional planning. While 
the central government was granted the major indirect taxes, 
the states were assigned the dominantly direct taxes including 
income and corporation taxes. It was, however, provided that 
the national government could claim a share of the income and 
corporation taxes, the size of which was to be decided by the 
Bundes rat.
The central legislature continued to be bicameral. The 
Bundestag, the House of the people, is the central governing 
agency of the State and the central executive is responsible 
to it. In contrast to the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, the 
House of states, is not popularly elected: its delegates
are appointed and controlled by, and represent the interests 
of, the state governments. The Basic Law provides that each 
state should have a minimum of three votes in the Bundesrat 
while the states with over two million people would have 
four, and those with over six million people five 
representatives in all.
As originally envisaged the powers of the Bundesrat were 
limited. Although it could participate in the passage of 
national legislation, it was given an absolute veto only on 
matters involving financial and/or administrative questions; 
in all other matters its veto could only be suspensive.
Thus the Bundesrat was not intended to be equal to the 
Bundestag in legislative powers, for the framers of the 
Constitution had assumed that the scope of legislative
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activity affected by its absolute veto would be relatively 
small. But practice has not supported this assumption, and 
the Bundesrat has successfully insisted that if a legislative 
bill contains provisions that are subject to its absolute 
veto then the entire bill, not just the particular provisions, 
is subject to its veto. The result has been that of the 
approximately 1900 bills that have been passed between 1945- 
1965, almost half (837) were potentially subject to the 
absolute veto power of the Bundesrat.^  Although the upper 
House does not exert influence in the manner of an American- 
style Senate, it has emerged nonetheless as a genuine and 
powerful second chamber. As a recent study concludes: 
"Bundesrat does in fact act specifically to protect 
governmental integrity and freedom of action at the L^fnd <*/ 
level and does in fact maintain a sensitive and protective 
attitude within the federal parliament toward the L^nd 
government interests".'*'1
In view of the extensive authority granted to the central
government, the scope for judicial interpretation in Germany
is rather limited. Still in two leading cases— the Concordat
decision of 1957 and the TV case of 1961— by upholding the
validity of the states-rights, the Court has clearly checked
over-centralization and it, along with the Bundesrat, has
helped to make federalism in West Germany very much a reality.
Sawer considers West Germany "even less organic than
Switzerland because the ambitions of the Centre politicians
are held so much in check by judicial doctrine, by the
structure of the legislature and by the growth of regional
12dissent within the main parties".
10
Figures quoted in K. H. Cerny, "Federalism in the West 
German Republic" in V. Earle (Ed.) , Federalism: Infinite
Variety in Theory and Practice. Itasca, Illinois: F. E.
Peacock Publishers Inc., 1968, p. 144.
11
Edward L. Pinney, Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Party 
Politics in Western Germany: Role of the Bundesrat,
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963,
p. 173.
G. Sawer, Modern Federalism, London: C» A. Watts & Co.,
1969, p. 126. The Concordat and the Te1evision cases 
are briefly noted in Sawer, op. cit., pp. 100-101.
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POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE RISE OF 
GERMAN FEDERALISM
A thousand years of the loose and decentralized Holy
Roman Empire had fostered in the various German states a
strong sense of particularism and had created thereby a highly
federalistic--rather con f e de r al i s ti c--s i t ua ti on , But when
in 1806 "the Holy Empire died and was buried", it was indeed
13"to all appearance soon forgotten", and along with it also
vanished much of the regional particularism, for Napoleon
welded together many of the smaller historic political units
to form (the short-lived) Confederation of the Rhine. And
the loose Confederation that the Congress of Vienna created
in 1815 did not materially change the territorial situation
created by Napoleon, although now Austria and Prussia emerged
as two great giants. The changed territorial and dynastic
situation made the rise of regional nationalism in most of
the new sub-units difficult, apart of course from states such
as Bavaria, Saxony, Baden, Württemberg, and Hanover (until
1866) which had long traditions as major states.
Besides this new politico-geographic situation that
discouraged the rise of state particularism, there were other
factors that for some time pulled the German people together
and instilled in them a strong sense of unity. One such factor
was the standardization of the German language. Luther's
translation of the Bible bridged the gulf which up to that
time had separated the high and the low German languages by
choosing a vocabulary and syntax derived from and intelligible
to both the regions. Even the sections that remained faithful
14to the Roman Catholic creed adopted "the Lutheran German".
But Napoleon I was the man who, without intention, helped 
to instil the vision of a free, great and united Germany 
in the hearts of the people so different in their cultural 
and political outlook as the Prussians, Saxons, Austrians and 
all other Germans of his age. By doing away with the hundreds
_
James Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire, New York: Macmillan
C o ., 1946, p. ix.
S. H. Steinberg, A Short History of Germany, New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1946, p. ix.
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of the smaller states and arbitrarily changing the boundaries 
of others without regard to historical and cultural factors, 
Napoleon virtually forced the German people to forget their 
age-old differences. This changed situation forced the elites 
to emphasize the broader German nationalism rather than the 
regional cultural particularisms which under the existent 
conditions were almost impossible to revive.
The facts of economic life were also pointing in the 
same direction. Since 1834 the industrially important parts 
of Germany, apart from Austria, had formed a single customs 
union. The initiative for the union and its leadership 
naturally fell to Prussia, for since 1815 she had included 
representative elements of all the important factors in German 
economic life--the agricultural east, the industrial west, 
the grain-producing Junkers as well as the cattle-breeding 
or vine-growing peasants. For this reason all the compromises
that Prussia had to make to reconcile the various interests
>within its oWn boundaries, were likely to satisfy most of 
the non-Prussian German interests as well. First, with a 
view to protect her delayed industrialism, and secondly because 
of the multi-national character of her Empire, Austria remained 
out of the all-German union. This assured Prussian hegemony 
and led to the ultimate parting of Austrian company from all- 
Ge rmany.
In fact by the mid-nineteenth century the politico- 
geographical situation in Germany had shifted almost to the 
unitary extreme of the federal spectrum. When the popularly 
elected representatives of the German states met after the 
1848 Revolution to draft a democratic federal Constitution,
"the great majority of the German states did not represent 
that variety in the national life which the framers of the 
Constitution might desire to preserve for the sake of its 
own merit",^  for now there was very little correspondence 
between the existing states and the actual diversity in German 
economic and cultural life. Although there was still a great 
deal of diversity in the national life of Germany, the historic 
units did not correspond to that diversity.
15
R. Schlesinger, Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe,
London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & C o . , Ltd., 1945, p. 53.
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The hist o r i c a l l y  minded romantic had to note that of 
the seven or eight tribal dukedoms of the ninth to the 
twelfth centuries, which c o r r e s p o n d e d  to the still 
surv iving varieties of dialect and folklore, only 
Bavaria, apart from Austria, had survived as a m i d ­
n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y  German state . . . .  In fact the 
German states in the nin e t e e n t h  century did not reflect 
that national past, which had been overlaid by the 
s pl itting-up of the old units during the Middle Ages, 
and by the formation of new terr itorial units since 
the thir teenth century in the newly colonized bo rder 
r e g i o n s .^
Though most of the German states in the nin e t e e n t h  century
did not represent hist orica l realities or the actual diversities
of the national life, they were n e v e r t h e l e s s  a strong political
real ity  and had to be taken into account in any scheme of
p o l i ti ca l r e o r g a nization of the country. Having formed
ad mi n i s t r a t i v e  units for c o nsiderable periods of time the
states succeeded in creating some degree of d y n a s t i c  allegiance.
The alle giance was so strong that it survived the stress of
the 1848 Revolution, when only in the smallest states was
there any inclination to surrender "independence" and
that too on the condition that the larger states also made
17the same sacrifice. But the univ ersal desire for a strong
1 8unity was unmis t a k a b l y  clear.
Though by virtue of her great size and strength, the 
he g e m o n y  of Prussia in the united Germany was inevitable, 
the terms of the federal bargain in 1871 were d e t e r m i n e d  by 
two chief factors: the formidable p a r t i c u l a r i s m  of the states
in the south, especially Bavaria, and Prussia's twin desires 
to ma in tain her separate identity while gaining he g e m o n y  of
16
Sch lesinger, op. c i t . , footnote 15, p. 52.
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See Schlesinger, op. cit., footnote 15, p p . 47-53 .
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Steinberg, op. cit., footnote 14, p. x i , writes: "The history
of the Germanies is the hi story of the unending struggle of 
the co ntinental Teutons for a w o r k i n g  compromise between 
u n i f or mity and disruption. U n i f o r m i t y  was and is contrary 
to the racial, cultural and p o l itical dive rgency of 
the Germanic tribes; the complete independence of each part 
w o ul d have been and will be contrary to the economic, cultural 
and po litical interests of the parts." This statement  
misses the point that the original tribes were no longer in 
the p o 1i t i c o - geog raphic position to feel themselves as compact 
un if ied groups. Hence the p o p ular sentiment, after the 
N a p o l e o n i c  era, was seldom for "disruption".
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the union. No solution could be acceptable to Prussia that
would make her only one among equals. With three-fifths of
the population and two-thirds of the area of the united
Germany, Prussia was the paramount state and she wanted this
recognized. Bismarck's Constitution was, therefore, what
Preuss described as "a peculiar combination of Prussian
20hegemony with federalistic disguises". The Constitution
devised a division of powers which was "horizontal" in
2 1contrast to the United States' "vertical" division of powers.
Though the legislative powers granted to the central government
were extensive, in contrast to the American example, the actual
administration of the national legislation was to remain a
state jurisdiction. Apart from the federal postal service
and the Navy (and partly the Army of which the Emperor was
2 2the Supreme Lord ) the national government had no separately 
established independent field agencies. Thus for the average 
citizen the Reich brought about no change in the governmental 
system with which he had to deal, for it meant only a minimal
19
The concept of federal bargain as applied to the German 
Empire is briefly explained in Cerny, op. cit., footnote 10., 
p. 144.
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Hugo Preuss, Reich und Länder, Berlin, 1928, p. 255; cited 
in Schlesinger, op. cit., footnote 15, p. 75. Unless other­
wise stated, all the quotations from Preuss are taken from 
Schlesinger and references are given as in Schlesinger's book.
21
The distinction between the German and American federalism 
is drawn by Arnold Brecht in his Federalism and Regionalism 
in Germany: The Division of Prussia, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1949, pp. 3-7.
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The actual structure was, however, very complex; and 
especially anomalous was the position of Bavaria which had 
received certain "reserved rights" that " . . .  made Bavaria 
autonomous in many respects. Bavaria was permitted to 
maintain a separate diplomatic service, with its own 
ambassadors at Vienna, St. Petersburg, and the Vatican. The 
Bavarian kingdom controlled its own postal, telegraphic and 
railway systems. Like Saxony and Württemberg, Bavaria retained 
her own Army; unlike them, she possessed a General Staff, 
and her generals were appointed by the King of Bavaria, not 
by the Emperor [as was the case with other states]. The 
Prussian Army was not permitted to enter Bavarian territory, 
and the Bavarian Army came under the command of the German 
Emperor only at the outbreak of war". R. M. Watt, The Kings 
Depart; The Tragedy of Germany: Versailles and the German
Re volution, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968 , p. 281.
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interference with the long-established adrtiini s trat i ve struct­
ures. It is believed that the device was adopted with a view 
to preserve the position of the Crowns, for it meant the 
strengthening of "the position of the individual states [most 
of them under princely aristocratic rule] at the expense of
2 3a federal parliament in which democracy might have its say".
Thus the German Confederation was in fact a princely
alliance, since "Not the sovereign people but the sovereign
24princes had joined together to form the Reich". This
technical character of the union and its undemocratic preamble
2 5were not changed until the Empire collapsed in 1918. As a
federation must essentially be a compact between the peoples,
the German Empire cannot be called a federation in the modern
sense. Thus the birth of modern federalism in Germany dates
from the rise of the Weimar Republic. The technical nature
of the Reich as a princely alliance had long been outmoded,
however, the various factors had combined to make ". . . the
national union a matter of people and the pride of common
man long before the revolution finally did away with the
26princes whose alliance had created the empire". Besides
the rise of an integrated national economy unhampered by 
barriers to trade and commerce, the universal interest in the 
Reichstag, which was divided not by states but by national 
parties, was highly significant.
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC CONCLUSIONS 
A . Weimar Republic
With the fall of the Princes in 1918 the primary raison
23
Schlesinger, op. cit., footnote 15, p. 74.
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Rupert Emerson, State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928, p. 105.
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The Preamble of the Empire read: "His majesty, the King of
Prussia on behalf of the North-German Federation; His Majesty 
the King of Bavaria; His Majesty, the King of Wiirttemburg;
His Royal Highness, the Grand-Duke of Hessen and the Rhine-- 
the latter for the section of the Grand-Duchy situated 
south of the river Main--conclude an eternal federation 
to protect the federal territory and the law of the land 
as well as to promote the welfare of the German people . . .". 
Cited in Brecht, op. cit., footnote 21, p. 4.
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d'etre of the states disappeared. This greatly weakened the
basis of state particularism. Naturally, therefore, the new
Constitution not only dropped any reference to the princes
2 7but also to the states as such. Still, the new republican
Constitution established a federal rather than a unitary State, 
even though a republican people should have had little desire 
to preserve the old dynastic territorial structures. The 
reason for this was that:
As distinct from the revolutions in the more solid 
national states, the German 1918 revolution was not 
accomplished at the centre, radiating from there to 
the peripheries. Rather it followed the opposite course, 
from the peripheries to the centre. In any case it was 
a highly decentralized revolution: 25 individual
miniature revolutions corresponded to the traditional 
existence of 25 individual states, and thus the existence 
of the states was transferred into the new order of things. 
Everywhere the new rulers settled down first of all in 
the State governments . . . The new jure revolutionis
state governments immediately considered themselves, 
in relation to the federation, as the legal successors 
of their jure divino predecessors and their attitude 
was supported by considerable sections of the local 
population.28
Although initially the revolutionaries had thought that 
to take over the existing administrations was the only 
alternative to anarchy, in fact it had meant taking over, even 
without the dynasties, the distinct administrative traditions 
of the individual states. Thus though the traditional 
justification of the states had disappeared, now behind the 
socialist state ministers stood the inertia of the Civil 
Services of the various states just as it had stood behind 
their predecessors, the Princes and Grand Dukes. The Socialist 
Prime Minister of Prussia had behind him, besides the Civil 
Service, also the unbroken tradition of the officer corps of the 
Prussian Army "who could not but wait for the moment to jump 
into the seat which the 'revolutionaries' were keeping warm
27
The new Constitution read: "The German people, in their
united branches animated by the will to renew and stabilize 
their commonwealth with liberty and justice, to preserve 
peace at home and abroad, and to promote social progress, 
have given themselves this Constitution . . .". Cited
in Brecht, op. c i t . , footnote 21, p. 6.
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for them". In this sense, the very nature of the 1918
Revolut ion carried within it the germs of federalism. Burdened
with these states from the beginning, the Republic could not
org ani ze new ones that could have better chances of survival
against the ul tra-centralisti c attacks to come., In fact, the
form of this structure "was an empty shell which B i s marck had
pr e s e r v e d  for the coming generations. It was the Republic's
30lot to see that shell broken, and be broken with it".
Since the German states were no longer c o nservative
ba sti ons  in need of prot ecti on against democracy, the new
Co ns t i t u e n t  Assembly that met at Weimar proceeded to establish
a national government whose p r e d ominance over the states was
not to be questioned. The centre was given extensive powers,
and the powers of the upper House were greatly reduced. Though
the pri nc iple of unequal re presentation in the upper House and
the practi ce of state instruction to the delegates were
retained, the role of Prussia in the House (Reichsrat) was
res tr ai ne d by specifying that no state would be e n t i t l e d  to more
than two- fifths of the 66 votes, and that the Pru s s i a n  vote
woul d be split b e t ween the central Lj^nd gove rnment and the 2/
thirte en a d m i n i strative prov inces into which P r ussia was
divided. Votes of the Prussian provinces were made independent,
i. e. , without instruction from the Land government. This was
done bec ause a united Prussia was bound to struggle p ermanently
with the federation, and either destroy it or r e e s t a b l i s h  its 
31own hegemony. Preuss thought: "Eliminate the princes and
32the people shall speak with one voice". It was for this
reason that Preuss and other right-wingers of the Revolution 
helped to strengthen the powers of the popularly elected  
President, But "Preuss's mistake was that he saw the surface 
rather than the essentials, Prussia, the territorial unit,
29
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3 3rather than the reality, the Prussian Army", Thus in course
of time the powers of the central government, based as they 
were on the surviving Army, were used to reestablish more 
and more centralized rule over the country.
As the state boundaries were unrepresentative of any 
regional differences in the national life, even the staunchest 
federalists (anti-unitarists) were unable to specify the social 
and economic interests that were to be preserved for the 
states. Because of the medley of social and economic interests 
that each state represented, every state was virtually a house 
divided against itself since the diverse particularistic forces 
within a state failed to recognize states-rights when they 
were exercised in a direction contrary to their own particular 
interest. Under these conditions it became easy for the 
central leadership to make deep inroads in the spheres of 
state autonomy and taking advantage of this, the Nazis were 
able to turn it into a unitary State.
The Weimar Republic showed almost all the constitutional
characteristics of a federal system, and was run like one till
the early part of 1923, but . . it is impossible to regard
the joint dictatorship of Army and Big Business, as established
after the winter crisis of 1923-4, as anything but sham
federalism", for though the state boundaries remained intact,
what the states in reality " . . .  could embody, and strive
for, was merely distinct conceptions of the way in which the
centralization of real power could be transformed into
34constitutional centralism."
To conclude, there were two politico-geographical reasons 
for the failure of federalism in the Weimar Republic: first,
German society, despite immense diversities in the various 
aspects of life, was basically nonfederal since the state 
boundaries were highly unrepresentative of the regional
33
Schlesinger, op. cit„, footnote 15, p. 94. As Emerson, op. 
cit., footnote 24, p. 227, writes: "The practical futility
of formal sovereignty was all too clear . . . but the wheels
of State continued to turn surprisingly in the same fashion 
as before. [for "Broadly speaking, the old administrative 
machinery remained intact during the Revolution".] The 
inherited machinery under the new master still seemed to 
act in the spirit of the old".
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distribution of these diversities. As there was no particular 
set of interests that the majority of people in the individual 
states identified themselves with, state rights sentiment in 
the country became very weak. This made it easy for the 
central government to usurp even the limited autonomy that 
the Constitution had given the states. Secondly, the over­
whelming size of Prussia had made that state virtually a
35second central government in the federation. Hence the
real cause of the breakdown of federalism in the Weimar Germany 
was not any basic drawback in the Constitution, but rather 
the underlying politico-geographic base which made any federal 
solution to the problem of its political organization quite 
unsuitable. [Fig. 7.1]
B . Post-1945 German Federalism;
The states-rights sentiment in post-1945 Germany was fur­
ther weakened because during the Hitler regime the states had 
ceased to exist in fact, and after the fall of Germany its terr­
itory underwent a detailed surgery at the hands of the occupying 
powers. Of the eleven states in the West only Bavaria, Bremen, 
and Hamburg retained their essentially traditional boundaries. 
The other eight were curious mixtures of parts of the tradit­
ional states, and like the former states they also were not 
representative of the actual diversity in German life. Thus, 
while failing to provide them with any marked regional ident­
ities, the new territorial division deprived the states even 
of the historical inertia that the old states had possessed 
as a result of their long-established individual political- 
administrative systems. Hence federalism in post-1945 Germany 
was not a genuine response to deeply-felt regional identities 
that demanded self-expression. Further
Not only were some of the Länder artificial creations 
because of their new boundaries, there had been massive 
internal migration which had begun under the stress of 
Allied bombing and military advance and then had reached 
flood tide with the millions of postwar refugees and 
expellees from Eastern Europe and Soviet-occupied Germany. 
As they settled throughout Western Germany, these migrants 
weakened the sense of local patriotism that had developed 
over generations, often based on distinctive cultural
35
On "Two Central Governments" see Brecht, op. cit., 
21 , pp. 6 7-68.
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F i g .  7 . 1  WEIMAR REPUBLI C:  PRUSSI A WRIT LARGE. T h e  s e v e n t e e n
Ge r ma n  s t a t e s  w e r e  b y  n o  m e a n s  t o o  ma ny  f o r  a f e d e r a l  S t a t e  o f  
n e a r l y  s i x t y  m i l l i o n  p e o p l e ,  b u t  t h e s e  w e r e  h i g h l y  d i s p a r a t e  
i n  s i z e .  P r u s s i a  a l o n e  i n c l u d e d  t h r e e - f i f t h s  o f  t h e  t o t a l  p o p ­
u l a t i o n ,  B a v a r i a  a n d  S a x o n y  t o g e t h e r  a n o t h e r  f i f t h ,  w h i l e  a l l  
t h e  o t h e r  f o u r t e e n  s t a t e s  ma d e  up  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  f i f t h .  F u r t h e r ­
m o r e ,  m o s t  o f  t h e  G e r m a n  s t a t e s  w e r e  g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  s p l i t  i n t o  
ma n y  s e c t i o n s  w h i c h  o f t e n  l a y  f a r  r e m o v e d  f r o m  o n e  a n o t h e r .
T h i s  m a d e  t h e  r i s e  o f  u n i t e d  s t a t e  i d e n t i t i e s  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t .  
(Map a d a p t e d  f r o m  A r n o l d  B r e c h t ,  1 9 4 5 ,  pp  . 1 0 - 1 1 . )
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t r a d i t i o n .
Thus the p o l i t i c o - g e o g r a p h i c  base in Germany in 1949 was
far less federal than it was in 1919. There was one sign ificant
difference, however: now the Prussian colossus that had so
long dwar fed other states and by acting as a second central
gove rnm ent had made f e d e ralism a farce, no longer existed. The
degree of disparity in size of the constituent states was
37greatly reduced. This made any compromise more workable.
As already noted, despite a nonfederal base, federalism  
was adopted for two reasons. First, the states were going 
concerns when the C o n s t i t u e n t  Assembly met, and secondly, the 
occ up yi ng  powers insisted on a federal form of gover n m e n t a l  
o rg an iz at ion which they c o n s idered as a safeguard for democracy. 
Thus what we consider the n e c e s s a r y  geographical pr emise for 
a normal type of federalism, i. e., that the states should  
rep resent regionally grouped dive rsities in the na tional life, 
was largely absent in the Germany of 1949. Still federalism 
in Ger many has been a reality for the last twenty years and 
in all p r o b a b i l i t y  has come to stay. How is it then that 
p o l i t i c o - g e o g r a p h i c  forces for unity, that for all pra c t i c a l  
purposes looked stronger than those for separation, were not 
able to o v e rwhelm the latter and turn Germany into a unitary 
State? Why did not federal a rticulation cease in G e r many the 
way it did in the Latin American States? Does, then, our 
hypo th es is regarding the basic geographical premise of 
fe de ral ism fail? A closer look at the federation reveals that 
it does not.
The sense of state identity (and in that form a set of 
re gi ona lly grouped diversities) that had come to exist as a
36
Cerny, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 154.
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The con stituent states in Germany are still far from equal 
in size. The state-wide breakup of seats in the B u n d e s t a g
(in which r e presentation 
1961 was as follows:
is on the basis of population) in
Bav aria 82 R h i n e l a n d - P a l a t i n a t e 31
Ba de n - W ü r t t e m b u r g 67 Saar 8
B remen 6 S c h l e s w i g - H o l s t e i n 23
Ha mb urg 19 Total 497
Hesse 46 Berlin (non-voting) 22
Lower Saxony
North R h i n e - W e s t p h a l i a
61
154
Total 519
(Figures from Elmer Plischke, op. cit., footnote 8, p. 69.)
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result of the existence of the Lander as organic political 
entities before the birth of the united federal State, was 
preserved till 1953 under the supervision of the Allies, who 
having helped to establish the federation wanted to assure 
the vitality of the constituent states» Marked by most 
intensive political activity and economic reconstruction, 
this period of Allied supervision greatly helped to fortify 
the position of the states as organic entities and created 
vested interests around the regional governments. These vested 
interests created a set of regionally-grouped diversities 
(around the different state governments) which, given peaceful 
conditions, would militate against over-centralization of 
power and the usurpation of state autonomy.
Further, during all these years the country was not faced
with any national emergency that could have given occasion for
over-extension of the central powers in the name of national
survival. This left the states free to play their independent
roles in the fields allotted to them by the Constitution, and
3 8thereby to develop their separate identities. An important
contributory factor was the presence of the NATO forces 
that assured external security, the absence of which might 
in all probability have created national emergencies in 
response to real or supposed external threat.
Thus, the study of post-1945 German federalism seems to 
offer a major modification not only of Riker's military 
interpretation of federal constitutions but also of my own 
supplementary hypothesis that the presence of external military 
threat helps to maintain the federal bond and that the absence 
of it, as in the West Indies example, often leads to federal 
failure. Riker's insistence on the necessarily military origin 
of federal constitution appears excessive at least in the case 
of the West German example. While the condition of federal 
bargaining in "the hope of attracting East Germany back into 
the federation" may not wholly be denied, the assumption that
38
As Hertz writes, although the Lander at first commanded 
little genuine attachment from their people, "the cake 
of custom by now has endowed the ten Länder structure 
with some kind of recognition". J. H. Hertz, "The 
Government of Germany", in G. M. Carter and J, H. Hertz,
Major Foreign Powers, New York: Harcourt, 1967, pp. 441-442,
Fig. 7.2 FEDERAL UNITS OF AUSTRIA AND WEST GERMANY .
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"It was a proposed bargain in face of the Soviet m i l itary
threat" appears o verstated in view of the de m i l i t a r i z e d  and
helple ss state of Ge r m a n y , Even if the national c o n s c i o u s n e s s
rea li ze d a greater threat from the east than from the west,
the con ti nued presence of the Allied forces as the guardians
of peace (if that is the right phrase) should have taken much
force out of this motivation. And if this factor was a really
po ten t force, it should have led to a unitary rather than a
federal o r g a n ization in view of the overall uni f o r m i t y  in
the nation al life. It becomes all the more quest i o n a b l e  when
Riker h i m s e l f  believes that the " c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  in Ge rmany
was dom in at ed by American occupation forces who w i s h e d  to
impose fe deralism [which they thought] . . . was a 'good
3 9t h i n g '" .
The German example leads to the hypothesis that though in 
fed erations where s t a t e s - rights sentiments are strong, the 
prese nce  of external threat is a very favourable condition  
for the m aintenance of federalism, in cases of b a s i c a l l y  
nonf ed er al  societies such as Germany represents, it is the 
absence of external threat that really helps the much n e e d e d  
rise of federal articulation and the main tenance of f e d e r a l i s m  
against u n i tarism which should be easy to establish in the event 
of nat ion al emergency posed by external threats to na tional 
survival. The hypo thesis is further confirmed when we compare 
fed er al is m in post-1945 Germany with that in the Spanish 
Americ an countries.
2 * A U S TRIA
Unlik e the We imar Republic which had found the r e a d ymade 
str ucture of the Reich to build upon, Austria after the collapse 
of the Ha psburg Empire in 1918, was almost a new n a t i o n  (if 
a nation at a l l ) . As the non-German n a t i o n alities of the 
former Empire broke off to form independent States, the G e r m a n ­
speaki ng provinces, the Archducal nucleus of the Empire 
(containing in all six and a half million people as ag ainst 
fifty mi llion of the Empire) were left alone to b u i l d  a new
39
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State and, if they could, a new nation.
Th ro ughout the imperial period the G e r m a n - A u s t r i a n s  were, 
in the imperial vocabulary, the m a s t e r-race who alone among 
the people of the Empire (apart from the Magyars) knew how 
to govern. Thus, the imperial system, however unjust to other 
nat io n a l i t i e s  of the Empire, gave rich rewards to the German- 
Austrians. This h e lped to create among the A u s trian people 
a strong sense of loyalty not to any specific Au strian identity 
but to the Habsb u r g  monarch who was the source of their 
prosperity. The people who were not monarchists were p e r m eated 
not by any specific Austrian  nati o n a l i s m  but by p a n - G e r m a n i s m .
Thus, when the H a b sburg Empire collapsed, almost no
uni fyi ng principle was left to bind the Austrian p r o v inces
together. With the p a s sing away of the centripetal influence
of the Inperial House the balance of power passed from the
central gove rnment to the provinces, and Austria became what
40has been called "a m eaningle ss concept". It was Tyrol,
Salzburg, Vorarlberg, etc., that became the centre of the 
loyalty of the people of the respective provinces, rather  
than any central ideal or authority, even though till the 
end of the Empire German Austria (the Archducal nucleus of 
the Empire) was for all prac tical purposes a c e n t r a l i z e d  
little kingdom, with the Lander much like little counties. 
Though the Empire by its very nature was highly de centralized, 
the pr ov incial Governors in Au stria were appointed by the 
Emperor, and the provincial Diets had little voice against them 
except in certain u nimportan t and secondary political matters. 
But the Revolution of 1918 changed the picture completely.
P O L I T I C O - G E O G R A P H I C  FACTORS IN THE RISE 
OF AUSTRIAN FEDE RALISM
With the disap p e a r a n c e  of the central authority, the 
prov inc es became real and vital political structures. For two 
years the writ of the central g overnment scarcely ran outside 
Vienna. "The Lander, faced with an oppressive shortage of 
food, shut themselves h e r m e t i c a l l y  up from one another and 
from the capital, in order to preserve their supplies . . .
Mary Mac donald, The Republic of Austria 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 3 4 , London: 
Ox for d Univ e r s i t y  Press, 1946, p. 1.
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and in some cases org a n i z e d  we 1 1 -equipped and we 1 1 -disciplined
4 1mil it ia s against external and internal foes". The provincial
Diets became the supreme organs of their respective governments,
leav ing  very little for the central control. There was
p r a c t i c a l l y  no ad ministrative o r g a n i z a t i o n  left apart from
that which the prov incial governments had taken over. "Under
such con ditions Austria was, virtually, a federation (unless
she was about to lapse into a state of a n a r c h y ) , quite
i n d e p en de ntly of the theoretical encour a g e m e n t  given to a
fed eralist conception of the State by a c k n o w ledging that the
42Provi nce s had joined voluntarily".
But the basis for s t a t e - i d e n t ity in the Au s t r i a n  provinces
was very weak, though the country was by no means devoid of
regional diversities and antagonism. It was almost equally
divided be tween industry and agriculture, between soci alism
and pol it ical Catholicism, between city (Vienna) and rural
societies. There had for long been a considerable ant a g o n i s m
be tw een  Vienna and the industrial parts of Lower Au stria on
the one hand, and the Alpine provinces with their conservative
peas ant  pop u l a t i o n  (which supported the Habsburgs almost till
the end) on the other. The post-1918 situation created further
reasons for this antagonism. V i enna and the Lower Austrian
region had during the imperial peri o d  drawn their provisions
mostl y from the non- A u s t r i a n  regions. With these usual sources
of supply now cut, Vienna and the industrial Lower Austria
had to be supplied from within the Ger m a n - A u s t r i a n  regions.
As the ag ricultural regions of the country hardly pos s e s s e d
any surplus, the industrial areas could be kept from starvation
only by means of a c e n t r a l 4r e a u i s i t i o n i n g  system that wasU'k'vd-«/’ V* Ad "H0 .
i n t r od uc ed in 1916^ This was greatly resented by the grain-
p r o d u c i n g  Alpine provinces; and the cleavages b e t w e e n  the
two societies were further hardened. All this made it "obvious
that, if Austria was to exist at all as an inde p e n d e n t  State,
4 3the form of her cons t i t u t i o n  must be prono u n c e d l y  federal".
41
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But despite this division and antagonism, Austria was 
esse n t i a l l y  a nati onally h o m o g eneous State in which although 
the pr ov in ces were divided from Vi enna by differences in social 
and cultural outlook, the overall forces for unity far 
ou t w e i g h e d  those for separation. As the issues dividing the 
pr ovi nce s were in no way fundamental, their representatives 
could not decide upon the matters that they specifically wanted 
to reserve for themselves against the centre. In such a 
situ ati on the 1920 federal C o n s t itution made the centre 
pa r a m o u n t  over the states.
The First Austrian Republic: C o n s t i tutional
Structure and P e r f o r m a n c e
A l t ho ugh the Constitution r e c o g n i z e d  the autonomous
ch ara cte r of the provinces, and pr o v i d e d  that all subjects
not s p e c if ically placed within the competence of the centre
rem ain ed reserved for the states, in fact, the sphere of the
central com petence was made so wide that hardly anything of
si gn ifi can ce was left to the states whose role became limited
p r a c t i c a l l y  to autonomous ad m i n i s t r a t i o n  of the central laws.
Wit h few m a tters of importance being left to their independent
control, the provinces became "agents and subordinates of the
4 4general [i. e., central] government". Although the
Co ns t i t u t i o n  nowhere specifically stated that the central law
took pr ec e d e n c e  over the prov incial laws, in fact "the absence
of this sta te ment . . . did not mean so much an accretion of
strengt h to the Provinces as an a c c u m ulation of work for the
45Co ns ti t u t i o n a l  Court".
The Co ns t i t u t i o n  created a b i c a meral central legislature: 
a N at io na lr at, directly el ected by the people through a system 
of pr op o r t i o n a l  representation, and a B u n d e s r a t  elected by the 
assembl ies  or Diets of the Provinces. R e p r e s entation in the 
Bu n d e s r a t  was w e i ghted according to population, and Article 56 
of the Co ns t i t u t i o n  decreed against the members of the l e g i s ­
latures bei ng instructed by outside (i. e., state) agencies.
This made strict representation of prov i n c i a l  interests in the
44
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Bundesrat almost impossible. Further, the upper House by
the very terms of the Constitution was not a very effective
body and in a number of highly important matters its veto
was only suspensive, while in financial matters it had no
veto at all. As for proportional representation (P. R,)
its results were as disastrous as in Republican Germany, and,
in fact, "P, R. had destroyed the spirit of Austrian democracy
46before its body was buried" in 1938.
Hitherto the office of the President was largely decorative, 
but the Constitutional reforms of 1929 granted the President 
considerable power over government and the parliament. He was 
made head of the Army which was now empowered to step into the 
provinces, even without being requested, in order to restore 
order in time of emergency. The Federal Court of Audit was 
now granted jurisdiction not only over the provinces but also 
over districts with more than 20,000 inhabitants. Similarly 
the powers of federal Police were considerably extended, and 
the Federal Minister of Education was given control over 
practically all matters concerning education.
The economic crisis into which the country was plunged 
in 1929 (and the civil commotion that accompanied it) led to 
the rise of a Catholic fascist regime under Dolfus in 1933.
Soon afterwards the Socialist opposition was suppressed in 
the country and the influence of the Nazis (who played on the 
latent pan-German sentiment of the Austrian people) increased 
greatly. This culminated into the march of Hitler into Austria 
in 1938. This brought the end of democracy and federalism 
in the first Republic.
Federalism in the Second Austrian Republic 
After the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, the 
provisional government for Austria adopted the Republican 
Constitution of 1920 as amended in 1929, which only with minor 
amendments has continued in operation. As in the first 
Republic, the central legislature continues to be bicameral: 
the Nationalrat elected by popular vote, and the Bundesrat 
elected by the provincial legislatures roughly on the basis 
of population but providing that no state would send less than
Hermens, op. cit., footnote 3, pp. 83-86.
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three or more than twelve representatives. The Bundesrat has
only a suspensive veto. The President is empowered to dissolve
any state legislature with the consent only of the Bundesrat and
to order fresh elections. The judicial system is entirely
centre-controlled. The overall powers of the centre are very
extensive. For this reason Austria has been considered as
the limiting case in the unificationist direction of the
"federal spectrum". Sawer regards it as the only extant example
of "organic" federalism. The central competence includes the
whole range of social, economic, and cultural matters, and
most forms of taxation and public borrowing. No single
important field has been left to the states: not even the
full control of their cultural activities. In the field of
education the states have exclusive authority only over the
pre-school education. "The Regions are thus confined to the
level of local affairs, and local administration of the
Centre laws, associated in most English-speaking countries
4 7with 'local government' of a rather limited kind". Although
the area of state-competence is very limited, the existence 
of the regional government is secured by the constitutional 
structure, and in principle, the states do not live at the 
mercy of the centre.
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC CONCLUSIONS
1. Reviewing federalism in the first Austrian Republic we 
noted that despite the overall homogeneity in the national 
life, there were certain regional diversities in political 
and cultural outlook that made the provinces desire a type of 
state-organization that could guarantee them autonomous 
authority over local administration. But a closer look 
reveals that though giving a regional appearance, the 
diversities and divisions within the Austrian society were 
basically nonfederal in character. Apart from Burgenland (ceded 
by Hungary in 1921) there were no basic differences in the 
historical experiences and political and cultural traditions 
of the Austrian provinces--as distinct from Vienna--that its 
people recognized, and that could foster among the provinces
47
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a strong sense of regional identity capable of creating an 
enduring states-rights sentiment to resist the moves towards 
excessive centralization of power. The sectional division 
in political outlook posed a potentially federal situation 
largely because of the overwhelming size of the city of Vienna, 
which with just under one-third of the country's population 
stood as a solid stronghold of socialism while the Conservative 
forces were less concentrated because of their extension all- 
over the countryside.
This was a very abnormal federal situation, for here 
that sense of compromise to live and let live, which is the 
essence of a genuine federalism, was completely absent. In 
view of the overall homogeneity in the nation's life, the 
primary interest of the leading parties was not regional 
autonomy but national supremacy. Regional autonomy was, at 
best, only a temporary safeguard for the then individually 
weak Catholic Conservative provinces against the solid 
socialist strength of Vienna.
And because the federalism was based upon an equilibrium
between the two main sectional groups, it could survive only
so long as that balance was maintained. As this equilibrium
definitely tilted in favour of the Christian Social-cum-
German Nationalist coalition in the early thirties, failure
of federalism was inevitable. Indeed, "A proletarian
revolution in Vienna would have been as portentous for it
[federalism] as the definite control of Christian Social
4 8policy by Big Business proved to be". In this sense,
federalism in the first Republic failed primarily because 
post-1918 Austria lacked the essential geographical base for 
a stable federation. A further contributing cause was the 
continued national economic crisis that made increase in the 
central powers and a closer coordination of the national life 
a necessity.
2. But perhaps a still greater missing prop was the lack 
of a definite State-idea for Austria inescapably recognized 
by the people after the 1918 Revolution. A State can survive 
as an independent unit only if the people are sufficiently 
united in their loyalty to a unique central ideal that
48
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distinguishes them as a group from their neighbours; further,
their union should be able to maintain their economic activity
at a standard of living acceptable to themselves. The "little
Austria" of the inter-war years was unable to fulfil these
conditions. The transference of Austrian people's allegiance
from the Empire (and the Arch-Duke) to the Republic was
difficult and incomplete. Though Austria and Prussia had
long been political rivals, and their people had developed
some separate identity, in the post-1918 period when the
Habsburg Empire broke into fragments and the German Austrians
lost their position as a ruling people within the great Empire,
and especially when the position of all German people in
Europe weakened as a result of the catastrophic defeat, the
outlook of the German-Austrian people changed profoundly: the
differences between Austria and Prussia began to be regarded
49as essentially a family quarrel within Deutschtum. The
problem of Teuton versus Slavs was posed afresh, and sentiment 
for unity with the rest of Germany, still great in size and 
population, tremendously increased. The provisional National 
Assembly of the new Republic declared (on November 22, 1918)
that "German-Austria is a constituent part of the German 
Republic".
But this resolution had no validity in the eyes of the
Allies. Union with Germany was flatly forbidden, and the
parliament was compelled under the Allied pressure to declare
(on October 21, 1919) that "German-Austria is a democratic
Republic under the name of Austria". Indeed, "it was not
federalism that prevented the dissolution of Austria, but the
Allies' fear of a piecemeal Anschluss as the most likely
50consequence of any further breaking of German Austria".
For this reason, unlike in most other cases, the failure of 
federalism in Austria did not mean dissolution of its constituent 
parts into independent States nor the establishment of a 
unitary State, but a union with Germany and, thereby, the 
creation of a greater German nation-State.
49
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3. Post-1945 federalism in Austria suffered from the same
drawback in its politico-geographic base as the first Republic 
did, but with one vital difference: As in West Germany, the
new federal structure was adopted under the Allied "dictation", 
and was run under their supervision till 1955, This was a long 
enough period to enforce some stability on the political 
structure. After the Allies left, in view of the comparative 
calm on the borders, and the absence of any great national 
crisis, the structure has continued to be maintained. Further 
as the central government has all the powers that a government 
might need in order to control a nation's life, there has been 
no need to interfere with the working of the regional govern­
ments in Austria. In fact, so long as democracy survives in a 
country, there can be little danger to the survival of an 
Austrian brand of federalism, for with all the essential powers 
in its command the central government will hardly ever need
to abolish the state structures.
4. We have seen (Chapter I) that the essential difference 
between Austria and a decentralized unitary State is
that in the latter, though for all practical purposes the 
regional governments may be autonomous in the administration 
of their local affairs, in principle this autonomy is not 
guaranteed. In Austria, on the other hand, the regional 
autonomy in the administration of local affairs of the states 
is guaranteed by the Constitution. Technically, therefore, 
Austria stands as an example of federalism, though one is 
sceptical if it is proper to call Austria an "organic 
federalism", if by that term is implied the ultimate form 
of a fully evolved federalism as may be the future federalism 
in the United States or Australia. If it is agreed that the 
essential difference between the Austrian brand of federalism 
and a decentralized unitary State is the constitutional 
guarantee to the regions in respect of local administration, 
one wonders if the Austrian State may not better be described 
as a federalized unitary State or a unified federal State 
rather than an organic federal State.
5. As in the West German example, in Austria also, Riker's 
insistence on the essentially military origin of federalism 
appears "excessive". Riker writes "Back of the federal 
bargain stands the fact of anschluss, the ever present fear
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of an aggressive Germany, and, owing to that fear, the intention 
to give all parties and geographic areas a part in the 
government1 In view of the trend of Austrian politics
between 1918 and 1945, however, this does not seem convincing.
As Julius Braunthal writes, every Austrian knew that an Austrian 
nation (apart from the German) was non-existent; "there has 
never been one" .
They proclaimed union with Germany when the Empire fell; 
they were again members of a German Federal [sic] State 
when the Republic fell; many of them welcomed enthusiast­
ically Hitler's entry into Austria and professed fervently 
their German nationality until the German Reich cracked.
But when it seemed convenient they suddenly discovered that 
they had never been proper Germans, but they had always 
been a particular species . . . Thus an "Austrian
nationality" came into being not . . .  as the result of 
generations' of growth under a common destiny, but as 
an act of expediency . «, . they might develop in course
of generations an identity somehow different from the 
German people . . . What they . . 0 cannot do . . .  is
to secede not only politically but also emotionally from 
the wider cultural body of which they are part . . . .52
As Braunthal writes, in the post-1945 period, the Austrian
people, with an eye to the Allies, were pleased to play the
role of "good boys" as distinct from the "bad boys" that
inhabited Germany.
In view of this, attributing the post-1945 federal struct­
ure of Austria to the fear of Germany would appear contrary 
to the facts of the case. This is all the more questionable 
when Riker himself regards the adoption of the post-war
5 3constitutional structure of Austria as an Allied "dictation". 
Then, if this fear was at all a potent force, in view of the 
homogeneous nature of Austrian society, a pure and simple unit­
ary State rather than the complicated and expensive facade of a
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federalism should have resulted» It should, however, be 
conceded that the difficulty of reconciling Vienna with the 
much more traditionalist countryside provides some sort of 
raison d'etre for a decentralized governmental structure.
Part 4
THE FEDERATIONS THAT FAILED
247
Chapter VIII
FEDERATIONS CREATED UNDER 
POTENTIALLY NONFEDERAL SITUATIONS
1 * LATIN AMERICAN FEDERATIONS
Federalism has been much talked of but little understood
in Latin America. Though Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, and
Brazil are the only four countries that describe themselves as
federal today, federalism in the past has been experimented
with in almost every part of Latin America: in Colombia for
about thirty years before 1886; in Chile for a few years in
the early years of independence; in Central America from
independence till 1838. Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador had
formed the federation of Gran Colombia which split in 1830.
Peru and Bolivia are the only ones that did not experiment
with the idea. But despite all this seeming popularity "More
frequently than not, federalism was a slogan rather than a
working principle of government" in Latin America.^
Though federalism has been almost a universal failure in
Latin America, "The reasons for the failure are [as yet] not
2fully understood". The reason may well be that political
scientists have so far tried to explain the Latin American
political institutions by constantly using the contrast between
"Anglo-Saxon" and "Latin", seldom stopping to think that through
the use of these terms they beg the question rather than solve
it. "The qualities which we designate as 'Latin' and 'Anglo-
Saxon'", warned L . S. Rowe, "are the results of well defined
social and economic forces" without a proper understanding of
which "our study of Latin American institutions must ever
3remain a play of words rather than a scientific study".
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Indeed, "The essential nature of federalism is to be sought
for . . .  in the forces--economic, social, political, cultural--
4that have made the outward form of federalism necessary"; and 
because a geographical approach based on the fundamental premise 
of federalism as a polity based on regionally-grouped 
diversities, is primarily an analysis of these very forces, 
we believe that it would give us a better understanding of 
the reasons why federalism has invariably failed in the Latin 
American countries. Latin American federations may, indeed, 
provide a test case for the objection whether or not the concept 
of federalism as a polity based on essentially regionally
5grouped diversities, is "useful" as a "tool of analysis".
In the analysis that follows, we analyze each individual 
case in brief, and then proceed to find out the reasons why 
federalism has been a universal failure in Latin America.
MEXICO
As one of Spain's two administrative hierarchies in the 
western hemisphere, Mexico had attracted distinguished military, 
political, and clerical personnel of the Empire who helped in 
applying here the monarch's principle of absolute centralization 
of power in government. Hence, the regional autonomy that is 
sometimes talked of in certain other areas of Spanish America, 
did not have a semblance of existence in Mexico. For this 
reason, the earlier attempts at the achievement of independence 
under Hidalgo or Morelos were not inspired by any particular 
governmental structure such as federalism. When Ferdinand VII 
of Spain restored (in 1820) the liberal Constitution of 1812, 
the conservative forces in Mexico became dissatisfied. Taking 
advantage of this, Augustine de Iturbide with the help of the 
military, the Church and wealthy conservatives declared his 
Plan de Iguala in September 1821, which led to the complete 
independence of Mexico. A monarchical government was estab­
lished, and Iturbide was rechristened as Emperor Augustin I. As 
Iturbide's regime represented centrism, the opposing forces 
called themselves liberals and decentralists. After the over-
4 “
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throw of Iturbide in 1824, the victorious forces under Santa 
Ana, confusing federalism with republican institutions, 
administrative decentralization and liberal reforms, adopted 
federalism as their banner; and the United States offered them 
a ready-made model for a new Constitutione
Though the American model was adopted, because the provinces 
had never functioned as organic political entities they lacked 
any states-nghts sentiment» As a result, the Constitution was 
highly centralized, and the new government almost immediately 
became a unified polity. Under the shelter of emergency powers 
for the President, the Congress delegated extraordinary powers 
to President Victoria (1825-29) even though, it is believed, 
there was less of an emergency than at any time in the next 
several decades.
The unitary Constitutions of 1836 and 1843 abolished 
federalism altogether; but when the liberals came to ascendency 
again, a federal Constitution was adopted in 1857 though, as 
before, power remained highly centralized. The new Constitution 
under its Article 74 (which provided that if the Senate declared 
that all constitutional powers of a state had disappeared, the 
President was empowered to intervene and appoint a new Governor) 
made the states subservient to the centre. It was almost under 
the provisions of this Constitution that Porfirio Diaz was able 
to establish his long dictatorial regime (1876-1911) that 
destroyed any semblance of regional autonomy. After the fall 
of Diaz a federal Constitution was adopted in 1917. Though 
Article 124 of the new Constitution guaranteed reserved powers 
to the states, Article 76 restated the provision in the 1857 
Constitution relating to the power of the Senate to declare 
the disappearance of constitutional government in any state 
and empowering the President to take over the administration 
of the state in question»
There is nothing inherently wrong with this provision, and 
most of the present-day federal Constitutions embody emergency 
powers; in the case of Mexico, however, because of the fact 
that her politico-geographic base was not conducive to 
federalism (because the country lacked any regionally-grouped 
diversities) this provision has repeatedly meant destruction 
of regional autonomy and excessive centralization of
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government. Various writers have pointed out that while the 
federal government in Mexico continues to seek , aggressively,
to achieve ever great centralization of power, the states remain
7apathetic. In explaining this political scientists have found 
"psychological attitudes and values" as all-important; and have 
attributed this to the fact that "there is a disposition toward3strong centralized power in Hispanic affairs". A geographer 
may, however, suggest that one strong (and perhaps basic) reason 
for the failure of federal articulation among the Mexican states 
is the fact that the Mexican states have neyer formed organic 
political entities either before or since independence. This has 
resulted into the absence of any states-rights sentiment in the 
Mexican states. Furthermore, none of the ethnic elements in the 
country possessed a definite territorial base--the Creoles, 
Mestizos and the Peninsulares were mixed together in most areas
During 1918-1948 the Senate declared disappearance of states' 
powers 45 times, at least 25 of which are said to have been 
arbitrary. Since 1935 the use of this power has been limited 
because the centre has found other, and more effective, ways 
of maintaining and expanding centralized control. The most 
effective measure is the Secretaria de Gobernacid'n which, 
acting under the personal direction of the President, is an 
authority intermediary between the federal government and the 
states. It watches over state elections and adjudicates most 
of the day-to-day political difficulties of the state govern­
ments and the federal-state relations. Its function is said tc 
be to find out the individuals and groups in each state who 
will work amicably with the federal government. It is alleged 
that it sees to it that friends are in office and enemies are 
denied political power. In practice this means the rule of a 
single party in the states as well as the centre. The denial 
of free e xpre s sion of regional opinion that this system 
entails, destroys the very basis of federal articulation and 
therefore tends to make the Mexican federalism a sham. From 
the title of his thesis, one student sees Mexico as "An 
Experiment in One-Party Democracy" (Frank Brandenburg, Mexico: 
An Experiment in One-Party Democracy, doctoral dissertation, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1956); cited in
M. C. Needier, "Mexico" in M. C. Needier (Ed.) , Political 
Systems of Latin America, Princeton; D, Van Nostrand Co.,
1964, p. 4.
7
Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government m  Transition, Urbana, 
111.:- University of Illinois Press, 1959, pp. 46-47; j. L. 
Mecham, "Mexican Federalism: Fact or Fiction", Annals ,
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 208, 
March 1940, p p . 23-38; and J. L. Mecham, "Federal Interventior
in Mexico", in Wilgus A. Curtis (Ed.), Hispnaic American 
Essays , Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1942.
8
Stokes, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 118.
251
rather than being separately concentrated, and the Indians were 
not counted in political calculations. Thus ethnic factors could 
not provide a federal base. Besides, in the highly centralized 
political system of New Spain, the provinces did not have even 
a semblance of regional autonomy,, Thus the Regional political 
cultures in Mexico, unlike those in the United States during the 
colonial period, were everywhere similar.
In view of all this, the only basis for the existence of 
the states as organic entities in a federation was, as the 
historian Justo Sierra has pointed out, that they were recognized 
by the Cortes of Cadiz (in 1812) as the basic units for sending 
deputies to the Cortes.9 But as the Constitution of 1812 was 
abrogated in 1814, this two-year period was too short to foster 
a states-rights sentiment in the local population. Thus, as 
Father Mier said, federating the Mexican provinces was equivalent 
to separating them— a policy that entailed upon them the very 
evil that the Anglo-Saxons had endeavoured to avert with their 
federalism. He said that the creation of the Mexican provinces 
into "sovereign" (i. e . , autonomous) states was to deny the 
significance of Mexico's colonial history and to court con­
tinuous division."*"9
Although there may be some dissenting voices, such as that
of A. 0. Spain,’*’’*’ most students of Mexican government agree that
federalism in the country is "defunct", and that "It is an
indisputable commonplace that the Mexican nation is now and has
always been federal in theory only; actually it has always been
centralistic", for despite the constitutional position, the
autonomy of the provinces has been a sham. The former President
13Emilo Porte Gil described Mexican federalism as a great lie,
9
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The state administrations in Mexico are, says Needier, "no more
14than the branch offices of the national administration"«.
VENEZUELA
Because of its lack of known minerals, its belligerent 
Indians, and its remoteness from the main centres of Spanish 
power in America, Venezuela was, unlike the favoured New Spain, 
among the most neglected regions of Spanish America. In so 
little regard was the area held by the mother country that it 
was once given over to a German banking company with exclusive 
rights for exploration and colonization, though as the venture 
failed the grant was rescinded in 1650. The seven provinces of 
Venezuela were made into a Captaincy-General in 1777. But owing 
to their economic insignificance and their distance from the 
main administrative headquarters, the administration of the 
provinces received only scant attention. Consequently regional 
leaders and administrators enjoyed greater powers of discretion, 
and the provinces were in fact not so completely integrated as 
say those in Mexico. It is, therefore, sometimes believed 
that regional identities of some kind existed in Venezuela of 
the colonial days. It should be remembered, however, that under 
the feudalistic pattern of Spanish colonial administration, where 
the people had no voice in political matters, these regional 
identities, if any, were confined to the administrators or the 
local military bosses (the caudillo). They had no popular 
basis (though in a restricted sense) as in the Thirteen Colonies.
Following the Napoleonic conquest of Spain, Venezuela had 
declared her independence in 1811, though internal troubles 
delayed the final overthrow of Spanish rule until 1821. However, 
under the dictates of the Great Liberator, Bolivar, Venezuela 
was joined into a federation with Colombia and Ecuador. When 
this federation broke up in 1830, Venezuela declared herself a 
republic under a unitary Constitution; but the country was 
soon plunged into a civil war now called the "federal war". As 
usual in Latin America, the two rival factions called themselves 
centralists and federalists, respectively. As one of the 
leaders of the Liberals later confessed, the liberal banner of 
federalism was adopted largely because the other side was
__
Needier, op. cit., footnote 6, p. 21,
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centralist. Considered synonymous with liberalism and
republicanism, federalism was declared a divinely inspired 
principle that would harmonize all the diverse interests and 
forces of man. With the victory of the Liberal forces, a new 
federal Constitution was adopted by the now twenty states in 
1864. The country in fact remained under a conservative 
administration till 1870 when Guzman Blanco took over power 
and despite his profession of federalism, ruled the country 
as a dictator till 1888.
Though the Constitution was drawn on the American model, 
"The states were not in fact sovereign [i. e., autonomous] and
had nothing to reserve".^ With gradual extensions of the 
central powers, the central government has usurped almost 
every field in which government can operate. It acquired 
secondary education in 1901; post offices, telephones and 
telegraphs in 1914; and health in 1922. In 1925, both the 
central and the state governments were given only enumerated 
powers though credit, banks, social welfare, conservation 
of forests, natural resources, labour, expropriations, and 
public registry were taken from the state governments. In 
1945 the states lost their judicial systems, and in 1953 
the centre acquired exclusive powers to regulate hotels, 
recreational resorts, tourism, and lotteries. Although the 
Constitution of 1953 asserted that Venezuela is a federal 
republic, the states no longer had any reserved powers, and 
there were no powers to enumerate for them. The Constitution 
removed the last important source of revenue to the states, 
i. e., the sale of sealed paper for legal documents. Though 
the Constitution of 1961 (the twenty-sixth in order), restores 
to the states the right to determine the organization of their 
public powers, municipalities, and police forces, and also 
restores the reserve power clause, in practice all this has 
meant little in view of the predominant position of the centre.
15
Antonio Guzman Blanco, leader of the Liberal faction, is 
said to have stated: "If our opponents had said 'federalism'
we should have said 'centrism'". Cited by Leo B. Lott, 
"Venezuela" in Needier (Ed.) , Political Systems of Latin 
America, op. cit., footnote 6, p. 239.
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The state Governors have almost invariably been chosen by 
the President, In 1925 the states lost even the theoretical 
right to choose their chief executive when at the instance of 
President Gomez the states amended their constitutions to permit 
the President to appoint their Governors, The 1961 Constitution 
restroed this power to the states though the President in 
practice continued to appoint all the Governors.
In view of this, federalism in Venezuela is, indeed, "A
17Case Study in Frustration". The Venezuelan "devotion to
federalism is to the principle and not to the practical
application, and . . .  it remains in existence only as a response
to emotional idealism of the Venezuelan people who see in it
18the unattainable goal of local self-government". The extremely
weak position of the states in the basic governmental structure 
of Venezuela is demonstrated by the number of territorial changes 
effected since 1864. There were twenty states in 1864, nine 
in 1881, twenty in 1899, thirteen in 1904, and again twenty in 
1909. This means that the central government in Venezuela 
has been able to recast the state-structure almost at will.
Hence, Venezuela does not satisfy even the barest minimum 
condition for federalism, i. e . , the inability of the centre 
to abolish the state-strueture. In absence of a genuine 
states-rights sentiment at the popular level, the states have 
existed only so long as the state leadership has been amenable 
to the powers at the centre.
As in Mexico in Venezuela also the ethnic divisions in 
the society cut across provincial boundaries without any 
marked regional concentrations to give even a semblance of 
identity to particular groups with particular states. Then, 
as in Mexico, here also the centralized and feudalistic 
pattern of Spanish colonial administration had resulted into 
uniform regional political cultures rather than distinctive 
regional political cultures which would have resulted if the 
provinces had experienced a democratic self-government. Again 
as in Mexico, in Venezuela also the reason why federalism,
Leo B. Lott, Venezuelan Federalism: A Case Study in
Frustration, Ph . D. thesis, Madison: University of Wisconsin,
1954 , cited in Lott, op. ci t . , footnote 15.
Lott, op. cit., footnote 15 , p . 256 .
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despite the Constitution, has failed to operate is that its 
politico-geographic base was essentially nonfederal, for the 
country lacked any regionally-grouped diversities which the 
people of the respective states identified themselves with»
As a result the people of the states felt that they had 
nothing special to preserve for regional governments. What 
the people wanted was an efficient administration; it did not 
matter very much whether it came from the centre or the states
ARGENTINA
Being far removed from the established highways of trans- 
Atlantic commerce, as also because of their poverty in readily 
exploitable minerals, the provinces of the River Plate region 
were among the neglected areas of the Spanish American Empire. 
Here the central administration was less rigid, and the 
provincial administrators enjoyed a measure of independent 
discretion. The region had also possessed some bases for 
decentralization in the very makeup of its society. The area 
was colonized between 1537-1596 by three rival conquests which 
had given rise to three mutually hostile groups that militated 
against complete integration of government. Until 1776 the 
territories of Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia were ruled 
from Lima as parts of the Viceroyalty of Peru. Under the 
Spanish mercantilist system only three ports in the whole 
of Spanish America--Veracruz (Mexico) , Porto Bello (Panama) , 
and Cartagena (Colombia)--were permitted to trade directly 
with the mother country and through her with the outside world 
An armada carried trade between Panama and Lima. It was 
through Lima that the cities of the Plate region had their 
trade relations with the outside world. The overland route 
from Lima passed through La Paz, Potosi, Jujuy and Santiago 
to Buenos Aires and Montevideo. Standing as middlemen the 
interior towns enjoyed certain advantages over the coastal 
towns and Buenos Aires, and based upon this pattern of trade 
they had succeeded in building some industrial complexes 
around them. [Fig. 8.1]
The royal decree of 1774 which had legalized commercial 
intercourse between Peru, New Spain, New Granada and Guatamala 
was two years later extended to Buenos Aires. The same year 
(1776) the River Plate provinces were formed into the 
Viceroyalty of La Plata. In 1778 imports to the interior
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provinces through Buenos Aires were legalized, though Buenos 
Aires had still to take all her imports through the mother 
country, which in view of its limited manufactures served 
only as the intermediary between the colonies and the 
industrially advanced countries of Europe« This made imports 
unnecessarily costly. The imperial system also deprived Buenos 
Aires of much of the advantages of her exports, for all the 
trade had to be routed through the mother country. Thus with 
the conquest of Spain by Napoleon (1810) the Cabildo Abierto 
of Buenos Aires launched a revolt which was the first step 
toward independence, which was finally declared in 1816, and 
was confirmed at the battle of Maipu in 1818.
Even before the revolt, consequent upon the confusion of 
the period of the Napoleonic war, the colony's communications 
with Spain had been cut; the central administration had 
become extremely weak, and regional caudillos had assumed 
power. It was during this period that the colonists in the 
absence of Spanish imperial support fought successfully against 
the invading British forces. This greatly added to their 
confidence in their individual as well as collective strength. 
Forces for regionalism that were relatively strong even in
the imperial days, now became paramount, and the regions of
uuParaguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia parted company with what is 
now Argentina.
The provinces that remained to form the federation of
Argentina were rent with economic and political rivalry.
Throughout the colonial period, the economic unity of the
Viceroyalty had been based on some sort of territorial division
19of labour under the mercantilist pattern. But the abolition
of trade restrictions, consequent upon the disappearance of 
Spanish authority, disrupted the regional economic balance. 
While the coastal provinces and the sectors of grazing industry 
benefited greatly under the new order, it was a very hard time 
for the interior provinces. Because the interior provinces 
had formed the termini and transit points of considerable trade 
between the coastal regions of Argentina on the one side, and 
Lima on the other, these provinces, taking advantage of their
Miron Bürgin, The Economic Aspects of Argentine Federalism 
1850-1852 , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946 ,
pp. 1-18, deals with these factors in detail.
19
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geographical position, had developed certain industries which 
in addition to their own requirements also produced some 
surpluses for export to other parts of the Viceroyalty, But 
the eclipse of the colonial system of trade finished all this, 
for now cheaper imports flooded the market and cut the very base 
of their economic prosperity» Economic self-defence became 
therefore the most important factor in the rise of that regional 
political particularism whose programmatic expression was the 
federalistic conception of State organization. Buenos Aires 
of course would have preferred a unitary organization in which 
by virtue of her wealth, her strategic location, and the 
control of the national capital she would dominate the 
government. But a compromise had to be made, for the port 
could not survive without its hinterland and the hinterland 
would not join unless regional autonomy was guaranteed.
Thus when the Congress of Tucuman (1819) drafted a unitary 
Constitution for the country, the provinces were not willing 
to accept, and when the Congress adjourned in February 1920, 
the Supreme Director at Buenos Aires resigned. This led to the 
disappearance of the central government. Now the provinces 
assumed sovereignty as almost independent States. Negotiations 
continued, however, and a Constitution that made modest 
concessions to regional autonomy was agreed upon in 1826.
But since the provincial Governors were made responsible to 
the President, the provinces remained dissatisfied. This led 
to a civil war which ended only with the dictatorship of Rosas. 
After the fall of Rosas in 1852, the victorious forces under 
General Urquiza called a Constitutional Convention which 
drafted a federal Constitution in 1853. Buenos Aires, however, 
refused to join till modifications were made to the original 
draft in 1860 .
Although drafted on the American model, the Constitution 
made the centre very dominant. Article 67 authorized the 
central government to draw up civil, commercial, penal, and 
mining codes for the whole of the country and conferred upon 
the centre the authority to promote and develop the prosperity 
and well-being of the entire nation. The Constitution of 
1949, while further expanding the powers of the central 
government, also compelled the provinces, through its Article 
5, to cooperate in whatever the central government saw fit
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to initiate- The Constitution, therefore, made "it clear
that in practice even the limited provincial sovereignty
[i. e-, autonomy] is moribund". The dependence of provincial
and local governments upon federal aid, and the relatively
limited provincial experience in regional self-government,
have made the sentiment for regional autonomy very weak. This
is obvious from the frequent federal interventions in the
provinces. There have been over one hundred interventions
from 1853, not counting those decreed by the de facto regimes
after 1930. As Austin McDonald explains, these interventions
2 1have often been made on very flimsy grounds. The practice
of frequent interventions has made the position of the
provinces so weak that they are said to "have become little
2 2more than election districts".
In view of the historical circumstances in which federalism
was born in the country, it may perhaps be justified to say
that "Argentina has been genuinely, perhaps inevitably 
2 3federalistic"; though it is true that the provinces did
not have in the colonial period any experience of popular 
self-government, nor was there anything inherently federalistic 
in the geographical distribution of the ethnic elements in 
the Argentinian society. But the sentiments for regionalism 
born out of the historical evolution of the economic geography 
of the area had provided a somewhat genuinely federalistic 
base in the beginning. Then for sixteen years (from 1810 to 
1826), the provinces had remained practically sovereign, 
drafting their own constitutions and entering into treaties 
with one another. In view of these factors, one could well 
expect state identities in the Argentinian provinces to be 
strong enough to stand against overcentralization of government,
20
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and thus make federalism work,
Why then did federalism fail to operate in Argentina? A 
close look reveals that despite all the pretensions to the 
contrary, provincial sovereignty or autonomy in Argentina before 
1853 was essentially a sham. With the disappearance of 
centralized control, regional military leaders (caudillos) 
had assumed power. But the authority of these caudillos had 
no traditional or legal sanction. This meant that the popular 
sentiment for regional autonomy in the provinces was practically 
nonexistent. For this reason whenever central caudillos 
became strong enough to subdue the regional ones, the force 
for provincial autonomy receded. Further, by the time the 
federal Constitution of 1853 was adopted, the old pattern of 
economy had changed, and the provinces had, through a painful 
process, come to adjust themselves to the new situation: 
accepting the inevitable primacy of the strategically located 
Buenos Aires which alone opened to them the gateway to the 
outside world.
Therefore, as elsewhere in Spanish America, in Argentina 
also, the primary reason why federalism has failed to be 
effective is that a genuine broad-based regional autonomy 
never existed in the provinces which later became the constituent 
units of the Federation. In the absence of a broad-based 
autonomy the provinces failed to develop regionally distinct 
political cultures which could possibly have given them a 
set of regionally-grouped diversities having inclusive 
territorial bases. Thus despite a brief period of states-rights 
sentiment born out of a strong desire on the part of the 
provinces to preserve the colonial pattern of economy, the 
po1itico-geographical conditions did not favour federalism 
in Argentina at the time that the polity was actually adopted, 
because now the country lacked any popularly recognized 
provincially identifiable diversities--po1itical, cultural, 
economic or other— strong enough to make the people inescapably 
devoted to the maintenance of regional autonomy which, in the 
view of most students, is the essence of federalism.
BRAZIL
Unlike the other Latin American federations, Brazil was 
a Portuguese colony. Although Portugal had discovered the 
area in 1500, its colonization did not begin until 1535 when
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the Crown decided to colonize the entire Brazilian coast through 
its projected plan of captaincies. The coast was divided into 
15 captaincies which were distributed among twelve leading 
nobles. The donatarios, as the grantees were called, were 
invested with economic and political powers which were feudal 
in nature and were to be transmitted through hereditary 
succession. Powers not specifically granted to the donatarios 
were reserved to the Crown. But as the system soon proved 
a failure, most of the rights of the grantees were abolished 
in 1546, and a Governor-General was appointed to whom all 
these rights were transferred. The territorial divisions 
were, nonetheless, maintained and the grantees who were partially 
successful (and such were not many), were allowed to retain 
substantial economic rights. Provision was made for the 
creation of new captaincies.
Because most of the states in Brazil have existed as well-
defined political units for over four centuries, some scholars,
like 0. Lima, have found in the captaincy system the germs of
24the "federative-principle" in Brazil. In fact, as Pierson
and Gil point out, "although the Portuguese evolved an imperial
system, it presented a far less systematic uniformity in patterns
2 5of administration than the one used by Spain in its colonies".
For this reason regional administrators were given sufficient 
independent discretion to suit their policies to local circum­
stances. This naturally gave rise to some regional particularism 
in the states. But here also the provinces lacked any broad- 
based regional self-government. The germs of regional 
particularism that existed in Brazilian states were, therefore, 
not those of democratic regional autonomy that could give rise 
to a genuine federalism, but of administrative decentralization
24
Manuel de Oliveira Lima, The Evolution of Brazil Compared 
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Stanford University Press, 1914, pp. 55-56. Another 
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evolution for four centuries, it is the dominant preoccupation 
of our country. Despite delays, dissimulations, attempts 
at suppression, it has finally emerged triumphant". Cited 
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The Constitution Reconsidered, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 367.
25
W. W. Pierson and F. G. Gil, Governments of Latin America,
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. , 1957, p. 69.
261
that would suit a decentralized unitary polity.
However, by virtue of the country's sheer size, the
Brazilian provinces do possess a good deal of regional
peculiarities, It is said that "Any one who reads Brazilian
newspapers and magazines cannot fail to notice a constant
caricaturing of real or imagined cultural differences associated
2 6with the regional divisions of the country . . There
is also a measure of psychological attachment of Brazilian
citizens to their states, for the great distances between
the major centres of population have made state capitals
attractive as centres of cultural and educational life, and
the extensive variations in regional development have
heightened the sense of difference between one region and 
2 7another. But, as we have seen, regional diversities become
potent germs for federalism only when the people of the regions
recognize them as inescapable parts of their life that are
so important to them emotionally and/or materially that they
believe that unless they retain their rights to control their
provincial affairs their way of life or prosperity is in the
danger of jeopardy. There is no such popular attachment with
the seeming particularisms of most of the states in Brazil,
although certain of the stronger states do display a certain
degree of regional patriotism, e. g. , Säio Paulo and Minas Gerais.
The Administration of Pedro II has sometimes been described
2 8as the "crowned democracy of America". But although it had
the outward form of a decentralized unitary polity on the
British parliamentary system, it lacked what Herring calls
2 9the under-pinnings of a democratic system. There were no
literate masses to voice the general will while the inarticulate 
proletariat was denied franchise. The electorate consisted 
of only a few thousand landowners, lawyers, physicians,
26
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engineers, priests, and officials etc, Alan Manchester cites
the election of 1881 as one of the fairest in the imperial
period; but even in this election there were only 142,000
qualified voters out of a total population of almost 14,000,000;
30a ratio of one to a hundred. In this sense then, Brazil
lacked an essentially federal geographical base.
Still, if things had remained tranquil in Brazil, and if 
the regional governments had been given a free hand in the 
administration of their affairs under a broad-based democratic 
set-up, the states could well have developed their regional 
political cultures born out of a continued exercise of regional 
autonomy. This would have given rise to a states-rights 
sentiment that would very likely have made federalism in the 
country a living force. But this was not to be. The change­
over from military leadership (that had created the Republic) 
to civilian leadership was a delayed process; and when things 
were just beginning to stabilize, the military again stepped 
in to help Getulio Vargas to take over power (in 1930) and 
finish federalism during his subsequent fifteen years of rule. 
After his fall in 1945, a new federal Constitution was 
promulgated in 1946.
The 1946 Constitution provides for a President, a bicameral 
legislature, and an independent judiciary, but the distribution 
of powers is such that "the national government retains 
considerable power over the states, enough for it and not
31the states to predominate within the federal relationship".
The national government is empowered to tax imports, consumption, 
production, income and profits--i. e., all the most lucrative 
sources of funds. This accentuates the dependence of the 
states upon the centre, and has helped to make Brazilian 
federalism, despite the Constitution, a sham. The Constitution 
also empowers the federal government to intervene in the 
states under "emergency". An extensive use of this power 
was made during the years of the Republic and the Vargas regime. 
After the adoption of the 1946 Constitution it had fallen into 
disuse until the military assumed power in 1964.
30
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Thus although Brazil had a different colonial past its
federalism fits into the general Latin American pattern; and
here as elsewhere in Latin America, federalism failed to take
root primarily because the constituent units of the State
did not possess any popularly recognized state-identities that
the people could be inescapably attached to and which they
would want to guard against the central encroachment* Here
again the people's primary need is efficient administration;
it matters little whether this comes from the centre or the
states. In fact, what a critic said of Mexico is true of
Brazil also: the establishment of federalism in the country
in 1891 was like a tailor destroying a suit of clothes in
3 2order to have the pleasure of sewing it again. Although
the Brazilian states, unlike the Mexican provinces, had
possessed their own regional legislatures, in reality under
the sweeping appointive powers of the Emperor, any pretensions
to state autonomy were only idle.
A further factor in the failure of federalism in Brazil
is, as H. G. James pointed out, that some of the states are
economically so undeveloped that they are able only with the
greatest difficulty to meet the minimum expense required for
the organization and functioning of a very rudimentary
government. In these states it is quite possible that the
population would benefit by having the central government
3 3do for them what their own governments cannot do. This
tends to cut into the very basis of federalism. However, 
the more wealthy, thickly populated, and progressive states 
are administering their affairs better than could be done 
by a distant central government, and these bigger provinces 
being zealous of their prosperity are reluctant to share their 
financial cake with the poorer states. This has complicated 
the issue and has made some kind of compromise between 
federalism and unitarism almost a necessity for Brazil.
CONCLUSIONS AND HYPOTHESES
1. An important factor in the failure of federalism in
32
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Spanish America was that the Spanish colonial Empire did not
" in reality consist of colonies like those of other
nations or mere entrepots, but [was] an essential and integral
part of the Spanish monarchy . . . " . J4 All the administrations,
large or small, were controlled by officers appointed by and
responsible to the Crown. Thus the provinces that had to
become the constituent states of the different federations
lacked any training in or tradition of regional autonomy.
Whatever sovereignty or autonomy the provinces could claim
emanated from the fact that after the conquest of Spain by
Napoleon, local councils or Juntas had assumed sovereignty.
This was in conformity with the ancient theory that in the
event of a national disaster such as the capture or imprisonment
of the King, the sovereignty returned to the people and the
councils became the residual legatees of this sovereignty.
The Junta of Seville had become supreme in Spain. As the
3 5Junta of Quito put it
. . . the same right which Seville has to form an
interim junta to be supreme in the government of Spain 
is shared by all the kingdoms in America . . . And since
the governors were no longer approved, they had . 
ceased to exercise their functions, and the sovereignty 
of necessity reverted to the people.
3 6As the Argentinian leader Moreno said
With the monarchy dissolved and Spain lost, are we not in 
the condition of sons who have become of age at the death 
of the father of the family? Each one enters into the 
enjoyment of his individual rights and sets up his own 
hearth and governs himself.
Now as each province became "sovereign", it was thought
that the best solution to the problem of political organization
of the individual viceroyal ties or captaincies-general was
federalism. But as already noted, their politico-geographic
3 7bases were not suitable to federalism, for as Gorriti said
A federation presupposes states already organized and 
constituted [or at least having a proper regional base
34
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to justify the organization of separately autonomous 
governmental units], while in the congress there were 
presented only inform [unformed?] provinces, without 
any interior organization sufficient for their own 
needs, and consequently, destitute for the most part of 
means of supporting the trials of a federation,
This explains the essential difference between the
historical and administrative heritage of the Spanish colonies
and the Thirteen British Colonies in North America, Even
though both the British and Spanish colonies were alike in
being outposts of their respective mother countries and were
founded with a view to mercantilist exploitation, the
administrative patterns in the two were highly divergent and
were responsible for the rise of highly different internal
political geography in the two areas. The differences in
institutions, motives, objectives, human elements and policies
which distinguished Spanish colonies from the English, greatly
account for the differences in the ultimate political
organizations that the two areas evolved.
Spain at the time of American colonization was an absolute
monarchy, which could and did establish imperial institutions
responsible to itself alone. As Pierson and Gil point out,
if Spain established colonial governments with an elaborate
system of checks and balances, juridical autonomy, and granted
to towns and guilds a limited measure of self-government,
it did so by choice and acquiescence and not by any mandate
3 8from a superior authority. England on the other hand,
although very far from having a democratic system of government, 
had sown by the seventeenth century the seeds of democratic 
institutions, and it was in the process of becoming a limited 
monarchy in a modern sense. During the seventeenth century 
parliamentary supremacy, the Bill of Rights, habeas corpus, 
and the beginnings of the cabinet system and party government 
were to be adopted. "The rights of Englishmen" were guarantees 
which the colonials claimed as much as residents of the 
mother country. Charters became constitutions that limited 
both the colony and the home government. So the English 
colonies of all origins in North America came to possess a 
greater opportunity for self-government which, within limits,
Pierson and Gil, op. cit., footnote 25, p p . 62-64.
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allowed them to develop their own distinctive regional 
personalities.
Thus, even though the Thirteen Colonies were (like the 
Spanish provinces) more or less similar in race, language, etc., 
the very fact that they had developed their distinctive regional 
personalities in course of their long experience with self- 
government had provided them with regional sentiments strong 
enough to stand against attempts to overextend the central 
powers. This provided the United States with a set of 
diversities identifiable with the constituent states, a factor 
which was conspicuous by its absence in the provinces of Latin 
America--both Spanish and Portuguese. Therefore, while the 
politico-geographical conditions in the Thirteen Colonies 
were potentially federal, the human geography born out of 
the colonial-administrative heritage in Latin America was 
essentially nonfederal.
A further contributory factor was that the Spanish and 
the Portuguese colonists were primarily agents of the respective 
Crowns and had come to the New World to conduct crusades and 
gain wealth.
The agents of expansion in Latin America were not 
opportunity-seeking pioneers as in the United States, 
but government-supported conquistadors in New Spain and 
the community-minded bandeirantes in New Portugal.
Nowhere did the reaction of men and nature generate 
a social environment that would stimulate the urge for 
self-improvement among individuals.39
What Vianna Moog has said of Brazil is true for the whole
of Latin America:
. . . for three centuries . . . the main motive for
going to the frontier was to get rich quickly, to 
find gold or other precious minerals, that labour, whether 
in urban or rural occupations, was denigrated as fit 
only for slaves; while the English and later American 
settlers looked for new homes based on their own work.40
As Adolf Berle observes, while "The Brazilian bandeirantes
were perhaps the last band of colonial conquistadores, the
39
R. A. Billington, "Frontiers", in C. Vann Woodward (Ed.) ,
A Comparative Approach to American History, Voice of America 
Forum Lectures, Washington: Voice of America, 1968, p. 84.
40
C. Vianna Moog, Bandeirantes and Pioneers, New York: 1964;
paraphrased in S. M. Lipset, "The 'Newness' of the New 
Nation", in C. Vann Woodward (Ed.) , A Comparative Approach to 
American History, op. cit., footnote 39, p. 76.
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American pioneers, though of all kinds, were predominantly
4 1Reformation Settlers". For these reasons, to the Larin
American colonists America was not a sweet home in the manner 
it was to the Englishmen and other later immigrants who, 
dissatisfied with conditions in the home country, had sought 
in America a new home and had built around it all the fine 
sentiments associated with a motherland. Thus, when the hour 
of independence arrived, the people of the Thirteen Colonies 
had thirteen separate homelands (each with a somewhat distinctive 
political culture), while to the Latin Americans Spain 
and Portugal had remained the real "mother countries", and 
thus the provinces lacked any raison d'etre as organic political 
entities. This in itself had made the federal form of union 
a necessity in the United States. It was not so in the 
provinces of Spanish and Portuguese America.
2. Even though the Latin American provinces did not have
a prior experience in self-government that could have made
the sentiment for regional autonomy strong, still if the
provinces had possessed some regional particularisms in their
human geographic base--language, religion, culture, etc.—
this sentiment might well have arisen to safeguard those
regional interests once the federation was born. But, as we
have seen, their geographic bases were not favourable. The
"true origin of [Spanish] American federalism", according to
the historian V. A. Belaunde, is to be explained in the
4 2following terms:
When the central authorities had been swept aside and 
the authority of the mother country no longer recognized, 
the government fell necessarily into the hands of local 
oligarchies or of caudillos who took the lead in the 
popular insurrection.
Thus the sovereignty of the provinces in reality meant only 
the sovereignty of the caudillos, who possessed no legal 
or broadly-based popular sanction. Hence no strong popular 
sentiment for regional autonomy could develop in the provinces 
that could in future stand against the change of power from 
the provinces to the centre. For this reason federalism 
throughout Spanish America has remained fluctuating, for
41
Cited in Lipset, op, cit., footnote 40, p. 75.
42
Belaunde, op, cit,, footnote 9, p. 131.
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only when the regional leaders (caudillos) have been strong 
enough to demand recognition from the central leadership, 
has any significant concession to provincial autonomy been 
granted; and as and when the central leadership has fallen 
into strong hands--the hands of some more widely-connected 
or more imaginative c0udi11o--unitary tendencies have been 
reinforced.
3. This analysis of Latin American federations should explode 
the myth that visible geographical factors such as large size 
and small population and underdeveloped transport and 
communication by themselves are necessary or predisposing 
factors in the rise of modern federalism. If it were true, 
there should have been no reason why federalism would not
be operative in the Latin American countries, each of which 
possessed large areas and small population scattered in 
isolated pockets. Transport and communications were naturally 
undeveloped. But all this could not avert the failure of 
federalism in these countries. The essential fact to remember 
is that the essence of federalism does not lie in the physical 
geography of a country but in the geography of the society 
inhabiting it: in the rise of federalism human forces are
far more important than the physical ones, although in many 
Ceises physical factors may set the stage for the human 
geographic pattern that evolves.
4. When comparing the Spanish American federations with
the United States, it should be noted that a relationship
somewhat similar to that between the Thirteen Colonies existed
not between the provinces of the individual viceroyalties
or captaincies but between the separate viceroyalties and
4 3captaincies-general themselves. As Belaunde puts it
These separate [American] kingdoms, according to Spanish 
policy, were united with the principle [principal?] 
nucleus--the crown itself--but there were [almost] no 
bonds uniting one kingdom to another . . . the Spanish
4 3
Belaunde, op. cit. , footnote 9, p. 163. A diagrammatic 
representation of "Hypothetical Patterns of the Continental 
Empire of Spain" is to be found on page 217 of D. W. Meini^g, 
"A Macrogeography of Western Imperialism: Some Morphologies
of Moving Frontiers of Political Control" in F. Gale and 
G. H. Lawton (Eds.), Settlement and Encounter: Geographical
Studies Presented to Sir Grenfell Price, Melbourne : Oxford
University Press, 1969, pp. 213-240.
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colonial Empire had a star-like form, and not the 
circular form of a chain a . . each colony was joined
directly to the crown with no connection between colony 
and colony . . . The Revolution broke the bonds uniting
the colony to crown, leaving the several unities entirely 
separate and free.
Thus while the separate viceroyalties and captaincies- 
general lacked the requisite geographical base for a genuine 
federalism, the reasons why Spanish America as a whole split 
into separate units rather than forming a federation as the 
Thirteen British Colonies did, were first, its overextension 
that made the rise of a strong sense of belonging together 
difficult; and secondly (and more important), that the Spanish 
American colonies, once independence had been gained, lacked 
any common external military pressures which in North America 
had helped to squeeze the Thirteen Colonies together: it
is significant that inter-colonial federalist ideas were 
most in vogue in the period of revolutionary struggle against 
Spain.
The situation was, however, different in Brazil. Unlike 
Spanish America, Portuguese America consisted of a single 
"kingdom", and the relationship between the captaincies 
vis-a-vis the Governor-Genera1 resembled that between the 
provinces and the Viceroys or the Captain-Generals in the 
Spanish colonies. Then following the Napoleonic invasion 
the Portuguese Court was transferred to Brazil, and thus here 
there was no occasion for sovereignty to return to the provinces. 
Hence the pretensions of independence that the viceroyalties, 
and captaincies-general or even the provinces in Spanish 
America had assumed were quite absent in Brazil. The external 
political geography of Portuguese America was more conducive 
to a strong union because the Portuguese Captaincies in Brazil 
formed a compact group and therefore found themselves together 
surrounded by ea "people" with foreign culture, language, 
and values, against whom they thought they needed a common 
defence. Thus, if at the time of the Napoleonic conquest 
of Portugal the Portuguese American captaincies had somehow 
assumed the sense of sovereignty that the Spanish colonies 
had, Brazil might well have developed into a genuine federal 
union.
5. This study of federalism in Latin America seems to 
suggest a major modification of the widely held view that
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federalism is essentially a response to external military 
threat, as also to our supplementary hypothesis that external 
military threat is a favourable factor in the maintenance 
of federal ties. Common military threat is no doubt a 
favourable factor in bringing discordant units together 
into union, but we should distinguish between two types 
of federal situations that require two different types 
of political conditions for their maintenance. In the normal 
type of federal situation the territorial units are based on 
regional1y-grouped diversities due to which states-rights 
sentiment in the units is strong. In the second type of 
federal situation regionally-based identities, if any, 
are very weak and the situation verges practically on the 
unitary extreme of the federal spectrum. This situation is 
exemplified by States like West Germany and the Latin American 
federations.
A comparison between Latin American federations and West 
Germany is quite revealing. In both cases regional identities 
were weak and the constituent states in general (with some 
exception in Germany) lacked any long tradition as organic 
political entities; yet federalism has been successfully 
operative in West Germany now for over two decades, while 
it failed to take root in the Latin American countries 
altogether. Comparing their historical circumstances 
we find that while each of the Spanish American federations 
was born, and remained for some time, under shadow of possible 
or actual military threats from their neighbours (though 
not a common formidable threat to the whole of Spanish 
America), West Germany has remained virtually secure from 
any such threat in view of the NATO alliance which stood as 
the guardian of West European security, and which was there 
to ensure that false alarms for such emergency were not raised 
In the absence of such emergencies, there were no occasions 
for the West German centre to intervene into the regional 
affairs under the pretext (false or true) of national survival 
Allowed to govern themselves without any interventions from 
above, the German provinces have been able to create new 
regional identities and some vested interests around their 
regional governments. In view of this, the regions have 
become lively political entities that have now begun to resist
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the undue extension of central powers over the regions
as is evidenced by the TV and the Concordat cases»
It would appear therefore that the chief reason why
fe de ral ism was able to take root in West Germany while it
altoget her failed to do so in the Latin American countries is
that West Germany unlike the Latin American federations was
at peace to experiment with this "most complicated and delicate
44governme ntal m e c h a n i s m  ever devised by man", while in view 
of em erg encies posed by frequent external threats (from their 
neighbours) the Latin American countries had no such long 
enough peaceful interlude during which democracy and federalism  
could have functioned and would, thereby, have created regional 
identities and vested interests of the type that has been 
possib le in West Germany. We may therefore conclude that 
while in cases of normal federal situations (where the 
te rri tor ial units are ba sed on regionally identifiable  
diversities) the presence of external military threat favours 
the m a i n tenance of federalism by forcing the c o n s t i t u e n t  units 
to learn to live together in order to preserve their common 
herita ge and to safeguard their common interests; in cases 
of fed erations that are created under basically n o n f ederal 
situations (i. e . , where the territorial units are not based 
on the very distinct regional identities) it is the absence 
of external threats, and an assured national survival that 
are n e c e ssary for the rise of a genuine federal a r t i c u l a t i o n  
and for the State's continued survival as a federation rather 
than a unitary State.
2. THE CENTRAL AFRICAN F E D E R A T I O N * 
Foun ded on the so-called compromise prin ciple of p a r t n e r ­
ship and m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s m  (that was more b r e a c h e d  than honoured) 
the Central African F ederation consisted of three former British  
te rr it or ie s--the self-g o v e r n i n g  Colony of Southern Rhodesia, 
and the two P r otectorates of N o r thern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
44
Mecham, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 363.
*
This is a slightly modified version of my article "The 
Failure of F e d e r a l i s m  in Central Africa: A Politico-
geo gr ap hical Postmortem", Professional G e o g r a p h e r , Vol» 23,
A p r i 1, 1971.
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Northern and Southern Rhodesia were brought together because 
the white settlers in both the areas saw greater advantages 
in a closer political union. Nyasaland was thrown in because 
the British Government was finding it too expensive to administer 
this poor, grant-aided area as a separate territory.^
Inaugurated in 1953, the Federation was dissolved ten years 
later in December 1963.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The historico-political heritages of the three units were 
highly diverse. Southern Rhodesia, which had from the 
beginning been administered by a Legislative Council in 
which the white settlers had gradually obtained majority, was 
granted responsible government in 1923 when the territory was 
declared a Crown Colony, with full powers of self-government 
on all matters except legislation pertaining to Natives and 
such other affairs as were reserved for the Crown. In contrast, 
a nonofficial majority in the Northern Rhodesia Legislative 
Council was obtained only in 1945, though not until 1949 did 
a nonofficial member hold a portfolio in the Executive Council. 
Even until 1953, when the Federation was inaugurated, Nyasaland's 
twenty-member Legislative Council was equally divided between 
official and nonofficial members out of whom only three were 
natives.
The territories were also contrasted with regard to 
the paramountcy of the settler population in the administration 
of their governments. Southern Rhodesia, where the settlers 
were most heavily concentrated, had a completely settler- 
controlled government that pursued a policy towards the natives 
that was hardly different from the segregationist policy 
pursued by the South African government. But the two 
Protectorates had remained under the Colonial Office rule 
which, in contrast to the South Rhodesian government, followed 
a policy of native paramountcy. Though the numbers and influence 
of the white settlers in Northern Rhodesia had increased 
considerably after the discovery of copper in 1925, Nyasaland, 
because of her lack of economic opportunities for European
F. G. Carnell, "Political Implications of Federalism in New 
States" in U. Hicks e t al , Federalism and Economic Growth in 
Underdeveloped Countries, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
1961, p. 35.
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settlers, had by far the fewest settlers.
The Move for Fede ration
Ever since 1915 the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia 
had from time to time advocated the a m a l g amation of the two 
Rhodesian territories on the ground that their economies 
were c o mp lementary and that the united country w o uld form 
a more c r edit-worthy and viable State which would facilitate 
an early achievement of dominion status and freedom from the 
Colonial Office rule. The British Government, which had 
for so long paid little heed to these demands, became receptive 
to the idea of union after 1948 when, in view of the spate 
of d e c o l o nization that was sweeping the post-1945 world, the 
eventual independence of the territories became inevitable.
The idea of a federation appealed to the British Government 
because it offered a solution to the p r o b l e m  of o b t aining 
most of the advantages of union while r e t aining the policy 
of native supremacy in the Protectorates. It is now that 
for the first time N y a s a l a n d  was i n c luded into the scheme 
of union. South Rhodesians became r e c o n c i l e d  to the idea 
because the British Government w o uld not agree to a federation 
wi th ou t Nyasaland.
Unlike the Labour Government that had initiated the 
Fed era tio n talks, the Conservative G o v e r n m e n t  that came into 
office in 1951 was more sympathetic to the settlers' aspirations 
and less concerned with the natives' rights. It p u shed through 
the federation plan in September 1953 against almost universal 
African opposition in the two Protectorates.
The Federal Structure
As finally established, the F e d e ration had four distinctiv e 
features. It p r o c eeded to unite t erritories which even after 
federation continued to possess sharply d i f f erent constitutiona l 
status. While internal admini s t r a t i o n  in the two Protectorates  
rem ain ed the Colonial Office responsibility, the settler  
dom in at ed  Southern Rhodesia was completely self-governing. 
Secondly, the electoral law and franchise q u a l i fications were 
so laid down that Africans remained ne arly ex cluded from the 
federal electorate. Thirdly, the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of powers 
betw een  the federal and territorial g o v e rnments was so arranged 
that mat ters p r i marily of settler interest were assigned to
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the centre while those primarily of African interest remained 
with the regional governments. But the exclusive and concurrent 
powers of the centre together were so sweeping in nature 
that the competence of the regional governments remained 
strictly limited. Lastly, certain safeguards were thrown 
into the Constitution in order to ease the anxiety of the 
natives. The most important of these safeguards were the 
provisions that any amendments to the Constitution would require 
the assent of the British Government, and that the Constitution 
would be reviewed within ten years of its inauguration.2
The Working of the Federation 
Dependent upon an almost white electorate, the federal 
government functioned primarily as a government for the 
settlers, of the settlers and by the settlers. Further, as 
Southern Rhodesia controlled three-quarters of the federal 
electorate, it treated the two Protectorates almost as its 
dependencies. The federal government was run largely by South 
Rhodesians, the federal capital remained in that country, 
and Southern Rhodesia's less economic and more expensive 
projects were given preference over more reasonable projects 
elsewhere. While the government supported increased European 
immigration, little was done to improve the condition of the 
native African population.
As the Monckton Commission reported, the opposition to
the Federation, which was strong at its establishment, gathered
further strength by African disappointment with the manner
3of its operation. It "accelerated the spread of militant
African nationalism and gave it a single unifying goal to work
for--the breakup of the hated federation with which settler
4aspirations to political supremacy seemed to be bound up".
During 1958-60 race relations deteriorated rapidly. 
Emergencies were declared in each of the three territories in 
1959. African leaders were arrested, and a police state was
2
R . L . Watts, New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966, p. 32.
3
Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the 
Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (The Monckton Commission 
Report), London: Cmd, 1148/1960, para 41. See also
paras 2 7 and 4 9 .
4
R. L . Watts, op. cit,, footnote 2, p. 33.
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imposed on Nyasaland with the help of federal troops,, The 
Monckton Commission which was appointed by the British Government 
as an advisory commission on the review of the Constitution 
felt that the Federation could "not be maintained in its present 
form". Drastic constitutional reforms were recommended, but all 
this was too late now since constitutional advances in the 
two Protectorates had brought into power African leaders who 
would have nothing to do with the "segregationist" Southern 
Rhodesian government. Late in 1962 Nyasaland was permitted 
by the British Government to secede from the Federation; and 
a year later when Northern Rhodesia also followed suit, the 
Federation was dissolved (December 31, 1963).
THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE FEDERATION
The geography of the Central African Federation may be 
viewed in two ways: from the viewpoint of the European settlers,
and secondly from the viewpoint of the native Africans.
The Settler Viewpoint
As already noted, the settlers were the real architects 
and the real motive force behind the Federation. They were 
considered (or they considered themselves) as the only 
civilized people in the territories; others were still 
extremely "primitive" with very thin prospects of evolving 
to that "civilized" stage. From this point of view (which 
had formed the basis of the electoral laws), the effective 
population of the three territories was synonymous with the 
settler populations in them. Practically devoid of franchise, 
the native population did not matter in political calculations.
Looked at thus the Central African federation would 
appear as almost a natural response to a characteristically 
federal situation. The European settlers in the three 
territories believed that they were bound together by ties 
of "race", language, religion (Christianity), and "nationality". 
As they saw it, the crimson thread of unity ran through them 
all. Economic factors also pulled them together. The settler 
population in all the three territories was primarily interested 
in cash crops, commerce and industry, while the subsistence 
occupations had remained an African preserve. While Northern 
Rhodesia's copper complemented the Southern Rhodesian coal, 
both seemed complementary to Nyasaland's tea and cotton.
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Whereas Southern and Northern Rhodesia needed large supplies of 
labour for their mining and other industries, Nyasaland  
po sse sse d a surplus of this commodity. Then, in view of their 
small po pulations and their under d e v e l o p e d  state of transport 
and communications, union offered a further economic advantage: 
if run jointly, their transport and communication services 
would be more economical and efficient.
While these factors urged them towards union, half a
century of their separate admini strative histories, their
contr ast ing levels of political and constitutional advance, the
great disparities in their effective sizes, and the long
distances that separated them made a centralized unitary polity
unsuite d to their needs. Like a characte r i s t i c a l l y  federal
society they desired union without desiring complete unity.
Thus a federation seemed to offer an ideal solution; though as
their regional identities were not in serious conflict, it would
have been natural for them to create a c e n t ralized rather than
5a p e r i p h e r a l i z e d  federation.
From  the settler point of view therefore, the politico- 
geographic situation in Central Africa offered almost a classic 
case for federation. Because the settlers looked upon t h e m ­
selves as a "people" surr ounded by alien and/or pote n t i a l l y  
hostile eleme n t s - - t h e  B o e r - d o m i n a t e d  South Africa to their south 
and the alien (n o n - B r i t i s h ) and/or black countries on other 
sides -- their external political geography also seemed to 
provide a situation conducive to federation: they were isolated
com munities that in face of common threats were seeking strength 
in union.
The African V i e w point
Seen from the v i e wpoint of the native African majority, 
the p o l i t i c o - g e o g r a p h i c  picture was just the reverse and the 
Fe de rat ion appeared almost a complete monstrosity. Except 
for the fact that the native popu lations in each of the 
te rri tor ies aspired for African self-rule, and that they 
all felt a sense of b r o t h e r h o o d  in that they were all u n d e r ­
p r i v il eg ed  sons of the soil who were ruled by the same imperial
The terms "centralized" and "peripheralized" federalism are 
di scu ssed in W. H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, O p e r a t i o n ,
S i g n i f i c a n c e , Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964, pp. 5-10.
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power, there were few common interests and traditions that 
could bind them together. Their national aspirations were 
highly divergent. They had possessed no common historical 
traditions before the British imperialism was imposedc Even 
during the British rule they never developed a tradition of 
a common united administration. They were ruled as three 
separate units with their divergent political institutions. 
Above all, the two Protectorates where the Colonial Office rule 
had espoused a policy of paramountcy of the natives, were out 
and out against any union with the segregationist Southern 
Rho desia.
As later events only too clearly showed, the African 
leaders were quite justified in their apprehensions that under 
the then existing franchise laws the resultant federation was 
bound to be dominated by settler interests in Southern Rhodesia 
and that the government would be run by and for the settlers 
at the expense of the natives. The natives had formed only 
two percent of the Southern Rhodesian roll; there were only 
eleven African voters in Northern Rhodesia and none at all in 
Nyasaland in 1951.
Thus, as Patrick Fletcher, a South Rhodesian Minister is
reported to have said after the Victoria Falls Conference in
1951, the question of the Federation was a question between
"governments" (and not between the peoples as a federation
should essentially be).6 The approval for the Federation by
the Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland legislatures "was of course
a farce . . . the two Africans and their European colleagues
representing native interests were just crying in the 
7wilderness". There were only nine representatives (six 
Africans and three Europeans) representing African interests 
in a Federal House of thirty-five.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Monckton Commission strongly argued the economic 
case for the Federation. Its main arguments were that a common
6
Cited in H. Franklin, The Unholy Wedlock: The Failure of the
Central African Federation, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd
1963, p. 63.
Franklin, op. cit., footnote 6, p. 79.
7
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market is better than three separate markets; the Fede ration  
would be more c r e d i t-worthy than the units indiv i d u a l l y  could 
be; and that the three territories had complementary economiesQ
which made a political union desirable. But as Franklin
puts it, even if these arguments were sound, they totally
9ignore that man does not live by bread alone. The economic 
arguments are, however, i n tr insically somewhat deceptive. The 
common market argument ignores the fact that the territories  
had always p o s s essed a common market before the Fede ration 
and could continue to do so even without it. A customs agreement 
had alr eady existed even without a customs union. The credit- 
w o r t hi ne ss  of the Federation, which was evident in the beginning, 
soon dwi ndled up when the flow of foreign capital stopped in 
face of continued political instability in the Federation. As 
for the c o m p l e m entariness of territorial economies, N y a s a l a n d  
labour had always flowed into the two other territories, and 
even after the Federation its products found the same outside 
markets as before.
As H a z lewood wrote, the economic interd e p e n d e n c e  of the 
three te rritories was not exceptionally great, n o t h i n g  like 
so great as that between Britain and the inde pendent Republic 
of Ireland. H a z l ewood remarked that if Nya s a l a n d  tea is drunk 
in Southern Rhodesia, so is China tea in London, but that was
The economic argument for the Federation has been s u p p orted by 
Harm  J. de Blij who thinks "The fact remains that federation  
is a sound obje ctive in this part of Central Africa, and the 
trag edy  is that the word and the concept are now asso ciated  
with white supremacy, colonialism, and imperialism". H. J. de 
Blij ( E d . ) , Systematic Political G e o g r a p h y , New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1967, p. 462. A more complete support of this 
pos it io n is to be found in H. J. de Blij, "Forced Wedding: 
Feder at ion in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland", in A f r i c a  S o u t h , 
Evanston: N o r t h - w e s t e r n  University Press, 1962, pp. 292-350.
Franklin, op. cit., footnote 6, p. 160. The economic aspects 
of the Federation have been studied by many scholars. Of 
special note are A. Hazlewood and P. D. Henderson, N y a s a l a n d  : 
The Economics of F e d e r a t i o n , Oxford: Blackwell, 1960; Shirley
Williams, Central Africa: The Economics of I n e q u a l i t y , London:
Fabian Society, 1960; and the two chapters "Federation and 
the Central African Economy" and "Federation and the D i s t r i ­
bution  of Economic Benefits" by W. J. Barber in Colin Leys 
and Cr anford Pratt (Eds.), A New Deal in Central A f r i c a ,
London: Heinemann, 1960, p p . 59-97. An excellent summary is
co nt ai ned in Harry Franklin's chapter on "Economies of 
Federa tion", Franklin, op. cit., footnote 6, p p . 160-170.
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no argument to federate U. K. with C h i n a . I n  fact the main 
economic interest in the Federation centred around the copper 
revenue of Northern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia received 
six and a half million pounds sterling of this revenue while 
Nyasaland received three and a half mi11ion--though neither 
of them contributed to the revenue of Northern Rhodesia itself. 
Thus in so far as Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were concerned, 
there were few or no clear gains in the Federation, apart from 
the monetary contribution to the latter.
2. The study of the Central African Federation offers us 
some valuable lessons in the role of effective size of 
constituent units in the functioning of a federal polity. The 
effective sizes of the three units under the Central African 
Federation came to be determined by the size of their electorates 
and the number of seats they held in the central legislature. In 
view of the extremely restricted franchise, the size of the 
federal electorate depended upon the size of the settler 
population in each territory. This made the predominance of 
Southern Rhodesia in the federal parliament inevitable. While 
the percentage breakup of the total population in the three 
territories was: Southern Rhodesia 34, Northern Rhodesia 30,
and Nyasaland 36; the distribution of the federal electorate 
between them was 75, 23, and 2 percent respectively. Thus,
while Nyasaland had a total population greater than Southern 
Rhodesia, her share in the federal electorate was only one- 
fiftieth as against Southern Rhodesia's share of three-quarters 
of the total electorate. This explains why despite her poverty 
Nyasaland shunned the three and a half million pounds of annual 
revenue and seceded from the Federation.
In fact the Central African Federation violated one of the 
primary rules of federalism, i. e., in a federation "there 
should not be one State so much more powerful than the rest 
as to be capable of vying in strength with many [or all] of 
them combined. If there be such a one and only one, it will 
insist on being the master of the joint deliberations . . . "  
and thereby vitiate the partnership by turning the other
A. Hazlewood, in The Listener, December 1961.
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components as its dependencies. With the control of the
three-quarters of the federal electorate, Southern Rhodesia 
proved such a unit in the Central African Federation.
3. So long as the African masses remained inarticulate, the 
Federation was naturally run by and for the South Rhodesian 
settlers. But when constitutional changes in the Protectorates 
made the so far "dumb" native people articulate by raising them 
to the "civilized" level through the grant of franchise in their 
territorial matters, change in the effective sizes of the 
constituent units of the Federation became imminent, for the 
federal electorate could not be restricted to the settler 
population alone. This threatened to cut South Rhodesia to 
size. For the settler population in Southern Rhodesia it also 
raised the alarming prospect that the continued partnership in 
the Federation might in time mean the grant of similar con­
cessions to its own native population. This would destroy the 
very basis of their "racial" supremacy. Hence, the South 
Rhodesian willingness to maintain the federal partnership also 
dis appeared.
It would appear that the Central African Federation violated
another essential condition for a stable federalism, i. e., the
units involved in a federation should possess mutual sympathy
for one another. As Mill says, a federation binds its
constituents "always to fight on the same side; and if they
have such feelings towards one another, or such diversity of
feeling towards their neighbours, that they would generally
fight on the opposite side, the federal tie is neither likely
to be of long duration, not [nor?] to be well observed while it 
12subsists". As already noted, the sympathies and fears of
the constituents in the Central African Federation were 
conflicting. The union, in fact, did not have any basis for 
cohesion; its failure was, therefore, inevitable.
4. Finally, contrary to what a political scientist may think, 
the Central African Federation was not "proposed on purely
n
J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative 
Gove rnment, Everyman's Library, London: J. M. Dent, 1947,
p p . 367-368.
Mill, op. cit,, footnote 11, pp. 366-367.
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geographic grounds", at least as a geographer would see ito 
The primary misconception in the Federation plan was that 
it tried to square unity with diversity in an area where the 
major diversities rather than having any inclusive territorial 
base, traversed the whole society in the form of "racial" 
or communal conflict. The essential politico-geographic 
base of the society was therefore plural rather than federal, 
for we have seen that federalism becomes nothing if it is 
required to cope with diversities that are not territorially 
based.
Riker, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 33.
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Chapter IX
FEDERATIONS THAT FAILED DESPITE THEIR 
POTENTIALLY FEDERAL BASES
1 * INDONESIA
Although federalism was a fleeting phase in the political 
development of Indonesia, a movement which started after the 
Second World War and was eclipsed soon after the Dutch left, 
still the reasons for its failure provide an interesting and 
rewarding study in the origins and stability of federalism.
Even before Dutch rule was imposed over the whole of
-^ rn J cJ\ o\-~the Indonesian realm, the archipelago was occasionally uni tedA äfor short periods of time when some power strong enough to 
subjugate others arose in the area. Two important periods 
of unification were the Sri Vijaya Kingdom (centred on south 
Sumatra) in the seventh century A. D. and the Majapahit Empire 
(based on eastern Java) of the fourt( A. D. But
and came only after very long intervals, since the forces 
of physical geography were too strong to be overcome by the 
rudimentary technology of the times.
The general picture of regional fragmentation did not 
change materially even under the Dutch for quite a long time, 
because the Dutch East India Company was primarily interested 
in the spice-trade and the establishment of its monopoly in 
the trade of the south-east Asian region. When the Dutch 
government assumed direct responsibility for the administration 
of the area in 1798, much of the old emphasis and the general 
pattern of the Company rule remained, and the country continued 
to be run almost like a business concern till 1870. Even 
the later Liberal and Ethical policies made no very significant 
changes in the general pattern of regional separation or 
fragmentation. The Dutch left the indigenous political 
institutions almost untouched and for a long time did not make 
large scale attempts at integrating their territorial dominion. 
They pursued a policy of concentration--!. e., concentrating
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
the periods of unification were always.comparatively short,A
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upon development of the more important areas, especially Java 
and later South Sumatra, and confining developmental activity 
in outer areas to the minimum needed to assert control. Hence 
local particularisms were not welded together. The primarily 
"indirect" Dutch rule did not favour an integrated evolution 
of the entire realm. Even later when all the land was declared 
the property of the Crown, the indigenous population in the 
different islands was "left the enjoyment of its own 
administration of justice".^
As there was only a very small Western-educated elite, the
nationalistic bonds born from a common education through a
common medium were also largely absent, though, as Leslie
Palmier says, because the most of the population was "blind",
2"The unseeing peasants followed the few with sight". Thus, 
only a sort of superficial unity for the limited purpose of 
freedom from colonial rule existed in the pre-independence
Indonesia. And when this purpose seemed to have been achieved
0  Kwith the departure of the Dutch and the achievement of MER^EßA
(freedom), divisive forces began to gain strength.
As C. D. Cowan has analyzed, though the pre-war Dutch
regime had imposed its administration over the archipelago,
it had failed to create a State or a nation there. The Dutch
policies were "inspired and sanctioned from outside; they did
not rest on the demand or consent of the governed". The result
was that "Before 1949 the peoples of the archipelago had never
3been united in one . . . state".
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE RISE OF THE FEDERATION 
Factors for Regional Identities 
The fundamental Indonesian problem springs from its
1
Article 130 of the Indies Constitution; cited in A. A. 
Schiller, The Formation of Federal I n d onesia, The H a u g e :
W. yan Hoeve Ltd., 1955, p. 1.
2 /
L. Palmier, Indonesia, London: Thames & Hudson Ltd.,
1965, p. 89.
C. D. Cowan, "The Political Evolution of Indonesia", 
in S. Rose (Ed.), Politics in Southern A s i a , London:
Macmillan Co., 1963, p. 236.
3
284
physical geographic fragmentation. Because the country
straddles the world's largest archipelago, it has to battle
4with "geography" to maintain itself. Its geographic dispersal 
has conferred on Indonesia a large number of regional 
diversities. While on the one hand there is a wide gap in 
the stages of cultural evolution between Java and the outer- 
islands, on the other their densities of population are 
also highly dissimi1ar--ranging from 1,168 per square mile 
in Java and Madura to a mere 18 in Indonesian Borneo and 8 in 
West Irian. If Bali and Lombok are grouped with Java, we find 
seventy percent of the country's population concentrated in 
less than seven percent of its area. This contrast has helped 
further to accentuate the manifold local rivalries which are 
almost inevitable in such a large and dispersed area. The 
degree of Indonesia's geographic fragmentation will be 
appreciated if we remember that its outer limits are separated 
by over 2,500 miles from east to west, and 1,250 miles from 
north to south--comparab1e to distances between the west coast 
of Ireland to the south shore of the Caspian, or from Portland 
(Oregon) to the Bermudas. Indonesia consists of some 3,000 
inhabited and uninhabited islands of various sizes and 
resources; the country's population includes speakers of 
at least 25 different languages and nearly 250 lesser dialects.
Because of the country's great dispersal and the negative 
tracts of uninhabitable swamps and uplands "the mingling and 
subsequent evolution of peoples and cultures have proceeded 
more or less independently in a whole series of separate centres, 
in each of which the several ingredients have been present
5in varying proportions and have combined in different ways".
Thus, physical and human geography have jointly fostered the 
rise of strong regional identities in Indonesia, which the 
Dutch rule left almost untouched.
4
Herbert Feith, "Indonesia" in George McT. Kahin (Ed.), 
Government and Politics in Southeast Asia, Ithaca, N. Y. : 
Cornell University Press, 1961, p. 155.
5
Charles A. Fisher, South-east Asia: A Social, Economic
and Political Geography, London: Mehtuen & Co., 1964,
p . 238.
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Then the Indonesian islands generally lack any significant 
degree of economic mutuality, except of course Java's 
dependence, on account of its heavily concentrated population, 
on the surplus produce of the other Indonesian territories,, 
Java's predominant size has further added to the sense of 
regional autonomy--i. e., the desire for a federation rather 
than a unitary organization of government. Furthermore, 
because the different islands were "left the enjoyment of . . 6
[their] own administration of justice", the archipelago was 
almost naturally divided into what Arthur Schiller calls 
different "law areas".6 7 This only further increased the urge 
for regional autonomy.
Factors for Indonesian Unity
Although the Dutch did not "create a state or a nation",
still we know that, once established, political frontiers
have a tendency to create national consciousness. Thus the
Dutch administration, by bringing the different island regions
together into a single political unit, helped to develop in
the peoples "a consciousness of kind" by joining the
archipelago's many patriotisms together into an all-embracing
nationalism which opened up "one great channel . . . into
which the countless little currents of local dissatisfaction
could merge and maintain themselves in collectivity rather
than dissipate themselves in the sands of their own isolated 
7parochialism".
Although the nature and extent of the Majapahit Empire 
are often exaggerated, the memory of this glorious past was 
very important, at least at the level of the elite, in the 
development of that community pride on which nationalism often 
feeds. The sense of community was greatly enhanced because 
of the fact that 90 percent of the people of the islands 
follow Islam. The religious unity acted as an in-group symbol 
against an alien power of a different religion. This overall 
religious unity coupled with the development of bazaar Malay 
as a strong link language between the island communities served
6
Schiller, op. cit,, footnote 1, p. 2.
7
George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961 (reprint),
p . 37 .
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to break down parochial tendencies* The Dutch had discouraged 
use of the Dutch language by the native people, and had them­
selves frequently used Malay for administrative purposes,, As a 
critic says, in discouraging the wide-spread use of the Dutch 
language, the Dutch thought that they were "forging a chain 
for their subjects, but they see now that they have given 
him a weapon, that terrible psychological weapon, a common
national language with which to express their common national 0aspirations".
Besides, there was the Volksraad, the top representative
council for the whole of Indonesia. Although its representative
character was almost a facade and its powers "not of
consequence", still "In bringing together Indonesians from the
various parts of the archipelago and making them more aware
of their common problems and common relationships with the
Dutch, this body tended to develop in them a more conscious 
9unity . . c". A further contributing factor was the increased
geographical mobility of people and ideas as a result of the 
twentieth-century pattern of economic organization, the inter­
island recruitment of labour to work on farms and factories, 
and the development of transport and communications.
From the above summary of the politico-geographic 
circumstances of Indonesia at the time of departure of the 
Dutch, it would appear that there were sufficiently strong 
forces for unity and separation in the country to present a 
characteristic situation for the rise of a federation. In this 
sense, the views of writers like Kahin and Schiller "that 
the opposition to the federal state of Indonesia was largely 
due to the fact that it was 'Dutch inspired" or 'Dutch 
imposed* rather than because of any intrinsic merit in the 
plan" would appear correct.8 910 But as Schiller agrees, there 
is also another view of some sound and unbiassed scholars 
who think that the idea of a federal State for Indonesia was 
artificial, and did not arise from spontaneous desires of the
8 ’
G . H. Bousquet, A French View of Netherlands Indies, 
translated from French by P. E. Lilienthal, London:
Oxford University Press, 1940, p. 89,
9
Kahin, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 39.
10
Schiller, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 9.
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regional governments (or their peoples) to federate with one 
another.
It is immaterial for the purposes of this study whether 
the proposal for federation by the Dutch was little more than 
a subterfuge, and that the Dutch had created puppet states 
so that by a policy of divide and rule they could forestall 
an independent Indonesia# as the Republic Indonesia delegation 
at the U . No 0. alleged, and as writers like Wolf and Kahin 
think.^ But it is important to examine whether or not there 
was "any intrinsic merit in the plan".
MERITS AND DEMERITS OF THE PLAN FOR 
INDONESIAN FEDERATION
Although we do not que s tion the desirability of union of 
the Indonesian realm as a single viable political community, 
in the paragraphs that follow we propose to indulge into a 
purely academic exercise in examining the feasibility and 
desirability of federalism in Indonesia in 1949.
1, As the foregoing discussion would show, regional identities 
in Indonesia were very strong--sometimes exclusive. Because 
of the extremely disparate size of Java's population, twice 
that of all other Indonesian territories combined, there was, 
it is believed, a strong desire on the part of other territories 
to remain separate or, at any rate, to seek guarantees for 
their regional autonomy. The imbalance between population and 
resources in Java gave cause for concern among the lesser 
territories of their eventual exploitation in a union dominated 
by Java. There would seem to have been almost a complete 
absence of what Riker would term, the "willingness to bargain" 
because most of the territories, other than Java, had little 
expectations of economic benefits from union either among 
themselves or with Java. Java of course, because of its small 
resource-base compared to its large population, found everything 
to its advantage in union. But for two reasons a genuine need 
or urge for bargain was absent on the part of Java. First, 
other than its human numbers the island had little to offer
n
Charles Wolf Jr., The Indonesian Story: The Birth, Growth
and Structure of the Indonesian Republic, New York: 1948,
p. 109. George McT. Kahin, "Indirect Rule in East Indonesia", 
Pacific Affairs, Vo1. 22, 1949, pp. 227-238.
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the other components of Indonesia; and secondly, because
of its overwhelming position in the group--its individual
strength being double the strength of all other constituents
combined--it felt no compulsion to bargain. The economic
argument against the Federation would be clear if we remember
that in 1955-56 approximately 71 percent of Indonesia's foreign
exchange earnings came from Sumatra and 17 percent from
the other outer areas, yet over 80 percent of these earnings
was spent on purchasing consumer and capital goods, food and
12raw materials, for the population of Java«
Viewed in this light, it would appear that there indeed
was an absence of any intrinsic merit in the plan for the
Indonesian Federation» But as writers have often failed
to point out, this intrinsic defect lay in the highly unequal
distribution of power among the component units of the union»
With two-thirds of the total population of the Union, Java
was a virtual colossus compared to the other members who
were mere pigmies» In fact, though the Indonesian units
possessed clearly identifiable regional personalities, because
of the extremely disparate sizes of the units involved, the
Indonesian situation was conducive to what may be termed a
"hegemonial alliance" rather than a federal union, Java,
therefore, violated one of the primary rules of federalism,
i. e», in a federation "there should not be one State so
much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying
1 3in strength with many [or all] of them combined"»
Furthermore, unlike Jamaica and Trinidad in the West 
Indies Federation, Java had no fear of being required to 
pay for union with territories poorer than herself. In every 
way Java had only to gain. And the stronger the grip over 
the union, the greater the possible benefits. A unitary 
government was therefore the best solution to Java's objective.
But to say that the federal plan had an intrinsic defect 
is not to say that the unitary plan was better suited. In view 
of the peculiar politico-geographic pattern of the archipelago,
12
Figures from Fisher, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 377.
13
J o S o  Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative 
Government, London: Everyman's Library, J, M. Dent, 1947
reprint, pp. 367-68.
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some kind of marriage between the two principles of governmental 
organ!zation--federal and uni tary--wou]d have been more 
desirable o
2. Charles Fisher describes the federal Republic of the
United States of Indonesia as "clearly a politico-geographical
monstrosity". The main basis for his remarks is that
In status the daerahs, all but one of which contained 
less than one million inhabitants each, were inferior 
to negaras whose population ranged from 1.5 million 
(South Sumatra) to 31 million of the Republic of 
Indonesia . „ * . Yet all these sixteen oddly assorted
units were to have equal representation in the Senate, 
and even in the lower house the Djokjakarta Republic 
was allotted only one third of the Representatives 
although it contained nearly half of the total 
population„14
In fact this smaller representation than the sheer weight
of population would warrant, should have been taken as a
condition for the bargaining that a federal union always
involves. As for the charge that none of the sixteen units
had any linguistic or historical validity, it may be said
that the people's representatives could resolve that problem
by mutual consent and redraw or modify the colonial boundaries
as was done in India. Nevertheless, one wonders if many
people living in the islands other than Java do not consider
it a politico-geographical monstrosity that a region which
earns only about a fifth of the nation's foreign exchange
eats up almost four-fifths of the total national earnings
in that respect. One can imagine what a Sumatran might think
if he were told that in India even on such small matters
as the location of an oil refinery slogans are raised that
15"Assam is being bled for Bengal".
To conclude, the politico-geographic situation in Indonesia 
in 1949 was federal in the sense that it consisted of a 
number of regionally grouped communities that while desiring 
union did not desire (complete) unity; an attitude which,
Dicey said, is fundamental to the rise of the sentiment for 
federalism. Indonesia, however, possessed one great defect 
which made the situation more conducive to a hegemonial
14
Fisher, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 362-63.
15
See Pran Chopra, Uncertain India, Bombay: Asia Publishing
House, 1968, p. 213.
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alliance rather than a federation which is essentially a 
union of equal partners. Like Prussia in the Bismarckian 
and Weimar Germany, Java in Indonesia dwarfed the other 
constituents and made a normal federal articulation impossible. 
Besides, not being rich enough to feed its own population,
Java, unlike Prussia, found a greater bargain in a unitary 
rather than a federal organization of State. With its over­
whelming size in the union Java was in a position to do 
whatever it chose; and because it chose the less cumbersome 
unitary organization, federalism died almost an instant death.
2• PAKISTAN
Ever since the birth of Pakistan in 1947, the political
institutions in the country "Despite their federal form, in
practice were worked in a highly centralized and essentially
unitary manner".1 There has all through been "a tendency
to give an authoritarian tinge to all [political] institutions" 
2in the country. As Governor-General, Jinnah, the founding 
father of Pakistan, extensively used the emergency powers 
of the office and made himself the real ruler of the country. 
The premiership never recovered from this invasion, and 
after 1953 these were "virtually two authorities striving 
for the seat of power. Since there was no parliament worth 
the name to sustain the premiers, the Cromwellian solution 
of army rule became inevitable".1 The head of the defence 
services, General Ayub Khan, took the reins of power in 1958, 
and after nearly four years of "no Constitution at all" the 
country received from the hands of the General her presently 
suspended Constitution in 1962. An English historian thinks 
that "Pakistani nationalism as a ruling passion is at present 
a hope rather than a motivating force", and adds that "The 
wonder is that the country lacking a general will strong 
enough to sustain an effective [united] authority has survived"
1
R . L . Watts, New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966, p, 349.
2
Percival Spear, "The Political Evolution of Pakistan etc." 
in S. Rose (Ed.), Politics in Southern Asia, London:
Macmillan Co . , 1963, p. 47 .
Spear, o p . cit. , footnote 2, pp, 33-34.
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even though under a military regime«,
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Despite such confusing phrases as "four thousand years 
of civilization in Pakistan", the political history of 
Pakistan begins from 1947 when the British at the insistence 
of the Musiim League agreed to divide India before quitting 
it.~* The Pakistan movement was itself launched for the first 
time only in 1935, Comprised of the two widely separated 
portions of the former British India, Pakistan was "launched 
with little [united] administrative or official inheritance 
and with none of the mystique of the old state [in union] 
whether of foreign or indigenous origin".  ^ Devoid of any 
very solid foundation--material or emotional--to build upon, 
the nation had to derive its strength from the separatist 
movement that gave it birth.
After its independence and inauguration Pakistan, like 
India, started with the 1935 pseudo-federal Constitutional 
Act, though power remained highly centralized under the 
Governor-General (Jinnah). When Jinnah died and Liaquat Ali 
Khan was assassinated, no all-Pakistan leader of significance 
was left to control the reins of power. From 1951 to 1953 
the country drifted towards impotence and disruption. As 
no agreement could be reached on the balance between East 
and West Pakistan, the draft Constitution made little progress.
When a draft Constitution was approved by the Constituent 
Assembly in September 1954, and the Assembly began enacting 
laws to curtail the powers of the Governor-General, the latter 
dismissed the Assembly, Shortly after a new Assembly was 
chosen (July 1955) and the four Provinces of the West were
4
Spear, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 47.
5
The evolution of Pakistan and the problems and prospects 
of the nation as they looked at the time of its birth have 
been presented in 0. H. K. Spate's articles "Geographical 
Aspects of the Pakistan Scheme", Geographical Journal,
Vol. 102, 1943, pp, 125-133, and "The Partition of India 
and Prospects of Pakistan", Geographical Review, Vol. 38, 
1947, pp. 5-29.
6
Spear, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 33.
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merged together to balance the solid weight of East Pakistan.
A new Constitution was proclaimed in March 1956 when the 
Governor-General assumed the new title of President, and the 
Constituent Assembly was renamed the National Assembly, 
Instability in the country continued, however. From March 
1956 to October 1958 there were four Prime Ministers--Chaudhri 
Muhammad Ali, Suharawardy, Chundrigar, and Firoz Khan Noon,
The President exercised considerable authority both in politics 
as well administration. General elections were promised for 
1958 but were postponed until 1959. In the meantime President 
Mirza p-ir nr 1 a t mff iü a coup d'etat and called the Army to assume 
power. The commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan, became 
the Prime Minister and three weeks later ousted Mirza and 
became himself the Presidento The assembly was dismissed, 
the Constitution abrogated, and all political parties were 
banned.
After four years of complete military rule, a new
Constitution was proclaimed by Ayub Khan in March 1962 which
came in force in June the same year. The new Constitution
made the central government what Chaudhri Muhammad Ali
called a government of the President, by the President, and
7for the President. By granting very extensive powers to
the President, and curtailing those of the Provinces, the
Constitution made "the federal character of . . . [Pakistan]0legally little more than a facade". Sayeed finds it
"difficult to describe Pakistani federalism as even quasi-
federal" for "the provinces are expected to function as mere
administrative agencies very much like local governments in
9a unitary state". It is said that
President Ayub's regime can be compared to the British 
viceregal system which existed in India during the 
thirties and forties of this century. Viceroys, like 
Ayub, also had a legislative assembly which they could 
control through their powers of certification of the 
budget and other legislative measures essential for 
the safety, tranquillity, or inertness of British India.
7
Dawn, April 2, 1963; cited in K. B. Sayeed, Political System
of Pakistan, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967, p. 105.
8
Watts, op. eit., footnote 1, pp, 239-240.
Sayeed, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 111.
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Like Ayub, they were also faced with opposition from 
political forces, but like Ayub they could often keep 
them under control with the help of the military and 
police power.
This viceregal system has aptly been called "constitutional 
autocracy".
After his ten years of absolute rule, the Army has 
pensioned off the viceroy, and another Commander-in-Chief 
has assumed the Presidential powers.
FACTORS IN THE RISE OF FEDERALISM
Forces Giving Rise to Separate Identities 
Pakistan presents an extreme example of a "fragmented" 
State. The two "wings" of the country sit one thousand 
miles apart on the shoulders of India, with which her 
relations have not been cordialo The sheer geographical 
distance between the two parts is enough to foster in them 
a strong sense of separateness. Pakistan is indeed a duality. 
It can be described in terms of two of everything. Whereas 
the Eastern wing far exceeds the West in total population, 
the West is six times the area of the East. The two do not 
even share common neighbours, except of course India. While 
West Pakistan stands in a continuous belt with the traditional 
Islamic homeland of South-West Asia, East Pakistan (East 
Bengal), bordered by India and Burma, looks more closely to 
the other part of Bengal in India (with which even till the 
last some of its leaders were reluctant to part company), 
and finds itself in many respect alien to the desert culture 
of Islam and its Arabic-Persian linguistic complex— her own 
language being highly Sanskritico
The two "wings" are unconnected with a body. The 
only apparent binding cord between the two is the thread of 
Islam. The two parts are not fed by common arteries. Their 
geographical circumstances are also highly dissimilar. One 
is dry, the other wet. East Pakistan mostly consists of 
the great deltaic plain. Rainfall is copious, and except 
for a small area along Assam and the border area with Burma, 
most of the surface is less than 50 feet above sea-level.
TÖ
Sayeed, op. cit., footnote 7, p p . 101-102.
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The whole of the province presents a flat and closely cultivated 
watery landscape,
Rivers are the chief means of transport in the Province,, 
Engaged in a continuous process of creating land, the rivers 
are frequently changing their courses. This makes the 
development of land transport difficult» In this region, 
made essentially of mud,, road-metals and ballast are non­
existent. Much of East Pakistan is therefore difficult of 
access and out of touch with the outside world.^ Despite 
its dense population, the Province is essentially rural.
Towns, mostly market centres, are few in number and, apart 
from Dacca, small in size.
Against this, West Pakistan is sub-tropical, dry, and 
in parts harshly arid. Unlike East Pakistan, it is not a 
homogeneous compact bloc. It includes the snowy mountainous 
country o /j*Hindukush^ snad KaraVnr.a/, f ierce desert country f 
in Sind and Baluchistan, and the Potwar plateau on the 
borders of Kashmir between the Indus and Jhelum rimmed to 
the east and south by the escarpments of the Salt Range 
with an average height of 3000 feet. South and east from 
Potwar lies the Punjab-Sind plain which forms a continuous 
belt with the rest of the Indo-Ganga flatness. While because 
of its more dependable rainfall and the close net of canals, 
cultivation is general in Punjab, in the rest of the plain 
arid and semi-arid conditions prevail. It is, indeed, a 
far cry from the humid and green East Bengal to the dry and 
almost desert Baluchistan. This contrast in the physical 
geographical personalities of the two "wings" has led to 
contrast in their human geographical personalities as well.
The people of the two wings of Pakistan are predominantly 
Muslim, but beyond that they are ethnically very diverse.
Western Pakistan is predominantly Scytho-Aryan, while Bengalis 
are Dravido-Mongoloid. There is great ethnic diversity 
among the people of the Western wing itself. The people 
have their own regional languages spoken in well-defined
areas. Important among these are Punjabi, Pushtu, Baluchi,3 kvi"Sindhi, and M uk r aiw. . Then, while the languages of Western
Ian Stephens, Pakistan, London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1963,
p. 3 9.
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Pakistan lean heavily on Arabic and Persian, Bengali is
primarily Sanskritic. Because of their largely common
sources in Arabic and Persian, the West Pakistani languages
are often mutually intelligible to some extent; but there
is nearly a complete linguistic barrier between the East
and West. Urdu serves as an effective link language in the
West, but it is not easily acceptable to the East*
Further, Bengalis are supremely conscious of their
distinct identity. They believe that "they are neither
12Aryans nor Arabs". "Bengalis feel that the land in which
they live and the language they speak have together given
them a uniqueness which . . . [is not] shared by . . .
the descendants of Arabs and Mughals who live in West 
13Pakistan". "Bengali culture" even though moulded by the
dominant influence of Bengali Hindus, had possessed certain
clearly secular strands in it. Even during the time of
Partition in 1947 there were a few influential Bengali Muslim
leaders like Suhrawardy who seriously considered the
establishment of a united and separate Bengal. Even as late
as 1954 the East Pakistani Chief Minister Fazlul Haq
said that he "would not take notice of the fact that there
was a political division of the Province of Bengal into East
14and West Bengal." East Pakistani leaders and university
students do not attach as great an importance to Islam as
a bond of unity between East and West Pakistan as West
Pakistani leaders and university students do; "This suggests
that the elite political culture in East Pakistan differs
15from that of West Pakistan". As an East Pakistani newspaper
has often pointed out, although Islam was the main source 
of inspiration that united East and West Pakistani Muslims 
in the forties, in the sixties this integrating force has
12
Shamsuddin Abul Kalam, "Social Questions in Bengali Fiction" 
in S. Sajjad Husain (Ed.), Dacca University Seminar on 
Contemporary Writings in East Pakistan, Dacca: Dacca
University, 1958, p. 60.
13
Sayeed, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 185.
14
Reported in Statesman, Calcutta, May 10 , 1954 .
15
Sayeed, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 188.
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been replaced by the utilitarian economic cleavage.
The two wings of Pakistan possess almost completely 
separate economies. Because of the great physical distance 
that separates them, there is practically no mobility of 
labour. Mobility of goods is also extremely difficult. It 
takes seven days to move goods from one Province to the other. 
In East Pakistan cement imported from Yugoslavia is cheaper 
than that from Karachi. As The Pakistan Observer noted, 
since West Pakistani industries have been operating behind 
protective tariff walls, East Pakistan has been purchasing 
West Pakistani goods at higher prices than it would have
17paid for the same goods if they had been purchased abroad.
Besides the great barriers that stand between the East
and West, there are a number of regionally based diversities
in the western wing itself. Before the whole of the West
was merged into one to create a single unit, most of these
regionally identifiable ethnic groups in the West had
possessed somewhat clearly identifiable political areas. The
strength of this federalizing force is clear especially with
regard to the Pathans , who like the Bengalis form a very
cohesive group and are "conscious of belonging to a separate
race and possessing a separate culture symbolized by Pakhtun
18wali (tribal code of honour)." Indeed the demand is
strong for a separate State called Pakhtunistan that would 
include all the Pushtu-speaking areas--the tribal areas in 
the northwest, the former North West Frontier Province, and 
parts of Baluchistan. Other linguistic areas also greatly 
resent the so-called Punjabi domination under the one-unit
16
The Pakistan Observer, November 10 and 13, 1967; cited
in Sayeed, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 188.
17
The Pakistan Observer, editorial: "The Perils of
Industrialization I", April 30, 1965. See also Economic
Disparities Between East and West Pakistan, Dacca: East
Pakistan Government Press, 1963, p p . 28-29, cited in Sayeed,
op. cit., footnote 7, p. 199.
18
Sayeed, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 186. See also K. B. Sayeed, 
Pathan Regionalism, Reprint No. 13, Duke University Common­
wealth Studies Centre, 1964. As Percival Spear, op. cit., 
footnote 2, p. 40, says "The Punjabi, the Pathan, the Sindhi 
and the Bengali has each in his mind's eye 'an emerald isle, 
set in the silver sea, a demi-paradise'".
297
scheme, and demand their regional autonomy. The new military 
administration has promised advances in this direction though 
the exact nature of these cannot be known until a popularly 
elected government comes into office«,
Forces for Unity
Despite all the diversities that separate East and West 
Pakistan, there definitely were some strong binding factors 
that pulled the two widely apart regions together into a 
single State. After the Pakistan Resolution of the Muslim 
League in 1940, Islam became the only identifying feature 
for the majority of Muslims in the undivided India.
Howsoever great the differences between the East Bengalis 
and other Muslims in the west, they recognized a separate 
identity from the Hindus, and to that extent were one. On 
the question of Hindus versus Muslims their feelings were 
exploited by the Muslim League, and on that question they 
were prepared to rise and fall together. But once this 
separate identity was granted, the sentiment for unity born 
out of the consciousness of religious brotherhood was numbed 
and "other purposes" began to stir them. Though at the 
level of the common man Islam versus Hinduism continued as 
a uniting force between the two wings of Pakistan, frequent 
observations of responsible East Pakistanis would show that 
it has for quite some time been progressively receding in 
strength.
Once the Partition was effected and Pakistan became a
reality, another strong factor for unity was born. This was
the fear of a big neighbour (India) fed upon the hatred
of Hinduism and the bitter memories of the Partition. Now
the two sections had to unite in order to retain any semblance
of strength. Pakistan in this sense is, indeed, a very
extraordinary country. Few others in the modern world can
be said to have been created to embody a belief, or a doctrine 
19or a theory. However, although a powerful force for union,
fear is not satisfactory as the sole ingredient of national 
cement.
Arnold Toynbee describes Pakistan as a child of encounter
19
Stephens, op. cit., footnote 11, p. 13.
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and strife that has arisen from the impact of Islam upon 
Hinduism. Though "If in Pakistan political allegiance 
were to be decided on lines of race or language, Pakistan 
would immediately fall to pieces „ . . [a ] common adherence
to Islam proved a stronger spiritual force among Pakistani 
Muslims than the differences which otherwise might have been 
disruptive".2 ^
The above analysis should make it clear that Pakistan 
soon after its birth did possess regionally grouped political 
communities with strong regional identities. The communities 
desired union but not complete unity. Hence a federal 
situation of a sort was present. But a closer look would 
reveal that the characteristic balance between the forces 
of unity and separation that is the essence of federalism 
was absent. The forces for separation were stronger than 
those for cohesion, at least in so far as the two wings 
were separately concerned. The sentiment for unity based 
solely on religion was quite fragile and limited. The 
situation was, in fact, confederal rather than federal.
The two wings could set up a common court of consultation 
(i. e., some kind of alliance) but not a truly half-way
house that a federation is.
In West Pakistan, however, where now a single unitary
government exists, a characteristic federal situation would
seem to have existed. But while a unitary government was
imposed in the West, the two "wings" were joined together
under a form of government whose "federal character . . .
[was] little more than a facade". The natural results of
this unnatural creation are that "Unlike the federal system
of the United States or Australia the sense of common
2 1nationality is getting weaker in Pakistan".
CONCLUSIONS
1. Like most other federations Pakistan also was born under
20
Arnold J. Toynbee, "Pakistan as an Historian Sees Her" in 
Crescent and Green: A miscellany of Writings on Pakistan,
London: Cassell & Co., 1955, p. 2.
G. W. Choudhury, Democracy in Pakistan, Dacca: Green
Book House, 1963, p. 225,
21
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a possible military threat, in this case from the predominantly 
non-Muslim India. The very basis of Pakistan's nationhood 
was the fear and hatred of Hindus,, So it was natural for 
Pakistani leaders to play upon the fear of India when the 
enthusiasm for the "new paradise" was fresho Since throughout 
Pakistan's existence over the past two decades relations 
with India have remained tense, the two wings remained 
strongly united despite unsatisfactory conditions within 
the country. Thus in Pakistan also live political frontiers 
seem to have fostered stability and unity. A comparison 
with the West Indies would show the vital importance of 
military threat, actual or assumed, in the rise and survival 
of some federations.
2. The Pakistani example is also a good reminder of the 
fact that superficial external threat or a temporary sense 
of unity born from allegiance to a common religious faith 
etc. are not sufficient factors for the national cohesion 
that a continued federal unity and stability demands. The 
essence of federalism is that the partners involved in the 
union should feel that they are better within than without 
the federation. For this it is necessary that the units in 
general benefit economically and politically from this 
partnership, that is, the federation should help the units 
to tide over certain of their urgent economic and other 
problems that they are not able to do in isolation. A study 
of Pakistan's economic development since its inauguration
I*would show that in so far as East Pakistan is concerned, the
2 2Federation has failed to offer adequate dividends. The
result is that even after eighteen years of Pakistan's existence,
and despite the quasi-viceregal regime of Ayub Khan, the
East Pakistani Finance Minister said in 1965 that "it would
be unfair to expect that our spiritual bond through Islam
will be so strong that we shall forget our economic disparities
2 3and will still remain united and unified as a nation". As
in most other human affairs, in federalism too, the bread- 
and-butter questions remain of vital importance.
22
See appendix to this chapter for a brief note on disparities 
between the two wings of Pakistan.
Moring News , July 1, 1965; cited in Sayeed, op. cit.,
footnote 7 , p. 188.
23
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3. Pakistan presents an interesting case study in the role 
of size in the rise and working of federalism. While the 
eastern wing is just over one-sixth of West Pakistan in area, 
it considerably exceeds the West in total population» Under 
normal conditions, when population is backed by resources, 
granted the degree of disparity in the relative size of 
the populations of the diverse units involved in the union 
in 1947, a federal union of the normal type would not have 
been possible because East Bengal, standing as a single 
unit with more population than all the different units in 
the West combined, would have become a paramount partner 
in the unit. And, as J. S. Mill said, in a federation there 
should not be one unit so much more powerful than the rest 
as to be capable of vying in strength with many or all of 
them combined. Thus, on the face of it, the situation was 
at best confederal rather than federal.
But two factors acted against East Bengal and reduced 
its effective weight in the Federation. First, to the 
East Bengali mind, West Pakistan, despite its political 
fragmentation, presented a compact Urdu-speaking bloc 
(even though Urdu is not the native speech of any of the 
regions in West Pakistan). The assemblage of the tall leaders 
of the Pakistan movement in the West further heightened the 
image of the strength of the western wing. Added to this 
was the greater prosperity of the western wing as a whole 
relative to the East.
Secondly, once Pakistan was born as a Muslim State 
based on religious intolerance and hatred towards Hindus 
in India, the image in the Pakistani mind of the overall 
politico-geographical strength of the two wings became highly 
different from what the mere size of their populations would 
warrant. While the West formed part of a continuous belt 
of Islamic brotherhood stretching through South-West Asia to 
northern Africa, East Bengal was a detached island of Islam 
one thousand miles away, and surrounded by infide1s--Hindus 
in India and Buddhists in Burma. In the pan-Islamic image 
of the Pakistani mind the western wing seemed to form, 
therefore, a strong bulwark against cow-worshipping India.
This mental image of the political geography of their homeland 
made the East Bengali doubt his country's real strength
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vls-ä-vis West Pakistan» Thus, at the time of Pakistan's 
inauguration, in the Pakistani mind these disparities in the 
size of the population of the two wings did not weigh in 
the manner that they would otherwise do.
Soon after inauguration and the achievement of the 
"paradise", as the nation began to settle down to business, 
these disparities came to the surface since under a democratic 
system size of population is bound to form the greatest weight 
in intranational affairs. And granted the political 
fragmentation of the West, as compared to the solid bloc of 
Bengalis in the East, the latter, under a system of 
representation by population, were bound to predominate in 
the national politics. This would have shifted the axis of 
power in the nation from Karachi to Dacca, for in 1951 East 
Bengal had a total population of 41.9 million as against West 
Pakistan's combined total of 33.7 million.
Then, the Bengalis were able to win the support of the 
Frontier and the Sindhi groups in West Pakistan in the 
central legislature because of the resentment that these 
groups also often displayed towards the Punjabi domination. 
Under these circumstances the Punjabi group was apprehensive 
that if the western wing remained fragmented as it was, the 
politicians from Bengal would be able to isolate the Punjabis 
by winning support from the other smaller West Pakistani 
groups, and thus emerge as the leaders of the Federation. For 
this reason no legitimate proposals made by the Constituent 
Assembly with regard to the distribution of seats in the 
central legislature could be acceptable to the leaders from 
Punjab. The game of political arithmetic was started, and a 
proposal for a single unit for West Pakistan was put forward. 
But the leaders of the constituent units were not agreeable 
to such a proposal. Attempt was then made for a sub-federation 
of the western units but this also failed to receive the 
requisite support. Faced with a showdown between himself and 
the Bengal-Sind group in the Assembly, the Governor-General 
dissolved the Assembly (October 4, 1954) and appointed
a "ministry of talents" consisting of a number of former 
or active military and civil servants who launched upon 
a course of "guided democracy".
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The new regime quickly set out to achieve the one-unit
plan for West Pakistan. Within five months of the dissolution
of the national Assembly through appropriate dismissals and
installations of pliable regimes in the Provinces, the
Governor-General was all set to legalize the creation of
one-unit West Pakistan. On March 27, 1955 the appropriate
ordinance was issued, though in view of the Federal Court's
objection it was required to receive the assent of the
National Assembly, which was reorganized in July 1955 and
passed the one-unit plan on 30 September the same year.
Now with only two units in the Federation, the country was
put under a perpetual tug of war of which no democratic
solution has so far seemed possible. Thus Pakistan like
Nigeria shows that in a federation it is desirable that the
number of the constituent units should not be so small
as to make it possible for only one type of cleavage to
perpetuate itself in the federal relationship.
4. As regards my hypothesis of cross-cutting federal
cleavages, Pakistan offers a negative proof. So long as
Pakistan was not achieved, to all questions Jinnah's reply
was "First get the government, this is a nation without any
territory or any government". After Pakistan was achieved,
one could say that Pakistan had a government and a territory
24but one often wondered if it was a nation. Nine years
after the birth of Pakistan an East Bengali legislator could
say "It is a country which is in reality not one country.
2 5We are going to form one nation out of two peoples".
As analyzed in the foregoing pages, except for religion the 
two wings of Pakistan have little in common. Their State- 
idea was based primarily on Islamic brotherhood and the 
fear of India which originated from the peculiar circumstances
24
Sayeed, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 66.
25
Constituent Assembly Debates I, January 16, 1956,
p. 1816; cited in Sayeed, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 66.
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of the country's birth. 26 But though strong in the West,
this fear was far less effective in the eastern wing.
Furthermore, the religious bond does not provide a unique
raison d'etre, since there are other Muslim countries which
are fairly close neighbours but the Islamic bond has not
been able to unite them. Because of the absence of any
interlinking cleavages the incompatibility between the two
wings of Pakistan has been difficult to reconcile. The
attempt to yoke the camel and water buffalo together is
2 7indeed a very formidable task.
3 * THE WEST INDIES 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
From almost the very beginning of their settlement 
talks of a closer union of the West Indian islands were 
heard; certain areas shared governors; and the Leeward 
group had also a federation of some sort from 1871 to 1957.
Yet on the whole there had been little unification in 
practice and each island outside the tiny islets of the 
Leeward group went its own way. Shortly after the creation 
of the Leeward Islands Federation an attempt to join 
Barbados in a federal union with the Windward Islands was 
dropped in view of violent opposition in Barbados. After 
this, no attempt at a federal union of the islands was 
made until the end of the Second World War. Before the 
Labour movements of the 1930s the proposals for a closer 
union or federation of the West Indian islands and Territories 
came largely from the British authorities who felt the 
need for administrative economy. It never came as a 
popular demand.
It seems relevant to note that Iqbal's concept of a 
separate and independent Muslim State in the northwest 
of India, which he put forward at the Muslim League session 
in December 1930, did not include the Muslim majority 
areas of Bengal; nor does Bengal figure among the 
countries included in the mnemonic "PAKISTAN" put forward 
by its begetter Choudhry Rahmat Ali: See his Pakistan :
The Fatherland of the Pak N a t i o n , London: The Pak
National Liberation Movement, 1947, p. 225.
The camel/water buffalo met;
26
O . H , K , S pate,
is borrowed from Professor
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By the 1930s, however, local opinion had begun to change
es pe cia lly  as the Labour movement under the leadership of
Arthur Cipriani and Hubert Crichlow in Trinidad and Tobago,
and under Duncan O'Neil in Barbados, gained strength.
For the time being, the distinction between political 
refor m and economic b et terment was blurred, and the 
popular leaders agitated for constitutional change and 
social justice with equal fervor and in the same breath. 
Their main targets for attack were their different local 
gove rnments and ruling classes, but the target they all 
held in common was the colonial office, which represented 
the ultimate source of constitutional r e f o r m . 1
The leaders of the eastern Caribbean territories often met
for di sc ussion and formulation of common courses of action
and they accepted union of their territories as a remedy for
their individual weakness. In all the legislatures the
qua li fi ca tions for vo ting and mem b e r s h i p  had been care fully
res tr ic te d to exclude the w o r king classes. Even at the end
of the 1930s the number of registered voters ranged only
2betw een  two and ten p e r cent of the total adult population.
In 1932 leaders of the eastern islands met in Dominica 
and decided upon a West Indian federation, but the proposal 
was reject ed by the Closer Union Commission of 1932-33.
This rej ection of a po p u l a r  demand only further h e l p e d  the 
as ce nde ncy of the Labour m o v e m e n t  and brought the po p u l a r  
forces in whole of the West Indies together. Thus, by 1938 
new po lit ical leaders in the eastern Caribbean had de cided 
that they must work together and support each other, whether 
in their demands on the Colonial Office, or in their n e g o t ­
iations with sugar and other employers. "The sense of being 
'all West Indians together' had taken hold. Not so in
3Jamaica." Ja maica and the Leeward group were not r e p r esented 
in either of these conferences. In 1945 in a conference in 
Barbados, Jamaica and Leeward Islands, as also Bahamas, 
joined and formed the Caribbean Labour Congress. Resolutions
1
H. W. Springer, Refl ection s on the Failure of the First 
West Indian F e d e r a t i o n , Cambridge, Mass.: Center of
Intern ational Affairs, Harvard University, 1962, p. 3.
2
M o r d e c a i , The West Indies:___The Federal N e g o t iations
London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. , 1968, p. 20,
John M o r d e c a i , op. cit„, footnote 2, p. 29.
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for federation and economic development were passed» Norman 
Manley, the Jamaican leader wrote.? "we of the Progressive 
Movements in Jamaica have stepped right out of the frame­
work in which we saw our problems . . * in isolation as
4affecting ourselves alone."
Besides the Labour movement, World War II had also
drawn the West Indian colonies closer together by forcing
the need for united action and the expansion of transport
facilities. The Colonial Development and Welfare Organization
and the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission introduced the
habit of planning development on a regional basis» Indeed,
here for the first time was a West India-wide adminis­
trative unit dealing with every aspect of the islands' 
affairs, except political aspects. Its staff travelled 
all over the islands; held conferences bringing people 
from the islands together; and behaved generally as 
if West Indies were already a single political unit.5
By the end of the Second World War, at least the eastern
Caribbean and the Colonial Office were favourable to
federation, A despatch from the Secretary of State in March
1945 invited the islands to meet and discuss a positive
advance towards federation. The Caribbean Labour Congress
met in conference in September 1947 at Kingston (Jamaica)
at which leaders of the various territories reaffirmed their
belief in federation and submitted proposals for a constitution
to the Montego Bay Conference which followed immediately.
At Montego Bay representatives of the West Indian governments
met with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur
Creech Jones. The principle of federal union was agreed
upon and committees were appointed to submit proposals for
a constitution and to consider other aspects of union. It
took, however, nine years to decide upon the nature of the
union. The agreement for federation was signed on February
23, 1956. By this time, however, owing to changed political
and economic situation in and around the West Indies, the
enthusiasm for union had waned. Consequently a very loose
federation--almost a confederation--with a weak and
4
Caribbean Labour Congress, Official Report of the Conference 
held at Barbados, September 17-27 , 1945 , pp. 36-37 ;
cited in Springer, op, cit „ , footnote 1, pp. 6-7.
5
Mordecai, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 31.
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ineffective centre emerged. The Constitution finally came 
into operation on January 3, 1958,
Nature of the Federation
The West Indies Federation has been considered as one 
of the weakest federal systems ever to come into existence.
Its weakness was apparent in the limited legislative powers 
of the federal government, the failure to agree on a customs 
union, the restrictions on migration between the islands and 
the extremely shaky state of the federal finances. Even 
these limited powers were not to be fully exercised by the 
federal government at the start. The Federation had no 
power of taxation. Receipts from the customs and excise 
duties were supposed to be adequate for federal needs. And 
even on this source a ceiling was fixed at $9,120,000 (West 
Indian) , an amount which was only a fraction of the annual 
budgets of either Trinidad and Tobago or Jamaica, and less 
than half of Barbados. It would appear, therefore, that 
right from the beginning it was planned as a peripheralized 
federation.^
The federal legislature was bicameral. The Senate 
was a states' House with equal representation for each of 
the island colonies. There were nineteen senators--two 
from each island unit except Montserrat which, because of 
its tiny size, had only one. The Senate remained a nominee 
house with advisory rather than legislative functions. The 
House of Representatives was an elected body of forty-five 
members. Representation was not directly proportionate to 
population though the more populous islands were given 
larger representation. Jamaica had seventeen representatives, 
Trinidad and Tobago ten, Barbados five, Montserrat one, and 
each of the remaining units two. Only about four years 
after its inauguration the federation was dissolved on 31 
May, 1962 and in the very first sitting of the House of 
Representatives a voice for secession had been raised by a 
Jamaican representative.
Details in C. B. Bourne, "The Federation of the West 
Indies", University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 13, 
1959-60, pp. 152-153.
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POLITICO-GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS IN THE RISE 
AND FAILURE OF THE FEDERATION
It would appear, on the face of it, that the British 
West Indies had every reason to succeed as a federation.
Except for Trinidad's "racial" complexity, a near homogeneity 
was present in the ethnic composition of the population.
The colonies had a long history as British possessions.
They did not have any memories of historical conflicts to 
divide them. They had possessed some common services, like 
the University College of the West Indies. They had a 
common language for education and intellectual intercourse. 
With a total area of 8000 square miles and a population of 
three million they could, it would appear, be easily governed 
from a single centre. Jamaica, no doubt was removed from 
the other islands by a thousand miles of sea but with modern 
transport it should not have been very difficult to join it 
effectively with the rest in view of the seemingly so over­
whelming factors for unity among them. Still, the Federation 
failed. It is, therefore, interesting to investigate the 
politico-geographic factors that led to such a loose union 
and its quick dissolution.
Despite broad ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, cultural 
affinity, similarity of colonial experience and relative 
geographic proximity, the West Indies did actually lack some 
of the essentials of a centralized federation. The politico- 
administrative heritages of the colonies were highly 
dissimilar. Despite their tiny size, each one had possessed 
its own separate administration except the Leeward group 
which had formed a federation. Even where some inter-island 
rapport was established, it remained limited only to sharing 
of a governor. Practically each island colony had its own 
postal stamps, its own separate economy competing with 
rather than complementing the others; they produced almost 
the same goods for export and looked to the same markets.
Their currencies also varied. While the eastern Caribbean 
islands and British Guiana adopted the British West Indian 
dollar in 1951, Jamaica chose to retain its own separate 
currency. Unlike the British Indian provinces, in the West 
Indies each major island had formed a separate colony.
Hence their relations to one another resembled those between
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India and Ceylon or between the Straits Settlements in Malaya 
and the British territories in North Borneo.
The eastern Caribbean and Jamaica had no direct steam­
ship communications, they did not read each other's newspapers
and at the level of the common man they were hardly aware
7of each other's existence except on the cricket field.
Lord Halifax reported in 1922 that "the postal authorities 
in Jamaica [were] usually compelled to send mails for Trinidad, 
Barbados and British Guiana via either England, New York orQHalifax". As a West Indian scholar wrote in 1953, they
were still unsure of themselves and "still trying to discover
9. . . what makes us characteristically West Indian?". It
is said that "only when the West Indies cricket team is 
playing do the islanders from the Windwards and Leewards, 
from Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados, recognize themselves 
as 'West I n d i a n s ' O p p o r t u n i t i e s  for the development of 
a strong sense of belonging together were drastically 
lacking. Since each island was its own little world, their 
national aspirations were divided rather than united.
Since the 1920s, soon after the British West Indian 
troops returned from the First World War, an incipient West 
Indian nationalism had begun to rise largely as a reaction 
of the West Indians to their common experiences as an 
under-privileged minority while a b r o a d . ^  They felt the 
need for having and belonging to some nation of their own.
This feeling was further heightened by the Labour movement 
of the 19 30s.
But all along these cross-currents of union had flowed
7
Mordecai, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 30.
8
Cited in Douglas G. Anglin, "Political Development of 
the West Indies", in D. Lowenthal (Ed.) The West Indies 
Federation, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961,
p . 4 0.
9
H. W. Springer, "On being a West Indian", Caribbean Quarterly, 
Vol. 3, 1953, p. 181; cited in D. Lowenthal, "Social
Background of West Indian Federation", in Lowenthal, op. 
cit., footnote 8, p. 67.
10
"The Caribbean Birthday", New Statesman, Vol. 55, 1958,
p . 3 9 7 .
Springer, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 39.
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only in the eastern Caribbean. Jamaica was too remote to 
be affected. Thus
when the federation was created in 1958 it was for 
the Eastern Caribbean the fulfilment of the political 
ambitions of forty years, . . . whereas in Jamaica it
was still a recent and strange idea . . . which had
not yet sunk into the popular sub-conscious.
Even in the eastern Caribbean the feeling for nationalism 
was not intense. In fact, the raw materials for rabid 
nationalism, such as long felt and long resented oppression 
by an alien power, or legal discrimination based on racial 
or cultural differences, or occurrence of affronts to 
personal dignity from motives of racial prejudice, which give 
rise to corporate resentment against the dominant power, 
were largely absent. Ever since the abolition of slavery, 
equality before the law had been provided for, and wherever 
expressions of prejudice occurred they were due to local 
rather than imperial reasons. Hence the colonial resentments 
were intra-island rather than between the islands and the 
metropolis. This meant the absence of any binding West India­
wide resentment.
Unlike countries with older civilizations such as India,
that usual food for nationalism--the defence of national
culture from foreign domination--was absent in the West
Indies. "There is in fact no indigenous culture" says a
1 3West Indian scholar. Grievances of the 1930s against
restrictive franchise and working conditions were not of the 
type that engender passionate feelings for nationalism.
Still, the attractions for independent nationhood were 
great and because the islanders felt that each of their 
units was too small to gain independence singly, they joined 
together in their move for constitutional reforms and 
independence in a federation. But their move started too 
late to offer them any real opportunity for struggle. The 
Government of India Act of 1935 had already set the pace 
for internal self-government for the British colonies, and 
later with the independence of India, the eventual independ­
ence of other British colonies had become a real prospect.
12
Mordecai , o p . ci t . , footnote 2, P • 30 .
13
Springer, op. c i t . , footnote 1, p. 40 .
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Thus unlike India, the West Indies found the imperial
government willing to grant them political independence.
In this atmosphere of seemingly benevolent cooperation,
the West Indian nationalism did not have a chance to develop
into an intense passion. When at the Montego Bay Conference
in September 1947 independence was clearly promised, no
cause was left to keep West Indian nationalism aflame, and
when it became clear that union was not necessary for
independence, the feeling for federation waned. After 1947,
instead of being united in the struggle for independence,
the leaders of the islands became engaged in bargaining and
securing safeguards for their own "countries". This brought
their separatist identities strongly to the fore, and in the
absence of any compelling reasons--economic or military--
no need for sacrifice and federal compromise was felt. Thus
instead of a modern centralized federalism a near-confederation
was created. The union was in this sense still-born.
Although expectations of mutual economic benefits in
union were weak, and there was no external threat to the
collective security of the island communities, still there
are strong reasons to believe that if the Federation had
been created right in 1947 rather than after a gestation of
eleven years, it would have been centralized in nature and
could very possibly have survived. In human affairs it
is not so much the realities as the images of the realities
that are decisive. In 1947 the West Indians felt that they
are all on a sea of world conditions, stormy and 
hazardous in the extreme, each huddled in some little 
craft of our own. Some hardly have oars and only a few 
have accomplished a rudimentary sail to take them along. 
And here [in the form of the Federation] offered us 
is a boat, substantial, capable of being made sea­
worthy and ready to be manned by our own captains and 
our own crew. If we won't leave our little boats and 
get into that larger vessel which is able to carry us 
to the goal of our ambitions, then I say without 
hesitation that we are damned and purblind and history 
will condemn us .^
But in the ensuing eleven years conditions in the two 
larger islands--Jamaica and Trinidad, which together
Statement by Norman Manley at the Conference on the Closer 
Association of the British West Indian Colonies, London, 
1948. Cited in Springer, op, cit., footnote 1, p. 8.
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contained three-fourths of the population of the Federation--
changed materially. They no longer found their ships in
storm and their sails rudimentary. Bauxite mining and the
expanding tourist trade gave a great fillip to the economy
of Jamaica. Trinidad, no doubt, had all through stood
above others, but her position also changed for the better
when her oil production more than doubled, and her secondary
manufacturing industries increased. Gross domestic production
in Jamaica rose from US$336 million in 1954 to US$582.4
million in 1959, an increase of 73 percent. Trinidad during
the same period recorded a rise from US$235.7 million to
US$452 million, an increase of 92 percent. Further, as
Mordecai explains, in 1947 the individual governments had
not received internal self-government with ministerial
15responsibilities. The politicians therefore, had not yet
acquired that sweet experience of running their own island
affairs, which later made them increasingly unwilling to
endow the Federation with adequate powers. The results are
clearly seen in that the federal government emerged from
the 1953 conference with less revenue than the Standing
Closer Association Committee had proposed in 1949. It
emerged from the 1956 London conference with even fewer powers
than had been agreed in 1953; and by the time of the
independence conference (June 1961) it was further away
from real power than was contemplated in 1956.
Two basic factors inhibiting the rise of a strong
sense of belonging together among the island communities
were geographical isolation and lack of communication as
well as lack of strong incentives--economic and strategic
--for a federal bargain. Their isolation had heightened
their differences. As the West Indian Royal Commission put
it, the average West Indian labourer is "more strictly
confined to his own island . . . than the English labourer
was tied to his parish in the most rigid phase of the
16Settlement Law". Facilities for inter-island movement
15
Mordecai, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 49.
16
The West Indian Royal Commission (1938-1939) Report,
British Command Paper, Cmd 6607, London, 1945, p. 11. Cited 
in D. Lowenthal "The West Indies Chooses a Capital", 
Geographical Review, Vol. 48, 1958, p. 340.
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were few, and "For Trinidadians London is even now easier
1 7to reach than Jamaica". Even the eastern Caribbean
islands, only 50 to 100 miles apart, must rely for contact 
on unreliable schooners and motor vessels notorious for 
discomfort and inconvenience. A regular steamer service 
inaugurated in 1955 survived for only two years because of 
the lack of adequate traffic.
But while their geographical isolation and the consequent 
strong regional identities tended to keep the island colonies 
apart, there were no compelling external threats or internal 
opportunities to draw them together. The small islanders 
had all through remained staunch federalists because the 
union seemed to offer them great economic dividends. Jamaica 
also was federalist when she found her fragile boat in a 
stormy sea before her economic boom that followed the bauxite 
mining. In the beginning the federal union with its prospects 
of a customs union and unrestricted inter-island mobility 
seemed to offer great economic advantages to Jamaica's 
land-hungry and unemployed population who could, under a 
union of the entire British West Indies, seek footings in 
the relatively empty British Honduras and British Guiana.
But when these two territories declined to join the federal 
union, much of this federalist enthusiasm in Jamaica cooled.
Still, however, because of its overwhelming size,
Jamaica had the prospect of becoming the dominant partner
in the Federation, possibly also the seat of the federal
capital, and definitely the leader in the federal government.
It had possessed the region's only seat of university
education, and had expected to provide the first leaders of
the federal government. As an important Jamaican journal
put it, the Jamaicans compromised on the federal capital
issue rather easily because they still believed that "It
would obviously be inadvisable for Jamaica to provide the
Federation with its Capital, its Prime Minister and its
1 8Governor-General, as well". But when the Federation
actually came into being, all these Jamaican hopes and
17
Lowenthal, op. cit., footnote 16, p. 340.
18
Public Opinion, January 5, 1957; cited in Lowenthal,
op. cit., footnote 16.
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expectations were belied. Already the distribution of 
representation in the central legislature as agreed in 
1953 gave Jamaica only 38 percent of the seats in the House 
of Representatives when her population entitled her to 52 
percent. Later when the federal capital was selected in 
Trinidad, the Federation appeared to the Jamaicans as some­
thing removed from them by a thousand miles. Then as the 
powers of the federal government were not of consequence, 
none of the top leaders of Jamaica--neither Manley nor 
Bustamante--stood for the federal legislature, and the Prime 
Ministership went to Grantley Adams of Barbados.
Out of the eleven ministerial seats in the Federation 
only two went to the Jamaican representatives, and of these 
only one carried a portfolio. Thus, the Federation as it 
finally came into existence lost any emotional attraction 
for the Jamaican masses. But while offering none of the 
projected advantages, the Federation appeared as a definite 
hindrance to Jamaica's economic development by standing in 
the way of the island's protectionist policy for industrial 
development. Now with the forces of separation overwhelming 
those for union, Jamaica found little interest in the Union, 
and it, therefore, decided to withdraw. Viewed thus, the 
Federation seems to have failed simply because the federal 
partnership offered no incentives to Jamaica to continue in 
the union.
It would appear from the above analysis that it is
incorrect to see, with Gordon Merrill, a strong resemblance
19between Canada of 1867 and the West Indies of 1958.
Except for the size of their respective populations and 
the isolation of their units--which we have seen are only 
superficial elements in the long-run prospects of a federation 
--there is little, if any, resemblance to be found. Unlike
Gordon Merrill, "The Survival of the Past in the West Indies" 
in David Lowenthal (Ed„), op. cit., footnote 8, p. 20.
In his article "Regionalism and Nationalism" in John 
Warkentin (Ed.) Canada: A Geographical Interpretation,
Toronto: Methuen, 1968, Merrill says that "the federation
of the four provinces of Canada is more comparable to the 
ill-fated and short-lived Federation of the West Indies in 
1958 than to the union of the Thirteen Colonies. Success 
was not achieved by the West Indies, and it was by no means 
certain for Canada", p. 560.
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Canada, the West Indian Federation did not offer strong 
incentives or any clear economic advantages, at least to one 
of the major partners, i. e., Jamaica. Neither was there 
in the West Indies any impetus for survival in union comparable 
to that provided for Canada by the militant presence of the 
American Republic of the Civil War days»
POLITIC-GEOGRAPHIC INFERENCES
The West Indian example provides an interesting case 
study in the role of size of the constituent units in the 
maintenance of d federal partnership. Although the West 
Indian Federation consisted of ten units, Jamaica alone 
possessed more than half the total area and population 
of the Federation. Together with Trinidad it had three-quarters 
of the population of the Federation. A comparison with some 
other failed federations seems revealing. The West Indian 
Federation did not offer Jamaica, despite her preponderant 
size, the advantages that such an association offered Java 
in the Indonesian Federation. Contrary to the Indonesian 
situation, the smaller units in the West Indies were rich 
in human numbers but poor in economic resources. Further­
more, while Jamaica loomed large in the Federation with just 
over half its population, because of its geographically 
peripheral location it had none of the strategic advantages 
that centrality of location had offered to Java. Nor did 
Jamaica tower in the Federation to the extent that Java 
did in the Indonesian Federation«. Because of the island's 
peripheral location and a stronger West Indian (largely non- 
Jamaican) nationalism in the eastern Caribbean, the slight 
edge in population that Jamaica had possessed over the rest of 
the units was more than balanced, and Jamaica (even granted 
proper weightage to population) could not have any real 
possibility of overwhelming the other units, especially with 
the capital being located in Trinidad. It is not difficult 
to imagine that had Jamaica been in a geographically central 
location the picture would have changed materially and she 
would hardly have been the first to withdraw.
A comparison with Pakistan is also interesting. The 
position of Jamaica in the West Indies somewhat resembled 
that of East Bengal in the Pakistani Republic. Like Jamaica,
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East Bengal had also been given a representation in the 
central legislature much lower than her population would 
warrant«, Like Jamaica, East Bengal also found the federal 
capital over a thousand miles away in a near-foreign territory. 
As in the West Indies, in Pakistan also the Federation was 
dominated by distantly located minority units, though unlike 
in Pakistan, in the West Indies there was nothing of consequence 
within the purview of the federal government to dominate 
upon. Now if unity could be maintained in Pakistan, there 
would appear no reason why it should not have been so in 
the West Indies especially when, unlike the two wings of 
Pakistan, the eastern Caribbean area and Jamaica did not 
have any strong linguistic barrier to social and intellectual 
intercourse.
But a closer look would show, that in fact things were 
not as they appeared on the surface. The self-images that 
East Bengal and Jamaica each possessed of itself were 
contrasting in the extreme. The contemporary historical 
circumstances of the two differed greatly. Although divided 
by a foreign territory one thousand miles wide, the two 
wings of Pakistan had fresh memories of their "revolution" 
by which these two end organs at the extremities of a body 
politic had parted company from the main body. Though in 
the process of the separation all their interconnecting veins 
and arteries were cut, still memories of the "revolution" 
and the bitterness of its fight acted as a great binding 
force between the two wings. There was no such compelling 
sentiment for union in Jamaica.
Comparing the mental maps that the Jamaicans and the 
East Bengalis had of their respective "countries", we find 
that while East Bengal, for reasons noted earlier, found 
itself in a weak boat in the midst of what appeared as a 
storm, it saw the western wing of Pakistan as a great bulwark 
of strength, derived from its contiguity with the traditional 
Islamic homeland of South-West Asia. East Bengal was prepared 
to join a union with West Pakistan on clearly unfavourable 
terms because it then thought that the latter would offer 
her strength and security. Jamaicans did not suffer from 
any such unfavourable image of their country, for the east 
Caribbean islands in no way presented a more favourable
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picture. Hence whereas East Bengal could compensate for the 
sacrifice of its seemingly legitimate rights and advantages, 
Jamaica had no compelling reasons to do so, and it, therefore, 
quietly withdrew from the Federation.
In conclusion, the West Indian example offers a negative 
proof of our hypo thesis that under a federal situation where 
the sentiment for regional identity is stronger than the 
urge for overall unity, unless a common external threat 
squeezes the constituents into unity, the resultant union 
is likely to be a loose alliance or a confederation. In 
other words, when the sense of separatism has an edge over 
the sense of union, external military threat may become an 
essential condition for the rise of a centralized federalism.
4 . NIGERIA 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
There was no cultural or political unit comprising the 
present area under Nigeria before British imperialism brought 
them together under its overall suzerainty. The term 
Nigeria itself was coined for the first time in 1897,^ 
and received official recognition in 1899. As in other 
colonial areas, here also the flag followed trade, and the 
Royal Niger Company was the precursor of the British colonial 
rule. Although the first foothold in Lagos was established 
in 1861, the actual British rule over the whole area under 
Nigeria came only in 1900. The geographical extension of 
British power in the area was determined arbitrarily by 
the limiting ambitions of rival colonial powers--French 
in the north, and Germans in the east. This arbitrary 
limitation of boundaries had two significant politico- 
geographical effects: first, it made Nigeria and its
Provinces a hodgepodge of different cultural, religious and 
linguistic groups; secondly, ethnic ties spilled across 
colonial boundaries.
After revoking the Charter of the Royal Niger Company 
on January 1, 1900, the British Government proclaimed three
separate administrations over the area— the two separate
1
In an article attributed to Flora Shaw (later Lady Lugard) 
in The Time s , London, January 8 , 1897 .
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Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria, and the 
Colony of Lagos. The administrative duality between the 
North and South was retained when in 1914 an amalgamated 
Protectorate of Nigeria was proclaimed. The two Protectorates 
now became the two Provinces, and Lord Lugard, the great 
proponent of Indirect Rule, became the Governor-General,
Though the first Nigerian Legislative Council (created in 
1922) introduced a token element of self-government in the 
South, the North was excluded from its jurisdiction, and the 
administration of that Province continued by proclamation 
of the colonial Governor. Thus until the so-called Richards 
Constitution of 1946, there was no central representative 
institution which could inculcate a sense of all-Nigerian 
unity. Because of the system of Indirect Rule the local 
administration in the North, in contrast to that in the 
South, continued to be somewhat authoritarian. The Emirs, 
who were also the religious heads of the local Islamic 
community, by using certain Islamic teachings imposed an 
autocratic government and inculcated in the populace habits 
of political deference and subordination.
Administrators in the two Provinces never looked at 
things in the same light. Their training was quite different 
and their approaches to problems were very dissimilar. While 
maintaining a break between the North and South in matters 
of social and political outlook, this pattern also created 
a gulf in the educational heritage of the two Provinces.
While activities of Christian missions were restricted in 
the North, in the South they got a free hand in the spread 
of education etc. Because education had remained largely 
a private enterprise, this policy greatly affected the 
standards of education and literacy in the two areas. The 
missions were specially successful among the Ibos in the 
southeast, though the western section of the Province also 
benefited. The Ibos, however, became the leading elite in 
the country, and dominated most of the administrative 
positions open to the natives throughout the country and 
especially in the North which because of its political and 
social pattern retained under the Indirect Rule had remained 
highly traditionbound, feudal and educationally backward.
Thus, the British rule had encouraged two parallel
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streams to flow in a single colonial area. Aspirations of 
the leaders in the North and South were different, so much 
so that while the Southern leaders were pressing for independ­
ence from the colonial rule in the 1950s, the leaders of the 
North were very reluctant because to them it seemed that 
independence "would surely mean the substitution of the 
relatively detached paternalism of the British Colonial 
Office administrators by the political domination of the 
ambitious and the substantially Westernized political elite
of the South from whom they had been carefully sheltered
2by the British". It was only after the Northern leaders 
realized the political potency of their numerical preponder­
ance under a majoritarian democratic rule, that they became 
ready to move with the rest of the country to independence.
Constitutional Progress in Nigeria 
As already noted, it was the Richards Constitution of 
1946 that for the first time established Nigeria as a single 
administrative unit. It also established for the first time 
the main political boundaries within the country--the three 
main Provinces: North, West, and East--corresponding to
the three broad physical and cultural-ethnic divisions. The 
only further change effected before the Coup and the Civil 
War was the carving out of the Mid-West Region from the 
Western Province in 1963. The Constitution established a 
single central legislature for the whole of Nigeria 
presided over by the British colonial Governor. The Council 
consisted of thirteen ex-officio, three nominated official, 
and twenty-four nominated nonofficial members, plus four 
elected members (three from Lagos, and one from Calabar). Two 
of the official, and nine nominated members were from 
the North, while the East and West each had two official 
and respectively five and six nominated nonofficial members. 
This introduced the principle of regional representation.
The Provinces were also given their own Regional Legislatures, 
bicameral in the North and unicameral in the other two.
Though the provincial legislatures were largely advisory, 
each of them possessed a nonofficial majority.
Edward McWhinney, Federal Constitution Making for a Multi­
national World, Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1966, p p . 43-44.
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The so-called Macpherson Constitution of 1951 went 
a step further in the political-institutional progress.
In the House of Representatives (which replaced the Legislative 
Council), 136 out of the total 148 members were elected
through the provincial legislatures acting as electoral 
colleges. Of this total sixty-eight came from the North, 
and thirty-four each from West and East« This established 
the principle of parity in representation between the North 
and the two southern provinces combined. The new federal 
Constitution of 1954, which conceded far greater regional 
autonomy, further extended this parity in political 
representation. Now the power of the central legislature 
to override the regional legislatures was ended, and, the 
principle of dual polity was extended by providing for 
separate provincial public services, judiciaries, marketing 
boards, and Governors who replaced the former lieutenant- 
Governors. A Supreme Court to act as an impartial tribunal 
in disputes between governments was also instituted.
On October 1, 1960 when Nigeria attained freedom from
colonial rule, a new federal Constitution was adopted.
It made the central legislature bicameral. The House of 
Representatives consisted of a speaker and 312 members 
elected on the basis of population--one member for approx­
imately 100,000 people. This assured the political pre­
dominance of the North, for based on census returns it 
would have 172 of the 312 members in the lower House. As 
the Senate was largely a revisionary upper House, equal 
representation (twelve members each) of the three regions 
plus four representatives for Lagos and four special members 
nominated by the Governor-General, could not redress the 
imbalance. The Constitution of October 1, 1963 which
established the Federal Republic of Nigeria in place of the 
old Constitutional monarchy, followed the general outlines 
of the 1960 Constitution. The progress from complete regional 
subordination (though coupled with regional separation) of 
the 1940s to almost complete regional autonomy of the late 
1950s (which was confirmed by the 1960 Constitution) was 
so rapid that many scholars feel that the "federation was 
formed by shearing away of the powers of the centre and 
giving them to the Regions, even to the extent that some-
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times one might have been pardoned for thinking that the
3Regions were independent countries"»
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE RISE 
OF THE FEDERATION
Factors for Regional Identities 
As noted above, in so far as political evolution is 
concerned, the northern and southern sections of Nigeria 
had formed two almost separate streams with hardly any 
intercommunication, except in so far as minor officials in 
the North might be drawn from the better-educated South.
The regional identities of the North versus South were always 
marked. After the Constitution of 1946 West and East came 
to exist as separate units, and their nationalisms evolved 
within their new political boundaries. Then, in contrast 
to certain other colonial areas, in Nigeria there had been 
no prior tradition of the entire area as a single political 
or cultural unit. It had been "a mass of peoples, tribes 
and nations: independent of each other" before the British
brought it into a single political unit. The country had 
been "divided by language and custom, history and geography, 
religion and culture . . . TraveH i n g  was difficult and
4dangerous and there was little inducement to wander far".
The country's principal river Niger and its tributary 
Benue, flowing from northwest to northeast then south 
through the middle of the country, divide Nigeria into three 
land blocs, though they also provide an easy access to the 
interior. It was along the valleys of these two rivers 
that most of Nigeria's present inhabitants entered the 
country in ancient times. While the coastal belt extending 
for nearly two hundred miles inland comprises a zone of 
high tropical rainforest, North of Ibadan from 7°N the 
tropical rainforest gradually gives way to deciduous forest 
which in turn thins down into parkland from about 10°N.
Right across the northern portion of the country from east 
to we st be tween Sokoto and Maiduguri is a wide expanse of
3
Rex Niven, Nigeria , London: Ernest Benn Ltd», 1967 ,
p. 103.
4
Niven, op. cit„, footnote 3, p. 13.
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open terrain which allowed free movement of people and 
facilitated the intermingling of "races" and cultures.
Though it is said that the autochthonous populations 
of Nigeria were racially the same, centuries of separation 
into different areas and considerable new cultural influences 
introduced by immigrants from North Africa and the Middle 
East produced by A. D. 1400 great differences between the 
peoples of the forest and those of the savannah zones.
While the latter were developing highly centralized pyramidal 
political structures and economic systems featuring 
occupational specialization and advanced agriculture, the 
former continued to be organized in small self-sufficient 
communities of cultivators and hunters with political 
organization still segmentary and kin-bound. The European 
penetration from the coast, and the rise of the Fulani 
in the North at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
further accentuated the differences between the northern 
and southern regions of the country.
For these reasons all-Nigerian nationalism as a life- 
inspiring sentiment could not develop. Even after independ­
ence was achieved, "Nigeria's struggle to become a nation
5in fact as well as in legal theory had hardly begun". In 
fact Northern and Southern Nigeria did hardly have a 
semblance of unity before the 1946 Constitution; and the 
period of fourteen years that followed was too short to 
inculcate the feeling of all-Nigerian partnership as a 
habit of life.
Factors for Unity
Though the North and South were governed largely 
separately for most of the British regime, the forty- 
seven years of existence as an amalgamated Protectorate did 
offer the units some measure of unity and uniformity in 
their political cultures.^ By creating peace and order, by 
imposing a common government, jurisprudence, language and
5
Okoi Arikpo, The Development of Modern Nigeria,
Harmondsworth (Middlesex) England: Penguin Books, 1967,
p. 84 .
These points have been beautifully summarized by R. L. Watts, 
New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1966, p. 28.
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educational system, currency and communications, the British 
rule did make possible the rise of a feeling of shared 
Nigerian identity. To this was added the sense of unity born 
from the sense of a united destiny in view of the surrounding 
French colonies which possessed an altogether separate 
political culture, different language, law, and education. 
Then the vision of the power and prestige of a united 
Nigeria that would emerge as the most populous and broad- 
based nation in Africa, was also a great attraction.
Because of the differences in the physical geography
of the three Regions, their economic resources were largely
7complementary, or at least not competitive. While the 
land-locked North looked to the South for seaports for 
international trade and commerce, the Westernized youth 
from the South (especially from the densely populated East) 
found a vast field for the exercise of his talents in the 
educationally backward North. Furthermore, each of the 
Regions realized the greater credit-worthiness of the united 
country. Thus while cultural, ethnic and tribal forces 
pulled the Regions apart, the geography of their economy 
and resources contained strong factors of unity in the very 
pattern of their diversity. For the time being at least 
the factors of unity weighed over those for separation, and 
that psychology of desiring union without desiring complete 
unity was born; and this culminated into the birth of 
the Nigerian Federation.
THE WORKING OF THE FEDERATION: A REVIEW
For a proper understanding of the causes for the break­
down of the Nigerian Federation, it. is necessary briefly 
to review the political game of musical chairs that led 
to widespread corruption, mutual distrust and the eventual 
estrangement of the Ibos which led to secession of the East 
and the subsequent Civil War.
Nigeria had achieved freedom almost unawares. It had
The economic argument for the Nigerian federation is 
discussed in J. R, V. Prescott, "Geographical Basis 
of Nigerian Federation", Nigerian Geographical Journal,
Vol. 2, June 1958, p p . 1-13.
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none of that revolutionary zeal that accompanied the birth 
of many other new nations» It had no prolonged struggle for 
freedom, and on almost half the population freedom was 
virtually thrust» The country had no national heroes, no 
charismatic leaders, and no national parties of any 
significance« Democracy and self-government came almost 
separately to the North and South, and the federal centre 
in Nigeria could not become a symbol of all-Nigerian 
aspirations and partnership. Each of the three Regions 
remained an almost completely separate politico-social entity. 
The three major political parties of independent Nigeria 
were based on the three separate Regions--the Nigerian 
People's Congress (NPC) in the North, the National Convention 
of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the East, and the Action 
Group in the West. Thus Nigeria remained largely devoid 
of that sense of inter-regional unity which comes from the 
existence of a common (nationwide) political arena. Further­
more, no strong internal (as distinct from transit) trade 
movements had arisen in this largely agrarian country that 
could have broken the Regional and tribal cleavages 
by creating inter-Regional class cleavages.
The election of 1959 was fought over personalities 
rather than politics, and the voting patterns were largely 
on Regional and tribal lines. Both the Action Group and 
the NCNC tried to upset the pattern by large scale cam­
paigning outside the Region of their influence with an 
emphasis on the North, but the results shattered their 
hopes. Between them the two parties along with their allies 
captured a third of the Northern votes, but because the two 
were not in alliance, and because seats were allocated on 
a constituency basis, they could not present any real 
challenge to the NPC. The NPC had won 148, the NCNC 89, and 
the Action Group 75 seats in a House of 312. As no party 
was in absolute majority to form a government, the NPC 
formed a coalition with the NCNC which continued in office 
till 1964 under the Prime Ministership of Balewa, a 
Northern leader. The lack of any nationwide political 
party, and the strong identification of the three major 
parties with the three separate Regions, by its very nature 
started the game of musical chairs which would at each change
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leave out one of the three major political groups. And this 
in ultimate analysis would appear to have led to the doom 
of the Federation, As a result of the Northern and Eastern 
alliance, a new Region was carved out of the existing West, 
while the far larger North was left intact and no attention 
was paid to the equally vocal and just demand for a separate 
Region in the Rivers area of the East»
The already numerically weak Action Group (which 
controlled the government of the West) was itself split, 
and a small rump of the party led by Chief Akintola aligned 
with the ruling central coalition. The "Establishment", 
consisting of the North, East and the Akintola group in the 
West, lasted until the 1964 election in which the NCNC and 
the Action Group aligned against the North, which now 
carried with it the new Western party of Chief Akintola 
who controlled the Western government. As a result of 
electoral manipulation which followed in each Region, the 
Establishment, now in association with the West, came out 
victorious, but the political strain that the election 
created had almost broken the Federation, In the 1965 
election for the Western legislature the Action Group-NCNC 
alliance made a final bid to win power by constitutional 
means. And their failure amid the bitterness of a rigged 
election produced the chaos that directly led to the coup 
and secession of the East, It was not difficult for the East 
to imagine that it could expect a similar lot under a 
North-West alliance as it had given to the West when it was 
in alliance with the Northern group.
The federal Constitution was in force until January 
1966, when widespread corruption, disorder and violence 
led to a military coup in which several political leaders 
including the federal Prime Minister were killed. The 
coup was led by the predominantly Ibo officers, and the main 
targets were the Northern leaders or those leaders from 
the West who were in alliance with the North. The 
Constitution was suspended and military Governors were 
appointed in each of the now four Regions, A few months
Walter Schwartz, Nigeria, London: Pall Mall Press, 1968,
p . 113.
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later in July another coup followed, this time led by 
military officers mainly from the Noith« The Supreme 
Military Commander was killed and the present Supreme 
Commander General Gowan took the office» Anti-Ibo feelings 
in the North were strong for quite sometime, and after 
the July coup a terrible riot occurred in the North (in 
September-October} in which a large number of Ibos were 
killed» Envy and resentment against the Ibos had increased 
as successive generations of Northerners were coming out of 
school to find that the best jobs were already filled by the 
Ibo. As a result of this mass anti-lbo upsurge in the North, 
large numbers of Ibos living in that Region fled to their 
home-region, and thus the vital linkage between the North 
and East came almost to a close« The discovery of rich 
oil deposits had already enhanced the confidence of the 
Eastern Region, and now the Ibo military Governor of the 
Region declared secession and independence from the 
Federation. This started the tragic Civil War.
CONCLUSIONS: THE CAUSES OF THE FAILURE
Scholars greatly differ as to the causes of the break­
down of the Nigerian Federation» While some believe that 
the main reason for the breakdown was that "Nigeria with­
out the same homogeneous cultural environment as Australia,
chose the Australian pattern of government, with all the
9implications and problems of a loose federation"; there 
are others who think that "The troubles experienced by 
Nigeria have not been due to any basic defect in the 
constitutional system, but to the gross numerical prepond­
erance of the Northern Region, and the political difficulty 
of accommodating great cultural and tribal differences and 
consequent mutual jealousies".^  Some others discounted 
the idea of further division of Nigeria and said that "Had 
changes been made [that is had the North been divided into 
smaller units], . . the consequences might well have
9
Arikpo, op» cit., footnote 5, p» 87„
10
G. Sawer, Modern Federalism, London: C» A. Watts & Co»,
1969, pp. 53-54»
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produced an even more unworkable Federation". In fact
both these factors contributed to the difficulties though 
neither of them was solely responsible for the breakdown.
The very nature of the Federation and its consequent
ineffectiveness led to the loosening of the sentiment for
Nigerian unity,, "The division of political and fiscal
powers between the Federal Government and the Regional
Governments „ „ = [reduced] the Central Government to
12a mere agency of the Regional Governments". In order
to maintain full employment and promote the welfare and 
unity of the country, the federal government should have 
been endowed with powers to regulate the overall economic 
and fiscal policy of the Federation® But the constitutional 
powers given to the Regions, coupled with the mounting 
inter-Reg ion a 1 rivalries, rendered national planning and 
coordination ineffective® Each Region pursued its 
own independent policy, and a person, irrespective of his 
qualifications, had difficulty in finding employment outside 
his own Region® This put a brake on inter-Regional mobility 
--that great antidote to unhealthy localism. As a result 
of all this the Nigerian Federation failed to create ident­
ifiable national symbols that could attract the loyalty of 
the masses in all the Regions®
Then, the Northern Region in the Federation also 
violated the rule that in a federation no single unit should 
be so powerful as to outweigh several of the others combined. 
Further, while the North was big, it was not big enough to 
dominate alone. This in itself gave rise to the increasingly 
unplayable game of musical chairs. While this political 
territorial structure contained a built-in imbalance, the 
constitutional structure, by creating a largely ineffective 
Senate, made no real attempt to overcome the difficulty. 
Besides this disparity in the size of the units, there was 
a deeper malady that lay in the very political and admin­
istrative heritage of the nation, which turned this molehill 
into a mountain. If Nigeria had possessed a unified 
administration during the long colonial period, nationwide
11
Niven, op® cit., footnote 3, p. 96.
Arikpo, op. cit®, footnote 5, p® 96.
12
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political parties (in contrast to the then existing Region-
based parties) would possibly have emerged as had happened
in India, In that case the disparity between the Regions
would not have plunged the nation to its doom so soon after
independence. Further, because of the weak centre that the
Nigerian federal Constitution created, the main political
leaders in the Regions (with the exception of Chief Awolowo)
who could have carried the loyalties of the peoples of
their respective Regions to the centre, remained within
their respective provinces sending only their second
lieutenants to the centre,^
Furthermore, it would appear that it was not so much
the numerical preponderance of one Region, as the very
small number of the constituent units which tended to leave
the odd unit out of power, that put the real strain on
the Federation. Indeed "a federal constitutional structure
which, with a three way only, territorial dispersal of
political authority, permits or indeed encourages two
regions to combine and pit themselves against the third
region in the struggle for the fruits of power" is bound
14to subject the federal structure to a great strain.
This strain was further aggravated because one of the Regions 
(North) on account of its numerical preponderance was 
assured of its permanent membership of the political-power 
club. It was therefore necessary that the political power 
of the North should be checked. This could be done either 
by giving a greater effectiveness to the Senate as a 
states-House (as in the United States), or to split the 
North into smaller Regions based on the regional preponderance 
of minority tribes in the manner that the West was split 
to carve out a non-Yoruba Mid-West Region. The East could 
also have been split into two, The military regime has 
taken steps in this direction and has divided the whole of 
the country into twelve administrative units. These may 
well form more durable units of a future federation. [Fig. 9.3] 
Although the sheer force of geographical location
13
J. P. Mackintosh, "Federalism in Nigeria", Political 
Studies, Vol. 10, 1962, pp„ 223-47.
14
McWhinney, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 47.
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compelled the interior (North) to join with the coast, its 
numerical dominance led to frustration in the South, (i. e.,
the East and West) which thought that it was not getting 
what was its due» It was this psychology which led to the 
secession movement in the East» It is possible that had 
the South nGt been bisected in 1946, the joint Southern 
Region with its appeal, to the Northein minority community 
voters might have created a somewhat more durable arrangement. 
In that case the South would have remained a "racially" 
or tribaliy heterogeneous unit, with at least two tribes 
in near-numerical-balance; and the political parties in 
the Region would have been some kind of coalitions between 
different tribal groups. These coalition parties could 
well have commanded some allegiance in the North, especially 
from the minority community areas. This would have meant 
that no Region as a whole could be discriminated against.
This might have averted the question of secession.
It is interesting to review the changing images (or 
the mental maps) that each of the Regions had of itself 
throughout the period from 1953 to 1966. In 1953, the 
North was still not conscious of the value of its numerical 
preponderance in a federation with the other Regions. It 
was therefore afraid that because of their higher standard 
of education and skill the Southerners might dominate it 
under a federation. It therefore wanted to remain independent, 
and would have done so had it possessed a seaport of its 
own. The North's reluctance to join the Federation also 
emanated from the fact that under the fiscal arrangements 
that were then decided, it received much less than it 
contributed to the central treasury. The West also contri­
buted more than it received, while the East received appre­
ciably higher revenue than it contributed. At that time tin, 
groundnuts, and cocoa, all derived from the North and West, 
commanded high export prices, while palm-oil, the chief 
export from the East, had yet not fully recovered from the 
slump. For these reasons the East was then the greatest 
federalist in Nigeria.
By the close of the fifties, however, the situation 
was changing. With the discovery of oil in commercial 
quantity the East became quite rich and soon began to
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contribute appreciably higher revenue to the centre than it 
receivedo This changed the Region's attitude towards the 
Federation, while the North, wiser by the realization of 
the value of its numerical preponderance in the Federation, 
had changed from a secessionist to a unionist (federalist) 
stance. The West, which had always been in the middle of 
the way, faced with a combined (and unhealthy) opposition 
of the East and North after 1960, believed that its political 
power had fallen far short of its economic contributions.
It therefore also became separatist. Later when the West 
and North combined against the East, the East was frustrated 
because despite its stronger economic position its political 
influence was receding. Hence, now the voice of secession 
came from this direction. A little later when the repeated 
anti-East riots in the North further disenchanted this Region 
and large numbers of Easterners in the North were pushed out 
from that Region, the East found itself with little to gain 
from the continued federal partnership, and it, therefore, 
decided to secede--a decision which could be reversed only
by the superior forces of the federal Army.
15Birch has shown that Riker's insistence on the military 
origin of federalism, in so far as Nigeria is concerned, is 
overdrawn. It needs to be pointed out, however, that although 
the Nigerian case demonstrates in a way that military condition 
is not necessary for the rise of federalism, it also demon­
strates my hypothesis that in a situation where regional 
identities are strong and somewhat exclusive, a federation 
achieves greater stability if it has a continued sense of 
common external threat to its collective survival. As 
Nigeria apparently lacked any such threat, there was nothing 
to squeeze the discordant partners into unity.
A. H. Birch, "Approaches to the Study of Federalism"
Political Studies, Vol. 14, 1966.
15
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Appendix to Chapter IX
DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE TWO WINGS OF PAKISTAN 
(Cf. footnote 22 on Pakistan)
As A., Tayyeb (Pakistan: A Political Geography, London:
Oxford University Press, 1966, p 0 181) says "the following 
table which spells out in concrete form the grievances of 
East Pakistan is eloquent by itself and needs no elaboration".
From West 
Pakistan
From East 
Pakistan
I. Central Government Services 
Civil
Secretaries 19 0
Joint secretaries 38 3
Deputy secretaries 123 10
Under secretaries 510 38
Military
Lt.-Generals 3 0
M a j. Generals 20 0
Brigadiers 34 1
Colonels 49 1
Lt.-Colonels 198 2
Majors 590 10
Navy officers 593 7
Air Force officers 640 40
II. Monetary Aid
(in million rupees)
Financial assistance 10,000 1,260
Defence expenditure 4 ,650 100
Capital expenditure 2 , 100 620
Educational grants 1,530 240
Share from foreign aid 730 150
P . I . D o C o  project investment 347 344
The following table (from K„ B. Sayeed, Political 
System of Pakistan, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967,
p. 200) would show the disparity in per capita incomes in 
the two wings of Pakistan:
(GNP at Factor Cost of 1959/60)
1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 *
East Pakistan 269 278 287 280 305
West Pakistan 355 359 368 382 388
Pakistan 318 325 334 336 353
Extent of Disparity 
(Pakistan = 100)**
28% 26% 25% 31% 24%
Provisional
The Pakistan figures cover 97 percent of the GNP. The 
remaining unallocated 3 percent has been excluded.
Source: Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, The
Third Five Year Plan 1965-70 (Karachi: May 1965), p. 127.
Part 5 
CONCLUSION
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Chapter X
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
Part 1
ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM: SOME THEORETICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
The question "In what circumstances is it appropriate
to adopt a system of federal government?" is the most
difficult to answer, but as Wheare says "It must be answered
because it is in many respects the most important".''’ Some
suggestive hints toward the solution of this problem are to
2be found in Mill and Dicey. There are also some scattered
3suggestions in Freeman. Maddox, though primarily talking
of international "federations", does throw, however, some
useful suggestions on the prerequisites for the origin of 
4federalism. All these earlier attempts to explain the
origins of federalism have been synthesized and developed
by Wheare in his Federal Government. Since Wheare wrote
his book, other substantive works on federalism have appeared.
One of these, by Riker, makes a concentrated attempt in this
direction. Here we propose to review the earlier attempts
in this direction and then proceed toward a new synthesis
and some hypotheses on the origins of this polity.
Wheare begins his synthesis on the basis of Dicey’s
justly famous dictum that federalism is born when political
communities in an area desire union without desiring complete 
5unity. This dictum, whose validity would hardly be questioned, 
presupposes two essential conditions for the origin of 
federalism: first, the units involved must have many
1
K. C. Wheare, Federal Government, London: Oxford
University Press, fourth edition, 1963, p. 35.
2
A . V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, London: Macmillan Co„ , first edition 1885,
ninth edition 1939.
3
A. W. Freeman, A History of Federal Government in Greece 
and Italy, London: Macmillan Co., second edition 1893
(edited by J. B. Bury).
4
W. P, Maddox, "Political Basis of Federation", American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 35, 1941, pp. 1120-1127.
5
Dicey, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 602.
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interests in common because of which they are convinced 
that their destiny lies in union; secondly, while very 
strongly committed to union by the force of their historical, 
political, cultural or economic circumstances, the units 
concerned must also possess certain strong elements of 
separation which seem to them so vital for their individual 
group identities, and which they value so greatly as essential 
parts of their way of life that they are not prepared to 
forgo their rights to manage their own regional affairs and 
want to retain their autonomy in respect of matters in which 
they differ from one another. In essence, then, the units 
should be prepared to erect a common central government for 
purposes that are best served in common, but at the same time 
they must also have a keen desire to maintain regional 
centres of decision-making with guaranteed autonomy in respect 
of matters that are served best by local involvement.
The two conditions must be present together. If the 
communities are not convinced of a common and united destiny, 
of a common cause in the preservation of a certain way of 
life or certain values and ideals, or security against a 
common enemy against which they are weak in disunity but 
strong in unity, a genuinely federal union is not likely to 
be born. If forces for unity are all-powerful, the result 
should normally be a unitary State. In a federation, along 
with a strong sense of united destiny, a conviction to 
stand or fall together, there should also be an equally 
strong conviction among the regional communities that they 
have each certain unique regional interests which are so 
important to their way of life that they are willing to forgo 
certain advantages, economic and other, to be derived from 
complete unity. Only when this desire is deep-rooted, can 
federal articulation in union be assured. But it is also 
necessary that the factors for regional isolation be not so 
strong as to overwhelm the sentiment for union. This will 
forfeit the very purpose of federa1ism--which is diversity 
within unity. As Boehm says "The antithesis of federalism 
is not unitarianism, but particularism and separatism" of 
an extreme kind.^
M. H. Boehm, "Federalism: in Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences, Vol, 5, New York: Macmillan Co., 1931, p. 170.
6
3 3 3
A balance between the two opposing sentiments is necess­
ary. This balance should, however, be so struck that the 
forces for unity have a slight edge over those for separatism. 
As Wheare says, "If they [the communities involved] are not 
prepared to submit themselves to an independent government
. . . they have not achieved the first prerequisite of
7federal government". This is important, for federalism is
essentially what Riker terms "a bargain between prospective
national leaders [who want unity] and the officials of
constituent governments [who stand for a larger regional 0control]". Most advocates of centralized federalism would 
agree that "A truly federal government is the denial of 
national [sic] independence to every State of the federation".
In his chapter on "Some Prerequisites of Federal Govern­
ment", Wheare has tried to isolate the various factors for 
union and separation which have appeared to him as necessary 
factors in the origin of federalism. He enumerates the 
following "half-dozen factors all [of which] operated in the 
United States, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia, to produce 
a desire for union among the communities concerned"
These factors are:
1 Need for common defence,
2 Desire to be independent of some foreign power and 
a realization that only through union could indep­
endence be achieved,
3 Expectations of economic advantages from union,
4 Some political association of the units involved 
prior to their federal union,
5 Geographical neighbourhood,
6 Similarity of political institutions.
Wheare writes that though "we may feel tempted to conclude 
that this desire [for union] will not be produced unless all 
or most of these factors are present", he thinks that such
7
Wheare, op. cit., footnote 1, p p . 35-36.
8
W. H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance,
Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1964, p. 11.
9
Dicey, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 607.
10
Wheare, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 37.
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a notion would be going further than is warranted. But
he thinks that "it is unlikely that states will desire union
unless these factors--or most of them--are present. To
that extent they may be classed as prerequisites for federal
government".'1'1 As will be noted, he excludes from this
list of prerequisites for union factors such as community
of language, of "race", of religion or of nationality. He
remarks "This is surprising, but the facts support it".
In his opinion, "Community in these matters cannot therefore
be described as an essential prerequisite of federal govern- 
12ment". To these six prerequisites Wheare adds one more:
"leadership or statesmanship at the right time".
Coming to the factors for regional separation (i. e. , 
the factors creating the desire for regional autonomy) Wheare 
is much less emphatic. He enumerates three important factors:
1 Previous existence as a distinct governmental unit,
2 Economic divergence, and
3 A sense of isolation through "geographical" factors; 
but, he says, "it does not seem possible to accept .
[the] conclusion" that these factors form "essential pre­
requisites of that desire for separation within union which 
goes to produce federal government". He thinks that the 
factor of "divergence of nationality" "itself alone quite 
certainly could produce the desire for separation in commun­
ities otherwise prepared to unite". "Another factor which
might produce the desire for separation is dissimilarity of
13social (including political) institutions". Wheare says
that "These are the kind of factors which, given the exist­
ence of a desire for union, are likely to produce a desire 
for federal union. [But] It is not possible to pick on any 
one of them or any combination of them and say that unless 
this or these are present, the desire for federal union
will not arise. That desire may be produced by any one of 
14them". "But it must be emphasized that the capacity of
11
Wheare,
i
0 ts ci t . , footnote 1/ p. 38 .
12
Wheare , op. c i t . , foo tnote 1, P- 39 .
13
Wheare, op . cit. , footnote 1, P- 41.
14
Wheare, op. cit, , footnote 1/ P- 42 .
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states to form and work a federal union depends upon some
agreement to differ but not to differ too much".^  "That
the two loyalties must be there is the prerequisite of
federal government, but that the one should not overpower
the other [though the factors for unity should have an
edge over those for separation] is also prerequisite"
It would appear from the foregoing resume of Wheare's
views that despite his very competent analysis and synthesis,
Wheare has not succeeded in providing us with any theory
or law (or a set of laws) on the origins of federalism.
More recently another writer, William H. Riker, has attempted
to formulate such a theory or law. Riker1s work has generally
been held in great esteem and some believe that his is "The
most successful attempt to formulate a theory of federalism 
17. . Birch regards Riker's attempt at a "theory" of
federalism as "a real, if limited, gain in a period in
which it seems fashionable to assume that economic and
18social factors are pre-eminent".
Riker1s Theory of the Military Origin of Federalism
Riker describes federalism as "a constitutional bargain"
"between prospective national leaders and officials of the
constituent governments for the purpose of aggregating
19territory, the better to lay taxes and raise armies". From
the "theory" of federalism as a bargain Riker infers the 
existence of at least two circumstances encouraging a willing­
ness to strike the bargain of federalism. Put in Riker's 
own words, these conditions are:
1 The politicians who offer to bargain desire to meet an 
external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare 
for military and diplomatic aggression and aggrandize­
ment. But, though they desire to expand, they are not 
able to do so by conquest . . . Hence, if they are not 
able to satisfy the desire to expand, they must offer
15
Wheare, op. cit. , footnote If P • CO
16
Whe are , op. cit., footnote I, P • 49 .
17
A. Wildavsky (Ed.) , American Federalism in Perspective, Boston 
Little, Brown & Co., 1967, editor's introduction, pp. vii-viii
18
A. H. Birch, "Approaches to the Study of Federalism",
Political Studies Vol. 14, 1966, p. 33.
Riker, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 11.
19
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concession to the rulers of the constituent units, 
which is the essence of federal bargain ,
2 The politicians who accept the bargain, giving up some 
independence for sake of union, are willing to do so 
because of some external military-diplomatic threat 
or they desire to participate in the potential aggression 
of the federation .
For convenience of abbreviation Riker refers to these two
conditions as (1) the expansion condition and (2) the military
conditionc And the "theory" or hypothesis that he sets forth
is that "these two predispositions are always present in the
federal bargain and that each one is a necessary condition
for the creation of a federalism". Riker writes that though
he was "tempted . . .  to assert that these two conditions
are together sufficient", since he could not possibly collect
"enough information to prove sufficiency", he was "constrained
20to assert only the more modest hypothesis of necessity".
Riker asserts that he has examined all the instances
of the creation of federalism since 1787, and that for those
federalisms that have survived he has been able to show
that the two above conditions existed at the time of their
origin; and for those federations that have failed he has
been able to demonstrate that either the conditions never
existed or they existed only momentarily.
It may here be noted that Riker is not the first or the
only writer to point out the importance of military condition
or external threat and the desire for expansion as favourable
factors in the origin of federalism. Many before him, including
2 1Maddox, Greaves, and Wheare have said so. There is, however,
one great difference: While others have regarded these factors
as two of the several efficient agents in the creation of 
federalism, Riker asserts that they are necessary and possibly 
even sufficient factors in the origin of the polity. Thus 
the whole question of validity or otherwise of the Riker 
thesis rests on the demonstration whether or not both these 
conditions have been present in every instance where at least 
a working federation has been created. If we are able to
20
Riker, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 13.
Maddox, op. cit., footnote 4, p. 1122; Wheare, op. cit.; 
H. R. G. Greaves, Federalism in Practice, London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1940, p. 123.
21
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demonstrate that either of these conditions was absent in 
the origin of any existent federation then the theory falls. 
Recapitulating our analyses in the foregoing chapters, we 
find that in our study of the West German and Austrian 
federations we have clearly demonstrated that in both these 
examples either or both of Riker's so-called necessary 
conditions were absent, The theory, therefore, seems untenable 
in the form it stands.
We may here note, however, that though we do not think 
that facts support the necessarily military origin of federal­
ism, the military condition may nevertheless be necessary 
in the rise of federalism under a particular type of federal 
situation. Such a federal situation would be the one in 
which the sentiment for regional autonomy is stronger than 
the sentiment for interregional unity. Under such a federal 
situation unless a common external threat squeezes the con­
stituents into unity, the resultant union is likely to be 
a loose alliance or confederation. Thus, the hypothesis is: 
where the sense of separatism has an edge over the sense of 
union, external military threat becomes a necessary condition 
for the rise of centralized federalism. We have demonstrated 
the validity of this hypothesis in our preceding studies of 
the Swiss, the American and some other federations. As already 
noted, the point is most clearly demonstrated by a comparison 
between the Pakistani and the West Indian experiments.
As for Riker's not so strongly asserted hypothesis that 
his two conditions are most likely sufficient conditions for 
the origin of federalism, we may repeat what we observed in 
our study of the Swiss example. Before the rise of modern 
centralized federalism, and its further course of integration 
necessitated by the rise of large-scale industrial economy, 
and the need for centralized national planning, federalism 
could often be regarded as essentially a limited purpose 
alliance for mutual military security in face of a common 
danger. In these earlier experiments the military condition 
may well have been a necessary and sometimes even sufficient 
factor in the origin of federalism (in fact, confederalism), 
for then military security was often the primary raison 
d'etre of such unions or alliances. With the changed emphasis
o f modern federalism, however, the military factor can no
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longer be a sufficient condition for the rise of federalism
of the centralized variety. Federations are no longer limited
purpose associations. The primary objective of modern
federalism is to create a body politic--an integrated and
fully functioning political unit» For this it is necessary
that the purposes that bind the prospective partners together
are not narrowly political or military.
Though Riker's theory of the essentially military origin
of federalism has received some passing criticism from scholars
like Sawer and Livingston who regard Riker's emphasis on the
military-diplomatic factor as "rather over-stressed" and
"excessive", only A. H. Birch has attempted a partial test
of Riker's thesis in relation to the Nigerian and Malaysian 
2 2federations. Birch has tried to present a modification
of Riker's theory of the military origin, though his arguments 
seem mainly in line with Riker's in regard to the necessity 
of the mi1itary-diplomatic factor in the rise of federalism. 
Thus Aaron Wildavsky thinks that despite his objections,
"A. H. Birch reaches a conclusion [basically] similar to 
Riker's . . ,".23
Some Other Views
Riker has pointed out two widely asserted fallacies about
the origin of federalism. One is the ideological fallacy
which asserts that federal forms are adopted as a device to
guarantee freedom. "I am certain that there is no simple
ca(s^al relationship between federalism and freedom", says
24Riker, and this author is largely in agreement with him.
The second fallacy Riker refers to is what he calls the 
"reductionist fallacy" which is found in the assertion 
that federalism is a response to certain social conditions 
that create some sense of a common interest. In this context 
Riker refers to Deutsch and his collaborators' nine "essential"
22
Birch, op. cit., footnote 18.
23
Wildavsky, op. cit., footnote 17, p. viii. For a brief 
critique on the issue see R. D. Dikshit, "Military inter­
pretation of Federal Constitutions: A Critique", Journal
of Politics, Vo 1 , 33 , 1971 , pp. 180-189.
24
Riker, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 13.
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conditions for the rise of an "amalgamated security community"
of which class federalism is a sub-class. The nine so-called
essential conditions proposed by Deutsch and his collaborators 
25are :
(1) mutual compatibility of main values; (2) a 
distinctive way of life; (3) expectations of 
stronger economic ties or gains; (4) marked 
increase in political and administrative capabil­
ities of at least some participating units;
(5) superior economic growth on the part of at 
least some participating units; (6) unbroken 
links of social communication, both geographically 
between territories and sociologically between 
different social strata; (7) a broadening of 
the political elite; (8) mobility of persons 
at least smong the politically relevant strata; 
and (9) a multiplicity of ranges of communications 
and transactions.
As Riker writes:
It is apparent that these conditions are not sufficient 
to bring about amalgamation, for, if they were, federalisms 
like the Central American Federation would never have 
broken up or a pan-Arabic movement would reunite the 
Arabic parts of the former Turkish empire. Nor are all 
these conditions necessary, for a great many successful 
amalgamations have violated some or even all of them, 
e. g . , the Swiss confederation seems to have violated 
conditions (1) and (2) during most of its history and 
19th-century colonial empires violated almost all 
conditions. If these conditions are neither jointly 
necessary nor sufficient, it is hard to imagine in what 
sense they are "essential".^
While Riker is justly critical of these two general 
fallacies, he makes no mention of Wheare's "Some Prerequisites 
of Federal Government" which, I believe, is quite free from 
the first fallacy, and only a partial victim of the second-- 
depending upon what view one takes of the reductionist fallacy 
itself. After all, every theory or law develops by reducing 
the nonessential from the essential. In fact, Riker misses 
the point that the reason why Deutsch's conditions fail 
completely to explain the origin of federalism is that 
federalism results from a peculiar combination of factors 
for unity and regional identity, and that in this combination
25
Karl Deustch, et al. , Political Community in the North 
Atlantic Area, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957,
p. 58 .
26
Riker, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 16.
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factors for regional separation are as important as those 
for inter-regional unity. Wheare, partly because he was 
writing a treatise on federalism, which Deutsch et al were 
not doing, presents a more balanced view because he takes 
into consideration either side of the picture. Still, however, 
Wheare's analysis has failed to yield any definite theory 
or law on the origin of federalism.
TOWARDS A NEW ANALYSIS
It seems to me that the difficulty with Wheare's analysis 
is not reduction but only reduction. As federalism is a 
product of forces of union as well as separation, inter­
acting upon one another, a better and more valid way to this 
explanation would appear to be reduction combined with inter­
action or correlation. This is the line of approach that 
is adopted in the following paragraphs which attempt to 
use the data gathered from my study of the examples of 
federalism--past and present--in the preceding chapters.
Factors for Overall Union
Unlike Wheare, I propose to enumerate below most of the 
factors for unity or separation that seem to have played a 
significant role in some case or other of the federations 
so far experimented with, even though it is clear that these 
factors alone are neither sufficient nor necessary for the 
rise of federalism in all cases. Taking the factors for union 
first, we find that some of the following factors in various 
combinations have played vital roles in pulling diverse units 
together into a federal union.
Al A sense of common military insecurity and the consequent 
need for common defence. This may often be coupled with the 
desire for independence from a common imperial power and the 
realization that only through union is this independence 
possible. Both these conditions have been found together 
in most cases, e. g . , the United States, Australia, India, 
Switzerland (in its earlier phases), Malaysia and others, 
though only the latter condition was present in the post-1945 
Austria and West Germany— here, however, the sentiment for 
union far outweighed that for regional separation. In the 
West Indies, at the time that the Federation was created, 
neither of these conditions was present, though earlier it
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was the second of these that had attracted the islands towards 
federalism. It has been thought proper to put both these 
factors together first, because federalism (and for that matter 
any type of union) is essentially a response to the need for 
common efforts; and secondly, when both these factors are 
present together the sense of unity and common purpose is 
stronger, but the second factor without the first may become 
only a temporary and largely impotent factor for the rise 
of a durable union. The West Indies and the African examples 
of federalism would prove this point.
A2 A community of "race", language, and culture (including 
religion). This is a very important factor in bringing about 
that sense of belonging together which gives rise to the 
feeling of community and common destiny in relation to out­
siders. In fact, Mill considered this factor so important 
as to write that "Free institutions are next to impossible 
in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a 
people without fellow feeling, especially if they read and
speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary
2 7to the working of representative government cannot exist". 
Examples of multi-ethnic federations such as Switzerland, 
Canada, or even India and Pakistan would show, however, that 
these factors are neither necessary nor sufficient factors 
for the rise of federalism. But the fact remains that granted 
that other factors are favourable to the rise of federalism, 
community of language and culture is likely to give rise to 
a more smooth-running federal partnership.
A3 Interdependent economies and expectations of greater 
economic benefits from union. This factor would be found 
to have been present in most examples of federalism where 
the union has proved stable. Similarly, in most cases where 
federal ties have been disrupted or have been threatened 
with collapse, this factor would seem to have been absent, 
at least in the view of the dissenting party. This factor 
was clearly absent in the West Indies in so far as the 
largest partner--Jamaica--was concerned, and as we have 
analyzed in a foregoing chapter, this lack of economic
27
J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative
Government, Everyman's Library, London: J. M. Dent, 1947
reprint, p . 361.
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incentives was one of the prime reasons why the federation 
failed. This factor was also the cause of Biafran disenchant­
ment in the Nigerian Federation, and is the main cause of 
the East Bengali disaffection in the Pakistani union.
A4 Prior existence of communities as parts of a single 
overall politico-administrative system or a common experience 
as parts of the same political system. This has been true 
of every case of federalism so far experimented with, and 
it may well be a necessary condition for the rise of federal 
union, though whether it is necessarily so or not is not 
vital to the discussion that follows.
A5 Easy interregional transport and communication or a close
geographical neighbourhood. "Physical contiguity . . . of
countries which are to form a confederated [sic] State is
certainly a favourable, and possibly a necessary condition
2 8for the success of federal government", says Dicey. Though
facts prove that this factor is not an essential factor in 
the origin of federalism, nevertheless the examples of Pakistan 
and the West Indies would show that the absence of this 
factor is often a source of weakness. The point is partly 
proved also by the Western Australian example in the 
Australian federation.
A6 There should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy 
among the political communities involved; they should, in 
other words, possess an overall compatibility in their social 
and political institutions.
Factors Giving Rise to the Desire for Regional Autonomy 
Bl Perhaps the most important factor for the sentiment for 
regional autonomy is the existence of regionally-grouped 
diversities in respect of 
a language 
b religion and/or 
c "race"
which are in a great measure identifiable with the individual 
political units involved in any particular federation.
B2 Existence of units with independent or competitive 
economies. The existence of this factor reduces the scope 
for economic expectations from union, and thereby brings
28
Dicey , o p . cit. , footnote 2, p. 603.
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some indifference among the units with regard to union.
Pakistan and the West Indies respectively provide examples 
of the two types.
B3 Prior existence of the political units as 
a independent units or,
b regionally autonomous provinces of a broader political 
system or empire. It is, however, important that 
this autonomy is based on either 
(i) a popular (even if restricted) democracy or, 
(ii) popularly recognized hereditary kingship etc. 
which in course of its long existence has 
helped to impart to the people a sense of 
regional cultural identity.
Examples of the first type were presented by the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and Switzerland, while Malaysia offered a 
weak example of the latter type.
B4 Absence of a common external threat to the survival of 
the units concerned. This becomes a critical factor in cases 
where the units involved have strong (and sometimes exclusive) 
regional identities born out of their ethnic, economic or 
physical circumstances. The West Indies provide a salient 
example.
B5 Presence of conflicting threats to the different units
involved. As Mill says, a federation must bind the units
"always to fight on the same side; and if they have such
feelings towards one another, or such diversity of feelings
towards their neighbours, that they would generally prefer
to fight on opposite sides, the federal tie is neither likely
to be of long duration, not [nor?] to be well observed while 
2 9it subsists".
B6 Existence of groups of units following contrasting and 
mutually incompatible social, economic and political philos­
ophies. Such was the division in the United States between 
the slave-owning and the so-called "free" states. Such 
was also the division between Southern Rhodesia and the two 
other units of the Central African Federation.
_
Mill, op. cit., footnote 27, p p . 366-67.
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SOME HYPOTHESES ON THE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM
I Now if all the various factors for unity enume rated
above in set "A" were present, there would be no need to
bother with federalism, for as Sir Ivor Jennings said, "nobody
30would have a federal constitution if he could avoid it".
Such a group of communities should, and most likely would, 
evolve as a unitary State.
II Conversely, if all the factors for separation enumerated 
above in set "B" were present, there can be no ground for 
union. The communities involved should, and in all probability 
would, organize as separate sovereign States forming at best 
some limited purpose alliances or associations.
III Only when some factors of set "A", and some of the set 
"B" are jointly present, would there be need for a federal 
union--that so-called halfway house between complete unity 
and complete separation.
To put it symbolically, if 
U = Unitary State,
N = No union,
F = Federal union,
Fc = Centralized federalism,
Fp = Peripheralized federalism,
A = Factors for unity,
B = Factors for separation, 
then
Al,2,3,4,5,6, . . . = U 
®1,2,3,4,5,6, . . . = N  
<A1 ,2,3,4,5,6 + <B1 ,2 , 3,4,5,6 = F
Now the different factors of the sets "A" and "B"
(i. e. , those for unity and separation) may be present in 
different combinations. Accordingly, therefore, the nature 
of the resultant federations would also differ. From the 
study of the federal experiments so far made, we are in a 
position to envisage some of these possible combinations 
and the nature of the resultant unions. On the basis of 
these we may, I think, frame certain tentative models of the
_
Sir Ivor Jennings, Some Characteristics of Indian Constit­
ution , Madras: Oxford University Press, 1953, p. 55.
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origin of federalism. Some of these possible models that 
I have been able to decipher are given below:
(1) If the first factor of the first set (i. e., the factor Aj_)
is found in combination with the first three factors of the 
second set (i. e., factors B ^^2 3 ) •  the situation is confederal.
A union consummated under such a condition would last only
as long as factor A^ (that is, external threat) is formidable 
and is so recognized by the parties concerned. Pakistan 
offers a good example of this type. Such a situation can, 
nevertheless, change into a federal one if the actual or 
presumed threat to the survival of the constituents remains 
in existence for a long period of time during which through 
wise statesmanship and planning the parties involved have 
succeeded in creating some kind of interdependent economies 
mutually beneficial to all the participants.
(2) If factors 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of set "A" are present in
combination with any one of the first group of set "B"
(i. e. , B ia , B lb or B lc) • a fairly centralized but quite 
articulatedtype of federation is likely to result. India 
offers a good example.
(3) If factors 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of set "A" (i. e., A j f3 4 5
and 6) are present along with an identical distribution of 
diversities in respect of the three elements (i. e., language,
religion and "race") in the first group of set "B" (that is, 
B l(a+b + c)) ' t i^e resultant union may still be a centralized 
federation but it is likely to have some very strong dualistic 
undertones. Canada is a good example. The raison d'etre
of such a federation would depend upon factors 1 and 3 
of the set "A", and if at any stage in its evolution either 
of these factors were to disappear, the sense of unity in 
the federation is likely to be adversely affected. If both 
these factors were to disappear together, the union would 
in all probability collapse.
(4) If factors 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of set "A" are present along 
with the factor 2 of the set "B", a federation may still be 
born but its existence will largely depend on the existence 
of the condition A ^ , i. e . , the factor of a common external 
threat to the collective security of the communities concerned. 
And if this factor of external threat is not present for a 
long enough time to have forced the constituent units of the 
federation to adjust themselves to the new situation to their
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mutual economic benefit (that is, if they have not succeeded 
in creating interdependent economies during the period that 
the external threat lasts), the end of this threat may mean 
the end of the federation as such» No historical example 
of this type is present, though the West Indian example 
reaches close to one. As will be remembered, the West Indian 
Federation was originally initiated by the indigenous leaders 
in order to achieve independence from British colonialism, 
but when it became clear that independence could be achieved 
even without the Federation, the federalistic enthusiasm 
began to wane. Similarly, it is not difficult to appreciate 
the force of possible external threat as a factor in the 
continued union of the two wings of Pakistan.
(5) If all or most of the factors of set "A" are present 
along with factor 3 of the set "B" (that is, if the units 
concerned have regional identities based simply on their prior 
existence as autonomous provinces or as units of an overall 
system--in other words, if the units do not have any 
significant ethnic or economic bases for their regional 
identities--the resultant union may well be a centralized 
federation with a good amount of federal articulation provided 
that after the inauguration of the federation political and 
military conditions in and around the State remain largely 
peaceful so that the units are not required to forgo their 
regional autonomy for the sake of national security. Granted 
peaceful conditions during which the units are left to mould 
their own individual personalities, regional identities, 
despite the absence of any very clear-cut identifying factors
of significance to the communities concerned, become rigidified; 
and the communities having acquired the habit of being masters 
of their own houses, are reluctant to subordinate themselves 
completely to the central government. West Germany offers 
a good example.
(6) If two or all of the elements of B ^ are present along 
with most of the factors in set "A" (except the factor A2) , 
and the patterns of diversities created by B ia, B lb' anc* B lc 
are overlapping in their regional distributions in relation 
to the constituent political units, the resultant union is 
likely to be a centralized federation. It will be so because 
this pattern of distribution of the conflicting diversities
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tends to divide each group against itself, since despite 
the antagonism that a group as a whole may harbour against 
a group of another type, neither group is able to overplay its 
hand against the other because it finds a section of the 
people of its own group having strong sympathies with certain 
sections in the opposite group. As explained in the pre­
ceding chapters, this pattern of geographical distribution 
of diversities by its very nature forces the communities 
concerned to compromise and thus to learn to live and let 
live. Switzerland offers the best example.
(7) Presence of factor B 5 in whatever combination of factors 
in the sets "A" and "B" will not produce a stable union: 
that is, if the units involved recognize conflicting threats 
to their safety and security, no durable union is likely to 
emerge whatever other factors might be present. The Central 
African Federation provides a clear example.
(8) The sixth factor in set "B" (i. e., the existence of
groups of units following contrasting and mutually incompatible 
social, economic and political philosophies), in whatever 
combination of factors in set "A", creates an essentially 
confederal situation. A federation created under these 
conditions can last only as long as the constituents think 
that they derive greater economic and other dividends within 
than without the union. The factor Bg will in the long run 
either break the union or would itself have to be broken
(by coercion) in order that the union should be maintained.
The United States of the Civil War days would prove the point.
To summarize the points stated above, 
if U = Unitary State,
N = No union,
F = Federal Union,
Fc = Centralized federalism,
Fp = Peripheralized federalism,
A = the factors for unity,
B = the factors for separation,
then the general proposition is
Al, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, . . . ” Ö 
B l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, . . .  = N ' and
<Ai 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6
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Based on various combinations of factors in sets "A" 
and "B", the following laws on the origin of federalism may 
be deduced:
(1) A.i + B i f 2 , 3 . s . = FP
(2) Al, 3 , 4, 5 , 6 + B la/lb/lc = Fc
(3) A l, 3, 4, 5, 6 + B 1 (a+b+c) = FcP e °' a centralized
federalism with strong 
dualistic undertones)
(4)
(5)
A l, 2, 4, 5, 
A2, 3, 4, 5,
6 + B 2 = Fp,
but A2 , 4, 5, 6 + B 2 = N 
6 + B 3 = Fc,
but A l, 2 , 3, 4, 5,
(6) A l, 3, 4, 5 , 6 + B la + B lb/lc - Fc
(7) A l, 2, 3, 4 , 5 , 6 + B 5 • « • = N
(8) A 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 + Bö • * . = Fp > N4 ; ( 2.) Cr-*r*L f 0  tk.\r l! C-* '-w*- •A FINAL POINT
6 + B 3 Fc --> U
A scrutiny of the above arguments on the origins of 
federalism would show that in all the combinations of the 
factors for unity and separation that we have envisaged, 
wherever a centralized federalism is likely to emerge one 
of the first three factors in set "B" has always been present. 
That is, we find that in order that a centralized union is 
federal rather than unitary, it is necessary that the political 
units involved have some regionally-grouped diversity as their 
raison d'etre for regional autonomy. These regionally- 
grouped diversities may result either from regional differences 
in the ethnic composition of the communities concerned, or 
from the existence of independent economies in the units 
involved, or it may result simply from the prior existence 
of the units as separate or autonomous organic political 
entities. Though the nature of the resultant union would 
vary depending upon which of these regionally-grouped 
diversities is the basis of the regional identities, the 
critical factor to remember is that only when the communities 
that are uniting together have separate regional identities, 
based on some regionally grouped diversities, would the 
resultant union, under normal conditions, be a federal as 
contrasted to a unitary polity. Indeed, federalism would 
often become nothing if it is required mainly to cope with 
diversities lacking inclusive territorial bases.. In contrast
34 9
to a unitary union, a federal union requires that the 
com munities involved, should besides recognizing a common 
national boundary (political, cultural and other) around them 
all, should also recognize definite cultural, economic or some 
other bo undaries along the lines that separate them from one 
another, although the regional political boun daries need not 
strictly coincide with the regional dist ribution of cultural, 
ethnic or other diversities within the State (see Ch a p t e r  I, 
section I I ) . Thus not only diversity, but r e g i o n a l l y - g r o u p e d  
di ve rs it y within unity is the essence of a c entralized  
federalism. But it must be remembered that in fede ralism 
the sentiments for overall unity should have an edge over 
those for regional separation.
Though sometimes fede ralism imposed over a p o t e n t i a l l y  
non fe de ra l base may survive as a functioning federation, a 
comp ara tive view of the West German and Latin American f e d e r ­
ations would, however, show that in contrast to federations 
whic h are created on a truly federal base (i. e., on a base
where regional identities are strong) it is necessary that 
the federations of this latter type should in their initial 
phase remain free from any external threats that might require 
o v e r - e x t e n s i o n  of central powers which might easily squeeze 
the co nst ituents into complete unity (in view of their overall 
mutual compatibility).
Part 2
WHAT MAINTAINS FEDERALISM?; SOME GENERAL P R O P O S I T I O N S
No less important than the study of the c i rcumstances  
that favour the rise of federalism, is to answer the question 
"What ma intains federalism?". As our study of f e d e r a l i s m  in 
the past would show, federal experiments have perhaps more 
often failed than survived. Among general inquiries on the 
subject, the more notable ones are those by Riker, Sawer, 
McWhinney, and May, besides some significant o bservations 
by Mill in his classic Representative g o v e r n m e n t .31 A recent
Riker, op. c i t . , footnote 8; G. F. Sawer, Modern F e d e r a l i s m , 
London: C. A, Watts & Co., 1969; Edward McWhinney, Federal
C o n s t i t u t i o n - M a k i n g  for a Multinational W o r l d , Leyden:
A. W. Sijthoff, 1966; R. J. May, " D e c i s i on-making and S t a b ­
ility in Federal Systems", Canadian Journal of Political 
Science , V o l . 3, 1970 , pp , 7 3-87 ; Mill, op. cit., footnote 27.
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book, rather than addressing itself to the problem of stability
32or instability, tries to explain Why Federations Fail? It
is also relevant to this study., But the findings of most
of these attempts are vitiated by the fact that their authors
have insisted on purely political factors, such as the party 
33system, or fiscal questions arising out of disparate size
34of the constituent units of the State, or on certain
questions of general social and cultural values held by a
3 5particular society, Sawer and McWhinney, however, take
a more general view, though both the authors (primarily con­
stitutional 1awyers) are presenting a general survey of 
modern federalism rather than addressing themselves to the 
specific question "What maintains federalism?".
In the analysis that follows I attempt to summarize and 
correlate my conclusions on the factors for the success or 
otherwise of the federations studied in the preceding chapters, 
(1) Our study of the various federations —  Switzerland, United 
States, Canada, India, Malaysia, etc,— has shown that one 
of the fundamental factors in federal stability is that the 
regional identities on which the constituent units of a 
federation are based should not be completely mutually exclus­
ive even though they may largely be conflicting«, When 
boundary lines of the regionally-identifying diversities in 
a federal State highly overlap, the cleavages have a tendency 
to be transformed into linkages and the result is a stable 
federal partnership. The point is most clearly brought out 
by the example of Switzerland where the boundaries of language 
and religion are highly overlapping. The overlapping bound­
aries of language and religion in Switzerland have weakened 
both language and religion as divisive forces, for each 
linguistic group contains representatives of both faiths, and 
of course vice versa. Hence, although the Catholics may
32
Thomas Franck (Ed.), Why Federations Fail?: An Inquiry
into the Requisites for Successful Federalism, New York:
New York University Press, 1968.
33
Riker, op. cit., footnote 8,
34
May, op. cit., footnote 31.
35
Franck, op. cit., footnote 32.
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harbour a distaste for the Protestants (or vice versa), they 
cannot discriminate or fight against them because each (the 
Catholic as well as the Protestant bloc) is divided within 
itself since a sizable number of its own group has a close 
affinity with a sizable section on the opposing side owing 
to the ties of a common language of communication despite 
the differences in faith. Thus neither side has been able 
to fortify its camp without risking a fair segment of its 
group in the opposite camp. Thus neither language nor religion 
has been able to overplay its hand and the fissiparous tenden­
cies have cancelled out»
When we compare Switzerland with Canada, the moral is 
easily drawn. Because both the French language and the Roman 
Catholic faith have been very highly identifiable with the 
province of Quebec in Canada, here the religious and linguistic 
division, in contrast to the situation in Switzerland, has 
been plaguing the federal partnership. The point is obvious 
in the case of India also, where ever since the creation of 
linguistic states in the nineteen fifties, fissiparous 
tendencies have raised their ugly heads. As I have explained 
in my chapter on the United States, the point is amply clear 
when we closely analyze the American partnership in the first 
sixty years of the nineteenth century.
It may need clarification that the federal situation 
that we are discussing here is clearly distinguished from a 
functional situation where the identities or conflicts within 
the society permeate the entire nation rather than having 
distinct territorial bases. In our examples regional diver­
sities are territorially arranged, and each component unit 
of the State possesses some clearly identifiable personality, 
though despite their clear regional interests their overall 
interests are not mutually exclusive because their internal 
political boundaries do not completely coincide with the 
linguistic, religious or economic divisions within the 
nation.
(2) Many students of federalism (the American, Canadian 
and Australian) have paid attention to the role of the 
structure of the party system in the maintenance of central­
ization or peripheralization of federalism. Some of the best 
known studies on this topic are those by Truman, and Grodzins
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on the United States; Wildavsky on Australia and a more
3 6)recent essay by Muller on Canada. All these studies have
focused attention on the role of the party system in the
operation of the State as a federal system. William Riker,
evidently drawing from these studies, has asserted (what
was only implicit in the previous studies) that
The federal relationship is centralized according to the 
degree to which the parties organized to operate the 
central government control the parties organized to 
operate the constituent governments. This amounts to 
the assertion that the proximate cause of variations 
in the degree of centralization (or peripheralization) 
in the constitutional structure of a federalism is the
variation in degree of party centralization.^7
Whatever the general social conditions, if any, that 
sustain the federal bargain, there is one institutional 
condition that controls the nature of the bargain . . .
This is the structure of the party system, which may 
be regarded as the main variable intervening between 
the background social conditions and the specific nature 
of the federal bargain.38 [Emphasis added.]
This line of approach to the problem, which seems currently 
to have become quite popular, clearly appears to have con­
fused the effect with the cause. Political parties or interest 
groups arise in response to certain inherent social or other 
conditions of a given area, they cannot by themselves be the 
structural features of any political system. The extent to 
which the party ruling at the centre would be in a position 
to control the governments in the regions would depend upon 
the nature of the geographical distribution of economic, 
social or cultural elements which are relevant in the national 
political life. If such elements have a somewhat exclusive 
regional distribution, the chances are slight that under 
peaceful conditions, the party ruling at the centre would be
Especially relevant are the following essays: D. B. Truman,
"Federalism and Party System"; Morton Grodzins , "American 
Political Parties and the American System"; Steven Muller, 
"Federalism and Party System in Canada"; and A. Wildavsky, 
"Party Discipline Under Federalism: Implications of the
Australian Experience". Though originally published in 
different places (except the article by Steven Muller), 
these different essays are reprinted together in Aaron 
Wildavsky (Ed.), American Federalism in Perspective, op. 
cit. , footnote 17.
37
Rike r , op. cit., footnote 8 , p. 130 .
38
Riker, op. cit. , footnote 8, p. 136 .
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in a position to control all or even most of the regional
governments as well. But if the regional distribution of
diversities on which the federal partnership is based is not
exclusive, or the nation as a whole has developed a strong nat-
ionally-conscious division of classes, the chances are greater
that political parties would be few in number, and that the
party in control at the centre is most likely in control of
a number of regional governments as welle Such a situation
prevails in Australia where the "Australian Labor Party . . .
in a sense c . . became a national party even before Australia
39was a nation".
The point was equally clear with reference to the Indian 
National Congress during its first flush of power under the 
leadership of the late Jawaharlal Nehru. The reasons were 
twofold: first, it was the party that had, in a sense,
given birth to the new political nation; and secondly, it 
took some time for the new state units organized on a 
linguistic basis to ossify as linguistic homelands of some 
sort. This ossification has now become somewhat apparent 
with the rise of linguistic patriotism, evident in the adoption 
of regional languages as the media of highest education, 
and with the field of enterprise for the common man becoming 
limited to his own linguistic homeland (i. e., the state 
in case of states other than those that have a language 
common with some other state, as the states in the Hindi 
belt). Hence regional political parties like the DMK party 
in Tamil Nadu (Madras), or the Siromani Akali Dal in Punjab, 
have come into power in some states. The number of such 
parties is likely to increase over time as the increasing 
popularity of regional Senas (militant political organizations), 
the most forceful of which is the Siva Sena in Maharashtra, 
would show. Such a situation would not be easily conceivable 
in Australia, o-jc— nnj-i-p^  states outaide Llie ' d e e p  SouL^
■w h o  r -e  i m  fc-hc. a y p n t  n  f a f  ivt- . .m i  m e y i ^  a 1 c n p f l - r j L ^ . i  f y  q _£ t h e _ ^
Ityegiu population— fc-h-e— aituaLiirn— — nrvhat g j pill ar ■ to- that o f .
e b trt— m ü U b "  Engll-a-h— apeakin-g— Gan add 'iirirgli' L— well— a-juse.— •
Thus the essential fact in federal stability is not the
L . Overacker, The Australian Party System, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1952, p , 30.
39~ "
354
political party organization but the nature of the federal 
situation which gives rise to such a political interest. If 
the social, economic and other cleavages cut across regional 
political boundaries, as in Australia and to a lesser extent 
in the United States, then the political organization is 
likely to be centralized. But if the cleavages in national 
life are somewhat watertight as in Quebec versus Canada, 
the result is likely to be just the reverse.
(3) Relevant in this context is our supplementary hypothesis 
to the one noted above. The hypothesis is that in multi­
ethnic or otherwise heterogeneous federations with regionally- 
grouped diversities, other things being favourable, the 
greater the factors of "felt" diversities in the national 
life, the greater are the chances of a stable federalism,
for under such a condition chances are great that the resultant 
spatial pattern of these diversities would not coincide, and 
that their overlapping boundaries would neutralize the 
fissiparous tendencies.
The point, we have noted, is well demonstrated by the 
example of India where despite a large number of apparent 
diversities, language has come to be recognized as the only 
cleavage-forming factor in the national life at the level 
of the common man. As internal political boundaries have 
now coincided with the linguistic ones, the cleavage lines 
between states have hardened, and language has begun to play 
divisive mischief. Granted the sense of general overall 
national unity and the recognition of strong State-idea 
unique to the nation itself, the chances for a more stable 
federal partnership would have increased if the country
had possessed some cleavages other than those of language.
40For instance, if, as some wrongly believe, the universal
system of caste among the Hindus had run across the nation 
uniting all those of similar caste together, rather than the 
caste ties being largely limited by linguistic boundaries, 
as in fact is the case, the divisive influence of language 
would have been very greatly neutralized.
(4) Our next general proposition is that in multi-ethnic 
__ ~
R . L o Watts, New Federations; Experiments in the Common-
we alth, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966, p = 55 =
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or otherwise highly heterogeneous federations with strong 
regional identities, a continued external threat to the 
collective security of the nation is a very favourable factor 
in the maintenance of the State as a centralized federation, 
for if external threat continues for a long enough time, the 
parties to the federal union, despite their sometimes mutually 
exclusive identities, are compelled to adjust their differences 
and learn to live together as a close-knit family» This 
factor squeezed the discordant cantons of Switzerland into 
unity; the French Spanish, and the British threats kept the 
otherwise discordant Thirteen Colonies together; the militant 
United States of the Civil War days forced the two quarrelling 
partners in "Canada" and the indifferent Maritime Provinces 
to join in order to create a united force against the 
seemingly encroaching Republic from the south. As already 
noted, the point is well explained when we compare the 
continued unity of Pakistan with the so rapid collapse of 
the West Indies federation. It was primarily the fear of 
Hindu-dominated India that had united the two "wings" of 
Pakistan, and many within and without the country think that 
it is the same factor that largely kept them together, though 
prominent East Pakistani leaders have frequently voiced the 
opinion that the bond of a common religion (or a common dis­
taste for another religion or group of people) may not keep
4 1them together for long, especially since the political
4 2cultures of the two wings are so different, and the economic
4 3dividends are considered highly inadequate.
Conversely, opportunities for expansion may also foster 
federal sentiment by offering common rewards, as with the 
U. S. A. vis-a-vis Mexico in the nineteenth century.
It has also been demonstrated that in areas removed 
from active political frontiers, sentiment for union is usually
41
A reported statement by the East Pakistani Finance Minister. 
Reported in Morning News , July 1, 1965; cited in K. B.
Sayeed, Political System of Pakistan, Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1967, p. 188.
42
Sayeed, op. cit., footnote 41, p. 188.
43
The point is well taken by Sayeed, op. cit., footnote 41, 
pp. 185-211. See also A. Tayyeb, Pakistan: A Political
Geography, London: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 181.
See appendix to chapter IX.
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relatively weak compared to such sentiments in the areas
bordering on active international frontiers. Julius Pratt
has shown this with reference to the United States of the 
4 41812 War days. The point is equally clear in relation 
to India. There is a comparative indifference to the border 
problems with Pakistan (which do not seem to threaten the 
security of the nation as a whole, in view of Pakistan's 
relatively small military power) in the southern states of 
the Indian Union, though when the nation was faced with the 
Chinese assault from across the Himalayas, the entire nation 
was alert to the danger. The passing of the Indonesian 
expansionist threat after the overthrow of President Sukarno, 
may be part of the explanation for the failure of the "racial" 
partnership in Malaysia, though in Malaysia the spatial pattern 
of federal diversities largely rules out the question of 
disruption of the united nation as such. The quarrel in 
Malaysia is for a better deal: it does not question the
unity of the Federation.
It may, however, be relevant to note in this context 
that contrary to the situation in federations where regional 
identities are quite strong, in countries where federation 
has been imposed over a largely nonfederal base (as in the 
Latin American countries or the post-1945 West Germany) it 
is the lack of external military threats that favours the 
continuance of the State as a functioning federalism rather 
than its transformation into a unitary organization. This 
is so because a federal political system once in motion 
tends to create vested interests and regional identities 
where none might have existed before. In order that these 
vested regional interests around the regional governments 
are able to take a deep root in the popular consciousness, 
it is necessary that the regional governments are left 
to manage their affairs uninterfered from outside for a long 
enough time during which the people of the regions concerned 
catch the habit of being masters of their own regional 
affairs and begin to resist central interference in matters 
that are purely regional. As already shown, a comparison
44~" —
Jo Wo Pratt, Expansionists of 1812, Gloucester, Mass.:
Peter Smith, first published 1925 , reissued 1957, pp. 126-127.
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between the West German and Latin American examples proves 
the point,
(5) When we proceed from the negative examples of federations
that have failed we are drawn to the conclusion that in most
cases of failure of federalism (e -> g« , Indonesia, the Central
African Federation, the West Indies, Pakistan, and Nigeria
before the Civil War) one common factor in the breaking or
straining of the federal tie was the presence of one unit
numerically so large as to be capable of vying in strength
with many or all of the others combined» Java was such a
unit in the Indonesian Federation, Southern Rhodesia in
the Central African, Jamaica in the West Indian, East Bengal
in the Pakistani, and the Northern Region in the Nigerian
Federation before the Civil War. In fact, as Mill pointed
out long ago, for the stability of a federal experiment it
is necessary that "there should not be one State so much
more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in
strength with many [or all] of them combined» If there be
such a one and only one, it will insist on being the master
45of the joint deliberations . . and thereby vitiate
the federal partnership by turning the other components into 
its dependencies*
The examples of East Pakistan and Jamaica, however, show 
that numerical preponderance in population is not always a 
guarantee that the largest unit would predominate in the 
federal partnership» The overall locational advantages have 
much to contribute in deciding whether the largest unit 
would or would not become the dominant partner« And this 
would also largely decide whether the numerically dominant 
partner would or would not stay in the union, for if for no 
other reason, because of its numerical preponderance the 
numerically dominant unit is in a position to make its 
secession accepted*
R „ J« May has tried to elaborate upon the effect of 
disparity in the size of the constituent units of a federation 
in the state-centre fiscal relationship and the relationship 
between the states« From his analysis May concludes that
Mill, op. cit«, footnote 27, pp. 366-67.
45
3 5 8
The outcome of federation is determined by a number of 
factors o 0 » [But] Two factors which exercise an
important and fairly systematic influence on the outcome 
are the relative size and wealth of units The evidence 
suggests t h a t , in general, when large, rich units are 
ranged against small, poor units there is some chance 
of federation being preserved, but the likely outcome 
is centralization with large unit dominance; in the 
extreme case federalism may yield to a unitary state.
When small rich units are ranged against large poor units, 
on the other hand, there is strong tendency for the 
small unit to s e c e d e , ^
(6) Mill's other dictum, already quoted in the first section
of this chapter, may be relevant in this context also. As
Mill says, a federation binds its constituents "always to
fight on the same side; and if they have such feelings
towards one another, or such diversity of feelings towards
their neighbours, that they would generally fight on the
opposite sides, the federal tie is neither likely to be of
long duration, not [nor?] to be well observed while it sub- 
4 7sists" . The Central African Federation, the United States
of the Civil War days, and Nigeria before the Civil War 
would prove the point,
(7) Another point about stability of federalism, that has
48been emphasized by scholars like McWhinney, Watts and Sawer , 
is that there should be a sufficient number of federating 
units (Sawer thinks, probably at least five) to prevent con­
tinuous face to face conflict of one or two potential rival 
units. The point is best explained by the example of Nigeria 
before the Civil War, where the federal structure "with 
a three way only, territorial dispersal of political authority, 
permit[ted] or indeed encourage[d] two regions to combine
and pit themselves against the third region in the struggle
4 9for the fruits of power," As already shown, this strain
on the federal relationship was further aggravated because 
of the numerical preponderance of one of the units--a situation
46
May, op. c i t . , footnote 31, p p . 86-87.
47
Mill, op. cit., footnote 27, p p . 367-68.
48
McWhinney, op. cit», footnote 31, p, 47; Watts, op. cit., 
footnote 40, pp. 154-155; Sawer, op. cit., footnote 31, 
p. 132.
49
McWhinney, op. cit,, footnote 31, p. 47.
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which assured permanent membership of the political power 
bloc to the largest partner, i. e . , the North. We have 
already reviewed the game of musical chairs born out of this 
territorial pattern which by leaving the odd unit out of 
power at each turn brought the Federation to a breaking point.
Where there are only two units in a federation, or only 
two clearly defined groups of units, there is likely to be 
a kind of permanent tug of war between the units or the 
groups concerned. This situation is bound to put great 
strain on the federation concerned, and if the units or 
groups were to develop mutually incompatible regional ident­
ities, the federation would most likely break. The point 
is amply proved by the United States during the Civil War 
days, and by the example of the uneasy partnership between 
the two wings of Pakistan (here, however, the units concerned 
are by no means mutually incompatible, though they have very 
limited common interests and do not derive many mutual 
economic advantages from the union).
(8) We now ask ourselves if, as was formerly believed, 
federalism is essentially a temporary wayside station to be 
pulled down in the course of a nation's journey towards a 
fully unitary State-structure. Such a view is, however, 
no longer in vogue though at times one comes across scholars 
who still seem to believe in it. Though federalism is, in 
some senses truly a halfway house towards unity and integration 
in a world where large-scale nationwide planning has become 
largely necessary, federalism is not, in our opinion, just 
a stage towards unitary polity. This is because once a 
federation is established, it tends to rigidify existing 
regional identities by giving them continued opportunity 
for articulation. In fact
If a federal system is once established, and if human 
good will and ingenuity are sufficient to keep it going 
for a certain period of time--ten years?--then the 
relative importance for federal stability of the 
various factors for initial federation may change 
materially. Incidental benefits may loom larger . . .
[and] The very fact of working a federal system may 
bring into existence "favourable" factors which were 
initially lacking.50
50
Sawer, op. cit., footnote 31, pp. 133-34.
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As Sawer further writes,
one enduring factor tending to preserve Region autonomy 
is the self-interest and momentum which a Region 
governmental apparatus . „ « acquires merely from its
existence. So long as the people with this vested 
interest are reasonably competent, and serve obviously 
useful functions, , . . Conservatism, o , . will be
sufficient [to maintain the status quo] , ^
even in countries where there are no very clear-cut regional
interests to preserve. As various writers have noted,
5 2countries with the so-called "structural" federalism such 
as Australia and West Germany, prove the point.
Finally, as explained in the introduction to this study, 
federalism is essentially a democratic process —  it is a 
democratic union of consenting partners. In order that it 
should continue as a union of largely consenting partners 
where the constituent regions have proper articulation of 
their needs and problems, it is necessary that the country 
concerned remains under a democratic system of government 
with a multiparty political system. Indeed a functioning 
federalism cannot exist without a guaranteed multiparty 
democracy.
51
Sawer, op. cit., footnote 31, p, 135.
52
Wildavsky, op. cit., footnote 36, p. 178; L. Mayer 
("Federalism and Party Behavior in Australia and Canada", 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 23, 1970, p p . 795-807)
calls it "formalistic", the other type being called 
"congruent".
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Appendix
FEDERAL CAPITALS AND TERRITORIES
AS FACTORS IN FEDERAL STABILITY
1. FEDERAL CAPITALS
As political nerve-centres of States national capitals 
are of great importance in political geography. The choice 
of capitals is particularly important in federal States for 
national capitals have sometimes played crucial roles in 
the success or otherwise of federal organizations per se.
But despite the fact that federalism has generally been 
considered as the most geographically expressive of all forms 
of government, little attention has so far been given to the 
study of federal capitals as a class: all that exists are
some stray observations in general studies such as the one 
by Spate.1 The reason may well be that the study of capitals 
is a "topic that has been well developed in European studies 
in political geography" while "American geographers on the 
other hand, have largely neglected capitals".  ^ This has 
meant a neglect of the study of federal capitals, for 
federal capitals are a feature more characteristic of Americas 
than of Europe.
Although our main objective in this study is to 
concentrate on the role of national capitals in the stability 
of federalism, in order to appreciate the problem fully we 
must clear certain misconceptions that may be held with 
regard to their nature. If capitals were to be classified 
into "natural" and "artificial"--a classification that Spate 
has shown to have been i11-conceived--then federal capitals 
all the world over would mostly rank in the latter category. 
Federal capitals are artificial in the sense that they often 
are not the "primate" cities1 23 4 of their countries, and have 
often not developed from some original nuclei of the State- 
area, The reason why federal capitals are usually new 
creations rather than centres established on some old nuclei, 
is that, as opposed to most unitary State-structures,, a 
federal structure often means almost a new evolution— the 
creation of a new polity in place of an old one, and, in 
some senses, joining together of parts that formerly regarded 
themselves as more or less disjointed. But this would 
hardly justify to call them "artificial". In fact, the 
distinction between "artificial" and "natural" capitals 
"completely begs the question" .4
1
0. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital 
Cities", Geographical Review, Vol. 32, 1942, p p . 622-631.
2
R. Hartshorne, "Political Geography", in P. E. James and 
C. F. Jones (Eds.), American Geography: Inventory and
Prospect, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1954, p. 215,
3
M . Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City", Geographical 
Review, Vol, 29 , 1930 , p p . 226-232.
4
Spate, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 622.
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CAPITALS IN CLASSICAL FEDERATIONS:
ESSENTIALLY "NEW" AND "NEUTRAL"
In federal States of the older type, as exemplified by 
the United States, Canada, and Australia--where the new 
State-structure did not evolve from a somewhat integrated 
unitary organization, the capital of the new nation had of 
necessity to be built afresh. This was because the federal 
government was created partly (at least) to serve as an 
arbiter between the constituent units of the State. The 
arbiter could not possibly be expected to be impartial if 
it were to be housed and fed by one of the interested parties 
—  i . e . , one of the constituent states of the federation.
For this reason federal capitals had often to be located on 
neutral ground.
The United States, which "invented" the modern central­
ized federalism, also showed the way in this respect. As 
Whittlesey points out, the United States capital, Washington, 
is "almost between the southern and northern boundaries of 
original States and only 50 miles from the Mason and Dixon 
Line, boundary between slave soil and free".5 6 Washington's 
site was, therefore, in most respects neutral and central, 
and, therefore, best suited to serve as the seat of the 
central arbiter--the federal government. This principle 
is equally clear in relation to Canada, where Ottawa 
was chosen to avoid ill feeling which would in all probability 
have resulted had any of the four capitals of the constituent 
units been selected. The city marks "the end of French- 
speaking territory within Ontario as well as Quebec, and is 
divided into two almost equal linguistic sections. There­
fore it is as nearly neutral ground as can be found".6 
Similarly Canberra was selected on neutral ground between 
Sydney and Melbourne, the two leading partners in the federal 
bargain of 1900.
Berne, which was selected as the capital of the Swiss 
Confederation in 1848, is not located on a new and neutral 
ground in the sense that federal capitals in the three largely 
Anglo-Saxon federations are, though the principle of federal 
compromise between the main linguistic and religious 
components of the State is quite obvious in its choice as 
the seat of the central government. As a compromise location 
between Protestants and Catholics on the one hand, and the 
German- and French-speaking groups on the other, Berne and 
Fribourg were the two best choices--each bordering on the 
other, and representing respectively the Protestant-German 
and French-Catholic alignment (though as we have seen, in 
Switzerland the boundaries of language and religion do not 
coincide). In 1848 religion was the main identifying 
cleavage in the country, and since the Catholic group had 
just been defeated in the Sonderbund War, the decision on 
the part of the ascendant Protestant-German bloc to locate
5
D . Whittlesey, The Earth and the State, New York: Henry
Holt & Co., 1951, p. 555.
6
Whittlesey, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 555.
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the national capital on its western borders rather than in 
its geographical heart, was a sufficient concession for 
comp ro mis e ,
In this sense then, in each of the classical federations 
the national capital was located largely on a "neutral" or 
compromise site, though, unlike others, Berne was not a "new" 
capital.
NEW AND NEUTRAL CAPITALS NOT NEEDED 
IN EVERY TYPE OF FEDERATION
A significant point that has often been missed is that 
only in those States where the federal structure is more or 
less a new creation, rather than some kind of recasting of 
a somewhat unitary structure, does the need for new and 
neutral capitals arise. In the formerly more or less 
integrated unitary organizations, as most of the post-1945 
federations in Asia and Africa were, the former colonial 
capitals have often continued to serve as the seats of the 
respective new governments, irrespective of the fact whether 
they are sited on neutral ground or not. This was also 
the case in the Latin American federations where most of 
the former colonial capitals (and the principal cities of 
the respective areas), continued to serve as the capitals 
of the new federal States, though after being designated 
as federal capitals these cities were shorn of much of their 
tributary areas directly under their control by carving out 
federal capital territories around them.
Latin American Capitals
In the absence of a long tradition of regional autonomy 
(which was so characteristic of the British colonies in 
America), conditions conducive to a long-drawn federal 
negotiation which would necessitate a compromise capital 
did not exist in Latin America in general. Grant of local 
autonomy in certain spheres was enough to satisfy a people 
who had seldom, if ever, tasted it. For this reason the 
former colonial capitals continued to serve as the seats 
of the respective new governments.
Mexico City, the earliest capital of conquest in America, 
remains "a neat example of an outmoded defence point main­
taining its political leadership in face of a radically 
changing economic world, supported by vested interests and 
location near the geopolitical centre of gravity".”7 
Similarly, Venezuela, after its independence from Colombia, 
converted its provincial capital Caracas to the capital of 
its newly formed federation. The case of Buenos Aires is 
too clear to need emphasis. Its predominance in Argentinian 
affairs was seldom in doubt and continues to remain so.
But all this did not prevent its selection as the seat of 
the national government in favour of some neutral site at 
the time the country declared itself a federation.
In the like manner Rio de Janeiro was chosen as the
7
Whittlesey, op. cit. footnote 6, p. 463.
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capital of Brazil in 1726 when its importance was greatly 
increased because of the exploitation of gold in the high­
lands north of the town, though its choice as the national 
capital had been fortunate in that it could be looked upon 
as a compromise location between "the waxing upland South 
and the waning, coastal north-east". "Rio probably comes 
nearer than any other place could to representing the 
diversity of interests that make up Brazil".® It was one 
of the reasons why the city was retained as the capital 
when the country declared independence in 1822. When a 
federal Constitution was adopted in 1891, the city continued 
as the seat of the federal government though a provision 
was made in the Constitution that the capital would be 
removed from Rio and established at a place near the 
geographical centre of the country.9 But the city continued 
as the capital of the country for over seventy years after 
the adoption of the federal Constitution despite some 
rivalry between the capital and s"£o Paulo--the industrial 
giant of Brazil; and the jealousy in the heart of the rest 
of Brazil against the two leaders.
The example of Brasilia cannot be taken as an evidence 
of federal compromise of the type witnessed in the classical 
federations discussed above. Though pious hopes have been 
expressed that the new capital may provide the much needed 
"focus of national unity, that element of stability in the 
confusion of the nation's life",10 "The most often heard and 
perhaps the most persuasive single argument for the 
construction of Brasilia is that it would open up the vast, 
empty core of the nation. . . . Moreover, this no man's
land offers potential routes for overland connections among 
the peripheral cells of the existing s e t t l e m e n t s 11
Capitals in Post-1945 Federations
Among the post-1945 federations, most of which are 
colonial successor States, the question of new and neutral 
capitals has often not arisen because in most of these the 
colonial administration concerned had already established 
a seat of government from which the different regions now 
forming the constituent states of the respective federations 
were effectively governed. During the long period of 
colonial administration these centres had often become 
the focus of transport and communication lines in their 
countries. Under these conditions choice of a new capital 
would have meant the disruption of a settled pattern in the 
nation's economic and political life.
8
Whittlesey, op. cit., footnote 5, p, 479.
9
See P. E. James and S. Faissol, "The Problem of Brazil's 
Capital City", Geographical Review, V o h  46 , 1956 , p p . 301
317 .
10
D. Crease, "Progress in Brasilia", Architectural Review, 
Vol. 133, 1962, p. 257.
D. E. Snyder, "Alternate Perspectives on Brasilia", 
Economic Geography, Vol, 40, 1964, p p . 34-45. Reference
on p . 3 5.
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Neutral capitals were needed only in those post-1945 
federations where for one reason or another the federal 
structure that was being erected was essentially a new 
organization as in the West Indies or in Pakistan. The 
question could very well have arisen in the Central African 
Federation if the African population in the two Protectorates 
had possessed the vote. In the absence of franchise to 
the natives, the minority government under the overwhelming 
predominance of Southern Rhodesia made its regional capital 
Salisbury as the seat of the federal government as well.
In West Germany also the new federation meant almost a new 
creation, although regional identities in most of its 
component units were not strong. West Germany was not "all 
Germany"; and no traditional seat of government for all of 
Germany was left within the area. Such other centres as 
there were had already strong claims as capitals of the 
component units. Cologne was an exception, but perhaps 
accidental factors (e. g . , bomb damage) came into play.
Thus Bonn as the new capital was almost a neutral site.
Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaya and now of Malaysia, 
has been a large city only since the second War. It was 
selected as the capital of the newly amalgamated Federated 
and Unfederated Malay States in 1948. "The choice was made 
because Kuala Lumpur happened to be the existing local 
administrative center with a reasonable site which was most 
nearly central and accessible within the populated and 
economically developed area of Malaya, still essentially 
the west coast plain".!2 The town had previously been 
the head-quarters of the Federated Malay States. When 
Malaysia was created by joining the Borneo territories 
of Sabah and Sarawak (originally also Singapore) , no question 
of relocating the capital arose even though the city of 
Kuala Lumpur was so far removed from the new components of 
the Federation east of the Malayan mainland.
The same is true of Lagos which as the capital of Nigeria 
is a legacy from its colonial past. It has continued as the 
capital of the Federation even though ethnic character of 
the city is not much different from the traditional Yoruba- 
capital, Ibadan. As a result of its location on the margins 
of the Western region, and its peripheral location in 
relation to the overall area of the State, the capital tends 
to have a regional rather than a truly national colour 
around it .!2
In case of India, Calcutta, the original river-mouth 
seaport of maritime penetration, remained the capital until 
1911 when the seat of colonial administration was moved to 
Delhi (New Delhi). The move was "in part a conscious effort 
to harmonize the alien rule with the historic tradition", and
12
R. Murphey, "New Capitals of Asia", Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, Vol. 5, 1956-1957, p p . 216-243
Reference on p. 236.
See G. Hamdan, "Capitals of the New Africa", Economic 
Geography, Vol. 40, 1964, p. 245.
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in part a recognition that the port of penetration was no 
longer more important than the rest of the country. Lying 
in a narrow lowland passage where desert on the west, mountains 
on the north, and hills to the southwest give wav to the 
productive valley of the Ganga and to easy routes to the 
south, Delhi possessed some compelling advantages which no 
ruler aiming at a tight control over the subcontinent 
could fail to discern. It is therefore rightly said that 
"as a conveniently central administrative location it [i. e.,
Delhi] is India's natural capital", and "has persisted as 
the major control point of India since at least the tenth 
century A. D„, and was prominent for a millenium before that" «-^ 
No doubt, then, that Delhi has been considered as "the 
only capital in the world at once so old, so big, and so 
exclusively devoted to administration»^
/ $ /a -ywi’c 
/fi vi
New Delhi may sometimes be considered to have been 
selected as a neutral site between Calcutta, Bombay, and 
Madras, the three original control points of the British 
administration and penetration in India. But the decision 
to shift the capital from Calcutta to the central core of 
the country was an administrative expediency on the part of 
the imperial government rather than a compromise resulting 
from a federal bargain. (It may also be that for the self- 
conscious imperialism of the British Raj, there was an obvious 
attraction in a site so strongly identified with the whole 
tradition of Empire in India.) The city may, however, be 
viewed as a compromise location (though not a neutral 
location) between the ao-'-ca U a d — Aiyan t e rth , and the— B-r avidian 
re'Outhj though this compromise was not by design.
A parallel has sometimes been drawn between New Delhi 
and Canberra. It is, indeed, true that " . . .  both the lusty 
giant New Delhi and the lusty infant Canberra approximate in 
function", for both being capitals of functioning federal 
States have almost "an identical political geographical 
role".16 It need however be remembered that the two had 
highly different historical and geographical origins. While 
the site of Delhi is, in the now discredited old vocabulary 
well fitted for a "natural" capital, Canberra is, we have 
seen, a leading example of the so-called "artificial" and 
neutral capitals. Indeed, the two capitals though serving 
almost similar functions, were not the products of similar 
politico-geographical forces of federal bargain.
National capitals in most colonial areas are character­
ized by an excessively marginal location in relation to the 
overall area of the State concerned. This was an obvious 
result of their origin as colonial footholds. As colonial 
footholds they were central between the "hinterland" of the 
colony on the one hand, and the invisible metropolitan
14
Murphey, op. cit., footnote 12 , p. 225 .
15
Murphey, op. eit», footnote 12 , P • 229 .
16
0 o H. K. Spate, "Two Federal Capitals: New Delhi and
Canberra", Geographical Outlook, Vol. 1, 1956, pp. 1-8.
Reference on p. 8.
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"foreland", on the o t h e r . F o r  this reason they were best 
suited as colonial capitals. But in the post-independence 
era their peripheral location has proved a definite disadvant­
age especially in countries with large areas and relatively 
more underdeveloped transportation and communication since 
in these conditions it has often meant a weak grip of the 
capital over the outlying provinces, and has tended to give 
the capital a regional rather than a national outlook. For 
this reason some tendencies towards the shift of capitals 
from the former "windows" (mostly maritime) to the interior 
may be noted, both in federal as well as nonfederal States.
But such movements of capitals should be viewed for what they 
are--administrative conveniences and a return to old 
national traditions--rather than examples of any federal 
compromise. Shift of capitals from Petersburg to Moscow, 
or from Karachi to Islamabad, or a possible future shift 
from Rangoon to Mandalay,18 would all come under this 
category.
Among the more recent examples of federal experiments, 
only in Pakistan and the West Indies was the situation 
somewhat similar to those found in the United States, Canada, 
or Australia in the pre-federation days. In neither of these 
new States was there any previous tradition of an united 
and integrated administration of the areas that were now 
to form the new State. As the two end organs cut off from 
a body politic (British India), the two "wings" of Pakistan 
found themselves as near-strangers to each other. Because 
the two "wings" are removed from each other by over a 
thousand miles of alien territory, any neutral site for a 
federal capital that would satisfy both the wings could not 
be found. The capital was previously located at the port 
city of Karachi but was later shifted to the relatively minor 
inland town, Rawalpindi, close to which has been erected the 
new city of Islamabad, near the Indo-Pakistani frontier. 
Islamabad should, in this sense, be regarded as a "forward" 
rather than a neutral capital.19
CONCLUSION
Balancing role, not the Neutrality of Site is the 
Essential feature of Federal Capitals
The choice of a national capital was more crucial and 
complex in the Federation of the West Indies in view of the
17
"Forelands [as opposed to "hinterlands'] are the land areas 
which lie on the seaward side of a port, beyond maritime 
space, and with which the port is connected by ocean 
carriers". G. Weigend, "Some Elements in the Study of Port 
Geography", Geographical Review, Vol. 48, 1958, p. 195.
18
See 0. H. K. Spate, "Mandalay and Rangoon: The Old and the
New in Burma", Transactions and Papers, Institute of British 
Geographers, Publication No. 44, 1968, p p . 155-168.
Reference on p. 164.
The concept of "forward capitals" was first formulated by 
V. Cornish, The Great Capitals, London: Methuen & C o . , 1923.
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highly disparate size of the constituent units of the Feder­
ation, and the fragmented nature of its State-area, Though 
the causes for the failure of the Federation were complex, 
an unsuitable site of the federal capital was itself a 
contributing factor. The Federation, as it finally came into 
existence, had greatly reduced the weightage of Jamaica by 
means of its underrepresentation in the central legislature.
In view of this already effected neutralization of the size 
of Jamaica, it would have been better if the capital was 
sited somewhere within Jamaica* But as the capital was 
sited in Trinidad, the Jamaicans lost any emotional attach­
ment with the Federation whatsoever, and the people of the 
island eventually decided to secede.20
In this sense, it is not so much the neutrality of site 
as its essentially balancing role between the constituents 
of the federation that is the fact of primary importance in 
the character of a federal capital. Though in earlier 
("classical") examples of federalism this balance was often 
achieved by locating the federal capital on a new and neutral 
site, such neutral sites may, however, not always be available 
because of the nature of the units involved. The point was, 
long back, obvious from the example of Switzerland.
As the West Indian example amply proves, because of its 
essentially balancing role, the national capital in a federal 
State is almost literally like a key-stone (though not in 
the same sense that it is in a nonfederal complex State^l) 
wherever a federation proceeds to bind formerly largely dis­
jointed (or loosely joined) and/or discordant units. In all 
such examples the national capital should be so selected 
that it helps to balance the emotional attachment of the 
chief partners to the federation, Washington, Ottawa, and 
Canberra were able to do so, and so they have survived along 
with the structures that were built upon them. The West 
Indian capital failed to accomplish this (in the eyes of the 
Jamaicans at least) by tilting the balance disproportionately 
against Jamaica. The West Indian federal capital, therefore, 
rather than resolving the issues, only contributed to the 
collapse of the arch of the federation that was being erected 
over the West Indies.
2. FEDERAL TERRITORIES
By the term "federal territories" we mean the areas-- 
inhabited or otherwise--that for certain reasons are left 
under the direct control of the central government in a 
federal State. In the newer lands of vast open spaces, such 
territories are likely to consist of near-virgin areas 
awaiting exploitation and settlement. Such precisely was 
the nature of the frontier territories in the United States
20
An account of factors leading to the choice of the West 
Indian capital is contained in D, Lowenthal, "The West 
Indies Chooses a Capital", Geographical Review, Vol. 48,
1958, pp. 336-364,
See Spate, op. cit,, footnote 1, p. 631.
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and Canada, To a lesser extent, the same was also true of 
Australia- In the older lands forming new federations, as 
for example India, these territories may usually consist of 
smaller political units which either for reasons of their 
separate identity or backwardness were not considered fit 
to be merged with some neighbouring state of the federation, 
or for strategic reasons the central government and the 
constituent states agreed to let these areas remain under 
the direct supervision of the central government. In some 
cases federal territories may also consist of newly acquired 
areas which, being won by the blood and treasure of all the 
federal units, could not fairly be annexed to two or three 
of them. Federal capital territories are also included under 
this heading.
In the case of federations in newer lands with vast open 
spaces, the chief importance of federal territories is to 
keep in reserve, under the control of the central arbiter 
(the federal government), a great resource for the future in 
which the people of each constituent unit of the union can 
look forward to new areas for settlement and enterprise.
Such territories by their nature tend to strengthen the power 
and prestige of the central government. They help to win the 
loyalties of large sections of the peoples in the constituent 
states who are in search for new opportunities and better 
prospects. By helping to make the central government look 
like a great Santa Claus, the federal territories in such 
federations help to blunt the teeth of divisive particularism 
among the constituents in the federal relationship.
The point is amply clear from the example of the United 
States where the great Frontier in the West helped to keep 
the highly conflicting groups of states on either side of 
the Mason-Dixon Line together in the federation. As long 
as the Frontier remained open to the people both in the 
slave-soil and "free", the United States, despite all the 
differences between its two sections, continued to develop 
as a united nation. But when in the middle of the nineteenth 
century it appeared to one of the sections, i. e . , South, 
that the West was being closed to her for ever, the Union 
came almost on the verge of collapse.
As new states are carved out from the extensive territ­
ories under the control of a federal government, the process 
of centralization within the federation is further strength­
ened; first, because the new states that are so created 
depend for a good deal of their development on the central 
government, and secondly, because these areas usually lack 
any preexisting regional loyalties that sometimes vitiate 
the relationship between the original states. It may be 
significant to note that in the U= S. A. while both the New 
England group as well as the South at one time or another, 
harboured secessionist sentiments, the noncommitted West 
had always been for the Union. This point is also proved 
by the Canadian example. Australia, however, presented quite 
a different case. Here the area of the continent was complet­
ely shared between the states when the Federation was born 
in 1901. Apart from the Australian Capital Territory and 
Papua and New Guinea (and some unimportant islands), the only 
federal holding of the Commonwealth of Australia is the
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Northern Territory, taken over from South Australia in 1911 
simply because that state had not the resources to develop a 
huge and very difficult area, isolated by semi-desert from 
its own nucleus in the South. For these reasons the federal 
territories could have no significant effect in the mainten­
ance of the federal tie in Australia.
Among the Latin American federations, the extent of the 
federal territory was quite significant in Brazil. But first, 
because federal loyalties in the Brazilian states were not 
seriously at issue and the unificationist tendencies were 
widely prevalent, and secondly, because each of the original 
states had enough area and resources of its own to develop, 
the federal territories were not required to make any signif­
icant contribution to the maintenance of the federal ties.
The same had generally been true of the other Latin American 
federations.
The Latin American federations are, however, instructive 
in another sense. In each of these federations the federal 
territories, especially the Federal Capital Territory, has 
possessed considerable population and/or resources to make 
it possible to tower over some of the constituent states.
For instance, in Argentina the Federal Capital accounted in 
1961 for 14.82 percent of the total population while only 
one state (Buenos Aires) had a share larger than this (33.58 
percent), and the rest of the twenty-one constituent states 
accounted for the remaining just over half of the total 
national population. Similarly in Mexico while the federal 
Capital District accounted for 14.0 percent of the total 
population in 1960, none of the thirty constituent states 
had more than seven percent of the national share. The case 
is still more glaring in Venezuela where the Federal Capital 
Territory accounted in 1962, for 16.71 percent of the total 
national population while the share of the most populous state, 
Zulia, was only 12.23 percent of the national total. In 
Brazil though the former Federal Capital Territory around 
Rio (now the state of Guanabara) accounted for only 4.66 
of the total population, it had in 1964 accounted for a 
revenue of over twelve percent of the national total, a 
share higher than that of any state except the giant S^o Paulo 
which accounted for just under thirty percent. With such 
large shares of national populations directly under their 
control, the central governments are not likely to remain 
impartial arbiters which they are often required to be. While 
on the one hand, it helps to strengthen centralization of 
government in the countries concerned, on the other by making 
the central government as a partisan in federal matters, it 
tends to vitiate the federal partnership.23
In the not-so-new lands that have formed federations
The figures for population and revenue for the Latin American 
federations are taken from Harry Kantor, "Latin American 
Federalism: Aspiration and Futility", in V. Earle (Ed.)
Federalism: Infinite Variety,in Theory and Practice,
F. E. Peacock Publishers, Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock
Publishers, 1968, p p . 185-208.
3 7 1
^  p  6’t 'l  l^\j
a f t e r  1 9 4 5 ,  t h e  f e d e r a l  t e r r i t o r i e s  a r e  o f t e n  s e t t l e d  a r e a s  
r a t h e r  t h a n  s t o r e - h o u s e s  o f  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e ,  a s  t h e  
f e d e r a l  t e r r i t o r i e s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  C a n a d a  w e r e .
F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n  f e d e r a l  t e r r i t o r i e s  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  a b l e  t o  
p l a y  t h e  c e n t r a l i z i n g  r o l e  i n  t h e  ne w f e d e r a t i o n s  a s  t h e  v a s t  
f r o n t i e r s  o f  s e t t l e m e n t  i n  t h e  N o r t h  A m e r i c a  d i d .  H e r e  
f e d e r a l  t e r r i t o r i e s  c o u l d  h a v e  s o me  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n f l u e n c e  
on t h e  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  p o w e r  o n l y  i f  t h e s e  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  
l i k e  t h o s e  i n  t h e  t h r e e  Ja-a t A m e r i c a n  f e d e r a t i o n s ,  p o s s e s s e d  
a s i z a b l e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  p o p u l a t i o n  t h a t  c o u l d  ma ke  
i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e m  t o  t i l t  t h e  b a l a n c e  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t .
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